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ABSTRACT 
The question on why, when and how to impose tariff barriers to protect the domestic 
industry is far from settled.  Although different branches of the literature acknowledge 
that the existence of market failures is a potential reason to protect, the identification 
and measurement of externalities, for example, is a very difficult empirical task. Thus, 
theoretical and empirical literature does not offer a satisfactory policy guidance.  
However, it is not an assessment of potential market failures such as externalities that 
should guide policy. More can be said about the different channels through the link 
between tariff protection/trade liberalization and competitiveness operates.  To shed 
light on these channels we undertake a case study of the Brazilian automotive sector, 
following an inductive approach and relying on different sources of both qualitative and 
quantitative data. In this, we ask “Why is the Brazilian Automotive sector not yet 
competitive after 60 years of protection?”.  
The identified channels that could answer our research question can be divided into 
(i) actions and policies that affect the internal and external scale of domestic 
production; (ii) variables affecting competition and productivity; (iii) variables affecting 
the production and absorption of innovation; (iv) institutional aspects and the business 
environment faced by firms operating domestically.  
The results indicate that the structure of protection within the domestic value chain – 
namely the level of  protection  for intermediate goods, and the overall business 
environment, are two relevant aspects potentially affecting the long-term 
competitiveness of industrial sectors, and that these should be better taken into 
account in policymaking.    
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 OBJECTIVES, MOTIVATION, AND WHERE THE THESIS 
FITS INTO THE LITERATURE 
 
 
What are the implications of trade liberalization for industrial growth and development? 
Alternatively, how does protection against foreign competition affects the path of 
economic development? Although these broad questions have been asked for 
decades, answers are still incomplete and very dependent on a vast number of 
assumptions and case-specific conditions: “There is no determinate theoretical link 
between trade protection and growth once real-world phenomena such as learning, 
technological change, and market imperfections (here captured by a learning-by-doing 
externality) are taken into account” (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000, page 272).  As 
economic theory is not able to provide a clear guidance, policymaking can be bending 
too much towards political considerations – with all the associated risks of capture, 
rent-seeking, short-termism, and populism. Nonetheless, there is also room for 
empirical arguments defending protection without those reprehensible political 
motives: Salazar-Xirinachs, J., Nübler, I. and Kozul-Wright, R. (2014), for example, 
state that all countries that achieved success in their industrialization process made 
use of some type of selective industrial policy but acknowledge that excessive 
protective tariffs can be detrimental.  
 
Given all these arguments, there is a clear scope for research aiming to clarify the 
theoretical landscape on the effects of protection (or trade liberalization) on growth, 
competitiveness and development.   
 
This thesis fits into the broad theoretical debate about the relationship between 
international trade and growth, and also in the subset that brings together insights from 
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Industrial Organization and International trade literatures. To gain insights on how 
international trade affects growth we focus on trade protection and liberalization 
through tariffs, and its effect on productivity and competitiveness, through the main 
channels indicated by the literature, notably scale, competition, and access to 
technology. We also extend this analysis to include the debate on how institutions and 
the business environment could potentially affect not only competitiveness, but also 
modify a country`s comparative advantage. The thesis encompasses the trade-related 
industrialization process, but also touches on the discussion of a more service-based 
and technology-driven economy, thus analysing how the theoretical and empirical 
conclusions on the sources of industrial competitiveness and classical comparative 
advantages could be amended to explain more recent trends in automation and in the 
distribution of value added among firms and nations. 
 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) pointed to many flaws in the previous empirical studies 
that had supported a positive link between trade liberalization and long-term economic 
growth. Since them, progress has been made, and Irwin (2019) surveyed the following 
strands of the more recent empirical literature on the subject, that arguably tried to 
correct the mistakes pointed out by Rodriguez and Rodrik: 
 
a) Cross country regressions; 
b) Studies using methods of synthetic control, to build a counterfactual to analyse 
specific trade reforms; 
c) Case studies that analyse the channels that may link trade reform and 
increases in productivity, including the channel of tariff reduction for 
intermediate goods.  
 
Our work fits into this last group, a case study: our thesis is a case study of the Brazilian 
automotive sector, taking an inductive approach and using a mixed-methods 
methodology.  
 
Although Irwin`s survey pointed to an average positive impact of trade liberalization 
on growth, there are important questions still needing answers on how the different 
channels potentially involved in this relationship operate. The examination of detailed 
channels by which trade can affect competitiveness, under the combination of market 
11 
 
structures with firm-level heterogeneity, imperfect competition (monopolistic and 
oligopolistic) and externalities, is still at the frontier of the literature, as previous 
assumptions are revisited and new microeconomic empirical results shape our 
understanding. As an example, De Loecker and Biesebroek (2018) stress three other 
important questions still in need of more empirical evidence and clarification, that we 
intend to tackle in this research: a) although it makes sense to think that trade 
liberalization increase the size of markets and thus increase competition, the existence 
and the size of this channel still raises questions among the literature; b) the effects of 
trade liberalization on productivity and welfare, usually seen as a result of competition 
eliminating the less productive firms (thus raising average productivity) and also 
promoting a better allocation of resources towards the more productive ones, can be 
affected by the distribution of market power among heterogenous firms: the foreign 
firms can increase their mark-up after trade liberalization, thus reducing the pro-
competitive effects of this liberalization1; c) how the access to imported input goods 
can be a source of market power; d) the relative importance of domestic and foreign 
competition.     
 
Moreover, a combination of insights from the Industrial Organization literature and the 
Trade literature has been pointed as necessary at least since the 1980s, as stressed 
by Krugman (1995)2. The literature on these interactions is evolving, but still has a 
long way to go, to further clarify the relationship between trade and economic 
performance in general and firm performance in particular. In this sense, De Loecker 
and Biesebroek (2018) stress that firm performance can be the result of a combination 
of productive efficiency and market power, and thus these two aspects need to be 
studied together, to provide meaningful measures of the impact of trade openness, for 
example. As the authors correctly point out, only under perfect competition, when there 
is no market power, would estimates of productivity reflect the efficiency of firms, for 
example. In an imperfect competition world, firms can gain productivity by means of 
 
1 This argument is analysed in Arkolakis, C., A. Costinot, D. Donaldson, and A. Rodriguez-Clare (2019), who explain 
that although it is well understood that trade distortions can affect the welfare gains of trade liberalization, as 
for example in Bhagwati (1971), most of the literature analysing the impact of trade openness on firm-level 
mark-up focus only on domestic producers, thus missing the point that firms could have variable mark-ups and 
maybe foreign producers could increase their mark-ups following the trade liberalization, as they do not need 
to compress their margins to overcome trade tariffs anymore, when exporting to the domestic market.  
2 “if there is an overriding conclusion from the last 15 years of research it is that international trade theory is 
also international industrial organization” (page 1274). Krugman, P. (1995).  
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increasing market power, for example, and not necessarily because they became 
intrinsically better in producing a good or service. 
 
Another motivation for this study is given also by the recent trend of renewed 
protectionism, led by declarations and actions from the United States, the country with 
the biggest Gross Domestic Product (GDP), measured at market exchange rates, in 
the world. The signs of a “trade war” between the United States and China, the biggest 
GDP measured at purchasing power parity, are alarming the world and such a dispute 
could endanger world growth. A final motivation relies on the personal experience of 
the author, who participated in several policymaking decisions related to industrial and 
trade policies in Brazil between 2005 and 2015.    
 
 
 
1.2 CONTEXT AND POTENTIAL CHANNELS 
 
The level of protection can affect industrial productivity levels and growth, as well as 
innovation, costs, and quality, either increasing them or decreasing them. If we 
consider all these indicators as part of the concept of dynamic competitiveness, we 
could say that the level of protection has an impact on the dynamic competitiveness 
of an industry. This is regardless of any consideration of externalities. Thus, even 
without measuring externalities we need to be sure that policies are promoting the 
dynamic competitiveness of the domestic economy. For this, we need to focus on the 
channels where the levels of trade protection can impact dynamic competitiveness. 
According to the economic literature, this impact can operate through effects on 
competition, on the ability to develop or adopt technology, and on scale of production. 
Moreover, other factors not necessarily related to trade can affect dynamic 
competitiveness, as, for example, institutions and the business environment.  
 
The channels are not straightforward: scale can be viewed as a consequence of the 
first two channels: protection could promote industry scale through barriers against 
foreign competition, and, if associated with barriers to domestic competition, also 
promote firm-level scale. On the other hand, both industry and firm-level scale could 
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be increased through specialization, with less protection. The effects on competition 
and on technology access link into productivity, quality, innovation and scale, with 
potential vicious or virtuous circles. Moreover, less discussed channels can also play 
a decisive role. This is the case of the effects of protection levels on the need and on 
the desirability of better business environments. Moreover, the nature of technology 
itself can change the results: as industry is being transformed by the so-called digital 
revolution, effects on scale, competition and access to technology can be 
fundamentally altered.  
 
As there are many potential channels, this analysis would already be challenging. If 
we consider that these channels can interact among themselves, and, also, interact 
with country-specific conditions, the potential results are multiplied. In this sense, it 
would be more an empirical, than a theoretical debate. However, as cumulative 
empirical results are the way to increase or decrease the acceptance of theories, valid 
empirical results can contribute to the theoretical debate. 
 
Our case study is the Brazilian automotive industry, actively manufacturing since the 
1950s, after a long period of import Substitution Strategy. It was ranked 9th worldwide 
in terms of car production in 2016, but its production is heavily towards the domestic 
market, and the industry still relies on relatively high protective tariffs to avoid 
competition from imports. The fact that almost all automakers operating in the country 
are foreign multinationals3 (and most of the tier 1 suppliers)4 adds to the specificities 
related to technology transfer. Finally, although the size of the domestic market is 
usually viewed as the main reason for the existence of such industry, the country is 
characterized by a substandard quality of business environment. 
          
The economic literature provides a vast array of theoretical models and potential 
arguments for and against trade protection. Each model or explanation has different 
assumptions and focus on a different set of potential channels/mechanisms.  Apart 
from the possibility of numerous different theoretical results, the debate usually 
 
3 The brands are all multinationals, but there are Brazilian-owned automakers, such as CAOA, manufacturing 
under licence. 
4 In the 90`s, following the trade openness of the Brazilian economy, some of the biggest Brazilian-owned tier 1 
autopart suppliers were acquired by foreign firms. However, there are still domestic-owned tier 1 firms, who 
became important players also in foreign markets, as Iochpe-Maxion (wheels manufacturer), for example.  
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sometimes stops at the validity of these assumptions. Even when there is a clear 
theoretical base and the assumptions are agreed, it may simply be that political 
economy considerations are more important, as the settling on small levels of 
protection can be viewed as politically difficult, especially within developing countries.  
In this sense, the debate that reaches policymakers is usually between the two 
extremes of complete free trade and high levels of generalized protection across the 
entire economy.  
 
Although the increasing availability of empirical evidence provided a test for the entire 
spectrum of arguments, pro and against protection, the empirical literature on the 
effects of trade liberalization on growth is also conflicting and its results are subjected 
to all sorts of criticisms. The conclusion from the empirical evidence found in the 
literature could be summarized this way: import substitution strategies without a 
credible commitment to future reduction of protection, or without correct incentives for 
productivity gains, quality and innovation, are potentially welfare-reducing, and do not 
lead to economic growth. The explanation is that the costs of such policy (not only the 
static costs related to higher consumer price, but also potential dynamic costs related 
to production and technology) can easily be higher than the benefits, if proper 
incentives are not in place, or if protection is too high.  East Asian countries are usually 
taken as examples of successful industrialization strategies, as they combined 
elements of protection with export promotion (thus incentives to become competitive). 
On the other hand, Latin American countries are usually taken as an example of failed 
ISI. However, given the country heterogeneity both in Asia and Latina America, each 
case study can show a myriad of different and country-specific aspects that played a 
role in the development results, as for example the differences in types and quality of 
institutions. Thus, going beyond a collection of case studies and reaching a general 
conclusion is quite tricky. 
 
The heterogeneity in development levels, innovation and technology adoption has 
implications for the distribution of production among nations, with the least competitive 
countries falling behind while the best ones are able to catch-up with the economies 
already in the development frontier. Rodrik (2015) found evidence of premature 
deindustrialization since the 1980s: for most developing countries maximum levels of 
industrialization, in terms of employment and output, were reached at lower income 
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levels, in comparison to older experiences. The exceptions, still according to Rodrik, 
are Asian countries, thanks to a stronger comparative advantage in industrial goods.  
 
Thus, while the fear of deindustrialization, as noticed by Qian, Araújo and Nucifora 
(2018) may provide an excuse for protectionist policies, the scope for gains from 
protecting manufacturing is eroding, as acknowledged by Rodrik (2015). It is then 
necessary to know how to increase productivity and value-added within the domestic 
economy, in a world with faster technological progress and where traditional sources 
of comparative advantage such as labour costs, are losing importance. A potential 
answer is to look at the quality of institutions in general, and the business environment 
in particular. As cited by Qian, Araújo and Nucifora (2018), Easterly and Levine (2001) 
and Caselli (2016) show, based on cross-country comparisons, that differences in per 
capita income are a consequence of differences in total factor productivity.  However, 
to know what causes these differences in productivity one needs to look at different 
layers of factors. Among these, the literature points to the quality of institutions as the 
single most important factor explaining productivity and growth (Torvik, 2016). 
 
Given the difficulty in reaching a consensus based either on the multitude of theoretical 
results from the trade literature, and also on the diversity of empirical results, the 
literature on industrial policy of the last 20 years is focusing on the description of best 
practices – how to better design industrial policies – improving the coordination 
between policymakers and industry. The debate based on the use of protection and 
subsidies, between horizontal (basically, improving the business environment) versus 
vertical (sectoral, more protectionist) industrial policies is left behind, inconclusive. 
Thus, the theoretical discussion permeates not only the trade and growth literature, 
but also the literatures related to industrial policies, competition, industrial 
organization, and institutions. The potential answers are also scattered among these 
literature branches. 
 
The Brazilian Automotive Sector 
 
Vehicle assembling in Brazil started with Ford in 1919, followed by General Motors in 
1925. After 1956, the Brazilian Government promoted an import-substitution strategy 
for the automotive sector, among other sectors. The restrictions on imports ceased, 
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temporarily, only in the 90’s. The policy achieved its initial targets, as Brazil started to 
produce thousands of vehicles with high local content, reaching economies of scale 
and developing important economic linkages (Shapiro, 1989). The economies of scale 
were viable thanks to the initial protection, to the market size, to the subsidies that 
reduced capital costs, and to the credible threat made by the Government to put a time 
limit to the governmental support (Shapiro, 1989). But, apart from a brief period in the 
90’s, protection continued, and the competitiveness of the sector suffered, making it 
difficult to be part of global value chains.  
 
Currently, the automotive industry in Brazil is the most protected both in terms of 
nominal and effective tariffs, among all industrial sectors in Brazil, continuing to be 
heavily oriented to the domestic market. There is very little connection with Global 
Value Chains and the productivity of tier 3 and 4 autopart producers is generally very 
low, although the multinational automakers and both domestic and foreign-based tier-
1 autopart producers are arguably as productive (within their plants) as their 
counterpart foreign plants. There are a relatively high number of firms in the market, 
but at least for final assemblers, the degree of competition in the domestic market is 
still an open empirical question. The policy towards the sector also incentivises local 
demand, not technological upgrading and productivity gains. 
 
The automotive sector in Brazil involves 29 assemblers (61 industrial units), around 
500 auto parts companies and 5.100 dealers (although the value chain includes more 
than 200 thousand companies). These numbers include vehicles and agricultural and 
highway construction machinery.  The production capacity is of 4.5 million vehicles per 
year. In 2017, the sector produced 2.3 million vehicles (down from 3.7 million vehicles 
in 2013). The sector employs directly and indirectly around 1.5 million people (150 
thousand directly employed by the vehicle assemblers).  Including the auto parts 
sector, it is responsible for near 5% of the Brazilian GDP (21% of the industrial GDP). 
Based on 2017 figures, the Brazilian automotive sector is the 8th largest world car 
producer and the fourth largest domestic market. 
 
The assembling companies are almost all multinationals (with characteristics of an 
oligopoly), although the auto parts sector (with all types of market structures, 
depending on the specific autopart) has an important participation of domestic capital. 
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Thus, the strategic decisions of these multinational firms are at the core of the 
underlying market forces that, together with the industrial policy, designed the 
landscape for the automotive sector in Brazil. 
 
In a sense, the selected case study is the archetypal industry of choice for middle-
income developing countries wishing to move beyond simpler labour-intensive 
industries. We chose the Brazilian automotive sector also because it is the most 
important industrial sector in the country; it is facing a crucial question regarding its 
viability without government support; is an example with firm heterogeneity and 
therefore rich in terms of variable responses to protection; it is a sector that illustrates 
very well the importance of scale; is globally characterized by being increasingly 
dependent on global value chains and global production networks; it possess a long 
value chain, making it possible to analyse cumulative effects of protection on inputs; 
the industry was targeted by a well-defined protectionist policy between 2011 and 
2017 (Inovar-Auto), making it ideal for a “before and after” analysis; there is plenty of 
data for the industry; the researcher has expertise in the policy under study; and the 
presence of multinationals together with domestic firms further enrich the analysis of 
theoretical arguments for and against protection, mainly related to technological 
transfers.     
 
Brazil was an example of a Latin American country following an ISI strategy based on 
high levels of protection until 1988, when the Government started to reduce trade 
protection, culminating with the generalized trade liberalization of 1990-1993. 
Subsequently protection was increased again, although not to the same levels of the 
ISI era. Although some protected sectors had a disastrous outcome (the protection of 
the Brazilian personal computer sector, for example), the country managed to achieve 
impressive records in some industrial sectors, such as aeronautical and oil extraction. 
The best sector to illustrate the heterogeneity of results is the Brazilian Automotive 
sector. Part of the literature concludes that ISI based on trade protection and subsidies 
was decisive in the establishment of the automotive industry in the country and that 
this industry effectively reached good competitiveness levels (Di Maio, 2009; Shapiro, 
1989). What is more debatable is at what costs this happened. Moreover, why does 
the industry still need high import tariffs and why is it not able to export more? In other 
words, why it is still infant, or, at least, treated as infant?  
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Since its conception, the Brazilian automotive sector has focused on the domestic 
market. However, this reliance has some drawbacks: it increases demand uncertainty 
and thus reduces potential investment; and it reduces competitive pressure for 
innovation and product upgrading. Protectionism was used as a tool to attract FDI in 
all Brazilian policies towards the sector. Moreover, for the 1950`s policy (import 
Substitution strategy responsible for the development of the automotive industry in 
Brazil) and the 1990`s policy (aimed to counteract the effects of a supposedly 
overvalued domestic currency besides attracting new FDI to the sector) the intention 
was also to avoid trade deficits. Meanwhile, the most recent policy - Inovar-Auto (2011-
2017) – shared the motivation to protect domestic producers from losing market-share 
to imports but had no strong concern regarding the current account. Besides this, only 
Inovar-Auto included R&D and fuel efficiency targets. None of the three policies 
directly promoted exports. 
 
Inovar-Auto increased the level of taxation on imported cars by 30 percentage points 
between 2012 and 2017. This was challenged, since 2014, at the WTO, and since 
December 2017 the Program no longer exist. This policy had two main objectives and, 
according to our analysis, targeted two different subsectors of the automotive industry: 
the carmakers and the autopart producers. Inovar-Auto`s declared goals were to 
develop the technological level of the industry and to attract FDI. Given that the car 
manufacturers in Brazil are all multinationals, the scope for improvements in 
technological level is higher in the autoparts sector, where there are a mix of 
multinationals and local players, with different degrees of technological development.  
 
The literature has vast amounts of accounts of the sluggish manufacturing productivity 
of the Brazilian economy, after a period of growth right after the trade liberalization of 
the early 90s, in comparison to most of the biggest developing markets, with the 
developed countries, and also with other Latin American countries. Both labour 
productivity and total factor productivity in manufacturing appear to have had, on 
average, a very weak performance in the last 3 decades (in chapter 5 we provide more 
evidence on this, for that we cite, among others, Kalout et al (2017) and Cirera et al 
(2015). 
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The potential channels  
 
Scrutinizing the literature, we can propose a list of the theoretical channels that may 
play a role in the transmission of effects from protection against foreign competition to 
economic development and growth. In this context, we are not discussing if a country 
should accept its static comparative advantages or try to push to dynamic comparative 
advantages in sectors with more positive externalities. Instead, we are discussing how 
trade barriers affect the prospects for having more thriving innovative and competitive 
firms. In order to thrive, firms need to be competitive. Thus, “international 
competitiveness” is our main dependant variable. A more competitive sector would 
grow faster and to a higher extent, and thus tend to generate more income, with or 
without externalities. In this sense, in this thesis we assume that trade barriers affect 
productivity both at firms and industry levels, and these productivity levels affect “long-
term industrial competitiveness”. This last variable is in turn a necessary condition to 
achieve economic growth and development.   
 
The process of identifying the channels required a vast literature review, as sometimes 
the same channel is presented differently within different branches of the literatures 
examined. As already mentioned, we identify three main set of analysis related to the 
effects that changes in the structure of protection can have on international 
competitiveness:  
 Scale: including internal and external economies of scale; investment location 
decisions; local content and domestic supply base; implication of domestic 
market size for R&D;  
 Competition: including domestic and foreign competition effects on firm`s 
efficiency and on innovation efforts; and resource allocation.  
 Technology: “within-border” or “cross-border” nature of technological spillovers; 
and access to better inputs and foreign technology. 
 
Adding to these, we also identified the effects of business environment and investment 
climate, on international competitiveness. Recalling that we start from the assumption 
that trade barriers impact total factor productivity, labour productivity, and then 
20 
 
competitiveness, we believe this analysis is quite comprehensive and can contribute 
towards a useful taxonomy.    
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The following assumptions framed our research questions: 
 
 Protection has costs and benefits. Too much or too little protection rises it costs 
and reduces benefits. The underlying variable that links protection to the cost-
benefit results is a combination of the size of externalities generated, if they 
exist, and the ability and speed of protected domestic firms to catch-up with the 
technology frontier. This ability and speed, for instance, depends on the 
competitiveness the firm and industry can achieve, and also on the distance 
between them and the frontier. The competitiveness, for instance, depends, 
among other factors, on the access to technology, on the scale that can be 
achieved, on the business environment, on incentives and policies, and on 
structural conditions.  
 
 The intermediate sector (in a broad sense) could also generate externalities 
(technological changes in intermediates) and also benefit from scale gains. 
However, as protecting intermediates (Local Content Requirements - LCRs) 
means, ceteris paribus, to reduce the competitiveness of final goods, there is 
then a trade-off between favouring intermediate or final goods.   
 
 Generalized protection can make general production costly, thus generating the 
need for further protection, in a potentially vicious cycle.  
 
 Since the prominence of imperfect competition models in the trade literature, 
starting in the 80s, it is accepted that trade patterns are driven by a combination 
of comparative advantages related to the availability of production factors 
(mainly capital and labour, both potentially quality-adjusted), the firm-level scale 
of production of manufacturing firms operating in a country, and also the 
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external economies of scale generated by technological spillovers from R&D. 
The more recent literature suggests that value added is not in manufacturing 
anymore, but in more knowledge-intensive activities and services prior or after 
the manufacturing process itself: R&D and design are usually used as 
examples. Moreover, although the literature has been studying the effects of 
institutions for some decades, it only recently started to collect evidence of 
institutions being able to shape comparative advantages. Finally, new 
economic activities are growing on the basis of network effects – the economies 
of scale from the demand side, and entirely new sectors have been created 
from start-ups and innovations that need the best IT infrastructure and a proper 
business environment to thrive. Putting all these insights together led us to the 
conclusion that from now on trade patterns and competitiveness will be driven 
by a combination of differences in competitiveness driven by differences in 
business environment, external economies of scale that includes network 
effects, and internal scale in value-added activities such as R&D.  
 
As widely accepted by the trade literature since the 80s, assuming the existence of 
economies of scale, either internal or external to the firms, the increase of scale of 
production is an important step to improve a country`s comparative advantages and 
competitiveness5. Furthermore, endogenous growth models explain how innovation 
and adoption of technologies are the main drivers of productivity and economic growth, 
while the new economic geography states the role of increasing returns of scale in 
concentration of location. Therefore, the question is how to promote efficiency, scale, 
innovation and adoption of technologies, and attract the location of value-added 
activities? There are two crucial elements in this debate: a) what would promote scale, 
technology gains, and competitiveness and; b) the decisions for location of production 
and other value-added activities. 
 
And what are the other aspects that could also enhance comparative advantages and 
competitiveness directly, or could promote scale or attract location decisions, and then 
 
5 External economies of scale can promote knowledge spillovers and other positive externalities that can make 
a country more competitive in some industries, and thus potentially creating comparative advantages that did 
not exist there before. The more recent acknowledgement that internal economies of scale do explain intra-
industry trade and can drive location decisions is also considered another potential element in building 
comparative advantages, as the underlying productivity gains would make production cheaper. 
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indirectly promote a country competitiveness and welfare? The literature pinpoints 
institutions (or, alternatively, a subset of it defined as “business environment” or 
“investment climate”) as the main candidate, but recognize this concept is very ample 
and results can easily please whatever pre-conceived idea. We believe that a 
comparison among the effects of key business environment aspects, and the structure 
of protection (degree of tariffs escalation, levels of tariffs, access to technology through 
imported inputs), the impacts on domestic and foreign competition, and the degree of 
specialization, can bring insights on what else is important to increase comparative 
advantages and competitiveness and how trade can affect these elements.         
 
Expressing the questions above in a more direct way we have the following research 
questions: 
 
Why is the Brazilian Automotive sector not yet competitive after 60 years of 
protection?  
 
1. How is the sector evolving? How competitive is it?  
 
2. What are the main channels linking trade policy and competitiveness? 
How do these channels interact? How does each channel operate within 
the Brazilian automotive industry? 
 
3. What is the relative importance of the business environment, and of 
institutions in general, vis a vis the trade policy?   
 
4. How can the pace of digital technological development affect the 
identified channels? Does it also alter the support for the selected 
theories? 
 
5. What are the lessons from Inovar-Auto in terms of policy design?  
 
 
The last discussion we will have is to assess how the results from the case study could 
be generalized to answer the overall theoretical questions of the thesis. We aim to 
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contribute to this debate through a combination of qualitative and quantitative data and 
methods.  
 
Our research also analyses how the new digital economy and the emergence of the 
so-called industry 4.0 could alter the results from the channel analysis. The pace of 
technology is increasing and there is a debate on whether these new technologies will 
facilitate or hinder catch-up for developing countries. This discussion has profound 
implications for the results of any development strategy, including trade policies.    
 
The underlying assumption is that protection can be welfare-enhancing or welfare-
reducing, depending on a series of conditions given by the economic theory. Our 
primary goal answering the research questions is to provide empirical insights and 
evidence to the literature, contributing to the development of the theoretical knowledge 
in the field. The secondary objective will be to extract policy lessons. Proceeding this 
way, we aim to improve our understanding of the limitations of the infant-industry 
argument as a guide for industrial policies in general, using a case study of a specific 
industrial sector. We will focus on trade-related measures of industrial policies (how 
tariffs affect competition, access to foreign inputs, productivity and scale, for example). 
Moreover, the comments on policy design will be restricted to the case under study, 
without any theory testing or generalization. Furthermore, any discussion regarding 
policy implementation and about other instruments of industrial policies (technical 
assistance, government procurements, financing etc.) would be marginal. 
 
 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS AND OVERALL 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology is an inductive case study with qualitative and quantitative methods 
– thus, a mixed-methods approach, where we aim to provide insights from different 
economic literatures and using different data types and sources. Specifically, we 
analyse the Brazilian automotive sector, including automakers and autopart 
producers, providing enough context and data to have a more detailed understanding 
of the specific case. Although there is always the caveat of reaching conclusions that 
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are maybe too case-specific, we are able to generalize some of the findings because: 
a) the industry under study is formed mainly by multinationals, that operate similarly 
around the world; b) we contextualize the analysis, helping to isolate factors that are 
specific to the Brazilian case, especially through our interviews and literature review 
of the automotive sector in Brazil. 
    
 Although De Loecker and Biesebroek (2018) successfully show that Industrial 
organization techniques to estimate market-power can disentangle it from other 
efficiency sources, they also accept that data constraints and ad hoc market 
classifications are still problematic. We believe detailed case studies can therefore 
provide meaningful insights. The advantages of this methodology will be explained in 
the methodological chapter.         
   
Given the complexity in terms of interactions and country-specific factors involved, the 
research design to accomplish this task is a detailed case study.  Moreover, to be able 
to use all information and data available, we use a mixed-methods approach, relying 
on qualitative (interviews) and on quantitative data (secondary data at the aggregated 
and at the firm-level). The qualitative data is central to the thesis, helping to make 
sense of the quantitative data and of the literature review on the case study. The 
quantitative data will help to build our evidenced-based narrative. This narrative will 
try to answer the research questions. In this sense, we will provide evidence from 
different sources of information, and this will be triangulated, to enhance the validity of 
the results: this is the purpose of using mixed-methods.  
 
Chapter 2, the conceptual framework and literature review, will cover the theories that 
build the foundations of the arguments present in the debate on the effects of 
international trade on competitiveness, growth and welfare. This needs to include 
discussions about static and dynamic effects of trade and protection, as well as partial 
and general equilibrium considerations, and how assumptions of externalities and 
production factors` unemployment affect the results. We therefore aim to organize a 
full description of how the literature evolved and, also, pointing the shortfalls of 
incomplete arguments usually presented in the debate. While the theoretical 
framework will then provide our theoretical basis, the empirical literature review will 
focus on the empirical evidence regarding the identified channels.  
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The use of a case study with mixed-methods is explained on chapter 3, where we also 
provide details about each method. 
 
Chapter 4 explain how the Brazilian automotive sector evolved and how it is organized, 
in the context of both a previous Import Substitution Industrialization process and the 
current position of being the most important industrial sector in Brazil in terms of GDP 
and also the one with the highest average tariff protection. The chapter provides 
further contextualization for our case study, gathering secondary data and insights on 
the new technologies that are affecting the sector worldwide, a brief description of the 
successful case of Embraer (highlighting its reliance on foreign inputs and its lower 
dependence on the domestic business environment), and a review of the industrial 
policies applied to the sector, with emphasis to Inovar-Auto. This last policy is analysed 
in enough detail to configure a before-and-after impact analysis.  
 
Chapter 5 will bring the results from the interviews, with a partial analysis based on a 
thematic grouping. The methods used in chapter 5 are primary qualitative data 
collection and analysis, based on semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample. 
Chapter 6 contains the quantitative exercises and another partial analysis of the 
results. This applies a collection of secondary data and produces some primary 
quantitative data. It uses descriptive statistics of secondary data and analysis, 
including analysis of correlations, and time-series regressions using aggregated data. 
On chapter 7 we put the qualitative and the quantitative results together, analyse them 
with the inputs from the literature review and the theoretical framework, and produce 
our conclusion, with some policy recommendations.  
 
The insights gathered in this study were plentiful, but a brief preview is useful at this 
stage, and can be summarised as follows: if a country is trapped in a low level 
equilibrium (no signs of dynamic learning or catching-up with more developed 
countries and industries) with overall low competitiveness, high import protection 
levels, underemployment and underinvestment, a trade liberalization process could be 
too costly in terms of unemployment in the short-term. This could block any meaningful 
trade reform, further increasing the welfare costs of a future adjustment. A potential 
alternative to allow the economy to enter in an economic growth path and eventually 
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catch-up with the technology frontier is to improve the institutions and business 
environment. If this is sufficiently done there will be less political resistance to trade 
liberalization and the likely employment adjustments will tend to be smoother.  
 
The Brazilian industry needs to be more specialized and export-oriented than it is, to 
gain scale of production and competitiveness. To this aim, the country would benefit 
from better access to foreign inputs and from lower overall levels of protection (to 
promote a better domestic allocation of resources and increase in average 
productivity). In which sectors to specialize is a market-driven decision, but one that 
could be influenced by a better business environment conducive to activities with high 
value-added, potential terms of trade gains, and more knowledge spillovers. The 
Brazilian automotive sector provided a clear picture of how a developing country can 
lose track of initially successful policies, if policymaking is biased towards rent-seeking 
interests.   
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CHAPTER 2 – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
This thesis is intended to be eclectic both in terms of methods and in terms of 
literatures from where it draws insights and theoretical foundations. The theories we 
rely upon are mainly within the domain of international trade, but they include important 
contributions from industrial organization economic theories as well6. This theoretical 
framework provides logical constructs for the impacts of some of our variables of 
interest - trade structure, scale, competition, or institutions/business environment – on 
industrial competitiveness, productivity, and ultimately, economic growth. 
 
Our exposition will build on the developments of the debate between import protection 
and trade liberalization. Section 1 will bring some important concepts needed for the 
thesis. In section 2 we expose the main theoretical foundations both for trade 
liberalization and for trade protection. We discuss how market failures can justify trade 
protection and discuss the theoretical base for infant industry arguments, among other 
justifications used for some protectionist policies. We also emphasize the message 
that different assumptions led to different results concerning the validity of trade 
protection as a growth and development strategy. Section 3 shows the evolution of 
industrial policies and trade theories based on the idea of relative comparative 
advantages. Section 4 briefly explain how insights from endogenous growth, industrial 
organization and institutional economics literatures contributed to the understanding 
of the theme, and partially changed the conclusions of the trade theories exposed in 
the previous section. Section 5 then explain the potential interactions among 
 
6 Including a very brief foundation of institutional economics to contextualize the importance of the investment 
climate/business environment for competitiveness. 
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comparative advantages, scale of production, business environment, competition, 
trade and growth, mapping the theoretical channels that could link our variables of 
interest. Section 6 discuss the empirical literatures on specific channels. These 
channels then constitute a taxonomy that summarizes our theoretical framework. 
 
The main message from theory is that trade protection against imports can promote 
welfare if there are market failures such as externalities, but protection can be 
potentially damaging to overall scale of domestic production in the long term, given a 
potentially less competitive domestic value chain. Moreover, trade protection rises 
inefficiencies as well, and its costs and benefits would need to properly be assessed 
under a dynamic general equilibrium context. Therefore, a potential optimum structure 
of protection can be a function of many factors, including the market structure, the 
quality of institutions and business environment, and the interaction with other drivers 
of international competitiveness. The intermediary effects on the scale of production, 
on the level of competition (among domestic producers and also between domestic 
producers and imports), and on the innovation and technology absorption patterns are 
channels that can substantially change the overall result. Therefore, they need to be 
properly considered.    
 
 
2.1 CONCEPTS 
 
Initially it is important to clarify important concepts used in this thesis:  
 
As in Krugman et al (2014), a country has relative comparative advantage in the 
production of a service or a good when this sector has a relatively7 better labour 
productivity (the Ricardian model) or relative abundance of resources (Heckscher- 
Ohlin model). Thus, relative comparative advantages in a certain good explain a static 
efficiency in production of that good. 
  
 
7 Relative to other goods and services supplied by the country. Different from this, the concept of “absolute 
comparative advantages” would mean that the country has always better productivity, in absolute terms, in 
producing that good.  
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Productivity is a measure of the ratio of output (or, alternatively, value-added) per 
input, while productivity change is a measure of cost-savings in production, given 
the output-input ratio. It then measures the degree of efficiency in using inputs. There 
are measures of partial productivities, such as labour productivity (production, or 
value-added, per worker, for example) and measures of multifactor productivity, such 
as Total Factor Productivity8 (this relates output to the technology used, eliminating 
all effects from labour and capital. As such, it can be estimated as a residual). The 
sources of productivity are many but can be organized following OECD (2001):  
 
 economies of scale; 
 technical change (innovation); 
 technical efficiency within firms; 
 technical efficiency arising from the flow of production factors towards the most 
efficient firms or sectors9; 
 learning-by-doing; and  
 capacity utilization.  
 
Another important source of productivity, not explicitly mentioned by the OECD 
manual, is the social infrastructure and business environment in general10. 
 
International competitiveness is the resulting combination of firm-level 
competitiveness11, exchange rate, export costs (including transport), and business 
environment. In this sense, it can express the capacity to export, being able to compete 
in price and quality with foreign competitors in external markets. This definition takes 
 
8 As noted by Qian, Araújo and Nucifora (2018), labour productivity and TFP are highly correlated, but can 
become more different if labour productivity is a result of capital accumulation, instead of a result of the TFP. 
The authors also remember that to calculate TFP as a residual it is necessary that prices are reflecting marginal 
costs and marginal factor productivity.   
9 Going into more details, Qian, Araújo and Nucifora (2018) explains that sources of productivity at the aggregate 
level may be: (i) structural change (“between-sector”) caused by productive resources moving to sectors with 
higher productivity, thus increasing the market share of these sectors (“between-static”) or by an increase in the 
market-share of the sector with higher productivity growth (“between-dynamic”); (ii) sector-level (“between-
firm”), when firms with higher productivity (levels or growth) gain market-share, while firms with lower 
productivity (levels or growth) lose market-share, within the sector. It includes the cases of entry and exit, when 
firms with higher productivity enter the market and firms with lower productivity exit the market. 
10 This source of positive externality, and thus productivity, was mentioned as early as in Frankel (1962). 
11 Firm-level competitiveness is a narrower concept: the result of production costs (inputs and production 
factors), productivity, and quality/innovation/value-added combinations of the firm. 
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into consideration the relative competitiveness of other countries/firms and includes 
the effects of costs of production and quality. It is therefore more complete than simpler 
cost-competitiveness measures, such as, for example, the Unit Labour Costs12. It 
also differs from measures of revealed comparative advantages, such as the 
revealed comparative advantage in exports (Balassa Index), that measures the 
relative importance of the exports of a good in comparison to the overall exports of the 
country, and compare this ratio to the relative importance of world exports of that good 
in comparison to the overall world exports. In other words, it measures a relative 
concentration of a country in exporting a specific good13.        
 
The following figure 1 illustrates these concepts. 
 
Figure 1 – The concept of competitiveness 
 
 
Of course, the factors that affect international competitiveness also will affect the 
competitiveness of the firm. In this sense, the factors in the two boxes are additive. 
 
Internal economies of scale are gains in terms of productive efficiency (reduction of 
average costs) brought by increases in scale of production. As sources of economies 
of scale, we would have: 
 
12 This is a measure of how much in wages it is necessary to pay for a given output of production.  
13 Algebraically the Balassa index could be represented by:  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 i𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 "𝑗"
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 "𝑗"
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 "𝑖"
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
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i) decreasing marginal costs14; 
ii) spreading fixed costs over as larger level of output. 
 
Learning can be viewed as a dynamic effect of economies of scale, while the reduction 
of average costs would be a static effect. The reduction of average costs is then a 
static effect of internal economies of scale. If we also consider that increasing scale 
can increase learning by doing, we arrive at a dynamic effect of internal economies 
of scale15.    
 
 A slightly different concept is Return to Scale. It focuses only on the technology of 
the production function of the firm, and is a potential source of economies of scale: 
when we have increasing returns to scale, characterized by an output that increases 
more than proportionately with the addition of inputs, the market structure needs to be 
one of imperfect competition. On the other hand, constant returns of scale refer to 
the case where any given proportionate increase in all inputs causes output to rise by 
the same proportion. Under this condition it is possible to have perfect or imperfect 
competition, because we could, for example, have constant returns to scale together 
with internal economies of scale. Decreasing returns to scale is when added inputs 
increase output less than proportionately. It is also possible to have perfect or 
imperfect competition in this case.  
 
When we have internal economies of scale, the economic theory suggests that there 
will be no perfect competition in that market, as the firm will exploit its economies of 
scale and eventually will abandon a perfect competition market structure. On the other 
hand, we can have external economies of scale (within the industry or region) and 
perfect competition at firm-level.   
 
Internal economies of scale are thus the gains generated and appropriated by the 
firm. More formally, average costs go down when firm-level output increases. On the 
other hand, external economies of scale are the gains that can be appropriated by 
firms that did not generate them: average costs go down when the industry or the 
 
14 This could be generated by the specialization that would follow a production expansion. 
15 If the learning “leaks” to other firms, we will have “external dynamic economies of scale”. 
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regional output increases. The gains generated by aggregated production are a type 
of externality.  
 
Externalities are benefits or costs that goes beyond the benefits and costs 
appropriated or supported by the firm16. Therefore, when are related to production, 
externalities are also named external economies of scale: the efficiency of a firm as 
a function of the output of the industry (Krugman, 1995), or even a function of the 
output of the economy or other firm. These, can be of the following types/sources: 
a) Marshalian economies of scale (or, alternatively, Marshallian external 
economies) – external economies of scale related to geographical location, also 
known as economies of agglomeration. According to the literature, this type of 
external economies of scale consists of three main sources: availability of 
specialized inputs/suppliers/infrastructure/buyers; labour market pooling; and 
technological spillovers, with all these as a function of the size of the industry 
located in a specific region or cluster;  
b) R&D and knowledge spillovers not necessarily related to spatial location; 
c) Learning-by-doing with spillovers – a process where workers learn how to better 
produce the good thanks to practice (thus not necessarily linked to the scale of 
production, but to the time producing something and using machinery or 
applying techniques). This would be a source of internal economy of scale (in 
this case also refered as “dynamic increasing returns”, but it can be assumed 
that the knowledge gained outflows to other firms as well, thus becoming a 
source of external economy of scale.  
 
Most Marshallian external economies are also considered as static externalities, as 
they can increase productivity levels but do not make it grow indefinitely17. Conversely, 
Knowledge spillovers, including the ones resulting from dynamic learning-by-doing, 
are a source of dynamic externalities, and can, under certain conditions, promote 
indefinite growth. Thus, we can define static external economies as the situation 
when social benefits are higher than what is suggested by market prices. Dynamic 
 
16 It is noteworthy that externalities are considered market failures, meaning that with any type of externality 
the market forces will not led to economic efficiency in terms of resources allocation.  
17 Marshallian external economies of scale can promote knowledge spillovers – an externality, by the simple fact 
that firms are close together, what facilitates the share of know-how, even in a single point in time, but 
potentially as a function of the size of the agglomeration (the number and size of firms). 
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external economies, on the other hand, happens when the flow of social return of an 
investment is higher than the costs reflected by market prices.  
 
In international trade, models assuming imperfect competition (and thus internal 
economies of scale) could provide a rationale for protection beyond that derived from 
external economies of scale. As stated by Junius (1997), external economies of scale 
provide a path dependence mechanism that makes any initial cost-advantage a 
reason for further investments, in a circular causation (Myrdal, 1957), or with 
forward and backward production linkages (Hirschman, 1958). As also noted by 
Junius, this is another way to express the concept of dynamic comparative 
advantages, and also the existence of multiple equilibria, where the winning region 
could have been anyone, but will be the one that first attract the initial investments. In 
growth theories, endogenous growth explains growth by externalities.     
 
As in Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), a latent or dynamic comparative 
advantage would be a potential comparative advantage resulting from the exploitation 
of the available externalities (static and dynamic), discounted by the opportunity costs 
involved. 
 
The last concept, the effective rate of protection, is the protection of final goods 
taking into consideration the protection of intermediate goods used in the production 
of that final good and the share of value-added in the production of the final good. 
Ceteris paribus, when you increase the protection of intermediate goods you decrease 
the protection of final goods, and the lower is the share of value-added, the higher will 
be effective rate of protection for any set of tariffs18. To fully protect against foreign 
competition all economic sectors in an economy, a policymaker would need to set all 
import prices above the domestic prices, through the imposition of a tariff (or another 
equivalent policy).Considering the entire value chain is produced (and then protected) 
domestically, this means that the nominal protection for final goods would need to be 
even higher. 
 
 
 
18 Provided the tariffs on inputs are lower than that on the final product. 
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2.2 Theoretical rationale for trade protection and for trade 
liberalization 
 
Importance of assumptions 
 
In a broader debate (impact on growth), Dani Rodrik reframe the idea that, when we 
consider dynamic (latent) comparative advantages, instead of only static ones, we 
could arrive at either net positive or at net negative effects of trade protection: “There 
is no determinate theoretical link between trade protection and growth once real-world 
phenomena such as learning, technological change, and market imperfections (here 
captured by a learning-by-doing externality) are taken into account” (Rodriguez and 
Rodrik, 2000, page 272). 
 
The discussion as to whether trade liberalization promotes economic growth or 
industrial competitiveness, or not, is not only context-dependent (thus an empirical 
question), but also assumption-dependent, if are looking at theoretical models. A vast 
myriad of factors can alter the theoretical base for trade protection or liberalization. 
There is, therefore, situations and assumptions where trade protection is economically 
sound from a theoretical point of view, grounded on microeconomic foundations, as 
there are cases and assumptions where trade liberalization is the most efficient policy. 
We can then list the following factors that can affect the result:  
 
a. Industrial organization assumptions about the market structure: perfect 
competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, or monopoly; 
b. The existence and type of market failures other than non-perfect 
competition, such as unemployment; externalities etc;  
c. Differences in perspectives: partial or general equilibrium19; and static or 
dynamic analysis20  .  
 
19 While a partial equilibrium will analyse only the effects on a chosen sector, a general equilibrium framework 
would include the effects and the feedback effects on and from other industries and other countries, as well 
between intermediate goods` suppliers and final goods` producers. 
20 Static analysis would focus in efficiency gains in a specific point of time, while a dynamic analysis would take 
into consideration a temporal path and results in the future. 
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The baseline case 
 
In an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, without market failures, free trade is Pareto-efficient. 
As explained by Buffie (2001), within this case free trade would be optimal because it 
would equate consumers` marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and producers’ marginal 
rate of transformation (MRT) to the relative world market prices of goods21. This would 
then be an efficient outcome. Therefore, under perfect competition and information, 
and no market distortions, protection against foreign competition decreases welfare. 
Moreover, within this framework, a country should specialize in producing what it has 
relative comparative advantages in. Proceeding this way this economy will make the 
most efficient use of its resources and will be able to buy more of what it does not 
produce. A tariff, for instance, would generate a dead weight loss of surplus given the 
fact that the domestic producers that don’t have enough efficiency to survive under 
free trade now are in the market, producing at higher costs (thus using other resources 
from the economy). This inefficient domestic production means a higher cost to the 
economy in terms of opportunity costs of production factors and resources. 
 
The social costs of a tariff protection could mainly come from: 
1) Consumption distortions: net loss of consumer surplus, given the higher prices 
paid domestically (it is “net” because the loss of consumer surplus is deducted 
from the resources that are not spent anymore on the imported good and now 
will be spent on other goods, with lower utility. This difference in utilities is the 
basis for the deadweight loss of the consumer surplus); 
2) Production distortions: extra costs of producing the protected good, instead of 
importing it cheaper and producing something else domestically (with better 
efficiency). 
 
 
 
 
21 Under those assumptions, every opportunity cost would be reflected by market prices, and private marginal 
costs would then be expressed as the sum of all opportunity costs of the factors used.   
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Departing from the baseline: imperfect competition, unemployment, and 
externalities 
 
Policy intervention could be welfare-improving if the perfect competition and no market 
failures assumption is not holding. And this is the real-world case. To improve welfare 
under these cases the literature suggests that the cause of the specific market failure 
should be tackled directly, meaning that tariffs would only be recommended if trade is 
the cause of market failure (Buffie, 2001). Otherwise we would be using second-best 
policies instead of first-best ones. 
 
Let`s start to add market failures. Supposing a market structure of imperfect 
competition, where it is possible to have internal economies of scale, protection could 
promote scale gains in the domestic industry and therefore reduce marginal costs of 
production22. However, there are two counterarguments against the claim that the 
reduction of marginal costs generated by the increase in internal scale at firm level 
would potentially counterbalance the domestic consumption surplus losses, cited 
before. The first counterargument is (a) if there were internal economies of scale, the 
domestic producer would have increased its production to reap the benefits, without 
the need for the society to incur in the costs of protection; (b) as we shall see later in 
this thesis, widespread domestic protection can also hinder scale gains, as it could 
bias the economy towards diversification and then hinder specialization. Therefore, 
promoting an inefficient allocation of production resources; c) protection for inputs 
could eventually negatively affect the competitiveness and scale of production of final 
goods. 
 
There is also the possibility that production factors are unemployed, and their 
opportunity costs may not be reflected in the market prices. This could also happen 
because of other market distortions. In this case, the social value of production factors 
could be smaller than the private marginal costs, and, therefore, protection would imply 
less opportunity costs. In other words, protection would allow the use of unemployed 
 
22 It is important to note that, although it is an industry characterized by internal economies of scale, there could 
be market characteristics such as a love for variety that makes the existence of different producers viable. This 
is encompassed by the monopolistic competition models with differentiated goods. Moreover, institutional 
constraints such as competition and antitrust regulations, or even weak societal laws, could induce a suboptimal 
domestic production pattern. 
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resources that otherwise would remain unemployed, thus potentially enhancing 
welfare23. These opportunity costs are also known in the literature as efficiency prices, 
or shadow prices. The message is that without perfect competition and information, or 
in the presence of some market distortion, market prices do not reflect the economic 
value of resources. Therefore, under market failures, the private marginal cost would 
not properly account for the social opportunity costs.  
 
Either under an imperfect competition or under a perfect competition framework, 
another different outcome would appear if we assume the existence of positive 
externalities in production. This would also give another rationale for protection, as an 
eventual new or expanded domestic activity that generates externalities could 
potentially compensate the costs of protection24. The focus would then be on how to 
assess the potential size of these externalities, to verify if they in fact compensate for 
the costs of protection. Buffie (2001) demonstrates that with external economies of 
scale, for example, a small tariff can be welfare-improving, as the benefits of the 
increased domestic production could be bigger than the costs in terms of consumption 
distortions. However, there is still a discussion on if a production subsidy would have 
the same benefit, with less distortions, provided, for example, that the taxation needed 
to raise funds for the subsidy is not too distortive. 
 
One argument derived from the existence of potential externalities is the infant industry 
argument: protection would allow learning by doing because there would be the 
accumulation of time for the workers to improve their abilities within the new industry. 
This learning by doing is derived from time, not necessarily from the scale (size) of the 
industry, as showed in the earlier paragraphs. However, if we assume that this learning 
by doing is only internal to the firm – in other words, the learning does not leak to the 
rest of the industry or economy, we would incur in the same criticisms and 
 
23 Buffie (2001) provide a general equilibrium model that accounts for different scenarios and assumptions to 
calculate the size of protection that could improve welfare in the case of unemployment and underinvestment. 
The result points to a steep tariff escalation, to allow access to imported inputs, but keeping nominal tariffs on 
final goods at a relatively low level: 7 to 10% in the case were there is unemployment causing a wage differential 
of around 50% between the manufacture sector and other sectors in the economy. The main reason for the 
tariffs to be low, as pointed by the author, is that demand for imports is very elastic, and then any increase in 
the protection level can increase the consequent distortions more than proportionately.   
24 These externalities could be in the form of technological spillovers; specialized input availability; labour 
pooling and others. 
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counterarguments explained for the case of internal economies of scale. For we to 
overcome those criticisms it is necessary to assume that the learning derived from the 
time the industry was protected leaks, thus being a positive production externality. This 
learning by doing with spillovers is usually assumed to be concentrated in industries 
with higher technological content. Ultimately, the economy could gain enough 
competitiveness and then relative comparative advantage in a sector with more growth 
potential – this is what is referred in the literature as dynamic comparative advantages 
or defying comparative advantages.  
 
Then, if we consider a dynamic framework, we arrive at arguments that advocate the 
use of protection to modify comparative advantages, as already exemplified by the 
infant industry argument.  However, there still are practical difficulties, such as how to 
assess and measure externalities, and political difficulties, such as possible 
retaliations from other countries, and the risk of rent-seeking behaviour and capture 
by lobbies seeking further protection.  
 
Putting together assumptions and results 
 
Taking together Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001), Trindade (2005), and Matsuyama 
(1992) we can summarize what economic theory has to say about trade protection 
and economic growth: 
a) Under static models and no market distortion any trade protection would 
produce a smaller real GDP level; 
b) Assuming the existence of market failures, even under static models trade 
protection could, sometimes, generate a higher real GDP level;   
c) Under the assumption of endogenous growth generated by technological 
spillovers (externalities) the result is ambiguous: trade protection would reduce 
real world GDP growth (as it would reduce the market size for some 
innovations), but could also prevent a fall in GDP for some countries that would 
be left behind in the case of a trade liberalization (if technology does not 
sufficiently spillover across international borders). If the trade protection 
promotes the development of a sector able to generate enough positive 
externalities in the future, endogenous growth models can show a positive 
effect on real GDP growth rates. If trade protection makes more difficult for the 
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domestic economy to produce or adopt technology, protection is obviously 
damaging growth prospects; 
d) Assuming coordination failures and externalities in the form of forward and 
backward linkages, trade protection would also be ambiguous: i) a further 
assumption that inputs are non-tradable would support the case for trade 
protection to promote domestic production of intermediate goods and then 
further domestic linkages, what arguably would promote the competitiveness of 
several industrial sectors; ii) assuming input-tradability, trade protection could 
be unnecessary (or even damaging) – as the economy could make better use 
of key imported inputs – and then the domestic production would follow a path 
where it has more competitiveness.  
 
Figure 2 – How assumptions affect the desirability of free trade 
 
ASSUMPTION POLICY TO MAXIMIZE GROWTH
STATIC MODELS WITHOUT 
MARKET DISTORTIONS
STATIC MODELS WITH 
MARKET DISTORTIONS
DYNAMIC MODELS WITH 
EXTERNALITIES (EITHER 
KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVERS 
(INCLUDING LEARNING-BY-
DOING) AND DOMESTIC 
LINKAGES)
FREE TRADE
SOME
PROTECTION
FREE TRADE
FREE TRADE
SOME
PROTECTION
WITH THE 
POTENTIAL TO
AFFECT ONLY THE 
LEVEL OF REAL 
GDP
WITH THE 
POTENTIAL TO
AFFECT REAL GDP 
GROWTH RATES
Depending on the size and nature of 
market distortions and externalities, 
and on the assumptions regarding the 
crossborder nature of technology 
spillovers and the tradability of inputs.
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The theoretical literature then seems to point to a bottom line were the result 
will depend on how trade protection affects domestic externalities – it could in 
theory either promote it or hinder it. A Myriad of theoretical models thus seek to 
gain insights into those ambiguities, trying to explain specific mechanisms, or 
channels, from trade policy to economic growth.  
 
Static externalities and distortions 
 
Any activity that is induced by trade protection and that provides a social benefit 
superior to the private benefits, and those social benefits are constant over time could 
be characterized as a static externality. If trade protection is needed for this, it would 
be warranted – provided these benefits outweigh the social costs of protection, of 
course. For example, the availability of a pool of specialized labour attracted by the 
process of agglomeration in an industrial cluster can be classified as a permanent 
externality.  
 
Unemployment, for example, could be a static or a dynamic distortion. In static terms, 
a tariff could be welfare-improving if the avoided unemployment costs are higher than 
the consumption and production distortions brought by the tariff. However, this is not 
always the case, as the distortions can be higher, and, moreover, protection could be 
refraining a dynamic resource reallocation of labour from less to more competitive 
industries. This would then be a source of lower productivity and lower growth. Thus, 
the case for trade protection to alleviate unemployment would be more likely to make 
sense when relatively small tariffs are sufficient to maintain relatively large 
employment levels, and this is more likely to happen in labour-intensive industries. 
This conclusion helps to explain the success of sectors such textiles in lobbying to 
maintain relatively high protection levels in many developing countries, including 
Brazil.  
 
Nonetheless, the case for tariffs is very undermined by the fact that a production 
subsidy would not generate the consumption distortion of the tariffs, and, besides 
potentially incurring in a distortionary taxation and higher administrative costs, could 
potentially be a superior policy.  Moreover, any employment kept at the expenses of 
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higher tariffs or subsidies could mean that an initial static inefficient resource allocation 
could eventually turn into a dynamic distortion, as the economy would tend to stick to 
labour-intensive sectors that could be less dynamic in the future.  
 
Dynamic externalities related to mature industries 
 
As an example of dynamic externalities that could be promoted by supporting mature 
industries, we have externalities generated by innovation and technology spillovers, 
resulting from higher production scale. This can thus be an argument for the promotion 
of “national champions”, or simply to the growth of already mature industries. 
 
We define National champions as large companies incentivized by Governments to 
became even larger and thus reap economies of scale benefits25. The theoretical case 
for the promotion of “national champions” through trade protection share many of the 
arguments used for the infant industry and other import-substitution strategies. The 
choice of policy to support those industries may vary, though, as national champions 
can be fostered by the promotion of mergers, for example. The rationale is usually the 
same: to foster innovation and reduce costs through economies of scale and scope. 
The main assumptions are that bigger firms can deliver more than proportionate 
increases in innovation26 and other social gains (thus, there are either internal and 
external economies of scale - externalities), and that some internal economies of scale 
could not be achieved by market forces alone (implicitly assuming problems in the 
institutional setting). However, on top of all caveats and theoretical weakness applied 
to the infant industry arguments, the promotion of national champions also bears the 
question of how important is to have a “national” firm, vis a vis a foreign owned with 
the same investments in the domestic market27. Furthermore, firms that are too big 
can be shown to have less incentive to innovate (see chapter 3), and mergers can 
 
25 This definition is related to the example of Korean chaebols. 
26 Theoretical arguments behind this assumption: being bigger would imply being less prone to failure and thus 
less risky, what would then encourage suppliers to work together within R&D, and being bigger would allow 
access to higher amounts of funds, necessary to finance some R&D. 
27 The benefits of such a firm being “national” rests on a set of possibilities similar to that of FDI: depending on 
the type and characteristics of the firm and the market, being domestically owned or being foreign owned could 
have similar or different implications.   
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increase the degree of oligopolization, with effects on prices and output. (Falck, Gollier 
and Woessmann, 2011; and Spector, Chapsal and Eymard, 2009). 
 
Another potential argument for protection of mature industries would be imperfect 
information: if the risks of investing in a firm or sector is high because of a lack of 
information or knowledge, but this investment could potentially generate enough 
externalities, protection may be used to incentivize the investment. However, as 
pointed by Baldwin (1969), tariffs cannot provide the information needed by those 
investors, and thus may be ineffective.  
 
Dynamic externalities related to infant industries and industrialization efforts in 
general 
 
There are many different arguments for infant industry, in the literature. Following the 
work of Grubel (1966), Baldwin (1969), and Kemp (1960) we will present the evolution 
of such arguments, and the eventual weakness.  
 
Classical arguments (based on the assumption of perfect competition): 
(i)“Broad classical argument”: as explained by Gruebel (1966), it calls for overall 
industrialization, arguing that the private rate of return of the investments in industry is 
lower than the social benefits in terms of a society better prepared to engage in such 
economic activities.  
(ii) “Narrow classical argument” – learning-by-doing: Time devoted to an industry, 
domestically, allow for a reduction in its average production costs.  
 
In both cases, under perfect competition, protection would be potentially justified only 
if these activities do generate enough externalities (these need to be available to other 
firms and be sufficiently large to pay for all social protection costs), otherwise the 
private decisions under free trade would reach the potential outcome without the need 
of distorting tariffs or costly subsidies. (Gruebel, 1966; Kemp, 1960).  As a result, under 
these assumptions, the valid argument for infant industry protection is that of 
externalities arising from learning-by-doing (Gruebel, 1966). Thus, the most accepted 
of the traditional infant industry arguments is that learn by doing will spillover onto 
other firms or sectors, therefore generating a positive production externality that will 
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allow the average production costs to be reduced to a point eventually equal (or even 
bellow) the international prices. At this point protection would be unnecessary. 
However, as noted by Baldwin (1969), there are counterarguments: even if firms are 
not able to fully protect the learning generated by their own employees (what the 
author believes they can do through contractual arrangements, for example), it would 
be expected that workers would finance their training – if this was indeed valuable to 
other firms – and sell their knowledge. Therefore, market forces would be able to foster 
learning by doing spillovers without the need of tariffs.      
 
“Modern” arguments (based on the assumption of imperfect competition and 
uncertainty): 
(i) Hirschman linkages and the interdependence of investments: The interdependence 
argument is based on a potential need for coordinated investments in order to allow 
for a higher internal economy of scale, in a process that can then generate externalities 
to the whole industry. Similarly, Hirschman points that with trade protection is possible 
to direct investments to a sector with more potential linkages and thus more potential 
externalities in this sense (Grubel, 1960). 
(ii) Any distortion that reduces investment in industries with more growth potential. As 
an example, wages in manufacturing that are higher than their opportunity costs, or 
new activities that involve a higher risk for the first entrants (without a proportionate 
potential reward).  
(iii) Protection against developed countries` imports, while allowing trade and 
subsequent internal scale gains among developing countries, what then would 
generate domestic external economies of scale.  
 
For most of the 20th century, the most used theoretical framework for industrial policy 
in developing countries was the Infant Industry Argument28. The traditional Infant 
Industry Argument (as defended by John Stuart Mill, following the ideas of Hamilton 
and List) is based on a temporary protection allowing a learning process and the 
accumulation of skills and know how that could then drive down production costs, 
making the home industry able to compete with foreign countries that had the 
 
28 The infant industry argument was pioneered by Friedrich List ("The National System of Political Economy", 
1841) and by John Stuart Mill (“Principles of Political Economy", 1848). Later on, economies of scale (Graham, 
1923) and externalities (Arrow, 1962) were studied as potential reasons for protection. 
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advantages of starting earlier. As discussed by Baldwin (1969), this learning can be 
internal to the firm or external to the firm. In the internal to the firm case, the social 
benefits would come in terms of more employment and income, but, as a later literature 
stress, it cannot provide a theoretically robust reason for protection, as someone can 
always assume that the private sector would be able to finance industries with potential 
internal economies of scale (Baldwin, 1969).  
 
The main critics against the infant industry arguments can be summarized as follows: 
1 – The capital markets would finance any viable investment, and thus the only scope 
for subsidies or trade protection would be when there are externalities, and these 
externalities need to be large enough to compensate for all social costs generated by 
protection or subsidies29; 
2 – The government lacks the necessary information to guide policy; 
3 – There are potentially more efficient alternatives to foster the targeted sectors (such 
as subsidies, for example); 
4 – Rent-seeking can turn the temporary protection into permanent ones, and also 
promote a level of protection unnecessarily high. Moreover, the belief in their lobby 
power and in a potentially permanent protection could make firms enjoy the protection 
without proper investments and learning. 
 
Assuming the potential positive externalities are possible to estimate, and if the 
decision is to use a sectoral policy instead of a more horizontal ones, the decision 
about protecting/subsidizing or not the infant industry will need to be assessed by a 
comparison of the potential learning and externality generation and the costs of 
 
29 Now brief comments on the choice of tariffs, quotas, and subsidies, as a deeper discussion on it is beyond this 
thesis. Buffie (2001) considers that quotas are not theoretically defensible, while Melitz (2005) argue for its 
superiority in some cases. If a lump sum tax is not possible, a government would have to use a distortionary tax 
to finance a subsidy. However, as explained by Buffie (2001), a “consumption tax on the importable good, 
smaller than the equivalent tariff, would suffice to pay for the subsidy”. On the other hand, a system of taxation 
and subsidies have more administrative costs.  Moreover, if the source of distortion is endogenous, such as the 
example found in Buffie (2001) of Unions raising the manufacturing wages as a strategical response to policy, 
the desirability of tariffs or subsidies would depend on other behavioural assumptions. 
  In other words, to develop industries that are too far from the viability level can be impracticable, as a necessary 
condition for the argument to hold is that the industry can be competitive in the future and thus protection is 
temporary. 
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supporting the sector, both brought at present value30. This is the so-called Mill-
Bastable criteria, formalized in Melitz (2005). The question is a cost-benefit analysis, 
taking into consideration the present value of the benefits in terms of externalities 
generated (remembering that the benefits in terms of internal economies of scale 
should be privately financeable) and the costs of protection. The decision of protecting 
or not a sector is then an empirical one and will depend on the result of the Mill-
Bastable test: if the protected industry generates enough externalities (specially 
learning externalities), if it is able to compete without protection after some time, and 
if the total social benefits of protection outweigh the total social costs.(Melitz, 2005).   
 
Figure 3 – An expanded “Bastable-test”. 
 
 
Thus, to “pass” a Bastable-test as depicted in figure “4” above, an industry should 
display either enough externalities (Marshallians or not) or a latent comparative 
advantage (i.e. scope for rising externalities), and, with enough positive externalities 
there is theoretical basis even for permanent protection (Harrison and Rodriguez-
Clare, 2010). 
 
 
30 In other words, to develop industries that are too far from the viability level can be impracticable, as a 
necessary condition for the argument to hold is that the industry can be competitive in the future and thus 
protection is temporary. 
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However, the literature suggests other aspects that need to be considered in order to 
assess the potential costs and benefits of an Infant Industry Argument strategy. One 
of particular importance for developing countries is the possibility of the Infant Industry 
tariff structure or subsidy inducing the use of a worse technology. This could happen 
by different channels, but a protection of inputs harming the final goods` production is 
perhaps the most common. The idea is similar to the debate regarding the use of Local 
Content Requirements31: if the final goods` producers have less access to imported 
inputs (potentially cheaper or with better quality) – either by regulatory imposition or 
by fact of import tariffs, domestic final goods` producers may show lower 
competitiveness, lower sales, and then lower scale, in a vicious circle32.  
 
As the infant industry argument is all about generating learning and externalities, a 
potential attachment to more traditional or less efficient technologies can abort all the 
development process. This idea is found in Saure (2007). However, this idea is in 
contrast with the arguments asking for a more diversified economy, found in different 
strands of the literature, such as, for example, Matsuyama (1992).     
 
Saure (2007) and Milberg, Jiang and Gereffi (2014) suggests a modification of the 
infant-industry model to allow for the negative effects of using a more expensive and 
less advanced input when there is protection. The first author synthesizes his 
argument saying that “infant industry argument suffers a severe drawback when the 
sectors that exhibit learning externalities can be out-competed by a domestic 
traditional low-growth technology” (Saure, 2007, p. 115). The assumption that 
domestic producers can chose a lower technology is reasonable and the literature 
 
31 In fact, local content requirements would only prevent access to certain foreign inputs if there are mandatory 
deletion requirements. Otherwise the choose of inputs to reach the minimum threshold of local content is made 
by the firm.  
32 However, an important observation needs to be done: in the Brazilian automotive sector most first-tier 
suppliers are foreign multinational firms, with access to world-class technology. Thus, local content 
requirements would only negatively affect technology adoption if the requirements reach lower tiers in the 
supply chain or if they are set sufficiently high to prevent the use of inputs that were imported by the first-tier 
suppliers but cannot be domestically-produced at reasonable costs. Local Content Requirements would neither 
encourage new investments from these multinational suppliers, as their location decisions are very attached to 
the location decisions of automakers – in fact, high local content requirements could even have the opposite 
effect: if the requirements make automakers`s costs too high, they may decide not to locate their production at 
the domestic market and thus would be followed by the tier 1 suppliers.    
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admit that even technologically advanced goods can be manufactured using 
alternative low technologies (Lederman and Maloney, 2004). 
 
Protection can negatively affect domestic scale because it can increase the costs of 
inputs, and then reduce competitiveness and exports. On the other hand, it can 
promote domestic production, if externalities compensate for the overall lower 
competitiveness. As Krugman (1995) explains, since Ethier (1979) it is mentioned that 
most trade within an industry is among differentiated intermediate goods, and thus 
there is probably much international external economies of scale on this ground. 
Therefore, tapping into a foreign-based supply of intermediate goods produced at high 
scale could be more efficient than relying on domestically produced low scale inputs.  
 
Infant industry argument can be applicable in an industry dominated by multinationals 
as well: although these firms already have access to knowledge, the training and 
experience given to the domestic employees can be beneficial for the future 
competitiveness of domestic operations of that multinational and also for other sectors, 
if this knowledge leaks.   
 
Imported X domestically-produced intermediate goods  
 
Import Substitution Strategies relies on the State to lead the development process, 
and thus it can be said that this type of policy is inspired by Keynesian economics. 
Moreover, although it has usually an inward-looking perspective, in opposition to trade-
liberalization approaches, it can be combined with export targets.  
 
An array of theories and arguments provided the theoretical basis for Import-
Substitution as a development theory. Among these arguments there are the infant 
industry argument; the theory of terms of trade deterioration for primary goods vis a 
vis industrial goods; horizontal complementarities (the existence of enough domestic 
sectors – intermediate and final goods, allowing the creation of other sectors, thanks 
to the linkages among these sectors); vertical complementarities (the existence of 
domestic inputs allowing the existence of final goods production and vice versa; and 
the “big push” argument (the promotion of virtuous growth cycles initiated by an 
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uncoordinated or a coordinated private or state action)33. The goal of I.S. strategies 
could include: 1) reaching a “critical mass”, when the emphasis was on having a 
broader industrial basis in order to allow the domestic production of other sectors – as 
forecasted by “big push” arguments and production linkages (Hirschman, 1957); 2) 
internal to the firm scale gains, to allow for cost reductions of “national champions” 
and to generate domestic market for suppliers; 3) external to the firm scale gains; and 
4) to acquire experience and skills through time devoted to production, as argued by 
infant-industry arguments. 
 
Thus, apart from the obvious case for export promotion and the coordination efforts, 
the overall theoretical and empirical question to be solved is the trade-off between 
specialization and diversification.  
    
Inputs can be assumed to be tradables or non-tradables. Models that assume that 
inputs are non-tradable would tend to favour trade protection as a policy to foster 
domestic input production, hoping for the creation of a “critical mass” and then 
conditions for a dynamic scale growth. Thus, these models argue that trade 
liberalization for intermediate goods would damage the intermediate domestic sector 
and without enough domestically-produced inputs there would be lower domestic 
production complementarities (for some models the important are horizontal 
complementarities34, while for others, vertical complementarities)  and thus lower 
competitiveness for the final goods and lower economic growth for the country. 
Matsuyama (1992) is an example of models focusing on the importance of vertical 
complementarities (domestic input availability favouring final goods production and 
vice versa). These ideas can be seen as a generalization of Infant industry arguments, 
as they ask for the development of entire sections of manufacturing sectors, potentially 
including suppliers from other industries.  
 
 
33 “Big-push” strategies could also be initiated without the need of protection, using, for example, export 
promotion and policies that promote coordination or that supply the basic needed infrastructure. 
34 Basically, assuming that a developing country should tackle all its complementarities and bottleneck at once, 
would face the obvious caveat that under limited resource availability this is logically impracticable. The 
argument is then that some investment decisions are interdependent, and the development process would be 
faster if the sectors with higher domestic linkages are promoted, as suggested by Albert Hirschman.    
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Matsuyama (1992) argues that the low availability of domestically-produced 
specialized inputs would imply a higher use of labour-intensive technologies and then 
the country would be locked to a lower stage of development. In other words, the 
availability of input variety would allow a better choice of technology. It is assumed 
that these domestically-produced inputs gain competitiveness with scale, as the 
intermediate sector is assumed to be monopolistically-competitive. Moreover, as 
mentioned before, the assumption of non-tradability of inputs is crucial for the model. 
It is also worthwhile to reinforce that coordination issues are considered by the author 
as a type of externality, to justify the trade protection: the virtuous cycle of growing 
production in some sectors helping to grow the production of other sectors.   
 
On the other hand, arguing for trade liberalization in inputs we have models that predict 
specialization within the domestic intermediate goods and also access to better 
technology from imported inputs. Trindade (2005), for example, argues that a trade 
liberalization in an intermediate sector characterized by increasing returns of scale, 
and tradable inputs, could induce specialization35 within that intermediate sector 
(some inputs would gain scale while others would cease to exist domestically) and this 
would foster the competitiveness of final goods and would promote a gradual forward 
and backward linkages` growth. Assuming that the exporting sector can generate 
domestic positive externalities, the economy would enter a virtuous cycle of increased 
availability of domestically-produced intermediate goods, all with enough scale to be 
competitive. Complementing this argument, Saure (2007), for example, highlights the 
risk of protecting intermediate goods leading to the use of less advanced technologies 
and thus damaging the prospects of dynamic scale growth.  
 
The underlying hypotheses is that access to imported inputs can bring lower costs, 
better quality and more variety (Ethier, 1979; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Halpern, 
Koren and Szeidl, 2015). Specifically starting with Ethier (1979) is the focus on the 
concentration of large-scale worldwide production of intermediate goods, and the 
subsequent dominance of these goods in international trade. Those models, such as 
Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2015) usually assume imperfect-substitution between 
 
35 In Trindade (2005) the specialization is driven by the assumption of increasing returns to scale in the 
intermediate goods, and a combination of higher competition between domestic firms and imports, and lower 
wages allowed by the trade liberalization.  
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foreign and domestic inputs, and thus the access to more variety of inputs – 
domestically and imported, is good for productivity. At the same time, a higher degree 
of imperfect-substitution means that there are some domestic inputs that would only 
be substituted by imported ones if the differences in cost-quality is big enough.  
    
Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) theorizes that the lack of enough specialized inputs 
forces firms to resort to production technologies that are more labour-intensive. This 
can be read as a defence of the domestic diversification: more variety of intermediate 
inputs domestically produced to be chosen from. However, the need for a variety of 
specialized intermediate inputs could also be fulfilled by imports – in fact, with greater 
variety. Thus, it follows the argument presented in Saure (2007), where protection 
against imported inputs forces firms to use less efficient technologies – a conclusion 
similar to Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996), but with opposite recommendations as it is 
favouring imports instead of domestic production of inputs. Saure (2007) and Milberg, 
Jiang and Gereffi (2014) suggests a modification of the infant-industry model to allow 
for the negative effects of using a more expensive and less advanced input when there 
is protection. The first author synthesizes his argument saying that “infant industry 
argument suffers a severe drawback when the sectors that exhibit learning 
externalities can be out-competed by a domestic traditional low-growth technology” 
(Saure, 2007, p. 115).      
 
Figure 4 illustrates the idea behind Saure (2007), showing that learning potential 
reduces the protection needed over time, and scale gains add to this effect. When 
there is less access to imported inputs there is a dragging effect on the learning and 
productivity growth, with reflex on the protection needed. This range of outcomes in 
the final graph is not presented in the original Saure`s model, but we believe it is 
straightforward to assume that in the extreme case the protection needed could 
increase over time. 
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Figure 4 – protection needed as a function of learning, scale and 
access to inputs  
 
 
The last graph shows that the level of protection needed for final goods could increase 
over time, if productivity is damaged by more protection on inputs, in a vicious cycle, 
if not enough scale is gained to counteract this effect. If there is enough domestic 
production scale gained, the protection needed could be flat or decreasing over time. 
 
The counter-argument against protection in a world with externalities would primarily 
say that some structures of protection can do harm, not good, to potentially externality-
generating industries: firstly because the level and duration of protection can easily be 
too high and then the costs of protection would be higher than the potential benefits 
arising from externalities; secondly because once potential externalities are properly 
identified, some structures of protection can negatively affect the competitiveness and 
catching up prospects of the targeted industry. As an example, we can think of the 
argument modelled in monopolistic competition models, where freer trade can allow 
Learning "Pure" learning Protection 
(productivity) needed*
Time Time
Learning With added scale effects Protection 
(productivity) needed*
Time Time
Learning Protection 
(productivity) With protection for inputs needed*
Time Time
*Protection needed: price differential between imports and domestic goods, in the domestic 
market, without any tariff.
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for more specialization, scale and efficiency gains, and thus promote the externality-
generator industry. The question is then where the industry would locate its value-
added activities, including production plants and R&D centres, for example. 
 
Fundamentally, policies promoting international competitiveness are conducive to the 
participation in global value chains, while protectionist policies tend to go in the 
opposite direction (Tijaja and Faisal, 2014; Saure, 2007; Halpern, Koren and Szeidl, 
2015). 
 
Global Value Chains can help firms and countries to achieve economies of scale 
through the specialization of production in intermediate goods and services to be sold 
globally or using intermediate goods and services produced abroad in these same 
GVCs.  
 
Stone et al (2015) cite Grossman (1981) as a seminal model for analysing the effects 
of local content requirements. This model assumes that domestic input supplier has 
lower technology and is more expensive than the alternative foreign supplier. The 
result is that the producer of domestic input will enjoy initially higher demands for his 
products, but domestic companies that buy that input will face higher costs and thus 
lower production and demand for that inputs. The net result will depend on the 
elasticities involved: if the demand for the “protected” inputs increase more or less 
than the increase in the prices of these inputs36.  
 
Goldberg et al (2010), highlights that theoretical models, such as Ethier (1982), Romer 
(1990), and Grossman and Helpman (1991), for example, predict productivity gains 
arising from imported inputs. 
 
While in the LCR argument, the production of final goods is negatively impacted by 
the rising costs (and maybe lower quality) of protected inputs, while in the Saure (2007) 
model, for example, the production of final goods is negatively impacted by the fact 
 
36 However, as also pointed by Grossman (1981), if the local content requirement favours a producer with market 
power the consequence is welfare loss, thanks to the enhanced ability of the producer in restrict production and 
increase prices.  
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that it now uses a less advanced technology. Overall, the final good can become worse 
and more expensive. At the end, the effect on the input sector would be the same: less 
demand.  
 
Young (1928) for instance, argue that the lack of good inputs prompts to the relatively 
simple methods of production in downstream industries, thus generating lower 
demand, in a vicious cycle. This could then be an argument for protection if it is not 
possible to rely on foreign inputs.  
  
Thus, economic theory seems to point to free trade as a superior policy to enhance 
welfare when there is: no market failures; or, even with knowledge externalities if this 
knowledge spillovers across borders. On the other hand, the theoretical literature 
basically points to the existence of market failures (unemployment, externalities etc) 
as the situations where some protection against imports could be welfare-enhancing. 
However, structures of protection that undermine the overall scale and 
competitiveness of other sectors can be counterproductive. Thus, it is not only a matter 
of identifying and assessing the existence of externalities and other market failures, 
but also of how to proper design an eventual structure of protection, if this is indeed 
needed. As market failures are the norm in the real world, the question is how to design 
the structure of protection to reduce distortions, minimize government failures, and 
promote, instead of damage, overall competitiveness.   
 
 
2.3 The evolution of trade theories and industrial policies 
 
As stated by Krugman et al (2014), the trade literature still reckons that international 
borders and distance have important effects on trade patterns and production location. 
The most important difference between what is accepted now and what was the 
mainstream in the international trade literature before the 1980s is that now internal 
economies of scale complement the relative comparative advantages37 as 
 
37 The relative comparative advantage Ricardian model is based on the relative productivity of labour: a country 
would specialize and then export the goods in where it has relatively more labour productivity on it. On the 
other hand, the Hecksher-Ohlin model predicts a country would specialize and export the good that uses more 
intensively the resource or the production factor that is abundant in that country, given the available 
technologies (combinations of labour and capital). 
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explanations for international trade38. Arguably, scale would better explain 
interindustry trade between developed countries, each one specialized in a variety of 
the good, while relative comparative advantages would still be the predominant 
explanation for trade with developing nations. However, as industrialization is not 
confined to developed countries anymore, especially in some industries that have 
strong economies of scale, the literature seems to be treating both explanations – 
scale and comparative advantages – as potentially reinforcing each other.  
 
It is important to note that an industry can be capital-intensive at the same time it uses 
low-skilled labour, and that higher labour productivity can allow a workforce that is 
more expensive to still be more competitive in producing labour-intensive goods. Thus, 
potential multiple interactions regarding factor productivity can be in place to determine 
the relative comparative advantage of a country in a specific industry (Krugman et al, 
2014 and Feenstra, 2015).  
 
The comparative advantage explanations for trade assume constant returns to scale. 
The assumption of externalities (external economies of scale) was a next step, still 
assuming perfect competition. As we noted earlier in this chapter, the idea of external 
economies of scale can be traced back to Marshall, who argued that firms clustering 
around a geographical area would be more efficient than isolated ones because they 
would benefit from more availability of specialized suppliers, more availability of 
labour, and from knowledge spillovers among the firms in the cluster39. Although the 
intention to promote clusters and external economies of scale can be used as a reason 
for trade protection40, it would also be possible to argue that trade liberalization allows 
more access to specialised suppliers in the form of imported inputs, as discussed in 
the previous section. Labour pooling would be indeed more likely in case of clusters, 
given the fact labour is usually less mobile. Finally, technology spillovers could be 
higher in either structure, depending on the assumption if technology spillover across 
 
38 Only after assuming imperfect competition did the trade models formally incorporate internal economies of 
scale, following the seminal monopolistic competition modelling of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).  
39 A combination of initial comparative advantages and historical “by chance” events could have led to “first 
mover advantages” and then the consolidation of external economies of scale in that location. 
40 Free trade and concentration in worldwide single locations would be more efficient from the world point of 
view, but if the positive externalities do not perfectly transpose international borders, individual countries could 
have incentives to promote location within its own borders.  
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borders or are geographically concentrated41. Either way, since the understanding of 
the potentialities of externalities, industrial and trade policies focus on how to promote 
sectors with more potential external economies of scale.  
 
Structuralist or evolutionist views emphasize the need to defy comparative advantages 
in order to promote development, and the underlying coordination role of governments. 
This view traditionally advocates for import-substitution policies and different types of 
the infant-industry framework. The objective of such policies is to create new dynamic 
comparative advantages, in sectors that could generate more technological spillovers 
and hence productivity gains to the economy, or to generate backward and forward 
linkages through the economy (Chang, 2009; Lin, 2009; Robinson, 2009; Rodrik, 
2008; Warwik, 2013; Schapiro, 2013; and Astorga, Cimoli and Porcile, 2014). In other 
words, positive externalities. 
 
The main criticism of the sectoral/structuralist approach is that the choice of targeted 
sectors is often based on weak economic considerations, subject to rent seeking 
behaviour, and lacks clear and enforceable conditionalities.  A corollary of this would 
be that losing sectors would lobby harder and thus keep a status quo that is no longer 
efficient for the economy (Warwick, 2013; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007). This 
view explains the condemnation of industrial policies from the 70’s until the 90’s, when 
the government failures were more highlighted and thus industrial policies in general 
were not recommended  
 
The evolutionary economics focus less on productive linkages and more on 
technological spillovers than the structuralists, but both share a view that government 
support is needed to create comparative advantages in sectors with more potential to 
generate growth. However, as trade is a potential source of technology, the 
evolutionary view tends to be less prone to protection against foreign competition than 
the structuralists. According to Salazar-Xirinachs,Nübler,and Kozul-Wright (2014), 
evolutionary economics emphasizes the need for supporting institutions that enable 
 
41 The literature lists various ways for firms to acquire technologies: in-house R&D; state-led R&D; adoption of 
technologies embebbed in imported goods and machinery; copy of a competitor`s technology; and learning-by-
doing externalities are among the most cited. However, a crucial aspect in the technology upgrading is 
absorptive capacity - a function of the education level of the workforce and the conducive business environment 
and institutional conditions.    
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firms to learn, in sectors where the learning process could generate positive spillovers 
and then allowing the economy to acquire comparative advantages in upgraded 
sectors (Reinert, 2009; Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009a; Greenwald and Stiglitz (2013). 
Chang (2013), for example, argue that better capabilities and better learning dynamics 
can explain the success of Japan and South Korea in their process of industrial 
upgrading and development.  
 
On the other hand, the neoclassical approach defends that a country should specialize 
in sectors where it has comparative advantages, not defying it. The basic assumption 
is that markets are efficient in channelling resources to its more productive ends, and, 
thus, any industrial policy should be done only in the presence of market failures, and 
after a careful examination of the potential government failures. 
 
More recently there has been a convergence between these apparently antagonist 
visions. This hybrid framework combines features of neoclassical economics and 
structuralism, having Justin Yifu Lin, Joseph Stiglitz and Dani Rodrik, among other 
economists, among its main proponents (Salazar-Xirinachs,Nübler,and Kozul-Wright, 
2014b). As an example of this type of hybrid models, there is Lin and Treichel (2014), 
who suggests a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate if it is worthwhile to try to defy existing 
comparative advantages. Their main point is that some sectors present growth 
potentials that can justify the risk of state intervention. This renewed approach keeps 
the belief that market failures can deter the technological transfer required to upgrade 
the economic structure and thus relying solely on existing comparative advantages 
would be pointless. On the other hand, they recognize the risks and costs of departing 
too much from the existing comparative advantages, thus suggesting that 
governmental interventions should be somehow market friendly (Lo and Mei, 2014).  
 
Part of the recently converging literature see market and government failures as 
equal problems, resulting in recommendations more concerning the design of 
such policies and advocating an emphasis on innovation policies (Naude, 2010). 
Summarizing the recommendations, Rodrik (2008) argues that to improve the 
quality of industrial policies it is necessary to have: (i) a better information flow 
between the private sector and the government; (ii) the imposition of 
conditionalities and a clear timeframe for benefits; and (iii) accountability. Other 
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authors suggest a closer look at competition, as the protection of old firms 
could prevent its replacement by new – and more productive – ones (Owen, 
2012; Acemoglu et al, 2013). 
 
ISI was advocated since mercantilist times and arguably adopted by virtually all 
industrialized countries, including the United States, in its industrialization process. In 
the 20th century it was widespread in the developing world (Salazar-Xirinachs, J., 
Nübler, I. and Kozul-Wright, R. (2014); Chang, Ha-Joon (2002)).  Nonetheless, ISI lost 
appeal after the 80s, among other reasons, because it appears that more export-
oriented strategies had more success. This helped to shift the mainstream view 
towards an agenda with more pro-trade policies, including the adjustment programs 
negotiated by international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF.  The 
example of South Korea, by instance, was taken by both sides of the debate as a proof 
of their validity: it would be viewed by some as an example of successful ISI strategy, 
conjugated with export targets; or an example of successful export-oriented approach, 
and a negation of the principles of ISI. A third view focus on the special characteristics 
of the south Korean economy, that would be not present in other developing countries, 
such as, for example, the availability of funds from the United States after the Korean 
war42.  
 
 
2.4 Brief contributions of institutional economics, industrial 
organization, and endogenous growth models  
 
Institution and the business environment 
 
Institutional economics studies how different institutions shape the behaviour of 
agents, through an evolutionary process that also consider the interaction of 
 
42 The main differences between the South Korean and the Latin American industrialization experiences, and 
that can explain why the South Koreans were more successful are: a) South Korea had preferential access to the 
US market and to US funds, in a cold war context; b) South Korea had access to technology spillovers from Japan; 
c) South Korea incentive exports, as its domestic market was quite small and the country had not enough natural 
resources to provide foreign currencies; d) South Korea did not neglect its human capital; e) South Korea 
implemented a system of tax incentives and export targets to force domestic firms to increase productivity and 
quality; f) South Korea firms had access to imported inputs (drawback), favouring the competitiveness of final 
goods. In this sense, South Korea chose industries, favouring mainly final goods ones. (Baumann, 2002). 
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physiological and legal aspects faced by each society. In a broader sense, following 
the definitions provided by Douglas North, Institutions are a set of rules and 
organizations that frame the way a society functions, guiding behaviour and interaction 
among members of that society. “At a time when the modern economy is becoming 
increasingly institutions-intensive, the reduction of economics to price theory is 
troubling enough. It is suicidal for the field to slide into a hard science of choice, 
ignoring the influences of society, history, culture, and politics on the working of the 
economy” (Coase, 2012). 
 
The so-called New Institutional Economics – NIE - merged concepts related to 
institutional economics with neoclassical economic modelling, formalizing the effects 
of property rights and transactions costs, and he interaction of political agents (public 
choice theory), for example. As proposed by Coase (1960), for example, property 
rights allow for negotiation among economic agents, and this can even solve 
externality problems. The NIEs includes the work of Ronald Coase, Douglas North; 
Oliver Williamsom; and Daron Acemoglu (2001)43. As proposed by these scholars, 
institutions can drive capital accumulation and investment decisions and promote 
cooperation among members of the society. Put it simply, institutions can not only set 
the path for the society and economic agents, providing the right (or the wrong) 
incentives, but can also potentialize or minimize given positive or negative 
characteristics of a society.  
 
Torvik (2016) points that Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) found that, although 
geography impacts institutions,  intuitional quality is the single most important variable 
to explain income differences among countries, while  trade integration is explicitly 
shown as to be not important, when institutions are taken into account. The most 
relevant institutions to promote investment, according to the literature, are the rule of 
law (including property rights and contract enforcement), the quality of the public 
sector in general (including regulation), and the political freedom (Menyashev et al, 
2011). This relationship is supported by econometric evidence, that confirms that 
institutions affect development, although there is also an opposite view, arguing that 
the level of development implies the quality of institutions (Menyashev et al, 2011). 
 
43 Examples: Coase (1960); North (1990); Williamson (1975); Acemoglu (2001). 
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The business environment can be understood as how easy is to setup and manage a 
business in a certain country. The easiest it is, the more investment is made in that 
location, thus potentially positively impacting productivity and growth. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) present the idea that bad institutions can be in the interest of 
incumbents that enjoy rents or benefits from the status quo.  Torvik (2016), citing Hall 
and Jones (1999), stress that institutions and economic policies define the business 
environment for economic activities and innovation.  
 
The balance of power within a society can led to the choice of institutions that favour 
the group in power, even if detrimental to the society in general. More specifically, 
powerful groups may prefer “weak property rights” as a way to keep institutions bad 
for outsiders, that would then be unable to compete with the political powers of the 
incumbent group (Torvik, 2016). An explanation of how some societies were able to 
overcome rent-seeking and promote better institutions can be found in the literature 
that shows that institutions develop incrementally, as put by North (1991).   
 
Moreover, as mentioned by Nunn and Trefler (2014), the usual channels for institutions 
to affect trade are through institutions favouring the accumulation of production factors; 
or the design of certain economic policies; or the rise of per capita income. All these 
have impacts on the comparative advantage of a country. Particularly, bad institutions 
or bad business environment can produce a tariff structure that incentive low-skill 
industries and then incentive low skill comparative advantages. This is closely related 
to the argument present in Saure (2007) and revisited in this thesis, with the difference 
that it goes further linking the choice of tariff structure to a bad institutional/business 
environment.  
 
There are, however, occasions when policies and reforms increase even more the 
economic and political powers of already dominant groups. In this case, such reforms 
can make ever difficult to promote future reforms aiming to reverse the initial path: 
“(…) one should be particularly careful about the political impacts of economic reforms 
that change the distribution of income or rents in a society in a direction benefiting 
already powerful groups. In such cases, well intentioned economic policies might tilt 
the balance of political power even further in favour of dominant groups, creating 
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significant adverse consequences for future political equilibria.” (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2013, p. 189). 
 
Internal economies of scale, competition, and monopolistic competition models 
 
Monopolistic competition with differentiated goods combines both a price and a non-
price competition, as it allows some market power to the firms, based on the perceived 
quality or other differentiating aspect of their products.  As in the perfect competition 
model, it contains many firms and the low entry and exit barriers keeps the economic 
profits close to zero (in formal models, at zero). The differentiated goods are possible 
because consumers demand choice options or different consumers have different 
tastes. Either way, it is assumed that consumers only imperfectly substitute these 
goods: the demand curve inclination will reflect the degree of this substitutability. 
Moreover, under a monopolistic competition market structure it is assumed that firms 
are small enough in relation to the whole market and therefore they do not take into 
consideration the production and price decisions of their competitors. Oligopolies, for 
instance, are markets with fewer firms, more market power, and strategic interactions 
among those firms, that chose the best combination of price and production based on 
the likely responses of their competitors.  
 
Under oligopoly the degree of competition would be a function of the number of firms 
and the degree of product differentiation, as both aspects contribute to the degree of 
market power of each firm. However, oligopolies can exist both with homogeneous44 
or differentiated products. There are many oligopoly models showing how firms would 
optimally choose their strategies based on some assumptions. In some cases, the 
strategic decisions of firms can lead to price rigidity: if price reductions are followed by 
the competitors, and if price increases are not followed – thus risking losing market-
share, the firm will tend to do not change its prices. The result is built on the 
assumption that goods are imperfectly substitutable (differentiated) and thus the result 
can be similar to monopolistic competition models45. This oligopoly model is refereed 
 
44 Thus, some source of entry barrier needs to be in place, such as sunk costs, scale economies, government 
regulations and so on.  
45 The striking difference is that under monopolistic competition firms decide their production levels and prices 
independently of the potential reaction of other firms, while under oligopoly the decision is taken after 
predicting the eventual reactions of competitors.   
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as the Kinked demand curve, and accordingly to our insights it is an oligopoly model 
that could eventually describe the Brazilian market of cars and light commercials 
production.   
 
Ceteris paribus, the degree of product differentiation affects the market power in both 
oligopolies and in monopolistic competition models. As Stiglitz (2017) explains, in the 
benchmark Dixit-Stiglitz model prices could still be above marginal costs (thus, not 
reaching perfect competition) if the number of producers increase but there is still 
enough product differentiation.  
 
Monopolistic competition models, initially formalized by Dixit and Stigltz (1977), were 
later used to show how internal economies of scale with differentiated goods can 
explain international trade (as in Krugman, 1980). If international trade thus promotes 
specialization of each country in each differentiated good, these models could also 
explain how international trade could induce internal economies of scale through 
specialization. Monopolistic competition models were also used to model other results, 
as for example the assumption of heterogenous firms, explaining how average 
productivity increases with trade liberalization, as in Melitz (2003). 
    
With differentiated products and internal economies of scale46, trade liberalization can 
induce specialization, but it is not possible to know a priori the pattern of geographical 
concentration. In fact, Krugman (1995) suggests that comparative advantages would 
be more important as an explanation for trade among different industries47 while scale 
would better explain intra-industry trade, but their relative importance would be given 
by the differences between each pair of countries.  
 
 
46 Higher internal scale could be achieved through protection, if there are “national champions” reaping the 
benefits of higher domestic market-shares. It could also be provided by trade liberalization, if domestic firms 
reach foreign markets and are able to expand production to levels higher than otherwise possible solely on its 
domestic market. A third possibility is the discriminating monopoly pricing, suggested by Krugman (1984), where 
the firm charges a higher price in its protected domestic market, and a lower price in its export markets. 
47 But Krugman (1995) also consider that trade between different industries can be caused by scale differentials, 
as there could be a first move advantages originated in historical accidents, for example, that allowed some 
country to start producing and gaining scale before its competitors, and then reinforcing or mitigating previous 
comparative advantages.  
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Given this uncertainty of location pattern, Krugman (1980) explains that the existence 
of scale gains is in the core of the arguments for some level of protection in the 
development process, but also provide indications of the limits and potential costs for 
government interventions. A subsequent development is what is called New Economic 
Geography literature. Its main conclusion is that what a country produces in the 
present time has impact on its comparative advantages in the future and thus on the 
pattern of spatial agglomeration, given the increasing economies of scale. Thus, 
without government intervention, industries tend to concentrate where they can exploit 
internal and external scale economies, contributing to what is called “agglomeration 
economies”. In this sense, free trade would promote a spatial concentration 
(cumulative causation) of industrial sectors towards regions with better conditions to 
exploit these scale gains (in other words, were it is cheaper to produce, in face of 
previous investments and production capacity and higher productivity levels, not 
necessarily lower labour costs). The main force to prevent such spatial concentration 
are transport costs. Therefore, with free trade, the result would depend on the 
magnitude of each of these factors, and the current location of industries would affect 
the future comparative advantages of each region (Fujita et al, 2001; Krugman, 1991; 
Hausmann et al, 2014; Veblen (1898) and Myrdal (1957)). Therefore, this assessment 
has been used to justify protection.  
 
Protection can lead either to lower or higher scale of production within the country. 
Less protection and the consequent integration into GVCs, for example, can lead to 
specialization and scale gains. The main channels for these results are then: a) 
Reallocation of market shares, with production going towards more efficient firms (as, 
for example, in Melitz, 2003); and b) Firms concentrating on their best products. More 
protection can, on the other hand, help domestic firms to secure market-share and 
thus increase scale. Within the monopolistic competition model, one could argue that 
the exploitation of economies of scale could be (at least initially) facilitated by 
protecting the domestic market, and not by opening it up. The rationale is that 
protecting domestic firms until they gain enough scale could allow them to gain 
productivity and be prepared for a trade liberalization. Only then the gains from trade 
would be offered also to the domestic firms. This argument is in this sense similar to 
the infant-industry argument. 
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Kucheryavyy, Lyn and Rodriguez-Claire (2016) points that gains from trade increase 
with scale, because firms already specialized in activities with comparative 
advantages will tend to achieve higher levels of productivity as their production 
increases. 
 
Krugman (1979), for example, says that trade enlarges market size, allowing for a 
better division of labour and thus higher productivity efficiency (thanks to 
specialization). This is then an argument for trade liberalization, to achieve higher 
internal economies of scale.  
 
De Loecker et al (forthcoming) summarize the channels through trade liberalization 
potentially can promote a better resource allocation and thus growth: a)exit of less 
productive firms (a la Melitz, 2003 etc); b) access to better and cheaper inputs (a la 
Goldberg et al (2010) and Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2015)); c) reductions in prices 
(a la Harrison (1994) and Levinsohn (1993)).  
 
Melitz (2003) is part of the “new new” trade theory, that highlights a new channel 
through trade liberalization can give rise to productivity: less barriers to trade allows 
the more productive firms to expand, while the less productive would tend to die in 
face of more competition. The result would be an increase in the average productivity 
of that country. In other words, when protection gets lower, the maximum marginal 
cost that allows a firm to stay in the market also gets lower, and then less firms are 
able to compete. These best firms are already the most productive in the domestic 
market and, as they tend to gain market-share they tend to grow, what could trigger 
further gains. It is then an example of an improvement in productivity caused by better 
resource allocation.    
 
Arguably, trade liberalization can boost x-efficiency, while protection would be 
increasing domestic profits, and, because of an income effect, increase willingness to 
leisure. However, protection could instead also increase the rewards from effort, as 
also pointed in the literature (Buffie, 2001). Buffie (2001) observes that the net effect 
of trade liberalization or protection on the competition faced by domestic firms is 
uncertain: while trade liberalization reduces the market power of domestic firms, can 
promote the exit of less efficient firms, and can induce x-efficiency and a search for 
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scale gains, it can on the other hand reduce the domestic production to a point where 
there are very few firms and competition is weaker. The domestic market structure 
and relative competitiveness are then crucial in defining the likely outcomes.  
 
Aguion et al (2015) build a model to show that industrial policies that favour sectors 
where there is more competition, or that helps to increase competition (usually not 
favouring just few firms) can have a positive effect on innovation and productivity. This 
would happen because these policies could make innovative firms decide to stay in 
the competitive market to innovate and enhance its productivity, and not deciding just 
to leave the market in search for monopolist rents. Their result opposes the 
recommendations from the traditional infant-industry argument, as this latter 
framework advocates for protection and concentration, not competition. “Thus, while 
(foreign) competition is damaging for domestic growth in the infant-industry model, 
here competition is always growth-enhancing” (Aghion et al. 2015, page 3). 
 
Adding to this is Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson and Stiglitz (2009)b, for example, who points 
that in both successful cases of Japan and South Korea, private firms were not able 
to exploit excessive rents, thanks to the existence of domestic competition (even if 
among oligopolistic firms) and to the exigence of achieving efficiency in order to export. 
On the other hand, in Latin America firms were able to pursue rent seeking without 
credible limits and were not required to increase efficiency. “Ultimately, success or 
failure appears to depend on the combination of different institutional arrangements 
and policies, in so far as they affect learning processes by individuals and 
organizations, on the one hand, and selection processes (including of course market 
competition), on the other” (Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson and Stiglitz,2009b, p. 28). As they 
point specifically in the case of Latin America, “governments could have created 
competition among domestic firms, which would have provided incentives to import 
new technologies. It was the failure to create competition internally, more than 
protection from abroad, which was the cause of the stagnation. Of course, competition 
from abroad would have provided an important challenge for domestic firms. But it is 
possible that in the one-sided race, domestic firms would have dropped-out the 
competition rather than enter the fray” (ibid, p. 32). 
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The results from international trade with imperfect competition then imply that 
protection could be necessary if one is to alter the trend of spatial concentration, 
in favour of the protected market. However, this protected domestic production 
would tend to be of reduced scale in comparison to what would be a scale under 
free trade. Another trade-off. Monopolistic competition and internal economies 
of scale provide a trade pattern were firms make the best possible combination 
of scale and variety, given the bigger overall market provided by trade (Krugman 
et al, 2014). Thus, trade increase market size, increase the availability of different 
goods to consumers, and allow firms to better exploit internal economies of 
scale. The pattern of country specialization and industrial location will depend 
on other factors such as relative comparative advantages, first move 
advantages (who started with more scale), transport costs, existence of other 
industries and external economies of scale, institutions, and so on.    
  
Externalities and endogenous growth models 
 
The international trade theory considered the effects of external economies of scale 
before formally incorporating the effects of internal economies of scale. However, the 
way external economies of scale were incorporated in the trade discussions was 
limited and seen as a distortion from the comparative advantages ‘explanation 
(Krugman, 1995). The formalization of external economies of scale came with 
Helpman (1982), Romer (1986) and the “new growth literature”48.   
 
The endogenous growth models show how aggregated production can have non-
diminishing returns, thanks to externalities (from physical capital, for example), even 
assuming perfect competition and diminishing returns at firm level. For this, 
endogenous growth models basically assume that a bigger population and a resulting 
higher number of researchers can generate more ideas, that ultimately generate more 
innovation and more per capita growth. Moreover, for this growth to be permanent the 
 
48 These were an advancement from the previous exogenous growth models: the Solow growth model (Solow, 
1956) applies a neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to each 
production factor input. Given the diminishing returns to capital, it is expected a conditional convergence of 
income among countries. The model assumes that the technological progress is exogenous, and, therefore, it 
does not explain it. 
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models need to assume some form of externality – spillovers to other firms or 
sectors49. 
 
While Marshal (1920) pioneered the analysis of external economies, focusing on 
positive externalities arising from geographical agglomeration of industries50,  a 
subsequent Arrow (1962) assumed that physical capital embodies technology and 
modelled the process of “learning by doing”, showing how technological knowledge 
and then productivity could be enhanced thanks to increases in total time devoted to 
industrial production. Frankel (1962) is also a learning-by-doing model, and, as Arrow 
(1962), assumed that technology evolves by chance. These were among the first 
tentative to endogenize technological progress, as a function of the stock of physical 
capital (machinery). Others developed the so-called “AK-model”, were permanent 
increases in the investment could generate permanent increase in the growth rate: 
Romer (1986) modelled externalities associated to knowledge, and Lucas (1988) 
externalities associated to human capital, for example. The presence of externalities 
basically allows a growth model to exhibit non-diminishing returns, if all the necessary 
conditions are met.   
 
But after Romer (1990) the literature had models that truly described the process of 
endogenous growth. As explained by Jones (2019), Romer (1990) pioneered 
explaining how entrepreneurs, seeking to maximize profits, would invest in nonrival 
ideas that would then allow an indefinite growth.  
 
Endogenous growth models imply that indefinite growth can be achieved if there is 
either externalities or imperfect competition (allowing for private rewards from 
investments). As suggested by Jones (2019), after these models we have a clear role 
for policies that enhance investments in sectors with more externalities` potential, 
instead of relying on pure market forces. “Romer (1990a) imports the models of 
imperfect competition developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982) into 
growth theory (…) This allows them to charge a mark-up over marginal cost, subject 
 
49 Only in the presence of enough externalities it would be possible to have a permanent economic growth.  
Increases in the investment rate or increases in the share of people engaged in R&D would only affect growth 
through a transition path. While these changes will increase the per capita steady state income of the country, 
they will not increase permanently the economic growth rate.   
50 Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) provides a brief review of these developments. 
67 
 
to imperfect competition, and to earn the profits that ultimately serve as the carrot that 
motivates the search for new ideas”. 
 
The next generations of growth models consisted in what is called Schumpeterian 
models (Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), among 
others), were innovations are more disruptive and can entirely substitute previous 
technologies, instead of only gaining a small market share in a love for variety 
framework (Jones, 2019). Other recent models followed different paths, including 
some “semi-endogenous” models, where externalities affect income levels but not 
growth, and models where the flow of ideas is not as free and costless as previously 
modelled (Ramondo et al, 2016). 
 
Rodriguez & Rodrik (2000) summarizes that endogenous growth models (either the 
ones where growth arises from the non-diminishing returns to capital, or the ones 
where growth arises from any form of endogenous technological change – such as 
learning-by-doing, for example) implies that protection is detrimental to the world 
growth, but that, depending on country-specific technology levels and factor 
endowments, protection could rise growth for the country instead.  
 
If externalities do explain long term growth, one consequence is that bigger markets 
could potentially grow faster. But as “big” we can refer to either a country or a trade 
agreement area, or even a world liberalized market. However, as summarized by 
Ramondo et al (2016), while endogenous growth models such as Romer (1990), for 
example, show external scale arising from ideas as the main driver for growth, and 
therefore country size do explain growth51, other models, such as Kortum (1997) and 
Lucas and Moll (2014) see externalities with much less force. Arguably, these last 
models make better sense of the empirical data, as it is clear that not always bigger 
countries grow faster.  
 
Ramondo el al (2016) proposes an explanation for the difference between data and 
endogenous growth models prediction about the supremacy of bigger countries:  
 
51 Ramondo et al (2016) also acknowledge that it would be possible to argue that smaller countries tend to be 
more open to trade, thus offsetting part of the advantages of bigger countries.  
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incomplete domestic integration can explain why some countries benefit from their 
size more than others. When the domestic market is too fragmented and distances 
make trade costs within the country more costly, there is less scale effects to be 
generated. They also note that international technology diffusion explains most of the 
remaining difference between empirical data and theoretical models, but domestic 
integration would be the most important factor.  
 
Domestic market integration can be viewed as a consequence of a better business 
environment and institutions, as we shall see later in this chapter. Assuming bigger 
scale is one of the key factors determining growth, and that this scale can be increased 
through domestic – and – international52 integration, there is still the question of where 
technology and production will be generated or located. Production is located where 
there are cost-advantages and where more scale can be achieved. Thus, bigger 
markets have an attractive force based on scale (interacting with production costs), as 
well markets that are more integrated with global value chains. But the production 
location can be separated from the R&D location. As R&D is assumed to be the main 
generator of externalities and then growth, how its location patterns can affect the 
effects of trade liberalization? Arkolakis et al (2018) set up a model of heterogenous 
multinational firms operating in a monopolistic competition and found that countries 
that hosted most R&D facilities gain more from trade liberalization.  
 
The relationship between these endogenous growth models and the 
international trade depends on the assumptions considered. The supply of 
ideas would be bigger in a bigger economy, thus indicating that trade 
liberalization would allow the participating countries engaging in the trade to 
mutually benefit from this larger flow of ideas - if the flow of ideas would be 
disseminated across these countries. Moreover, as ideas and research efforts 
are costly – usually modelled as fixed costs of R&D, a bigger market would also 
help to pay for these costs, therefore absorbing more R&D efforts. However, if 
knowledge does not easily spillovers across national boundaries53, there could 
 
52 Either because of larger markets and also because of easier technology transfers. 
53 This “spillover” does not need to be an unintentional by-product of production but could be a deliberate 
policy from the knowledge-generator country or from the knowledge-recipient country, resulting in 
technological transfer. Moreover, countries could absorb some of the knowledge through imports of 
intermediate and capital goods.   
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be a concentration of benefits in the country were most of the production or 
R&D activities is done. Thus, if this happens, protection would be an alternative 
way to foster domestic production and generation of R&D and knowledge 
spillovers. But the protection alternative itself rely on another assumption to be 
able to fulfil these objectives: it needs to promote the growth of domestic 
production and R&D that is either bigger and at least as efficient/quality than 
what would be possible under a more liberalized trade, and the time to be able 
to do this need to compensate for the costs involved in the process. 
 
As in Buffie (2001), countries with a larger R&D activity and a larger stock of 
knowledge would then have a comparative advantage that would make them 
concentrate R&D activities. If knowledge does leak between countries, countries 
with less comparative advantage on R&D can absorb some knowledge54 and 
therefore the world as a whole would benefit thanks to more specialization. 
 
Thus, protection imposes a high risk of vicious circle of isolation, and the main 
variables to consider are the cross-border potential for technology flows and the 
minimum viable scale for the target innovation and the possibility of doing that at all 
(time and capacity, measured as distance from that innovation), within the domestic 
market. 
 
For example, there is a vast literature that focus on the importance of domestic 
capabilities to absorb foreign innovations. Furthermore, institutional and 
business environment constraints such as the quality of contract enforcement 
and the supply of IT infrastructure, can make R&D efforts more or less 
productive. The need to take into consideration other factors than simply 
investing in R&D is shared by Buffie (2001), that cites Romer (1990) and others 
as examples of the literature that point to the need of specialized inputs and 
good institutions. This question is then potentially more affected by the 
business environment than to the tariff structure. A further variable is the 
 
54 Foreign technology could also be acquired from FDI, human interaction, or international trade, but the process 
involves costs and also the existence of sufficient adoption capabilities. Domestically sourced technology is 
potentially cheaper to acquire, but the overall cost-benefit needs to take into account the “quality” or 
“potential” of these technologies.   
70 
 
integration of the domestic market, as pointed by Ramondo et al (2016). This can be 
understood as an argument for better physical integration (through infrastructure, for 
example) and for more and better contractual relationships (rule of law and other 
investment climate variables). 
 
In this sense, endogenous growth models can also provide a theoretical foundation 
for protection, sharing the rationale behind infant-industry models: if a country is able 
to identify the “right” industry, this one could be temporarily protected in order to 
generate externalities and thus enhance long-term growth. Among formalizations of 
the infant-industry argument using the basis of endogenous growth models we have 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Matsuyama (1992), for example. Furthermore, 
Mendoza (2010) points that some growth models (such as Lucas, 1988; Young, 1991; 
and Matsuyama, 1992) predict that countries with backwarded industrial sectors could 
lose from trade liberalization. 
 
However, externalities can also be viewed as a reason for trade liberalization. 
Mendoza (2010) cites some endogenous growth models (Chuang, 1998; and Goh and 
Olivier, 2002, for example), that can predict cacthup with trade liberalization. These 
models assume that the backwarded country could benefit from learning by doing 
through exports and through imports of intermediate and capital goods.   
 
 
2.5 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF TRADE ON 
COMPETITIVENESS   
 
The achievement of internal and external economies of scale 
 
As seen in the previous sections, the achievement of internal economies of scale has 
added to comparative advantage in explaining the competitiveness of industries and 
countries when trading worldwide. This competitiveness is also important to explain 
production location decisions, together with transport costs and industrial, trade and 
competition policies. The search for scale gains and the consequent spatial 
concentration can be a source of dynamic competitive edge if the R&D efforts 
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undertaken in these locations does not spillover through national borders. If this is the 
case, effort must be done do attract the location of such activities. However, if enough 
technological spillovers do occur, international location of R&D does not matter for 
dynamic growth, and trade liberalization gain more support – as it will promote 
specialization and spatial concentration.    
  
Aiming to increase the likelihood of domestic production, the typical trade structure 
used by developing countries (and developed ones as well, even in a smaller scale) 
is the one with positive effective protection, where inputs are less protected than final 
goods. This tariff escalation aims to incentivize domestic value-added. Moreover, if 
enough scale is obtained in final goods production, policies with lower protection for 
intermediate goods in conjunction with higher protection for final goods (usually seen 
in the 60s) could be a good combination for the achievement of external 
competitiveness (Thoburn, 2002). However, without proper scale gains the 
competitiveness of final goods is compromised. The most recent endogenous growth 
models reviewed in the previous sections point to the need of having access to better 
and cheaper inputs, produced at higher scale – either domestically produced if there 
is room for it, or imported. This last option is usually the one that comes with higher 
scale and also has advantages in terms of technology spillovers, although part of the 
literature sees the specialization on final goods as potentially detrimental if a domestic 
intermediate sector is viewed as important for the competitiveness of final goods and 
also for the overall pattern of industrialization. Therefore, according to this view, the 
lack of good and efficient intermediate goods would be a barrier to the production of 
more developed final goods (Young, 1928), and a stronger domestic intermediate 
sector could mean more employment, income, and further domestic productive 
linkages (Hirschman, 1957).  
 
Thus, in this discussion of trade liberalization for inputs versus domestic production of 
the same inputs, a debate emerges between specialization versus diversification. As 
we shall see in later paragraphs, local content requirements are another policy that 
tries to foster the domestic production of diversified inputs using protection (although 
it can also be used to specialize in some inputs) while the participation in Global Value 
Chains tries to foster specialization in specific goods or even industries using market 
forces. The common ground is the search for domestic scale of production. In this 
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sense, Kucheryavyy, Lyn and Rodriguez-Claire (2016) points that gains from trade 
increase with scale, because firms already specialized in activities with comparative 
advantages will tend to achieve higher levels of productivity as its production 
increases.  
 
Another industrial policy strategy, followed by South Korea, for example, consists in 
what Krugman (1984) calls “protection as export promotion”: a country protects its 
domestic industry to allow for scale gains and lower marginal costs, being able to price-
discriminate and then to export at lower prices (than the ones charged domestically).  
 
Both strategies can be designed to allow a country to gain comparative advantage in 
sectors it had not. In the case of protection or local content requirements, the induced 
local production is expected to show  inter-industry externalities, with  consequent 
improvements in productivity in other sectors and better potential for new (horizontal 
changes) and better (vertical changes) varieties (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006, 
Hirschman (1957), Succar, 1987, Young, 1991, and Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2006). 
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) for example say that the speed that a country can 
undergo a structural transformation depend on the “density” of economic activities it 
has in the areas nearby its current comparative advantage areas. This is a more 
detailed and complete argument than the papers that do not take into account the 
different “distances” between the current good and the production of a new one or new 
variety. As examples of these “simpler” – although crucial - papers on product variety 
we have Grossman and Helpman (1989 & 1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). 
Another strand focus on the difference between new goods and better goods (when 
there is just an improvement in quality). Albert Hirschman (1957), nonetheless, 
focusses on a specific type of clustering condition – the availability of backward and 
forward linkages – to explain why a “denser” economy is desirable to promote 
structural transformation. Moreover, local content requirements have the same effect 
as protection, thus also potentially being justified if they generate enough Marshallian 
externalities. Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010). 
 
Veloso (2006) summarizes the subsequent literature on this, saying that most of those 
papers condemned local content requirements as a welfare-reducing policy. He 
argues, however, that those studies (such as Lahiri and Ono, 1998, for example) do 
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not take into consideration the potential dynamic benefits arising from positive 
externalities. Veloso (2006) stressed that the empirical literature shows that there are 
examples of successful policies of LCRs, and these successful ones are due to local 
content policies set up at reasonable levels, that encouraged scale gains and that kept 
a reasonable level of competition within the protected sector. 
 
However, as seen in the previous sections, there is still a risk that protection for inputs 
or local content requirements55 can undermine the competitiveness of final goods - the 
net result will depend on the price-elasticities of both goods (Grossman, 1981). Stone 
et al (2015), for example, stress that local content requirements are a barrier to 
efficiency gains (given its suboptimal resource allocation) and deterrent to the 
innovation that could have happened if the economy were able to access better foreign 
inputs. They also point out that the literature shows that LCRs can deliver some good 
results in terms of employment and income in the short-run, but that there is usually a 
long-run negative effect on competitiveness. The authors emphasize that, as these 
policies negatively affect trade in intermediate goods, the immediate risk is not to fully 
participate in Global Value Chains. The following consequence is the rise in costs 
throughout the domestic production chain, bringing loss of production efficiency and 
competitiveness, and the potential loss in dynamic efficiency caused by lower 
productivity and innovation (which in turn was caused by the lower influx of more 
advanced inputs). These effects are even bigger when the local content is set up in 
the beginning of the production chain and when it is widespread in the economy. 
However, positive externalities could indeed arise from local content requirements, 
and therefore the welfare result will then be driven by the balance between gains for 
the producers of protected goods and losses for consumers of that good (Stone et al, 
2015). 
 
Veloso (2006) points out that the use of policy to attract FDI to the automotive sector 
was always widespread. Moreover, local content requirements are used to leverage 
the potential vertical positive effects of FDI throughout the value chain (basically, 
backward linkages), and is likely to increase domestic welfare, as it helps to promote 
 
55 Export performance can be allowed to fulfil LCRs, as was the case in the South African industrial policy for 
the automotive sector. 
74 
 
internal economies of scale. However, LCRs can either promote the industry, or 
destroy its competitiveness, as there is a risk of domestic autoparts being too costly, 
thus reducing the competitiveness of the domestic auto sector.  (Natsuda, Otsuka and 
Thoburn, 2015).  
 
In general, this literature suggests that the presence of learning by doing, technology 
transfers and scale gains could provide benefits that would mitigate at least some of 
the negative effects of LCRs. Specifically, regarding learning by doing, the literature 
states that learning-by-doing through learned experience gained from higher 
production levels could lower production costs. However, it is not clear whether the 
domestic production cost would fall below the cost of the foreign input producer, which 
would be needed to justify the LCR. Thus, there is no clear evidence that those 
benefits will in fact outweigh the discussed negative effects. Moreover, as noted, LCRs 
may discourage technological transfers by reducing imported inputs and reducing 
investor’s willingness to invest. 
 
As cited by Veloso (2006), the empirical literature on LCRs is mixed: part find the policy 
is flawed (because of sub-optimal firm sizes and because of higher rents generated 
by lower competition) and part find the policy successful (mainly through a better 
exploitation of economies of scale and assuming there is enough competition in the 
input sector).  
 
Lower trade protection would promote a specialization more driven by competitive 
forces, and therefore by initial internal economies of scale and comparative 
advantages. Trade augments market size, and this allows for a better exploitation of 
the division of labour, specialization, and productive efficiency (Krugman, 1979, based 
on Adam Smith). Thus, the engagement in GVCs could be a safer bet in terms of 
achieving the efficient scale in some sectors. Participation in GVCs could happen 
through the import of intermediate goods and services intended for a domestic 
assembly operation or through the sale of intermediate goods and services to foreign 
markets, or even through the sale of final goods to a foreign retailer.  
 
Furthermore, it is well known that clusters can enhance competitiveness through 
specialization and economies of agglomeration, and they can be connected to GVCs, 
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contributing to further specialization in a potential virtuous circle. For more on this see 
De Marchi et al (2018). 
 
What stands out is that the participation in GVCs can bring benefits in the form of more 
value added in that production (Milberg, Jiang and Gereffi, 2014), or more scale 
(Kowalski et al, 2015), and these have a positive impact on productivity.  
 
The automotive industry is the second in GVC activity (measured as the percentage 
of foreign value-added in the exports), and the electronics industry is the first (Natsuda, 
Otsuka and Thoburn, 2015). If we take into consideration that the share of electronics 
in a vehicle is growing rapidly, it would be clear that vehicle production relies heavily 
on GVCs. As Natsuda, Otsuka and Thoburn (2015) point out, major first-tier suppliers 
are operating globally and usually follow the automakers in their location decisions. 
Moreover, as the authors also remember, these suppliers are increasingly producing 
complete systems, increasing their value-added and becoming a more important driver 
of GVCs.  
 
Milberg, Jiang and Gereffi (2014), citing Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2006), define 
industrial upgrading as the possibility to produce more skilled products, better quality  
products or to produce it more efficiently, which, within the GVCS, are ways to ascend 
in the value chains, often adding value in the production. On the other hand, Kowalski 
et al (2015) argue that the exclusive focus on the pursuit of more value-added activities 
within GVCs could be misleading, because an increase in production volume (even in 
lower value-added activities) could also be beneficial. Despite this controversy, what 
stands out is that the participation in GVCs can bring benefits in the form of more value 
added in that production or more volume (scale), and these have a positive impact on 
productivity.  
 
It is also important to consider that FDI and trade liberalization are not the only 
strategies that can foster participation in Global Value Chains. Other types of contracts 
and outsourcing can help to link the domestic economy to foreign sources of demand 
and suppliers of technology (UNCTAD, 2011). 
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Foreign and domestic competition56.  
 
Here we discuss channels that rely on firm-level decisions caused by competition 
pressures. In other words, it comprises efforts to make better, at firm-level, including 
the discussion on how competition impacts innovation. 
 
A potential drawback from protection, not always foreseen by its proponents, is that 
protection can induce the entrance of new competitors in a sufficient number to reduce 
the average market-share and scale in the domestic market. These new entrants are 
probably less efficient firms, as they can only enter after the protection is in place. This 
argument is in Horstmann and Markusen (1986) and can be understood as analogous 
to the arguments that protection allows inefficient firms to stay in the market, therefore 
reducing average productivity and increasing costs.   
 
Melitz (2003) is part of the “new new” trade theory, that also highlights how trade 
liberalization can give rise to increased productivity: less barriers to trade allows the 
more productive firms to expand, while the less productive would tend to die in face of 
more competition. The result would be an increase in the average productivity of that 
country. In other words, when protection gets lower, the maximum marginal cost that 
allows a firm to stay in the market also gets lower, and then less firms are able to 
compete. These best firms are already the most productive in the domestic market 
and, as they tend to gain market-share they tend to grow, which could trigger further 
gains. It is then an example of an improvement in productivity caused by better 
resource allocation.    
 
Hoekman and Javorcik (2004) provide empirical evidence based on previous studies 
showing that productivity at plant-level grew after trade liberalization episodes, 
pointing at both reallocation effects and mark-up reductions as direct consequences 
of the increase in competition faced by those firms.  
 
 
56 It is necessary to point that here we are assuming that more imports would mean more competition, but this 
is not necessarily true if the imports come from other plants within the same multinational, just substituting its 
own domestic production without changes in prices, or if these inter-firm imports come to a domestic market 
where this firms is monopolistic.  
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Productivity arising from changes in X-efficiencies are the result of competitive 
pressures to reduce costs and increase innovation. However, although competition 
can provide incentives for firms to innovate, it can also discourage it, when there is a 
fear that no reward will be gained. The literature thus provides evidence of an inverted 
“U” relationship between the degree of competition and innovation: very low or very 
high levels of competition would generate low levels of innovation, while medium levels 
of competition would generate the highest levels of innovation.   
 
Possas and Borges (2009) argues that neoclassical economics is more concerned 
with static allocative efficiency gains, and thus favour perfect competition, while 
evolutionary economics show that the most important thing for growth is dynamic 
efficiency and for this to happen there is the need of incentives and regulation that 
promotes innovation – not necessarily perfect competition. “(...) competition policies 
ought to be seen as the set of measures providing the incentives as well as the sticks 
fostering innovative behaviours. To reach this target, the simple guideline ` the higher 
the number of competitors, the better`, usually will not do. Indeed, we know from 
Schumpeter that such dynamic competition can be achieved even in oligopolistic 
industries – indeed mostly in such industries” (Possas and Borges (2009, p. 449) 
 
As summarized by Peneder and Woerter (2014), the industrial organization literature 
does not reach a consensus regarding the effects of competition on innovation. There 
are theoretical and empirical results suggesting effects in both ways: competition being 
obstructive and competition being conducive to innovation. This literature usually relies 
on two main theoretical predictions: Schumpeter (1942; 2014) and Arrow (1962). 
Peneder and Woerter (2014) say that most studies, misinterpreting what Schumpeter 
said, assume that the Austrian economist defended a negative relationship between 
competition and innovation. The truth, however, would be that Schumpeter said only: 
a) that it is logically impossible for a firm operating in a perfect competitive market to 
innovate; b) the prospects of market power are conducive to investment in innovation; 
c) a monopoly is always contestable. Regarding Arrow (1962), Peneder and Woerter 
(2014) say that he agrees with the impossibility of endogeneity innovations in perfectly 
competitive markets. He also pointed out that firms in markets that are more 
competitive will tend to invest more in innovation than in non-contestable monopolies: 
this is because while the monopoly could expect to substitute the old rents for the new 
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rents (generated by innovation), the firms in the more competitive setting could expect 
to see a larger difference between its new rents (generated by innovation) and its 
previous rents. 
 
Therefore, as Peneder and Woerter (2014) explain, taken together these two 
fundamental works suggest, “neither perfect competition nor uncontested monopolies 
provide a market structure that is conducive for the creation of new knowledge” 
(Peneder and Woerter, 2014, p. 656). This means that these are not antagonist views, 
to the contrary of what is usually assumed by the literature. Moreover, they can be 
integrated in a common framework – an inverted-U relationship, as has been done in 
a successful strand of the literature initiated by Kamien and Scwartz (1976) but best 
represented by Aghion (2005). 
 
Utar and Ruiz (2013), discussing the relationship between competition and innovation, 
point to the two main antagonist views: a) “typical industrial organization theories” 
indicate that competition would reduce the rents and thus the incentives for innovation 
or upgrading, in a Schumpeterian fashion. Nonetheless, Aghion et al (2005) amend 
this view saying that if pre-innovation rents are lower due to competition, but post-
innovation rents are higher, firms will invest in innovation in order to stay in the market. 
This is, according to Utar and Ruiz (2013), the reason for innovation and upgrading in 
the Mexican maquiladoras in face of Chinese competition, an interpretation aided by 
the idea that multinationals` subsidiaries compete among themselves for investments 
from their headquarters; and b)  thanks to the fact that a cost-reducing innovation 
carried on by a monopolist would simply replace the source of rents, a firm facing 
competitive pressure would be more willing to innovate, in order to reduce its costs 
and thus  try to stand-up (Arrow, 1962). 
 
Competition has two antagonist effects on innovation (Aghion et al, 2005): 
a) “escape competition effect”: higher competition reduces rents received by the firms 
in the market and then induces the firms to innovate in order to escape from the 
competition;  
b) “rent dissipation effect”: higher competition reduces rents received by the firms that 
innovated, thus disincentivizing firms from innovate.  
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The net effect on rents and thus on innovation will depend on the technological gap 
within the industry: in sectors where firms are similar in terms of technological 
development the “escape-competition” dominates, as the probability of achieving 
higher post-innovation rents is higher (Peneder and Woerter, 2014;  Aghion et al, 
2005). 
 
Aghion (2005) combined these propositions with the assumption that heterogeneity in 
technological levels (average technological differences) rises with competition. The 
outcome is an inverted-U relationship where in perfect competition innovation by 
laggard firms is low because “rent dissipation effects” are sufficiently high for these 
firms. Moreover, with incontestable monopoly innovation is also low, because such 
firm does not face any “escape competition effect”. Figure 5 illustrates this relationship. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Inverted-U relationship between competition and 
innovation. 
  
 
Using the terminology of Aghion et al (2005), in an incontestable monopoly the firm 
will innovate very little, as it does not need to “escape competition”. In a perfect 
competition environment, firms will also not innovate, but because they would face a 
massive “rent dissipation effect”.  
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Peneder and Woerter (2014), analysing data from Swiss firms, also find evidence of 
an inverted-U relationship. They concluded that the possibility of multiple equilibria 
between competition and innovation suggest that industrial policies could play a role 
in promoting innovation. However, the empirical studies about the inverted-U 
relationship are usually aggregated, meaning they consider all industries. This does 
not allow for the examination of idiosyncrasies among different industries. 
 
Kaufman (2013) remember that the Neoclassical theory states that optimal 
competition equals 100% competition, based mainly in the First Welfare Theorem 
(competitive equilibria is Pareto efficient – “allocative efficiency”). However, the author 
points that market-failures affect this statement in different levels, and that there is an 
optimal domestic competition equal to less than 100% competition. Duranton (2000), 
using a standard industrial organization model with increasing returns (that generates 
growth and imperfect competition and, ultimately invalidates the First Welfare 
Theorem), concludes that “There exists a growth-maximizing degree of competition”. 
Singh (2003) reviews methodologies to analyse the intensity and effects of 
competition, concluding that the optimum level of competition does not appear to be 
zero or maximum competition. He further argues that the relationship between 
competition and incentive to innovate may be correct in some cases, but not 
necessarily always; that uncoordinated price competition has the disadvantage of 
maybe becoming so intense that it could cause instability in prices and ultimately 
dampen firms` propensity to invest; and finally, that it is not possible to say a priori that 
price competition would necessarily be more conducive to promoting social welfare 
and productivity growth than non-price competition. 
 
Aghion et al (2015) argue that forcing a firm to compete in a sector that is already 
competitive increases its productivity. In other words, foreign and domestic 
competition are growth-enhancers. This is quite different from the infant-industry 
arguments, where foreign-competition is bad for domestic growth. The reason for the 
difference is because Aghion et al (2015) believe that firms will try to escape this 
competition resorting to innovations that ultimately will increase productivity growth.  
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The literature poinst to the variations in the degree and form of rivalry (be it domestic 
or related to foreign competitors) as one of the main explanations for the differences 
in the results of industrial policies around the world. Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson and Stiglitz 
(2009)b, for example, point  outthat in both successful cases of Japan and South 
Korea, private firms were not able to exploit excessive rents, thanks to the existence 
of domestic competition (even if among oligopolistic firms) and to the exigence of 
achieving efficiency in order to export. On the other hand, in Latin America firms were 
able to pursue rent seeking without credible limits and were not required to increase 
efficiency. “Ultimately, success or failure appears to depend on the combination of 
different institutional arrangements and policies, in so far as they affect learning 
processes by individuals and organizations, on the one hand, and selection processes 
(including of course market competition), on the other” (Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson and 
Stiglitz,2009b, p. 28). As they point out specifically in the case of Latin America, 
“governments could have created competition among domestic firms, which would 
have provided incentives to import new technologies. It was the failure to create 
competition internally, more than protection from abroad, which was the cause of the 
stagnation. Of course, competition from abroad would have provided an important 
challenge for domestic firms. But it is possible that in the one-sided race, domestic 
firms would have dropped-out the competition rather than enter the fray” (ibid, p. 32). 
 
Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2014) highlight another source of productivity gains from 
trade: competition reduces markup levels and thus promotes within-firm concentration 
towards their best products. The authors found evidence of this analysing the 
behaviour of French exporters.  
 
Hashmi and Biesebroeck (2016) found evidence that in the automotive sector more 
concentration and market power generates more innovation.   
 
The automotive sector worldwide is very concentrated, and this trend has been driven 
by the need to fund more intense and expensive R&D – this outcome is not generating 
less competition, but instead more, as automakers are fighting for innovative edges 
(Hashmi and Biesebroeck, 2016 ou 2010?)   
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On top of the heterogeneity of results in terms of firms` characteristics, Schor (2004) 
also observed variations through time: immediately after a reduction in the tariffs on 
final goods, there is a reduction in productivity, caused by the smaller market share 
(and the subsequent reduction in the scale of production). The productivity (the real 
technical progress) rise as soon as the low-productivity firms need to do so in order to 
avoid bankruptcy. A slightly different dynamic happens when the tariffs on inputs are 
reduced: in this case all domestic firms (the low-productivity and the high-productivity 
ones) would benefit from the higher use of imported inputs and the consequent higher 
productivity. 
 
Muendler (2004) researched the same topic as Schor (2004), with similar 
methodology, and arrived at similar results. One difference is that Muendler makes 
explicit the channel of an increase in productivity due to the shutdown of inefficient 
firms (which increases average productivity). The other channels are those already 
mentioned: (i) competition pressure from imports (the author cites the literature that 
confirms this channel); and (ii) availability of foreign inputs (always assuming that 
foreign inputs have a better combination of quality and cost). Another difference is that 
Muendler (2004) found the impact of foreign inputs to be less important than the 
competitive pressure and also less important than the exit from the market caused by 
more competition. A potential explanation, given by the author, is that it takes time for 
firms to be able to use the new imported input efficiently – if the firm can do it at all.  
 
As pointed out by Peng, Riezman and Wang (2016), “Sizable productivity gains 
resulting from trade liberalization is documented for Brazil (Ferreira and Rossi 2003) 
and other countries” (...) “more substantial productivity gains are found in firms using 
newly imported intermediate inputs (see Goldberg et al. 2010 for the case of India)” 
(…) “trade liberalization results in lower mark-ups and greater competition (see 
Krishna and Mitra 1998 for the case of India)” (…) “firms facing greater competition 
incur significantly larger productivity gains (see Amiti and Konings 2007 for the case 
of Indonesia)”. 
 
The Schumpeterian approach emphasizes the link between economic incentives – 
entrepreneurship – innovations – creative destruction - economic growth. Quian, 
Araujo and Nucifora (2018) argues that creative destruction has been avoided by 
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distortions of the Brazilian economy, thus breaking the link between entrepreneurship 
and economic growth. They examine how productivity growth evolved in Brazil, ate 
firm, sectoral and aggregated levels, and concluded that the main distortions that 
reduced productivity in the country are: restricted reallocation of resources between 
sectors; low capital accumulation and suboptimal allocation of resources; an 
environment where inefficient firms are allowed to survive, thanks to low competition. 
The authors go further to argue that these factors make firms in Brazil compete for 
public privileges rather than searching to gain productivity.  
 
Bacha (2017) points to the importance of trade liberalization to improve productivity. 
According to him, this would happen thanks to a) the access to better technologies; b) 
the specialization and consequent higher scale of production; c) higher competition 
leading to the natural selection of better firms. Bacha (2017) affirms that every country 
that succeeded in becoming developed after the second world war did so because 
they promoted a growing participation in international trade. This, together with the 
fact that the Brazilian economy is among the most closed in the World, could explain 
why the Brazilian economy lags behind in productivity growth.  The fact that Brazil 
receives a reasonable amount of FDI is no relief, because, as remembered by Bacha, 
this high FDI just means that multinationals are investing to benefit from a protected 
market, without truly promoting productivity growth.  
 
Acemoglu et al (2013) also point  out that subsidies to incumbent operations reduces 
growth and welfare; the optimal policy should incentive R&D irrespective of the firm, 
while encouraging the exit of less productive incumbents; as small and young firms 
engage more in R&D and grow faster than larger and older ones. 
 
Access to technology 
 
Employing qualitative and quantitative data, Otsuka and Natsuda (2015) studied if and 
how policies were able to foster technology – and productivity (TFP and labor) in the 
Malaysian automotive sector. The theoretical framework was the model of R&D 
spillover of Coe and Helpman (1995). “One of the most important implications of these 
models is that technological knowledge in other firms, industries, or countries influence 
the domestic TFP. This is referred to as knowledge spillover or R&D spillover and is 
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considered to be a vital part of productivity growth. (…) The R&D spillover model in 
Coe and Helpman (1995) demonstrates that TFP depends on research efforts and 
includes two research variables: domestic R&D (RD) and foreign R&D (FRD). 
Domestic R&D is made up of the research efforts made by a firm in home country, and 
FRD is undertaken by firms outside of the countries. The R&D spillover model 
demonstrates that a firm can utilize technological knowledge created by others. One 
of the key features in the R&D spillover model is that TFP may depend on FRD — a 
positive externality from foreign technology”.   
 
We focus now on the effects on innovation and technology adoption, given the access 
to technology embodied into imported inputs and machinery, and effects on the quality 
and cost of production, given the access to inputs and machinery at international price 
and quality. 
 
Technology and innovation are the main driver of productivity growth. The empirical 
literature usually points that outward FDI, exposure to export markets, and access to 
imported inputs (especially capital goods) embebed with foreign technology, are thus 
important drivers of productivity and growth.        
 
There are two main sets of benefits brought by the access to imported inputs: lower 
costs and more technology/quality. And the main channels used by these models to 
explain the benefits of such access are through: a) static gains in terms of more 
revenue and/or market share, triggered by the possibility to have cheaper and better 
inputs; b) dynamic gains from the ability to create new products or variations. 
(Goldberg et all, 2010). 
 
Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2015) review the literature on the microeconomic effects 
of imported inputs on firm productivity. According to them, there is plenty of evidence 
that a trade liberalization in intermediate goods positively impacts the productivity of 
the economy. The authors point out that the channels for this to happen are: (i) the 
imports bring a better combination of price and quality (as modelled in Aghion and 
Howitt (1992), for example); and (ii) the imports bring more product variety (as 
modelled in Ethier (1982)). The authors, using data of Hungarian firms, found that 
foreign intermediate goods raise considerably the productivity of firms operating 
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domestically. They also found that these gains are higher when the tariff cuts happen 
in an economy with already a substantial number of foreign firms. Halpern, Koren and 
Szeidl (2015) also point out that domestic suppliers of intermediate goods may face 
some relief from the fact that the demand for their products will probably decrease less 
than the amount of new imports: the increased productivity and output in the final 
goods sector may counteract the initial effect. 
 
Goldberg et al (2010), analysing the trade liberalization in India during the 90s, found 
evidence that better access to imported inputs helped domestic firms to gain efficiency 
and to develop new products, in line with other empirical literature.  
 
Saure (2007) developed a formal model departing from the infant industry argument 
to demonstrate that, under certain circumstances, trade promotes growth through the 
availability of foreign inputs and the learning possibilities carried by it. The model 
shows that when the initial conditions in the developing country favours the adoption 
of less advanced technologies, any restriction on the imports of inputs incentivizes the 
domestic industry to use the less advanced technology. Conversely, the access to 
imported inputs at world prices allow the developing country to participate in the global 
value chains, taking advantage of the technology embodied in the imported input and 
using it in the production of another good (while also producing complementary 
inputs). The assumption that domestic producers can chose a lower technology is 
reasonable and the literature admits that even technologically advanced goods can be 
manufactured using alternative low technologies (Lederman and Maloney, 2004). 
 
Technology embedded into imported inputs can not only raise domestic productivity 
(as it can reduce production costs and/or increase efficiency, including in terms of 
quality), but can also contribute to increased domestic innovation (International 
Monetary Fund, 2018). 
 
Tariffs can have different effects on the competition of a good: they provide protection 
for the producer of the good itself, but also increase cost for the producer of the final 
good that use the previous one as an intermediate good. These effects are well 
characterized in the literature on local content requirements, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter, and one way to measure the resultant effect is to use measure of effective 
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tariffs, as proposed by Corden (1971). As pointed out by UFRJ (2015), this concept 
regained importance after the rise of Global Value Chains, where firms use foreign 
inputs to enhance their competitiveness. To measure the effective protection, we need 
to know the production technology of each sector, to calculate the relative importance 
of foreign inputs. Alternatively, one can calculate the nominal tariffs applied to each 
phase of the value chain. 
 
For the productivity and quality/innovation gains the rationale is to open up to imported 
inputs with superior technology that could provide competitiveness (static and mainly 
dynamic) for the domestic final goods. The theoretical and the empirical literature are 
categorical that if a country insists on protecting a high-tech input sector without 
enough capabilities to efficiently produce that good, it can damage the prospects of 
the entire domestic value chain that could use that input, because: a) the domestic 
input turns out to be very expansive – thus reducing demand and production in the 
final goods sector (and subsequently reducing the demand for those domestic inputs).; 
or b) the domestic final goods sector chose to use lower technologies, not using the 
“high-tech” inputs57.  
 
A good example was the policy implemented in Brazil during the 80s to promote 
domestic microcomputer manufacturing. Luzio and Greenstein (1995) used an 8-year 
time series for price and performance of Brazilian-made microcomputers, evaluating 
the rate of advance using hedonic techniques, and then comparing the results to 
international standards, Although the rates of advance in price and performance of the 
Brazilian microcomputers were similar to international rates, there was never a catch-
up: prices started almost 100% higher and kept almost 100% higher. The potential 
explanations given for the non-catching up was basically the higher input costs, as 
they needed to be locally sourced, given local content requirements. This seems to be 
evidence that trying to have domestic production of too many sectors or the entire 
value chain of most of these sectors can drag down the average productivity and the 
competitiveness of the economy, as there will be lower specialization and higher 
production costs.  
 
57 This is the argument behind the models that argue against the protection of inputs and criticize this aspect of 
infant-industry models. 
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As pointed out by Peng, Riezman and Wang (2016), Keller (2000) demonstrates how 
“technology can be transferred through intermediate goods trade”, contributing to a 
literature going back to Ethier (1982), that pointed to the positive effects that trade in 
intermediate goods can have on final goods`s productivity. Peng, Riezman and Wang 
(2016) thus use his insights to dynamically model the effects that trade liberalization 
in intermediate goods can have on productivity and technology. The main assumptions 
and results are that “Trade liberalization (either domestic or foreign) reduces domestic 
intermediate producer mark-ups and increases final good output and average 
productivity. However, aggregate domestic technology levels fall. Hence, we see the 
tension that trade liberalization brings. Lower tariffs make more advanced technology 
cheaper leading to productivity gains. However, these come at the expense of 
domestic technology levels which fall in the steady state because the incentive for 
domestic firms to invest in improving their own technology is weakened. We found, 
numerically, that the negative effect on technology is smaller in less developed 
countries. So, the bottom line is that trade liberalization is good for productivity but bad 
for the domestic level of technology”. 
 
Schor (2004) found positive effects of trade liberalization through the increased use of 
imported inputs in Brazil following the trade liberalization of early nineties. These 
inputs contributed to the increase in firm productivity mainly through two channels: (i) 
increased competition within the sectors that produce those inputs; and (ii) access to 
the technology embedded in the imported intermediate goods, by final goods firms. 
 
The empirical evidence on the nature of technological spillovers is one of only partial 
cross-border spillover. In terms of geographic distribution, by 2018 R&D investments 
remains heavily concentrated in the United States, with China growing rapidly and set 
to surpass the US very soon. However, if we look at the sources of R&D investments, 
most of it comes from private manufacturing firms – an indication that attracting and 
maintaining a manufacturing base is still important for R&D generation (Delloite and 
Singularity, 2018). Most R&D activities are concentrated around the headquarters of 
the multinationals, or in clusters located in developed countries, leaving little room for 
technological spillovers from the manufacturing activities located in developing 
countries (World Bank, 2018). 
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R&D investment worldwide is concentrated in large multinational private companies, 
with the automotive sector being among the top contributors, together with the 
technology sector, the pharmaceutical sector, and the electronic goods sector. 
Volkswagen invested 10,5 billion dollars annually, on average between 2012 and 
2016, – the fourth biggest among all companies in the world, while Toyota invested on 
average 8,2 billion in Japan. At the same token, the biggest R&D investments made 
in the world came from Samsung (12,2 billion), Intel (11,4 billion), and Microsoft (11,4 
billion). (Delloite and Singularity, 2018). 
 
As suggested in Delloite and Singularity (2018), “manufacturers should plug into an 
innovation network and create bilateral or multilateral relationships that (…) serve as 
a feeder system for ideas/building blocks for the iterative development of breakthrough 
innovation” (page 24). This statement resulted from the acknowledgement that 
technology is evolving ever faster. 
 
Effects on and from institutions in general and business environment in 
special.   
 
This section discusses how protection levels and the business environment are 
related, and how one affects the other. The complementary views in this relationship 
are the following:  
a)  Less protection gives incentives for firms to lobby for better institutions and 
better business environment, as this become relatively more important for their 
competitiveness, as they cannot rely on protection to survive. Similarly, a good 
business environment would give better competitiveness conditions, and thus less 
need for protection.  
b) Conversely, a bad business environment and bad institutions overall generate 
the need for protection. Moreover, a highly protected industry would prefer to keep this 
status quo rather than  improve the overall business environment, as the protected 
firms would be able to lobby for special treatments allowing them to survive within the 
bad business environment while making it difficult for the competition to enter or to 
remain in the market. 
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A better business environment is among the necessary conditions to achieve 
competitiveness, together with increases in trade (Kalout et al, 2017), A poor business 
environment can cause lower TFP through: 
• Entry and exit barriers (caused by a bad business environment or by protection 
against foreign competition) generates less incentives for firms to improve (as they 
face less challenges from new competitors and/or receive subsidies). It is not clear 
how these impact on average scale. 
• Higher production costs (caused by a bad business environment or by 
protection against foreign competition). 
 
Higher domestic integration (with better infrastructure), for example, could also 
increase productivity. A weak transport network can make it more difficult for 
integration of economic activities and full exploitation of the internal economies of 
scale: there is empirical evidence for Brazilian manufactures that in some sectors 
prices are very different according to the region were the product is sold (Goes and 
Matheson, 2017).  
 
A process of structural transformation where productive resources are reallocated to 
uses with higher productivity contributes to economic development. As cited in 
Sebastian and Steinbuks (2017), the literature shows that public infrastructure helps 
to increase the productivity of private inputs because: a) it reduces fixed costs, thus 
lowering entry barriers, increasing competition, and thus increasing the growth of 
productivity; b) it reduces fixed costs, thus increasing the level of productivity; c) it 
contributes to the Marshalian economies of scale; d) it contributes to factor reallocation 
across sectors and firms. 
 
There is a vast literature with convincing empirical evidence showing that institutions 
are indeed among the most important factors affecting the prospects of economic 
development. Among those, there is the New Institutional Economics, including the 
work of Ronald Coase, Douglas North; Oliver Williamsom; and Daron Acemoglu 
(2001)58.  As proposed by these scholars, institutions can drive capital accumulation 
 
58 In a broader sense, following the definitions provided by Douglas North, Institutions are a set of rules and 
organizations that frame the way a society functions, guiding behaviour and interaction among members of that 
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and investment decisions and promote cooperation among members of the society. 
Among the most important (and measured) institutions affecting economic growth 
there is the existence of enforceable property rights, and the rule of law (Menyashev 
et al, 2011). As proposed by Coase (1960), property rights allow for negotiation among 
economic agents, and this can even solve externality problems. 
 
There is also literature that does not focus on the impacts of institutions on proximate 
factor accumulation (Capital, labour and technology), but instead, can impact 
comparative advantage (Nunn and Trefler, 2014). This would happen through better 
contracts allowing more efficiency and competitiveness, especially in products that 
use contracts more intensively (Nunn, 2007). The quality of contracts proved to be 
important in determining export performance, both in cross-country econometric 
studies and in comparisons among firms within the same country ((Nunn and Trefler, 
2014). There is also historical empirical evidence on the impact of trade on domestic 
institutions, where studies argued that trade volume and trade mix altered the balance 
of power within societies and therefore impacted in the chosen domestic institutions 
(Acemoglu et al, 2005; and Nunn and Trefler, 2014).    
 
Torvik (2016), citing Hall and Jones (1999), stress that institutions and economic 
policies define the business environment for economic activities and innovation. “The 
main message in this literature is that institutions are main driving forces in explaining 
cross-country income differences” (Torvik, 2016, page 3). Torvik (2016) points out that 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) found that, although geography impacts 
institutions, instuitional quality is the single most important variable to explain income 
differences among countries, while  trade integration is explicitly shown as to be not 
important, when institutions are taken into account. This relationship is supported by 
econometric evidence, that confirms that institutions affect development, although 
there is also an opposite view, arguing that the level of development implies the quality 
of institutions (Menyashev et al, 2011). 
 
 
society. In a narrower sense, NIE seeks to understand how institutions affect the process of capital accumulation 
and investment. Examples: Coase (1960); North (1990); Williamson (1975); Acemoglu (2001). 
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The empirical literature on institutions usually rely on case studies or econometrics. 
Critics argue that it is difficult to generalize the results from case studies, while within 
econometric studies the difficulty is mainly how to find good instrumental variable to 
overcome the fact that institutions can be an endogenous variable (Lloyd and Lee, 
2018).  
 
A bad business environment favours big established companies, while punishing 
smaller start-ups. Moreover, a weak rule of law, uncertain macroeconomic conditions 
together with high interest rates, and complicated regulations, makes investment and 
contracts riskier and costly (Kalout et al, 2017). This is the scenario faced by Brazilian 
firms and also by the multinationals facing the decision of making FDI in the country. 
It is safe to argue that Brazil is among the 10 biggest FDI destinations mainly because 
of its domestic market size.   
 
It is difficult to point to one specific aspect of the business environment in Brazil as the 
most important, but according to the available rankings the high interest rates are 
perhaps the safest bet: high interest rates make the costs of capital very high in Brazil, 
and can also contribute to a relatively overvalued exchange rate.  
 
Protection can also reinforce a bad business environment, as previously suggested by 
Sachs and Warner (1995): trade liberalization …” forces the government to take 
actions on the other parts of the reform program under the pressures of international 
competition”. 
 
Overall, to reduce inefficiencies and promote the competitiveness of Brazilian firms 
the literature suggests59, besides a reduction of tariffs and more trade agreements and 
even some exchange rate devaluation, a better business environment.   
 
The balance of power within a society can led to the choice of institutions that favour 
the group in power, even if detrimental to the society in general. More specifically, 
powerful groups may prefer “weak property rights” as a way to keep institutions bad 
for outsiders, that would then be unable to compete with the political powers of the 
 
59 Bacha (2017) is an example of such literature. 
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incumbent group (Torvik, 2016). An explanation of how some societies were able to 
overcome rent-seeking and promote better institutions can be found in the literature 
that shows that institutions develop incrementally, as put by North (1991).   
 
Pushing reforms to accelerate the evolution of institutions is hard, as they face the 
opposition of the negatively affected groups in power. Torvik (2016) summarizes the 
literature saying that the way forward is either to show who are the potential winners 
and make sure they are a majority, or to compensate the potential losers. In any case, 
the author also defends gradualism, as it gathers more political support.  Another 
potential way to promote better institutions is allowing competition among political 
groups, be it among different governmental levels and agencies, or between 
competing groups seeking power through the vote. (Menyashev et al, 2011). 
  
There are, however, occasions when policies and reforms increase even more the 
economic and political powers of already dominant groups. In this case, such reforms 
can make it ever difficult to promote future reforms aiming to reverse the initial path: 
“(…) one should be particularly careful about the political impacts of economic reforms 
that change the distribution of income or rents in a society in a direction benefiting 
already powerful groups. In such cases, well intentioned economic policies might tilt 
the balance of political power even further in favour of dominant groups, creating 
significant adverse consequences for future political equilibria.” (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2013, p. 189). 
 
Competitiveness and business environment Indexes 
 
We present two international indexes to assess the quality of the business 
environment and also the competitiveness of manufacturing: The Competitive 
Industrial Performance Index, from UNIDO60, and the Global Competitiveness Index 
4.0, from the World Economic Forum61, both for 2018, and both ranking countries in 
relative positions. 
 
 
60 UNIDO (2019) 
61 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2018). 
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The Index from UNIDO is composed by measures of manufacturing value added and 
exports per capita; industrialization intensity and export quality; and the impact on 
world manufacturing value added and exports. It is measuring the outcomes in terms 
of performance and is based on very objective data.  
 
The 2018 UNIDO competitive industrial index showed Germany as the most 
competitive nation for manufacturing in the world, followed by Japan, China, the United 
States, South Korea, and Switzerland. The United Kingdom is the 16th, while Mexico 
is the 20th, Malaysia 22nd, Poland 23rd, Thailand 25th, , Turkey 29th, Russia 32nd, and 
Brazil 35th , slightly better than Indonesia (38th) and India (39th). South Africa falls 
behind in 45th, as Argentina 49th. African countries make the most positions between 
103rd and 150th.  
 
It is striking the fast rise of China, that was the 29th in 1990, and the 19th in 2000. On 
the other hand, Brazil lost positions in the index, from 2010 to 2018, while had a 
relatively stable position between 1990 and 2010. The exception was the dimension 
related to “technological deepening and upgrading”, where Brazil felt between 1990 
and 2010, but is stable since 2010.  
 
On the other hand, the Global competitiveness report, from the World Economic 
Forum, ranks 140 countries. The index measures factors that are arguably underlying 
determinants of competitiveness, including some directly related to institutions and 
business environment. The first places were the following: 
1 United States 
2 Singapore 
3. Germany 
4. Switzerland 
5. Japan 
6. Netherlands 
7. Hong Kong SAR 
8. United Kingdom 
 
China is the 28th, India 58th, Brazil 72nd.  
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Within the Brazilian ranking, the most negative aspects were macroeconomic stability 
(sustainability of fiscal policy) in the 122nd position; and product market (low exposure 
to foreign competition and existence of severe market distortions) in the 117th position. 
The best performing aspect were on its market size (10th).  
 
Overall, the picture that emerges from these two indicators is that Brazilian economy 
suffer from a bad business environment, caused by fiscal difficulties, high interest 
rates, and high levels of distortions/low levels of competition in the product market. 
This business environment is damaging the prospects of industrial competitiveness, 
and reliance on the size of the domestic market is clearly not enough.   
 
However, we ask why China is the second most competitive manufacturing country, 
according to the UNIDO`s index, and only the 28th more competitive economy, 
according to the Global competitiveness report? In other words, what are the elements 
in the World Economic Forum index that apparently did not impact the Chinese 
manufacturing competitiveness? The best Chinese indicator, by far, is the size of its 
domestic market. This seems to be the explanation for its manufacturing 
competitiveness – scale – despite a not so good relative performance in other 
indicators. But China does not perform badly in most of the other indicators and is 
better in all indicators compared to Brazil. 
 
Interaction among dynamic externalities, foreign competition, and access to 
technology: the case for infant industries  
 
The empirical evidence for infant industry arguments is weak. “The empirical evidence 
bearing on the infant industry argument is limited and indirect. It is not clear that 
anything meaningful can be inferred from the fact that many industries have remained 
dependent on protection for a very long time. Governments adopt protectionist policies 
for a variety of reasons; a proper test of the infant industry argument would therefore 
have to isolate those industries where infant industry considerations were the primary 
motivation for protection” (Buffie, 2001, page 64). In our case study this is not possible, 
as there were different potential motivations for the protection of the Brazilian 
automotive sector since the 50s: learning by doing related to infant industry 
arguments; domestic linkages and external economies of scale; internal economies of 
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scale; current account deficits; R&D; employment and income etc. And those motives 
were not clearly stated, nor properly measured.   
 
Moreover, the difficulties in gathering the necessary data and the political risks of the 
government being captured and allowing a higher and permanent protection can 
increase the costs of such policies: “The governments of S. Korea and Taiwan were 
able to precommit effectively to temporary protection (Lee, 1997; Pack, 1988, p. 339), 
but it is obvious that this feat would be more difficult to replicate in many other LDCs 
where policy makers have a long history of imposing tariffs and quotas to shelter 
domestic firms from foreign competition” (Buffie, 2001, page 65). This risk seems to 
have materialized in the Brazilian case, as can be inferred from the perpetuation of 
relative high levels of trade protection for the manufacturing sector. 
 
Another point stressed by Navaretti and Venables (2013, p. 362) is that “(…) the infant 
industry argument is not applicable as MNCs do not need support to attain their own 
production possibility frontier. There are two alternative arguments for industrial policy 
towards such firms. One we refer to as location, deriving from possible benefits of 
having an MNC locate a project in our country rather than elsewhere. (…) The other 
is ownership; what are the effects of changing ownership of existing activities, and 
should policy seek to influence the ownership (or control) of activity in a country?”. 
Moreover, the authors consider the case where multinationals can be firms with 
domestic ownership that are able to decide their location among any part of the world. 
This concept could be applied, for example, to cases where multinationals face the 
decision of abandoning their current location, either to relocate anywhere or to simply 
shutdown. But location decisions can imply technological spillovers, including under 
the form of learning-by-doing – one of the infant industry arguments for protection. 
Therefore, the industry where the multinationals operate within the domestic country, 
and their local employees, can still be viewed as potentially generating learning-by-
doing, although the multinationals itself not.   
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Are the new technologies contributing to the technology convergence among 
countries? how and why?   
 
How are digital technologies and industry 4.0 affects the channels between trade and 
competitiveness? 
a)  One argument is that new technologies are reducing entry barriers and also 
facilitating catching up, as the access to technology becomes easier. In this world of 
mobile factors of production and easier availability of goods and services suppliers, 
the business environment and institutions gain importance as reasons for location 
decisions: a bad business environment can be detrimental especially to start-ups, 
without access to lobby and very dependent on the availability of fast transactions and 
the rule of law. (Delloite and Singularity, 2018). 
b) Moreover, as the technology frontier is moving faster, catching up based on 
protection is riskier, as the time needed to learn domestically can be offset by the 
speed of technology in foreign markets. (Lee, 2012; Delloite and Singularity, 2018)  
c) The converse argument is that the new technologies are making innovation and 
production ever more concentrated on already established regions. Protection is then 
necessary to counterbalance this movement, although it is often concealed that 
innovation efforts should ideally be partnered or helped by regional trade agreements, 
if a country is not large enough to provide the required scale.   
 
The main debate emerging from those considerations is if innovation spills over freely 
across borders and at long distances.     
 
The most recent wave of new technologies that are heavily affecting production 
structures and demand around the world has been called by names such as 
“exponential technologies” and “digital technologies”, and the industries employing 
these are called “industry 4.0”, as it is deemed the “fourth industrial revolution”. These 
new technologies, when applied to manufacturing, are usually centred around ways to 
automate processes including the ones that require reasoning and decision-making. 
Another way to characterize these new technologies is its unprecedented speed – how 
fast they evolve and how fast they create and alter entire economic sectors.  This 
disruptive trait puts innovation and technology adoption capabilities at the forefront of 
any industrial strategy (Delloite and Singularity, 2018).  
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Although automation and IT technologies have been around for some decades, there 
are some differences in the current paradigm shifting: new and bigger data sources; 
business models as platforms; and the growing use of artificial intelligence (Sturgeon, 
2017). The author concludes that it is difficult to forecast the consequences in terms 
of future location of investments and facilities among countries and regions, and 
identifies some contradictory trends: he recalls that thanks to 3-D printing and flexible 
machinery, the production of parts and final goods could be done with less scale, 
closer to the final demand. However, he also recalls that given the high initial costs of 
some technologies and data advantages, and the possibility of achieving great product 
variety within production lines, final goods production could be concentrated in clusters 
with huge scale capacities, taking advantage of economies of agglomeration within its 
value chains, and being able to reach consumers worldwide at lower costs. This is 
especially relevant for some frontier R&D: R&D investment can take many years 
before it generates some innovation that becomes a technology ready to be applied. 
This makes investment in R&D more costly and risky, thus increasing the need for a 
more collaborative investment in R&D, putting together public and private players, 
domestic and foreigners, especially if these are located in global centres of knowledge. 
The partnerships or contacts with firms and institutions located in the most important 
centres for innovation are becoming even more important. Delloite and Singularity 
(2018). A last identified possibility is that location of production will not be changed by 
the new technologies, and the main outcomes will be a growth in productivity and 
quality, and a fall in the demand for labour (Sturgeon, 2017). Sturgeon (2017) suggests 
that the value-added could still be concentrated, but with very few jobs, in few 
worldwide centres, while production using these central innovations and secondary 
innovations could be more easily widespread.  
 
Some new technologies are allowing for a reduction in the demand for less skilled 
labour, and allowing the creation of new products with much less use of engineering 
skills or heavy machinery (Sturgeon, 2017). This trend can be specially damaging for 
development strategies based on more traditional manufacturing sectors that are 
intensive in heavy machinery and labour applied to repetitive tasks – such as the 
automotive sector, for example. Thus, it is advisable, in a developing perspective, “to 
create an environment that attracts and retains top performing manufacturing 
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companies, as manufacturing has the highest multiplier rate across industries” Delloite 
and Singularity (2018).   
 
Thus, relying on more traditional or low-skill labour-intensive technologies seems not 
to be a viable path to development, for two main reasons, found in the literature: 
 
a) If the speed of learning and technological upgrading that an industry is able to 
show is lower than the speed of technological progress in the frontier, the catch 
up will not happen. Thus, time is crucial. For example, as cited in Lee (2012), 
“(…) Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) proposed a Schumpeterian model of 
growth divergence focusing on the possibility of ever weakening potential for 
technology transfer, in which technologically backward countries face 
increasingly eroding absorptive capacity (due to increasingly ineffective 
technology investments) for tapping into global technology frontier, as the 
world’s technological frontier advances”. (Lee, 2012, p. 112). Thus, it may be 
that the difficulties for productivity growth are higher when all the sectors – 
including especially the intermediate goods – are protected. 
 
CNI (2018) states that the current pace of technology related to industry 4.0 increases 
the need for more innovation, to try catching up with the technological frontier. This is 
then a perception, from the firms, that the new technologies have the potential to widen 
the gap, if there are not enough capabilities to innovate and/or assimilate the foreign 
technologies. 
 
b) Lower wages have been a comparative advantage of developing countries and 
one of the main drivers of FDI during their industrialization processes. However, 
production costs are becoming less dependent on wages and more dependent 
on the scale, availability of skilled labour, good institutions and business 
environment. These factors could even explain why Asian developing countries 
performed better than Latin American ones, from the 80s, but the novelty is that 
these same factors are gaining even more importance, thanks to the digital 
revolution, automation, and importance of new ideas and specialized services 
in generating new avenues for value added in manufacturing. The fact that 
these services, including design, marketing, and research can increasingly be 
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exported (Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar, 2017) contributes to their 
importance as sources of income and to the importance of scale in suppling it 
competitively.       
 
Industrial policies for R&D are still found in many developed countries. In fact, this may 
be considered a resurrection triggered mainly by the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
consequent need for government support both in terms of monetary and fiscal policies. 
Some developed countries have clear national strategies for boosting digital 
technologies and industry 4.0, as, for exempla, the USA, Germany, and, more 
recently, the UK. Developing countries are much less able to follow such strategies 
with the necessary amount of R&D expenditures, apart from China, which is set to 
compete with the leading developed countries in R&D. Within this context, the Chinese 
Government launched the “Made in China 2025” initiative, to increase the local content 
of Chinese manufacturing to 70% by 2025.  The policy includes subsidies to produce 
specific products and for domestic firms; the use of government purchases to induce 
domestic production especially in information technologies; and the acquisition of 
foreign firms and technologies. Delloite and Singularity (2018)  
 
Sturgeon (2017) recalls that, although industrial policies are usually based on the idea 
of complementarities between technology/innovation and production activities, in 
some industries, such as motor vehicles and electronics, for examples, the value chain 
works with geographically separated production and innovation clusters. He then asks 
a second question: if co-location will prevail under the new technologies, which part of 
the value chain will move? The R&D or the production? As cited by the author, there 
is some evidence of a coming back of some industries to developed countries, either 
because of  automation (and thus less need for cheaper labour), or because there is 
a more active “industrial policy” from developed countries, or even because of new 
technological requirements in production. However, this movement is still very small 
and, according to the author, does not alter the pattern of R&D and production located 
in countries with cheaper labour. All in all, the author concludes that the new 
technologies are allowing for a further fragmentation in the production process, as 
R&D could be embodied in other easily transported products or services, and design 
services, for example, could be easily decentralized done at lower costs. This means 
that there is less need for co-location of R&D and production activities, and that maybe 
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the result will depend on the interaction between strategic firm-specific decisions and 
the governmental policies in place.   
 
The view that production is becoming a lower value-added activity, in contrast with 
R&D and some manufacturing-related services, is known in the literature as the 
“smiling curve”62, confirmed initially by Linden et al (2009), who, according to Sturgeon 
(2017) used the example of the Apple iPhone and calculated that “China’s value added 
to a US $600 iPhone 4 (mainly assembly and packaging) was only US $6.54, about 
1% of the retail price”. 
 
Sturgeon (2017) also concludes for three scenarios regarding the role of developing 
countries in the new manufacturing and R&D landscape: a) routine tasks would be “re-
shored or even eliminated by advanced manufacturing and automation”; b) developing 
countries will be able to use the new technologies to gain competitiveness and 
upgrade their industries; c) the landscape does not change too much, as there are 
counteracting forces playing around.     
 
Consolidation in the automotive industry was driven by a search for scale (at firm level) 
and the need to heavily invest in R&D (Natsuda, Otsuka and Thoburn, 2015). But while 
demand and production have been moving from Europe and North America to Latin 
America and Asia – a shift driven by production costs and/or domestic demand growth 
(Natsuda, Otsuka and Thoburn, 2015), R&D is becoming more concentrated, 
specifically regarding the centres of global platform innovation, in a movement driven 
by a winner-takes-all type of competition (Sturgeon, 2017).  
 
Taking specifically the average scale, it is clear that Asian countries achieved this 
through exporting, even when they had a reasonable domestic market. However, 
recent protectionist policies around the world seems to indicate that export-led growth 
strategies would be more difficult to attain.  
 
 
62 The smile curve: value added is higher in R&D and design, lower in production, and higher again in services 
and marketing. 
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Observing a list of the potential future drivers of competitiveness, elaborated by 
Delloite and Singularity (2018), we note that availability of talents is the single most 
important factor. Trying to group these factors, we could say that the following groups 
are important for competitiveness under the new technology paradigm: 1 – 
skills/talent/education; 2 – costs and productivity; 3 – business environment and 
institutions, including the ones directly linked to innovation. Although the single main 
driver to improve a country’s environment for innovation would be the availability of 
talented and high skilled people, improving the business environment and the access 
to foreign technology would certainly help: a) better institutions and business 
environment can promote start-ups and encourage innovation; can provide a safer 
and more pro-growth environment for these firms; and can attract global talents in 
search for a good place to live and develop ideas; b) access to foreign technology 
increases the potential combinations of cost-quality-innovation in production, thus 
allowing for either cost reductions, productivity gains, or simply innovation, with 
impacts in the entire domestic value-chain.  
    
In terms of geographic distribution, by 2018 R&D investments remains heavily 
concentrated in the United States, with China growing rapidly and set to surpass the 
US very soon. However, if we look at the sources of R&D investments, most of it 
comes from private manufacturing firms – thus an indication that attract and maintain 
a manufacturing base is still important for R&D generation (Delloite and Singularity, 
2018). The R&D investments worldwide is concentrated in large multinational private 
companies, with the automotive sector being among the top contributors, together with 
the technology sector, the pharmaceutical sector, and the electronic goods sector.  
 
As suggested in Delloite and Singularity (2018), “manufacturers should plug into an 
innovation network and create bilateral or multilateral relationships that (…) serve as 
a feeder system for ideas/building blocks for the iterative development of breakthrough 
innovation” (page 24). This statement resulted from the acknowledgement that 
technology is evolving ever faster. 
 
FORD (2016) announced that Ford Motors plan to turn themselves into an “auto and 
a mobility company”. This means investing not only in trends like electrical and hybrid 
cars, but also on autonomous-driving vehicles and vehicle-sharing platforms. The 
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company also recognises that the industry faces huge excess capacity, mainly in 
Europe and Asia. Finally, the report states that patents are an important asset for the 
industry, as technological innovation is still actively pursued.   
 
Here is a list of the most important new technologies applicable to a 4.0 automotive 
industry, based on Delloite and Singularity (2018): 
 
 3D printing, eliminating the need of physical modelling and allowing the 
reproduction of parts at very small scale and at a much faster speed. It is 
starting to be used to produce prototypes and autoparts; 
 Advanced analytics: data analysis and intelligence, based on methods such as 
text and image recognition, machine learning and etc, that can be used to 
automate supply chains, for example; 
 New advanced materials, that can be lighter, stronger, or made with new 
chemical or biological elements, and that are changing the material composition 
of vehicles;  
 Advanced robotics;  
 Artificial intelligence (AI), that have been used to allow a computer vision in 
semi-autonomous vehicles;   
 Biotechnology: any technology that uses biological organisms or its by-
products. An example of future use are synthetic biological cars that repair 
themselves; 
 Blockchain: a technology that allows the recording of transactions (information) 
within a database where information flows without any centralized control. An 
example of use is within the transfer of personal data in car sharing schemes;  
 Designing and virtual prototyping using computer simulations. Example of 
current use: 3D CAD for designing in auto manufacturers; 
 Energy storage technologies: more efficient energy storage capabilities, 
including new types of batteries, technologies to store compressed air and other 
types of energy. Example of current use: storage for electric vehicle charging; 
 High performance Computing (HPC), allowing for highly complex simulation 
models of virtual crash testing and wear and tear of materials and parts;  
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 Interface of Things - technologies that allow the exploration of virtual or 
augmented realities; and wearables that can be used at assembly plants, for 
example; 
 Internet of Things (IoT): technologies that interconnect machines, people and 
the environment, using sensors and advanced software, and allows machines 
to operate with different degrees of autonomy. Example of current use: 
automatic accident notification. 
 
The reviewed literature provides some evidence that the speed of technological 
changes and innovation is accelerating and that value-added in labour-intensive 
manufacturing is decreasing. The future patterns for location of manufacturing and for 
the type of technological spillovers are less clear.  
 
 
 
2.6 The potential channels 
 
Drawing on the material from the previous sections of this chapter, we suggest a 
taxonomy to build a framework containing the most relevant relationships and trade-
offs for the debate between trade liberalization and trade protection.  
 
Potential channels 
 
Group 1: Scale-related channels. Here there is the discussion if the best strategy 
is to have fewer, better and more specialized firms or sectors, or to have a more 
diversified economy, even with firms initially not competitive at international 
levels. It includes the effects of market size on R&D. 
 
Group 2: Competition-related channels.  The debate includes discussions about 
how competition impacts innovation, and comprises efforts to make better, and 
capacity to make better, at firm-level. Within this group are changes in 
productivity arising from firm-level efforts (productivity arising from changes in X-
inefficiencies - given competition pressures to reduce costs -, and innovation resulting 
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from competitive pressures); productivity arising from changes in the barriers to entry 
and exit, affecting average productivity; and productivity arising from the effects on 
static and dynamic allocative efficiency (resources going to where there is more 
comparative advantage, either static or dynamic), resulting from protection levels. 
 
Group 3: Resource allocation and access to technology.  
Effects on innovation and technology adoption given the access to technology 
embodied into imported inputs and machinery, and effects on the quality and cost of 
production, given the access to inputs and machinery at international price and quality; 
and effects on innovation and technology adoption given the access to technology 
through exposure to foreign markets and technology (exports, inward and outward 
FDI, for example). 
 
Group 4: Institutions and business environment channels. The debate 
discusses how protection levels and the business environment are related, and 
how one affects the other. Less protection gives incentives for firms to lobby for 
better institutions and better business environment, as this become relatively more 
important for their competitiveness, as they cannot rely on protection to survive. 
Similarly, a good business environment would give better competitiveness conditions, 
and thus less need for protection. On the other hand, a bad business environment and 
bad institutions overall generate the need for protection. Moreover, a highly protected 
industry would prefer to keep this status quo than to improve the overall business 
environment, as the protected firms would be able to lobby for special treatments 
allowing them to survive within the bad business environment while making difficult for 
the competition to enter or to remain in the market. 
  
The thesis analyses these channels using the Brazilian automotive sector as a case 
study. However, our research also analyses how the new digital economy and the 
emergence of the so-called industry 4.063 could alter the results from the channel 
analysis. One argument is that new technologies are reducing entry barriers and also 
facilitating the catching up, as the access to technology becomes easier. In this world 
 
63 Industry 4.0 refers to industries under a so-called fourth industrial revolution, characterized by more 
automation of the manufacturing process, including the use of artificial intelligence, and that can present other 
aspects such as customization and service-orientation, for example.    
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of mobile factors of production and easier availability of goods and services suppliers, 
the business environment and institutions gain importance as reasons for location 
decisions: a bad business environment can be detrimental especially to start-ups, 
without access to lobby and very dependent on the availability of fast transactions and 
the rule of law. Moreover, less protection would make easier for domestic firms to 
access these available resources, worldwide.  
 
Moreover, as the technology frontier is moving faster, there is no room for any tentative 
of catching up based on import-substitution strategies and infant industries policies 
aiming to give time for a domestic learning-by-doing. The converse argument is that 
the new technologies are making innovation and production ever more concentrated 
on already established regions. Protection is then necessary to counterbalance this 
movement, although it is often concealed that innovation efforts should ideally be 
partnered or helped by regional trade agreements, if a country is not large enough to 
provide the required scale.   
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Figure 6 – Channels for effects of trade liberalization 
 
Notes: 
¹If the domestic firms were previously less competitive than the foreign firms. If they had similar 
competitiveness, a reduction in the domestic mark-up could be compensated by an increase in the 
mark-up for the new exports of the domestic firm, symmetrically to the mark-up of foreign firms. 
²Assuming imperfect competition.  
³Potential permanent/long-term effect. 
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2.7 CONCLUSION  
 
In this chapter we reviewed the theoretical background that could explain when and 
how trade protection (or trade liberalization) can enhance welfare. An important insight 
is that different assumptions and different timescales can drastically change the 
results. These remarks are the source of most antagonist positions in the broad debate 
on trade liberalization. Overall, the conflict in the literature regarding protection is 
between those who: a) advocate that lower protection stops the achievement of 
dynamic efficiency (through Marshallian economies of scale and learning-by doing), 
thus generating dynamic costs of losing domestic sectors; and b) advocate that lower 
protection promotes the achievement of dynamic efficiency (through Marshallian 
economies of scale), as it promotes innovation efforts (because of “escape-
competition effects”); and higher productivity (given the gains in allocative efficiency,  
specialization and access to better inputs).  
 
Concisely, there are two conflicting potential outcomes of protection regarding the 
achievement of scale gains and learning by doing: 
a) on one hand, protection may promote internal and external scale gains and 
innovation efforts in the protected final goods sector;  
b) on the other hand, protection can be damaging through increasing costs and 
decreasing quality/innovation in intermediate goods, lower participation in Global 
Value Chains, consequently deterring internal and external scale gains and innovation 
efforts in the protected final goods sector, and also in the intermediate sector. 
 
Since the emergence of monopolistic competition trade models, scale of production is 
important to define competitiveness, as well traditional comparative advantages, but 
only recently the literature has acknowledged that institutions – including business 
environment aspects – can even affect comparative advantages. Institutions can affect 
both scale and comparative advantages, as in Rodrik (1988) and Nunn and Trefler 
(2014). Moreover, some endogenous growth models can explain economic growth as 
a result of higher domestic scale of production – and this is not equal country size: the 
scale can be fostered either by more domestic integration -thus including a better 
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business environment – and by participation in global value chains, including using 
regional trade agreements, for example. Therefore, all three aspects – scale, business 
environment, and comparative advantages - are important and mutually reinforcing.  
 
Both trade protection and trade liberalization can promote domestic external 
economies of scale: the resulting domestic production depends on the relative 
competitiveness and internal scale achieved by the firm under a protected and under 
a liberalized environment. In this sense, the ability to assess cheaper and better 
production inputs is of particular importance. Protection can deter domestic external 
economies of scale if domestic firms start to use less advanced or more costly inputs. 
These outcomes can be made even worse if one includes business environment 
restraints. Therefore, a relatively widespread protection of the domestic market, that 
includes most of the inputs necessary for the final goods, together with a bad business 
environment, can drive the overall competitiveness and domestic scale downwards 
through time, making catching up ever more difficult, and a vicious circle more likely.  
 
Moreover, if the speed of learning and technological upgrading that an industry is able 
to show is lower than the speed of technological progress in the frontier, the catch up 
will not happen. Thus, time is crucial. For example, as cited in Lee (2012), “(…) Howitt 
and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) proposed a Schumpeterian model of growth divergence 
focusing on the possibility of ever weakening potential for technology transfer, in which 
technologically backward countries face increasingly eroding absorptive capacity (due 
to increasingly ineffective technology investments) for tapping into global technology 
frontier, as the world’s technological frontier advances”. (Lee, 2012, p. 112). This could 
be read as a warning for those who wish a widespread and deep protection policy: the 
difficulties for productivity growth are higher when all the sectors – including especially 
the intermediate goods – are protected. 
 
To shed light on these relationships we proposed a framework to explain the potential 
channels linking trade policy to industrial competitiveness.  
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CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
We follow a “theory building” research strategy, thus an inductive approach, to 
generate insights to answer our research questions. Our methodology is an 
exploratory and observational case study: exploratory because we intend to gain 
insights on the relationships among the variables under study, and observational 
because instead of using experimental controls to manipulate our sample, we draw 
inferences from the sample based on data analysis without a treated and a control 
group. For this, we use a mixed methods strategy, combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods of analysis. A methodology needs to link the theories we use to 
the methods we chose to analyse our data, and, as our study is inductive, also to later 
link the data results to an explanation or theory. This is done in chapter 7, when we 
triangulate the partial results of each chapter and concludes. Our research then draws 
inferences from the case study (a detailed analysis) of a single industry, historically 
targeted by high import tariffs. 
 
Our study starts with the identification of theories related to our research questions. 
These are described in the theoretical framework and provide a guidance for the 
following empirical literature review. This empirical literature review also contains 
qualitative and quantitative data to provide a context for the case study64. We then 
proceed to the interviews and its analysis, collecting relevant primary data and insights 
on the subject. The next phase is the gathering and analysis of several quantitative 
data, including primary and secondary ones, using different methods to analyse them. 
The choice of quantitative data was made following the results of the qualitative phase, 
and was also constrained by data availability, of course. Each one of these three data 
gathering chapters – empirical literature review, qualitative data and quantitative data 
– generates a set of partial insights and evidences. These are then analysed together 
 
64 For case studies literature see Yin (2012). 
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in another chapter, aimed to generate more insights resulting from the combination of 
the previously partial insights. The research questions are then answered in the light 
of such evidences.    
 
In a nutshell, our exploratory sequential methodology addresses the existing theories 
and empirical literatures, and then gathers primary and secondary data to generate 
potential answers to our research questions. Figure 1 illustrates this broad strategy. 
 
Figure 1 – An Exploratory Strategy 
 
 
In this sense, we adopt an exploratory sequential mixed-methods design (or 
methodology), within a case-study framework. Within a mixed method, both 
quantitative and qualitative data are collected and analysed in a single study, aiming 
to improve the quality and comprehensiveness of the analysis through the triangulation 
of different types and sources of data. The Exploratory Sequential design is a type of 
sequential mixed methods that collects and analyses qualitative data before collecting 
and analysing quantitative data. This is different from the Explanatory Sequential 
Design, where the researcher initially collects and analyse quantitative data, and then 
use the qualitative data to help understand or explain the results of the first.  In our 
choice – the Exploratory Design – qualitative data is used to gain initial insights that 
are then complemented by quantitative data analysis. These further insights can also 
take the form of a generalization of the data provided by the qualitative analysis. 
Following a classification provided by Creswell (2013), our design could be further 
classified as “taxonomy development model”. This is because our aim is to use 
qualitative data not only to gain insights related to our research questions, but also to 
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guide us in the process of choosing the quantitative data we need. We will interpret 
the results of both strands – qualitative and quantitative – together, at a later stage.  
 
As depicted in figure 2, our point of departure is the theoretical and empirical literature 
and then we move to different sources of data to contextualize and to provide detailed 
information on specific aspects of the case under study. The data collected through 
interviews is analysed using thematic analysis. For quantitative data collection we rely 
on several databases, therefore also using a bigger variety of analytical methods. The 
triangulation of results does not favour a priori any of the data sources, but follows a 
logical path where evidence is emphasized when coming from all sources or at least 
not contradicted by any source. However, if a piece of evidence is contradictory among 
the data results obtained, we further check the degree of confidence with each one of 
the data sources and put more emphasis on the results directly generated by our 
research (vis a vis eventual conflicts with the previous empirical literature review).     
The triangulated results will then be interpreted to answer our research questions.  
 
Figure 2 – Research Design - A Variant of the Exploratory Sequential 
Mixed Methods 
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3.2 METHODS 
 
The methods used in the analytical chapters (chapters 5 and 6) comprise the following:  
 
Qualitative data 
 
Semi-structured interviews - a survey with a purposive sample (elite interviews) will 
allow for primary qualitative data collection. Thematic analysis will be used to make 
sense of the data.  
 
Sampling strategy 
 
As depicted above, the primary qualitative data collection and analysis is based on 
semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample, and the results are broken down 
using the tools of thematic analysis. Our sample was selected to provide factual 
information on the subject under study but allowing different points of view. To make 
the sample as representative as possible, we decided to seek interviews with people 
from all subsets of the population related to or involved in the analysis of policies 
towards the automotive sector. The number of interviews was relatively small, as 
expected for elite interviews, but the depth and richness of information collected was 
very high. As a step to collect as much reliable information as possible, from different 
perspectives, to provide a comprehensive context and generate useful insights, the 
interviews were quite effective.  
 
The main populations we studied are the automobile producers based in Brazil and 
the auto-part producers also based in Brazil. The former are mostly multinational 
companies that manufacture vehicles in Brazil. The latter are made up of different 
types of firms that supply the automakers with inputs and intermediate goods. These 
suppliers are usually divided into three categories: Tier 1 (suppliers of systems and 
complete parts, selling directly to the automakers); Tier 2 (suppliers of components, 
mainly to Tier 1 firms); and Tier 3 (suppliers of individual parts used by Tier 2 firms). 
Tier 1 firms are usually multinationals and work in collaboration with the automakers, 
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even in the process of research and development. In this sense, we consider that Tier 
1 firms share the interests of automakers. Tier 2 and Tier 3 are mainly medium and 
small domestic firms that usually compete with foreign suppliers. We also included an 
interview with representatives of Embraer, to provide important comparison insights 
between two sectors with very different competitive environment and tariff structure. 
 
The population comprises around 500 Tier 2 and Tier 3 autopart firms associated to 
Sindipecas; 16 automakers producing cars and or light commercials (thus, not 
including assemblers that produce just trucks or buses) and 45 Tier 1 autopart firms.  
 
Our purposive sample is made of “elite” interviews drawn from the population of firms 
and from academics, government officials and business associations with expertise in 
the sector and in the themes studied. 
 
Questionnaire design 
 
The face-to-face interviews include pre-defined open-ended questions. This approach 
has several benefits for our research: i) being pre-defined, it allows for comparison 
and a more effective analysis of the results; ii) being open-ended allows for a richer 
investigation and the collection of broader insights, in a more inductive fashion; iii) 
potentially provides explanations for why the phenomenon happens. On the other 
hand, it is more time consuming for the interviewees, for the interviewer and for the 
analysis.  
 
On top of the time required to code and compare open-ended questions, the analysis 
of such interviews is also particularly challenging because: a) interviewees from 
different backgrounds tend to focus on specific topics; b) interviewees have different 
levels of knowledge and also of bias. 
 
In the next section we will explain the procedures we took to minimize potential biases 
and also to make possible the comparison and analysis.    
 
The Annex provides the questionnaires used as a basis for the interviews. 
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Treatment of confidentiality requirements and potential biases 
 
Given the characteristics of the sample – purposive - anonymity is neither possible nor 
desirable. On the other hand, most of the respondents required confidentiality. This 
was expected, given that most of the interviewees have active roles in the industry 
under study, and thus could face a variety of sanctions if the insights or opinions they 
provided were disclosed.  
 
The confidentiality was then granted through the consent form and is guaranteed in 
this section by expressions citing the broad area of activity of the individual. 
Furthermore, the aggregation in interviews categories is done in a way to have at least 
2 individuals in each. This, added to the fact that no interviewee knows who else were 
interviewed, guarantees that the identification by triangulation is impossible. The only 
exception is for the interview with Embraer, in which case we grant confidentiality for 
the interviewee, as required, but not for the firm, as allowed by the interviewee. 
Furthermore, the identification of the firm in this case is not problematic as the firm is 
the main aeronautical producer in Brazil and it is being used only as a benchmark for 
comparison, with only publicly available data being used and no confidential or 
strategic information being discussed.   
 
There is always the risk of potential biases from interviewees seeking to defend their 
interests. This is especially true when we are dealing with representatives of private 
firms that are asked to talk about factors affecting their competitiveness: they probably 
choose to focus on aspects that they want to be changed, or that are the responsibility 
of third parties. Moreover, the fact that the researcher is a previous policymaker can 
bring further questions related to the researcher positionality.  
 
To alleviate the first issue, we rely on the diversity of interviewees, and on the duration 
of each interview, with enough time to cover all aspects involved, and not only those 
the interviews wish to highlight. To alleviate the second issue, the researcher 
explained that he was a policymaker in the past, but that was currently engaged in the 
Doctorate study and would probably pursuit a career in academia. Moreover, the 
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researcher was based in the UK, with no contact with Brazilian officials currently in 
charge of the policies for the sector.    
 
Interviews information (dates, places, duration, origins of interviewees) 
 
The first set of interviews had a total of 14 people interviewed in 10 different interviews, 
face to face, with an average duration of 3 hours (4 hours maximum and 1,5 hours 
minimum), totalling around 26 hours of interviews. The interviews were conducted in 
Sao Paulo and in Brasilia, Brazil, in May 2017.  
 
The second set of interviews had a total of 15 people interviewed in 8 different 
interviews, face to face and using videoconference, with an average duration of 2 
hours (3 hours maximum and 1 hour minimum), totalling around 16 hours of interviews. 
The interviews were conducted in Sao Paulo and in Brasilia, Brazil, during the last 
week of November and the first week of December 2017.  
 
The third and last set of interviews was conducted from April to June 2018, through 
videoconferences, in Brasilia and in the United Kingdom. This round had 5 interviews 
and included two automakers, one association, one lower-tier supplier, and one firm 
from the aeronautical sector.  
 
Table 1 and figure 3 shows the distribution of participants among the seven categories 
we labelled:  Academics; Government officials/policymakers; Industry representatives 
from associations; automakers; suppliers Tier 1; suppliers lower Tier; and Embraer. 
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Table 1 - Number of interviews, involving one or more people in each, 
with specialists in the Brazilian automotive sector or the Brazilian 
industrial sectors. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Distribution of interviews per category. 
 
 
 
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS, INVOLVING ONE OR MORE PEOPLE IN EACH, WITH SPECIALISTS
SECTOR INTERVIEWS PARTICIPATION
INDUSTRY (ASSOCIATION) 6 26.09%
INDUSTRY (SUPPLIER TIER 1) 3 13.04%
INDUSTRY (AUTOMAKER) 4 17.39%
INDUSTRY (SUPPLIER TIERS 3 AND 4) 3 13.04%
ACADEMIA 2 8.70%
GOVERNMENT 4 17.39%
EMBRAER 1 4.35%
TOTAL 23 100.00%
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List of interviewees: 
 
Among the government officials interviewed we have: 
 A former Director of the department for automotive industries in the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry; 
 A Director of the department for automotive industries in the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry; 
 A manager at ABDI, specialized in the automotive sector and in innovation; 
 A senior official in the Ministry of Finance, overlooking the industrial sector and 
competitiveness issues in general. 
 
Among the representatives of industrial associations, we have: 
 A manager at CNI overlooking trade-related issues; 
 A manager at CNI overlooking productivity and policy-related issues; 
 The president of Sindipecas; 
 A manager at Sindipecas; 
 A former senior economist at Sindipecas; 
 An executive at ABEIFA. 
 
Among the Suppliers we have: 
 Two low tier suppliers; 
 A tier 2/3 supplier specialized in hardware and rubber; 
 Two tier 1 suppliers with domestic capital;  
 A tier 1 supplier with foreign capital. 
 
Among the automakers we have: 
 Three automakers with high scale of production in Brazil;  
 One automaker with small scale in Brazil. 
 
Among the academics we have: 
 One academic specialized in innovation and competitiveness, and with vast 
experience in senior governmental positions; 
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 One academic specialized in the automotive sector, and with experience in 
international organizations. 
   
We also had a representative from the aeronautical sector (Embraer). 
 
Analysis of interviews - establishing codes and categories / themes / sub 
questions. 
 
We use thematic analysis as a method to make sense of the data and information 
obtained from the interviews. 
 
To properly analyse the results, we first need to conceptualize the data. This will allow 
us to make sense of unstructured data (qualitative data from interview transcripts), to 
generate new knowledge. To make the information gathered tractable we then need 
to clean up the transcripts, eliminating repetitive statements and unnecessary wording, 
and organizing the flow of ideas.  
 
Sequentially, we coded the cleaned transcripts, using colours to identify similar 
phrases and words within the text. Once this process was done, we identified the 
topics and subjects present in each interview transcript. Sequentially, we created 
themes and allocate the coded excerpts from each interview into a related theme. The 
strategy to create these themes was straightforward: we grouped the topics identified 
in each transcript into topics related either to the questions of the questionnaires and 
to the answers to open-ended questions.  
 
In other words, each coded information or data extracted from the interview transcripts 
is allocated into one or more than one theme/category. Any specific information or 
data can be allocated into more than one theme/category: this is a consequence of 
the complexity of causes and effects observed and proceeding this way we preserve 
the richness of information and allow for more insightful analysis. 
 
A third step was to group the interviewees into one of the six categories (Government, 
Industry – automakers, …) and to label each one with a sequential number, in order 
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to grant confidentiality and at the same time be able to discuss the different points of 
view according to the origin (category) of each interviewee.  
 
After carefully classifying each interviewee and having coded and classified each part 
of their responses we were able to build a more tractable matrix of results. In the fourth 
step we extracted partial results for each pre-defined theme. In this process we 
identified consensus and differences, highlighting how these differences were 
distributed among the main categories of interviewees. We also highlighted any 
information that provides an insight not mentioned by others, but that was not 
contradicted. This allowed us to broad our perspective and to potentially follow other 
lines of investigation, eventually helping to make sense of the other results.  
 
The themes were the following: 
A - EFFECTS OF BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT ON COMPETITIVENESS AND ITS 
RELATION TO THE PROTECTION LEVELS. 
B1 - EFFECTS OF PROTECTION ON THE ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY AND 
ADOPTION CAPACITY, INVESTMENTS, COMPETITION LEVELS AND MARKUP 
B2 - IS PROTECTION EXCESSIVE? DO FIRMS WANT MORE OR LESS? HOW TO 
LIBERALIZE?  
C - WHY ARE THERE TOO MANY SMALL AND INEFFICIENT FIRMS. 
D - REGULATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY; INVESTMENTS IN R&D, AND THE 
EFFECTS OF INOVAR-AUTO  
E – SPECIALIZATION, EXPORT-ORIENTATION AND SCALE.  
F - HOW NEW TECHNOLOGIES WILL AFFECT THESE FINDINGS? WHAT NEEDS 
TO BE DONE TO CATCHUP IN THIS ENVIRONMENT? IS THERE A RATIONALE 
FOR A "NATIONAL CAR"?  WHICH TECHNOLOGIES TO INVEST IN?   
G - INVESTMENT DECISIONS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS. 
  
The interviews results were then regrouped into themes.  
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Quantitative data 
 
The methods for our quantitative analysis are both of descriptive and inferential nature. 
The descriptive part presents and describes the sample data, obtaining key statistics. 
This basically summarize data, allowing the researcher to compare it with other pieces 
of evidence and to draw some conclusions. The other set of methods we use - the 
inferential statistics - reach conclusions about populations based on sample analysis. 
This can take the forms of a regression estimation, a correlation analysis, or a 
hypothesis testing. In our case we apply both tests of associations: correlation 
analysis; and regression analysis.  
 
Analysis of correlations: to measure the strength and direction of the relationships 
between variables. Under this analysis it’s not possible to distinguish causal effects 
and therefore it is not designed to test a hypothesis, but only to gain further insights. 
We will apply the Pearson correlation coefficient to a series of variables, to measure 
the relationship between pairs of variables.  
 
Regressions: it can be viewed as a correlation among variables that, when using 
multiple variables, can provide a better understanding of the relationships among 
those, taking into consideration the interactions and shared effects among the same 
variables, and also given the addition of other explanatory variables.  
In our regression we still cannot state causality, as this would only be possible under 
a randomized controlled trial.   
 
The quantitative exercises on chapter 6 are then the following: 
 
I – International Comparison of Toyota Corolla prices, using exchange rate 
adjustments, and testing scale, specialization, trade barriers, taxation and business 
environment measures as potential explanatory variables; 
II - Evolution of real prices of cars from 1989 to 2019 and potential explanations; 
III – Industrial organization background, an analysis of the evolution of domestic 
competition and market-power, and inferences about the interactions among 
exchange rate movements, imports, scale, concentration and prices;   
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IV – Comparison of cost structures and sensitivity analysis: a) comparison of the 
average cost structure for automakers in Brazil in 2017 versus the average cost 
structure of other manufacturing sectors (agricultural machines, motorcycle, 
aeronautical) in Brazil in 2017; b) sensitivity analysis – how performance and 
competitiveness are affected by changes in variables related to: i) trade barriers; ii) 
business environment; iii) scale of production; iv) specialization and labour 
productivity. This analysis can clarify the effects of inputs costs and also of “custo-
Brasil” on different industrial sectors, thus allowing us to estimate its relative 
importance; 
V – Estimation of changes in Total Factor Productivity for the Brazilian automotive 
sector from 1996 to 2017. Sectoral level total factor productivity (TFP) estimates, 
based on a Cobb-Douglas production function such as Y𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖𝐾𝑖𝛼𝑘𝐿𝑖 𝛼𝑙 using monetary 
inputs and outputs. We are then assuming that prices reflect marginal costs. 
VI - Aggregated longitudinal (time-series) regressions. Simple or multilinear 
regressions, using aggregated secondary data. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR 
IN THE WORLD AND IN BRAZIL: 
EVOLUTION AND THE CONTEXT WITHIN 
THE BRAZILIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 
PROCESS   
 
 
This chapter will bring data from the literature and other secondary sources to better 
characterize the Brazilian automotive sector, comparing it with other Brazilian 
industries and with other countries. Moreover, it provides an overview of the industrial 
policies that affected the sector, in Brazil, with an emphasis on the Inovar-Auto.  
 
 
4.1 CURRENT CONTEXT 
 
This section brings a broader layer of context for the case study developed in this 
thesis. It comprises narratives found in the literature about why and how the 
automotive industry evolved in Brazil, and a brief account the overall industrialization 
process in Brazil, and also the growth of the automotive sector worldwide.   
 
Brazil has a very distinguished “industrial mass” among developing countries. This 
was created through decades of import substitution strategies and high levels of 
protection that last up to the trade liberalization or early 1990s. Despite the reduction 
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of tariffs and the elimination of most quantitative limits, the Brazilian Industry continued 
to be among the most protected in the world.  
 
The vehicle production capacity of automakers associated to Anfavea, in 2017, was 
of 5,05 million per year, although in that year the total vehicle production was 2,7 
million units. There were 16 car manufacturers, 9 light commercial manufacturers, 10 
truck manufacturers and 9 buses manufacturers, all with production distributed 
through 65 industrial plants (source: Anfavea website). An interesting characteristic of 
the Brazilian vehicle production is the dominance of flex fuel engines: in 2017, vehicles 
able to receive both alcohol and petrol were around 63% of the production. 
 
There were also 446 producers associated to Sindipecas in 2017.  Table 1 shows that 
the autopart sector has been hit by the economic crisis after 2014. Moreover, between 
60% and 70% of its sales is for automakers, with the remaining sources of turnover 
coming from spare parts, exports, and sales to other autopart producers.  
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Table 1 – the Brazilian autopart sector 
 
 
 
Table 2 presents an international comparison of Brazilian cars and light commercial 
production. The year of 2017 marked a relative rebound for the country, from the very 
bottom period of 2014-2016, but still far from the golden period that culminated in 2013. 
Brazil was then the 9th biggest producer in 2017.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brazilian Autoparts Sector
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
2018 
(projection)
Employment (thousands) 218.6 220 204.8 172.4 162.2 164.6 174.5
Nominal Turnover (R$ bi) 81.7 87.6 80.1 71.3 69.8 86.6 98.9
Nominal Turnover (US$ bi) 41.7 40.6 34.1 21.3 20.1 27.1 26.9
Total investments (R$ bi) 4.08 4.53 2.4 1.9 1.57 1.85 2.47
Total investments (US$ bi) 1.89 1.93 1.02 0.57 0.45 0.58 0.67
Exports (US$ bi FOB) 10.58 9.85 8.34 7.56 6.56 7.41 8.26
Imports (US$ bi FOB) 16.69 19.75 17.34 13.15 11.82 12.75 14.54
Trade Balance (US$ bi FOB) -6.11 -9.89 -9.00 -5.60 -5.26 -5.34 -6.28
Annual Inflation (IGPM) 7.80% 5.50% 3.70% 10.50% 7.20% -0.50% 8.20%
R$/US$ (*) 1.96 2.16 2.35 3.35 3.47 3.20 3.68
(*) average buying exchange rate
Source: Sindipecas. "Desempenho da Industria Brasileira de Autopecas". www.sindipecas.org.br
Sources of Turnover - per segment (%)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
2018 
(projection)
Automaker 69.3 70.4 67.6 60.8 61.7 62.4 64.4
Spare/replacement 14.7 14.5 16.7 18.8 18.2 18 17.2
Exports 8.6 8.3 10.3 14.7 14.2 14 13.2
Intrasectoral 7.4 6.8 5.4 5.7 5.9 5.6 5.2
Source: Sindipecas. "Desempenho da Industria Brasileira de Autopecas". Www.sindipecas.org.br
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Table 2 – Vehicle production worldwide - 2017 
Country Cars 
Commercial 
vehicles 
Total 
% change from 
previous year 
China 24,806,687 4,208,747 29,015,434 3.19% 
USA 3,033,216 8,156,769 11,189,985 -8.13% 
Japan 8,347,836 1,345,910 9,693,746 5.31% 
Germany 5,645,581 0 5,645,581 -1.76% 
India 3,952,550 830,346 4,782,896 5.83% 
South Korea 3,735,399 379,514 4,114,913 -2.69% 
Mexico 1,900,029 2,168,386 4,068,415 13.00% 
Spain 2,291,492 556,843 2,848,335 -1.30% 
Brazil 2,269,468 430,204 2,699,672 25.20% 
France 1,748,000 479,000 2,227,000 6.54% 
Canada 749,458 1,450,331 2,199,789 -7.21% 
Thailand 818,440 1,170,383 1,988,823 2.28% 
UK 1,671,166 78,219 1,749,385 -3.70% 
Turkey 1,142,906 552,825 1,695,731 14.12% 
Russia 1,348,029 203,264 1,551,293 19.01% 
Iran 1,418,550 96,846 1,515,396 18.19% 
Czech Rep. 1,413,881 6,112 1,419,993 0.00% 
Indonesia 982,356 234,259 1,216,615 3.30% 
Italy 742,642 399,568 1,142,210 3.53% 
Slovakia 1,001,520 0 1,001,520 -3.70% 
Others 536,725 221,947 758,672 16% 
Poland 514,700 175,029 689,729 1.16% 
South Africa 321,358 268,593 589,951 -1.51% 
Hungary 502,000 3,400 505,400 -4.01% 
Argentina 203,700 268,458 472,158 -0.13% 
Source:  http://www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/2017-statistics/  
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The behaviour of vehicle production has its own idiosyncrasies but is also related to 
the overall trends in manufacturing around the world. Although car manufacturing has 
been moving towards countries with relative better demand potential – such as the 
main developing countries, overall manufacturing has been increasingly concentrated 
in Asian countries, as can be seen from table 3. Only big countries in Asia are 
increasing their manufacturing value-added. Brazil`s is declining, in line with most 
countries excepting Asian ones: China, Korea, India and Indonesia.   
 
Table 3 – Share in world manufacture value-added 
 
 
 
4.2 BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SECTOR IN BRAZIL AND THE 
MAIN INDUSTRIAL POLICIES65 
 
The automotive sector, as showed in figure 8, followed a strong growth path since its 
inception, in the 1950s, until 2013, when production started to fall sharply (this last 
inflexion is not necessarily a trend, but probably a short-term adjustment to the overall 
 
65 Part of this section is from parts solely authored by the author of this thesis, already published as chapter 4 of 
the following jointly-authored publication: Inovar auto: evaluating Brazil's automotive industrial policy to meet 
the challenges of global value chains (English).  World Bank Working Paper Report No.121667, 2017. Co-
authored with Timothy Sturgeon and Justin Barnes. 
Country/Economy 2005 2010 2015 Trend
China 11.75 18.69 23.84
United States of America 20.43 17.77 16.54
Japan 11.14 10.43 8.93
Germany 7.29 6.55 6.37
Republic of Korea 2.54 2.95 3.09
India 1.74 2.36 2.45
Italy 3.7 2.94 2.42
France 3.13 2.61 2.34
Brazil 3.08 2.89 2.26
Indonesia 1.65 1.7 1.93
United Kingdom 2.66 2.15 1.93
Russian Federation 2.15 1.9 1.77
Mexico 1.91 1.69 1.7
Canada 2.2 1.57 1.45
Spain 2.18 1.69 1.44
Source: UNIDO
(1) Constant 2010 prices
Shares in World Manufacturing Value-Added (1)
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economic crisis faced by the country).  We then can group three periods of high 
production growth for cars:  
 1957-1980: 23.88% average growth, for 23 years;  
 1993-1997: 18.21% average growth for 5 years; and 
 2000-2013: 7.87% average growth for 14 years. 
 
Similarly, the years of most pronounced decreases in car production could be grouped 
as follows: 
 1981: 41% fall; 
 1998-1999: 32% fall; and   
 2014-2015: 34% fall        
    
Figure 1. Brazilian vehicle production (thousands of units) 
 
Source: Anuario Anfavea. 
 
Production grew after the implementation of the “Regime Automotivo” and the sectoral 
agreements of the 1990s. Based on the discussion in the previous sections, we can 
infer that these policies successfully helped to increase production. For Inovar Auto, 
however, the picture is much less clear, since the industry grew immediately after the 
Program was established but was not sustained thereafter.   
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However, all such cycles faced by the automotive sector in Brazil broadly 
corresponded to general cycles in the Brazilian economy, and this makes it difficult to 
build a reliable counterfactual with the available data. As we shall see in the following 
sections, we do make some inferences using the production of agricultural machines 
as a control group, although this is clearly an imperfect one. As we will also see in the 
following sections, the most reliable inference that can be made with these industry-
level data is that Inovar Auto provided some relief against imports, and thus helped 
domestic players avoid losing market-share to imports. 
 
The industrialization process and the 1950’s 
 
Vehicle assembly in Brazil started with the Ford Model T in 1919, followed by General 
Motors in 1925. These were based on CKDs imports, and thus didn’t generate a value 
chain of auto parts production. However, the auto part industry in Brazil gained a 
momentum during the Second World War, as imports were affected, and the domestic 
industry assumed the role to supply spare parts to the vehicle fleet in use within the 
country. When the war was over, imports of auto parts and vehicles rose again, 
bringing concerns about trade deficits (Barros and Pedera, 2012).  
 
The import disruption caused by the Second World War had provided an opportunity 
for indigenous auto part producers, so when the end of the War brought rising imports 
and balance of trade concerns, the government turned to import substitution policies. 
Specifically, the Government established, from February 1948 to October 1953, a 
licensing scheme to allocate foreign exchange in a discriminatory way, favoring capital 
goods and discouraging imports of consumer goods, including automobiles. Moreover, 
in 1952 imports of auto parts with similar domestic production were prohibited66, and 
in 1953 imports of assembled cars were prohibited67. As a result, the use of 
domestically-made auto parts rebounded to 30 percent local content and the number 
of members of the Brazilian Professional Association of the Auto part producers, 
created in 1951, rose from 250 firms in 1952 to 900 registered firms in 1955 (Shapiro, 
 
66 Advisory 288 , from August/1952. 
67 Advisory 311, from April 1953. The quantitative restriction to imports was ceased only in the 90’s (although 
high tariffs were still present for most of the time thereafter). 
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1994). By then, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen and Willys-Overland started to produce 
vehicles in Brazil, although at small scales (Barros and Pedera, 2012). 
 
As pointed by Shapiro (ibid), it was only after 1956 when the Government unveiled its 
“Target Plan” that Brazil began to produce vehicles in high volumes with high local 
content. The Plan promoted “basic industries”. In short, it provided financial incentives 
and required higher levels of local-content (up to 95% by weight in 1960) to promote 
import-substitution68. 
 
The financial incentives were given to projects approved by December 1957 and 
consisted in a series of subsidies and tax exemptions (Shapiro, 1994):   
 Subsidized exchange rates for capital goods imported for FDI, including imports 
by foreign automakers;   
 Subsidized exchange rate for foreign loans borrowed for investments;  
 Subsidized exchange rates for importing auto parts not yet domestically 
produced, with the aim of eventually reaching the required local content levels;  
 Fiscal benefits: exemption of import and sale taxes on capital goods purchased 
by automakers. In the case of trucks, utility vehicles and jeeps also had a sales 
tax exemption;  
 BNDE loans: automakers became eligible for subsidized financing and loan 
guarantees from the State Development Bank – BNDE. 
 
The first car manufactured in Brazil was the Romi-Isetta, built in 1956 with 70% of local 
content (Barros and Pedera, 2012). This vehicle was produced under license from 
Italian automakers by Industria Romi S.A., a Brazilian automaker.  The same local 
content level was achieved for trucks by another indigenous automaker of that time: 
The National Motor Factory (FNM), also producing under license.  It is important to 
note that licensing designs did not create automotive engineering spillovers.  
 
 
68 As summarized by Shapiro (1989): 
By December 1956: trucks: 35%; jeeps: 50%; utility vehicles:40%; cars: none; 
By July 1957: trucks: 40%; jeeps: 60%; utility vehicles:50%; cars: 50%; 
By July 1958: trucks: 65%; jeeps: 75%; utility vehicles:65%; cars: 65%; 
By July 1959: trucks: 75%; jeeps: 85%; utility vehicles:75%; cars: 85%; 
By July 1960: trucks: 90%; jeeps: 95%; utility vehicles:90%; cars:95%. 
130 
 
As Shapiro (ibid) pointed out, Brazil opted for an import substitution strategy for 
industrialization, instead of an export-led strategy, because policymakers believed the 
latter would not be enough to solve the country’s growing foreign-exchange 
constraints69. Specifically, regarding the auto sector, the strategy involved taking the 
firms to a “point of no return”, where large upfront investments would be made to 
comply with the requirements of the policy. The consequence was a large number of 
entrants with relatively small scale of production, leading to scale inefficiencies that 
implied higher costs of production. Foreign firms decided to invest, despite these 
problems, because they were interested in the potential of the Brazilian domestic 
market70, and were convinced that there was a time limit to the governmental support71 
(Shapiro, 1994).  
 
It is worthwhile to note that the Brazilian Government did not show a long-lasting 
commitment to promote a genuine Brazilian car. As the literature indicates, the 
experience with FNM, an initially state-owned firm, apparently convinced local 
policymakers that there was no economic reason to promote national champions 
within the automotive sector, as FDI attraction was from multinationals was successful.   
 
The strategy was successful in terms of attracting investment and creating 
employment for both assembly and parts, as pointed by Shapiro (ibid): By 1961 there 
were eleven automakers operating in the country, producing with an average local-
content of more than 90% by weight and almost that figure by value; After some 
consolidation, production almost doubled from 1961 to 1968 and reasonable 
economies of scale were achieved72; By 1975, Brazil was the ninth largest producer of 
automobiles in the world.  
 
69 As reasons for this belief the author cites the limited export market in post-war 1950s and the dominance of 
agricultural items in the Brazilian exports.  
70 Shapiro (1989) uses Argentina as a comparison for this argument, stating that this country had similar 
policies to attract FDI for the sector in 1958, but did not succeeded as Brazil, mainly because of its smaller 
domestic market. 
71 As stated by Shapiro (ibid), historical evidence suggests that policy requirements were a determinant factor 
in making the multinational automakers investing in domestic production in Brazil, even if this investment was 
only the anticipation of decisions already taken.  
72 Shapiro (1994) cites evidence that shows that, in 1967, ex-factory costs in Brazil were 1.7 times higher than 
in the United States, mainly because of tax differentials (without taxes the cost differential would be reduced 
to 1.28, and scale would be the main cause for it). The author also cites that this cost differential was reduced 
in the 1970s and that in the early 1980s Brazilian prices, net of taxes, were lower than similar models in foreign 
markets.   
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In the 1970s, the foreign automakers producing in Brazil asked for a withdrawal of 
incentives to deter new entrants.  The Government ended the incentives in 1974 with 
the rational of further increasing the average scale of production73 (Guimaraes, 1989).  
 
After 1975 the Government started to promote vehicle exports. The main motivation, 
according to Shapiro (ibid), was to improve the country’s the trade balance. Barros 
and Pedera (2012) emphasizes that the government adopted policies to promote 
exports of auto parts and to incentivize R&D through financial support for the 
automakers producing domestically. In the 1980s, exports did grow substantially, 
especially since the country faced a long-lasting economic crisis in the 1980s and 
domestic demand for vehicles fell, forcing the industry to resort to exports. The 1980’s 
crisis was so severe that, even with growing exports, domestic production recovered 
to levels reached in 1979 only in 1993. 
 
The trade liberalization and the 1990’s automotive strategy  
 
In the early 1990s the Government pushed further the trade liberalization agenda, 
eliminating non-tariff barriers and reducing tariffs, including in the automotive sector. 
The so-called “Regime Automotivo Brasileiro” also promoted cost (achieved by lower 
taxes) and price (achieved by reduced profits) reductions within the sector, which led 
to rising sales and production: Between 1992 and 1993 the Government, the 
automakers, the auto parts producers, the dealers and the workers set up a series of 
agreements (“Acordos Automotivos”) meant to achieve the following goals: a) price 
reduction of 22%, following a reduction in taxation (IPI, ICMS) and in profit margins 
(for automakers, auto part producers and dealers); b) public commitment to keep the 
level of employment at July 1993 levels; c) better financial conditions for vehicles 
purchases; d) increasing production targets and new investments within the sector. 
Furthermore, in April 1993 the Government launched Decree 799, reducing the IPI 
from 8% to 0.1% for cars with low cylinder capacity, thus promoting the production of 
these so-called “popular” vehicles, with production initially led by Volkswagen and Fiat 
(Barros and Pedra, 2012). 
 
73In the 1970s, the last firm to get subsidies and enter the market was FIAT (initiated production in 1976). 
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With inflation under control after 1994, there is further growth in vehicle sales. 
However, the rapid increase in imports in 1994 brought new concerns about the trade 
balance. Thus, the Government resorted to measures to reduce consumption, 
including higher import tariffs and quotas.  
 
In 1995 and 1996 President Cardoso implemented the “Regime Automotivo Brasileiro” 
(Brazilian Automotive Regime and the Special Regime)74. This policy, set to expire in 
31/December/1999, consisted of a series of tax incentives for FDI in new plants in 
Brazil, especially in less developed regions and for the existing domestic producers:  
 
 Reduction of import taxes for vehicles imported by carmakers operating in 
Brazil; for capital goods; and for raw materials and auto parts; 
 For vehicles, the policy stated that the total subsidized imports should be less 
than the total exports; 
 For auto parts, the policy stated that the total subsidized imports should be less 
than 2/3 of total exports; 
 Local content requirement was 60% of the value of inputs used in the vehicle 
production (new automakers had 3 years to start complying with the LCR 
target). 
 
The Special Regime had more incentives, specially designed for new investments in 
the least developed regions (Northeast, North, and Centre-West). These incentives 
contained a series of tax abatements, including further reduction in import taxes and 
IPI for capital goods; reduction of IPI for inputs; and exemption of Income tax and 
others. 
 
The policy was apparently successful regarding import substitution and increasing the 
geographic diversity of the industry within Brazil. De Negri (1999) points that the 
automakers reached a local content above 80% (much higher than the required 
levels), the trade deficit was eliminated, and production was geographically dispersed 
 
74 Provisional Measure n. 1,024, from 13/June/1995, converted into the Law n. 9,449/97, from 14/March/1997; 
Provisional Measure n. 1,235/1995; Presidential Decrees 1,291/1995 and 1,761/1995; and, for the Special 
Regime, the Provisional Measure n. 1,532/1996, converted into the Law n. 9,440/1997. 
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in Brazil for the first time. Moreover, according to Arbix (2000), the successful result 
came quickly, with 16 automakers within the Automotive Regime. The amount 
invested under the Program by the firms was similar in scale to the investment made 
in the 1950s and1960s. 
 
Arbix (ibid) presents survey data from the National Confederation of Industries -CNI 
and the ECLAC/UN that revels investor motivations for choosing specific investment 
locations within the New Automotive Regime in the 90s. The most important factors 
identified by respondents were equally “proximity with the market” and “financial 
benefits” and secondarily “labor costs” and “local incentives and advantages”.  
 
However, at the end of the 90s, crisis hit again with a new, short cycle of devalued 
exchange, higher taxation, and lower domestic demand, leading to a short-term hike 
in exports (2002 and 2003). 
 
The 2010 import boom and the birth of Inovar Auto 
 
After 2003 the Brazilian economy began to recover from 6 years of crisis caused by a 
combination of the international financial crisis from the late 90s; energy shortages; 
political uncertainties; trade imbalances. The prospects of a Government with more 
than expected market-friendly policies and the fiscal windfall generated by a new 
commodity boom provided the background for rising confidence, production, real wage 
gains and consumption in through 2014.    
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis production and sales dropped, but 
the country experienced a relatively quick recovery. Among the policies implemented 
to offset the effects of the 2008 crisis there was the availability of cheap credit trough 
PSI line (“Programa de Sustentação do Investimento”), operated by BNDES. Despite 
these efforts, investments by auto parts suffered a huge setback in 2009, and auto 
part producers have been unable to match the investments made by automakers since 
(Barros and Pedra, 2012). 
 
Meanwhile, given the increasing strength of the Real, and the robust domestic demand 
since 2004, sales of imported vehicles grew substantially, reaching 34.8% of apparent 
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domestic consumption in December 2011. This was viewed as a threat by the locally 
based automakers, who then asked for protection against imports. The auto part 
producers joined the request, asking for the establishment of minimum local content 
requirements. After negotiations with the Government, a 30-percentage points 
differential in the IPI tax rate between imported and domestic produced vehicles was 
established in 2011. Since 2012 this differential was included, together with other 
measures, in a policy called Inovar Auto. 
 
According to Anfavea, the Brazilian automotive producer association, Inovar Auto 
increased local production by 10% in 2013, reflecting a reduction in import penetration, 
and promoted new investments of over 30 billion dollars until 2017. However, 
investment in new plants and capacity was already growing in the 2000s, even before 
Inovar Auto was conceived. Similarly, FDI had started to increase sharply in 2010 – 
before Inovar-auto was conceived. 
 
Inovar Auto as a tax expenditure and its case at the World Trade Organization 
 
Two dispute cases involving Brazilian tax expenditures were initiated under the WTO 
dispute settlement system75. According to the WTO, at DS 472 the European Union 
requested a panel in October 2014 (established in December 2014 and composed in 
March 2015), after almost one year of consultations.76 The consultations discussed 
taxation not only in the automotive sector, but also in electronics and included debates 
on the use of Free Trade Zones and differential tax treatments for exporters. The 
allegations were that Brazil didn`t comply with a series of WTO rules77.  
 
Consultations requested by Japan78 in July 2015 culminated in a panel established 
and composed in September 2015, for the dispute DS 497, with the allegation that 
Brazil didn`t comply with the GATT 1994; the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
 
75 DS 472 and DS 497. 
76 Third parties in the panel are: Argentina, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, the Russian Federation, Chinese 
Taipei, Turkey, the United States, Canada, Colombia and South Africa. 
77 More precisely: articles I:1, II:1(b), III:2, III:4, and III:5 of the GATT 1994; article 3.1(b) of the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement; and articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
agreement. 
78 Third parties in the panel are:  Argentina, Australia, China, the European Union, India, Korea, the Russian 
Federation and the United States. 
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Agreement; and the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement. The 
panel in the dispute DS497 is the same as in the dispute DS 472, and thus both 
followed a harmonized procedure. 
 
The publicly available documents at the WTO website show that the consultation 
requested by the European Union pointed to the following tax measures:  
 
 The Programme of incentive to the technological innovation and densification 
of the automotive supply chain Law (Programa de Incentivo à Inovação 
Tecnológica e Adensamento da Cadeia Produtiva de Veículos Automotores - 
"INOVAR-AUTO"); 
 the Informatics Programme (Lei de Informatica); 
 the Digital Inclusion Programme (Programa de Inclusão Digital);  
 the Programme of Incentives for the Semiconductors Sector (Programa de 
Incentivos ao Setor de Semicondutores - PADIS); 
 the Programme of Support to the Technological Developments of the Industry 
of Digital TV Equipment") (Programa de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento 
Tecnológico da Indústria de Equipamentos para TV Digital - PATVD); 
 the Special Regime for the Purchase of Capital Goods for Exporting Enterprises 
(Regime Especial de Aquisição de Bens de Capital para Empresas 
Exportadoras - RECAP); 
 the export contingent subsidies for predominantly exporting companies 
(Empresas preponderantemente exportadoras) concerning the Purchase of 
Raw Materials, Intermediate Goods and Packaging Materials; 
 The Manaus Free Trade Zone (Zona Franca de Manaus). 
 
The consultation requested by Japan had all but the Manaus Free Trade Zone item. 
According to both consultations, these measures discriminate foreign producers by 
commanding a higher taxation on imports and export contingent subsidies. Specifically 
regarding Inovar Auto, the claim is that the Program discriminates in favor of domestic 
production and in favor of some WTO members over others.  
 
The Panel Report was circulated on 30/August/2017, and concluded that: 
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a) Regarding most-favored nations claims: Brazil could not have implemented 
discriminatory internal taxation measures, treating imports from the E.U. and 
Japan differently from imports from Mexico and Mercosur; 
b) Regrading National Treatment claims: The Panel concluded that the tax 
discriminations against imports and the local content requirements favor 
domestic production in a way that is inconsistent with WTO rules.    
 
Inovar Auto is considered a tax expenditure, as it constitutes an exception from the 
normal tax code and, following Hashimzade et al (2014), this exception is motivated 
by a specific policy that benefits a sector in a way that is analogue to a budget 
expenditure79.    
 
Another important fact is that Inovar-Auto elevated the level of protection against 
foreign competition in 30 percentage points since 2011, that, adding to the import tariff 
of 35% and to the substantial currency devaluation since 2011 promoted a sizeable 
barrier to foreign competition. It is therefore possible that the Brazilian auto sector is 
being excessively protected and that this is contributing to a situation where firms 
operate with smaller scales than otherwise. To be exempt from this surcharge, an 
assembler needs to comply with local content requirements.  However, local contents 
have the same effect as trade barriers on imported inputs: they make these inputs 
more expensive, thus damaging the competitiveness of the domestic value chain. 
 
Overall, the Brazilian value chains show tariff escalation: the tariffs for the automotive 
sector were the following: 
Average nominal tariff within the first transformation: 14.3% 
Average nominal tariff within the second transformation: 14.9% 
Average nominal tariff within the third transformation: 31.1% 
Source: UFRJ (2015). 
 
79 The Brazilian Internal Revenue Secretariat defines tax expenditures in a similar way: “Gastos tributários são 
gastos indiretos do governo realizados por intermédio do sistema tributário, visando atender objetivos 
econômicos e sociais. São explicitados na norma que referencia o tributo, constituindo-se uma exceção ao 
sistema tributário de referência, reduzindo a arrecadação potencial e, consequentemente, aumentando a 
disponibilidade econômica do contribuinte. Têm caráter compensatório, quando o governo não atende 
adequadamente a população dos serviços de sua responsabilidade, ou têm caráter incentivador, quando o 
governo tem a intenção de desenvolver determinado setor ou região”(SRFB, 2015). 
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This means that the automotive sector shows strong tariff escalation for the third 
transformation – the manufacturing of cars, trucks, buses and motorcycles. However, 
the tariff escalation within lower levels of the value chain is not noticeable, despite the 
high tariff levels observed.  This could indicate that autoparts are buying inputs with 
high tariffs, both in relative and in absolute terms. The highest effective tariffs in Brazil 
are for trucks, buses, cars and light commercials. These industries also have the 
highest nominal tariffs. This means that their nominal tariff is much higher than the one 
applied for its inputs.  
 
In the case of electronics and telecom goods, there is no tariff escalation, as the inputs 
are taxed heavier than the other transformation phases. 
 
Without any static consideration regarding consumer prices, the concept of effective 
protection shows clearly that when a tariff is imposed on an input, ceteris paribus the 
final good will be less protected. In the Brazilian automotive sector, there are high 
tariffs for autoparts (inputs), and, in order to avoid a loss in effective protection for the 
automakers (final goods), even higher tariffs were needed (and were imposed) on 
vehicles. An example of an opposite approach is from the aeronautical sector: input 
tariffs are relatively lower, thus increasing effective protection for aircrafts and, at the 
same time, increasing its international competitiveness. 
 
 
4.3 A BEFORE-AND-AFTER ANALYSIS OF INOVAR-AUTO80 
 
Estimating the Impact of Inovar Auto 
 
What has been the effect of Inovar Auto?  Because the program affects all firms in the 
sector, there is no easy candidate for a control group and, therefore, no rigorous way 
to judge its impact against a counterfactual outcome. Thus, our analysis will be based 
 
80 Part of this section is from parts solely authored by the author of this thesis, already published as chapter 4 of 
the following jointly-authored publication: Inovar auto: evaluating Brazil's automotive industrial policy to meet 
the challenges of global value chains (English).  World Bank Working Paper Report No.121667, 2017. Co-
authored with Timothy Sturgeon and Justin Barnes. 
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on a non-experimental design, seeking to make inferences about the impact of the 
Program on the automotive sector before and after its implementation, while remaining 
aware of the limitations of the analysis in terms of internal validity81. To deal with these 
limitations we will use complementary (comparable) information when available. This 
can be data on the entire Brazilian manufacturing sector or on adjacent industries 
(agricultural vehicles and motorcycles, for instance), or the identification of historical 
trends. 
 
It is not straightforward to define a point in time were Inovar Auto started affecting 
economic agents. The Policy was set up trough successive pieces of legislation, with 
different effects: 
 02/August/2011: Provisional Measure 540, effective to deter imports after 
December and not effective regarding local content requirements. 
 14/December/2011: Conversion into Law 12.546 
 03/April/2012: Provisional Measure 563, set up of Inovar Auto, more effective 
to deter imports and with more detailed commands regarding local content 
requirements. 
 17/September/2012: Law 12.715: Inovar Auto converted into Law. 
 03/October/2012: Decree 7819: Inovar Auto fully effective. 
 
In this analysis, we position the start of Inovar Auto as when MP 563 was issued: April 
2012. 
 
Output, Sales, Investments, and Employment 
 
It can be seen from figure 2 that there was an upward trend in automotive sector 
investment in the between 2005 and 2011. If we take the investment in agricultural 
machinery not covered by Inovar Auto as a control group, we see a very similar 
pattern, apart from 1995-2001, a period where the 1995`s policy seemed to have 
played a role in promoting investment for the automotive sector. However, we must 
 
81 Because there is no control group it is not possible to establish a clear causal relationship and therefore 
estimate the impact of the Program: other factors could be affecting the changes in the m, measured variables. 
The most important potential factors that in our view could affect the outcomes are the macroeconomic 
environment and the business cycle for the industry (similarly to a “regression-to-the mean”).   
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acknowledge that this period was characterized by strong outward investment by 
automakers and global suppliers (see section 1 of this report and Sturgeon and 
Florida, 2004).  Market saturation in OECD countries led to a huge investment wave 
in large emerging markets such as China, India, and Brazil.  So, there was a general 
“push” in the global industry for outward investment to big emerging markets such as 
Brazil, as well as “pull” from policies.  Following the arguments presented in the 
analysis of the previous policies, data seems to confirm that automakers invested 
because of growing domestic demand and potential demand. In this sense, policy, at 
best, only accelerated a trend that was already under way, driven by the corporate 
strategies of global automotive firms.  
 
Figure 2. Investments in production 
 
Source: Anuario Anfavea 
 
Another important consideration is how much of the announced investments after 
Inovar Auto were in fact “caused” by the Program. With the available data we can only 
make some inferences. To do this exercise we will assume that a typical investment 
decision would be taken at least 3 years before production is initiated. Another 
assumption is that Inovar-Auto began to influence investment decisions on the 14th of 
December, 2011. From these assumptions, we assume that any production that was 
planned to start before December of 2014 is was decided prior to Inovar Auto. Our 
calculations use data from investment commitments and employment forecasts 
released by the firms through 2015.  
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Table 4 shows the results: According to our assumptions, the Program could be 
responsible for only 51% of the investment committed and 52% of the jobs predicted. 
These figures are not far from other results in the literature: studies surveyed by James 
(2009) show that the percentage of firms that would have invested even without the 
tax incentive range from 51% to 85%. 
 
Table 4. Announced Investment 2013-2017 
 
Source of primary data: Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade. Author`s calculations. 
(*) Dates were given by firms to the Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade when enrolling in the Program 
Inovar-Auto and includes updates until 2015. (**) As a result of the following assumptions: a) An 
investment decision is taken at least 3 years before production takes place; and b) The Policy started 
to influence investment decisions on 14/December/2011. Thus, any production planned to start before 
the end of 2014 is deemed to be already decided before Inovar-Auto. (***) Total investment committed 
and job creation assumed to be resultant from the Program, according to our assumptions. 
FIRM
INVESTMENT 
COMMITED  
(R$ milions)
FORECASTED 
PRODUCTION 
CAPACITY (Units)
EXPECTED DATE 
TO START 
PRODUCTION(*)
EXPECTED JOB 
CREATION 
(Persons)
HYPOTHESIS(**)
AUDI DO BRASIL DIST. DE 
VEÍCULOS LTDA (Projeto A3 e Q3)
670 26.000                    4º trim 2015 400                         
INFLUENCED BY INOVAR
BMW DO BRASIL LTDA. 625 32.000                    1º trim 2014 1.300                      ALREADY DECIDED
CAMINHÕES METRO-SHACMAN 
DO BRASIL, COM. E IND. DE VEIC. 
AUTOMOTORES LTDA.
329 10.000                    4º trim 2014 300                         
ALREADY DECIDED
CAOA MONTADORA DE VEIC. 
PROJETO (Ix35)
300 24.000                    3º trim 2014 550                         
ALREADY DECIDED
CHERY BRASIL IMP.FAB.E 
DIST.VEIC.
351 100.000                  1º trim 2014 1.700                      
ALREADY DECIDED
DAF CAMINHÕES BRASIL 
INDÚSTRIA LTDA.
351 10.000                    4º trim 2013 500                         
ALREADY DECIDED
FOTON AUMARK DO BRASIL - 
Fábrica no Rio Grande do Sul
239 34.000                    2º trim 2015 307                         INFLUENCED BY INOVAR
FOTON MOTORS DO BRASIL LTDA - 
Fábrica na Bahia
301 16.000                    2º trim 2015 500                         
INFLUENCED BY INOVAR
JAC MOTORS DO BRASIL 
AUTOMÓVEIS
900 80.000                    1º trim 2015 3.000                      
INFLUENCED BY INOVAR
JAGUAR E LAND ROVER BRASIL 
IMPORTAÇÃO E COMÉRCIO DE 
VEÍCULOS LTDA.
904 24.000                    3º trim 2016 1.360                      
INFLUENCED BY INOVAR
MERCEDES-BENZ DO BRASIL 
LTDA (Projeto Clase C e GLA)
709 20.000                    1º trim 2016 1.000                      
INFLUENCED BY INOVAR
MMC AUTOMOTORES DO BRASIL 
LTDA (Projeto ASX)
283 27.000                    2º trim 2013 324                         
ALREADY DECIDED
MMC AUTOMOTORES DO BRASIL 
LTDA (Projeto LANCER)
193 21.715                    1º trim 2014 300                         
ALREADY DECIDED
NISSAN DO BRASIL AUTOMOVEIS 
LTDA (INCISO III)
2.500 160.000                  1º trim 2014 2.700                      
ALREADY DECIDED
SBTC  INDÚSTRIA DE VEÍCULOS 
S/A
199 5.000                      1º trim 2016 850                         
INFLUENCED BY INOVAR
VOLKSWAGEN DO BRASIL IND. DE 
VEÍCULOS AUTOMOTORES (Projeto 
GOLF)
505 40.000                    3º trim 2015 400                         
INFLUENCED BY INOVAR
TOTAL 8.688 603.715                  - 15.091                    
TOTAL INFLUENCED BY THE 
POLICY(***) 
4.426 7.817                      
% 51% 52%
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Figure 3 shows the number of vehicles produced in Brazil quarterly from 2007 to 
September 2016. Using agricultural machines as a control group, it is not possible to 
infer that production of motor vehicles has been affected by Inovar Auto. However, this 
control is not perfect, as one could argue that imports of agricultural machines were 
not a threat to domestic production as it were in the case of vehicles. The point here 
is, as we shall see throughout this section, that although Inovar Auto may have shifted 
demand from imports to domestic production in the short-term, thus briefly boosting 
and then slowing the decline in domestic production, it did not alter the 
competitiveness of the industry enough to allow Brazilian production to grow despite 
the domestic crisis trough exports or trough costs and price reductions in the domestic 
market. 
 
Figure 3. Units produced 
 
Source: Anfavea website 
 
Monthly production data from PIM/IBGE (figure 4) also shows that Inovar Auto did not 
have a clear impact on the production of both vehicles and auto parts.  
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Figure 4. Production index (2012=100)  
 
Source: PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual) - IBGE 
 
Apparently, Inovar Auto had no impact on employment, as can be inferred from figure 
5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Employment (number of workers): vehicle production and 
agricultural machines production 
 
Source: Anuario Anfavea 
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Trade, Innovation and Exchange Rates  
 
As explained in section 4, Inovar Auto represented a barrier to imports. Not 
surprisingly, it likely succeeded in reducing the import penetration in the Brazilian 
market, as is suggested by the trade statistics (figure 6). In this case, there was an 
effective trade barrier since December 2011, when imports were due to pay the 
increased IPI tax. There was, however, a delay in import reduction for auto parts, what 
could be explained by the time required to domestic sourcing and by the time required 
to assure compliance with the local content requirements.  
 
Figure 6. Brazil motor vehicle trade balance (current US$ thousands) 
 
Source: United Nations Comtrade database 
 
A more detailed look (figure 7) at Brazil’s trade balance in vehicles and parts confirms 
that passenger cars were the most affected by imports before Inovar Auto, and that 
this trend was reversed after the policy came into effect in 2011. The trend for auto 
parts began to change only in 2013, when the Government gained the legal provisions 
needed to enforce compliance with local content requirements.  
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Figure 7. Brazil automotive vehicle trade balance (current US$ 
thousands) 
 
Source: AliceWeb - Brazilian Ministry of Trade 
 
The reason for the sharp deterioration of the Brazilian trade balance in vehicles from 
2006 to 2011 was a combination of growing domestic demand, which diverted exports 
to the local market, and the increasing value of the domestic currency, which 
overpriced exports and made imports more appealing. The peak in terms of value for 
the Brazilian currency was 2010-2011, when it reached a level very close to that of 
1997-1998. Similar data for manufacturing as a whole suggests that the level reached 
in 2011 was also similar to the level reached in 1990, when the market was opened, 
and not so far from 1994-1998 levels (figure 8). In other words, the last three times the 
domestic currency reached such levels policy responses followed.     
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Figure 8. Real effective exchange rate (2010 = 100) 
 
Source: IPEADATA 
Note: INPC price index. Trade-weighted currencies.  
 
From figure 8 we also see that after the protection was brought by Inovar Auto the 
country faced a deterioration of its currency, what means that the real protection for 
the sector started to increase substantially above what was deemed as necessary by 
the policy.  
 
Another way to explore how Inovar Auto reduced imports is to examine the import 
penetration coefficient (figure 9). This is calculated dividing imports by apparent 
consumption82. The results also show that Inovar Auto may have broken a trend of 
growth in import penetration that has been in place since 2004. The average level over 
the last 4 years is nonetheless similar to the average level verified in the 4 years after 
the 1995’s policy: around 20%. This could indicate two things: 1) During the 6 years 
before the implementation of Inovar Auto the industry was indeed suffering from a 
relatively fast growth of imports – what could have justified the concerns among the 
domestic producers; and 2) The import penetration was very low in 2004-2008, 
meaning that the concern highlighted in item “1” could be somehow unjustified. 
 
 
 
 
82 Apparent consumption = Production + imports – exports. 
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Figure 9. Monthly import penetration - total vehicles 
 
Source: Anfavea (Anuario and Cartas Anfavea) 
 
Although the trade balance data and the import penetration coefficients allow us to 
make inferences, it is also informative to examine measures of revealed comparative 
advantage, as a proxy for external competitiveness83:   
    
Revealed Comparative Advantage in Exports (Balassa index) - RCAE: 
(VEHICLES EXPORTS BRAZIL/TOTAL EXPORTS BRAZIL) / (VEHICLES 
EXPORTS WORLD/TOTAL EXPORTS WORLD) 
 
Revealed Comparative Advantage in Imports - RCAI: 
(VEHICLES IMPORTS BRAZIL/TOTAL IMPORTS BRAZIL) / (VEHICLES IMPORTS 
WORLD/TOTAL IMPORTS WORLD) 
 
Net Revealed Comparative Advantage – NRCA: 
RCAE - RCAI 
            
NRCA is a combination of RCAE and RCAI, and a higher NRCA means higher 
competitiveness. This is related to trade balance, as it includes exports and imports, 
 
83 As these measures do not disentangle the effects of subsidies and pro6ection, they are not measures of 
“pure” competitiveness.  
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but it emphasizes the differences in the ratios of export and imports between the 
observed country and the rest of the world. 
       
Clearly, Brazilian vehicle production faced stronger competition from abroad during 
the periods 1993-1996 and 2008-2011. Interestingly, years 1994/1995 and 2010/2011 
were practically identical bottom points in terms of the index (figure 10), and both 
points coincide with the timing of the discussions that led to both policies "Regime 
Automotivo" and "Inovar Auto". Moreover, the data suggests that the implementation 
of both policies seem to have coincided with improved competitiveness. For auto parts, 
data show an opposite trend between 1991 and 2005, as auto parts production in 
Brazil lost competitiveness starting in 1992. Since 2006 final goods joined this loss of 
competitiveness until the trends reversed in 2001 for vehicles and 2013 for parts. 
 
Figure 10. Net Revealed Comparative Advantage - NRCA 
 
Data source: United Nations Comtrade database.  
        
To shed more light on the issue, we disaggregated the NRCA vehicle index into its two 
components: RCAE and RCAI. As we can see, from figure 11, RCAE does not seem 
to have been impacted by either policy regime. This suggests that Brazilian vehicle 
exports were driven by other factors, such as the capacity of the domestic market to 
absorb domestic production. In the years when the domestic demand is weaker, RCAE 
is higher. This illustrates how the Brazilian automotive sector is focused on the 
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domestic market, turning to exports to provide relief during periods of slumping 
domestic demand. RCAI, on the other hand, matches (with opposite signals, as it 
shows the strength of imports) the NRCA curve. As there was no major structural 
change for the Brazilian competitiveness, the explanation for these movements is 
likely to be the exchange rate and tariffs (protection from or exposure to imports).  
 
For auto parts (figure 12), RCAI was growing faster than RCAE (higher comparative 
advantage in exports) since 1991, resulting in a deteriorating NRCA. This means that 
in the 1990s Brazilian auto parts lost competitiveness because firms were not able to 
withstand import competition, while in the 2000s Brazilian auto parts also lost capacity 
to compete in foreign markets through exports. 
 
Figure 11. Other measures of revealed comparative advantage - 
vehicles 
 
Data source: United Nations Comtrade database 
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Figure 12. Other measures of revealed comparative advantage - auto 
parts 
 
Data source: United Nations Comtrade database 
 
 
Prices, Costs, Margins, Productivity, and Scale 
 
Overall, labor productivity (figure 13) as measured by vehicles per worker rose until 
the 2010-2011 period, notably in the years when production was growing the fastest. 
Since then, given the reduction in production, productivity has fallen sharply. Thus, 
these results could be simply a consequence of excess capacity and employment 
rigidity, not labor efficiency. As with output, there is no clear link between Inovar Auto 
and labor productivity in Brazil’s automotive sector. 
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Figure 13. Labor productivity (vehicles per worker) 
 
Source: Anuario Anfavea 
 
The difference between total sales and total costs show that this margin, for cars, was 
decreasing since 2008, and that Inovar Auto may have halted this trend only for one 
year, as margins were fell again from 2012 onwards.  Auto part producers followed a 
similar trend since 2009, but again with a lag in relation to the automakers. In sum, 
Inovar Auto may have had a short-term effect on auto part firms, with a one-year lag 
relative to vehicle producers (figure 14).  Protection was not sufficient to avoid the 
reduction in margins for automakers and for auto parts producers. The main reason is 
because costs kept rising from 2012, while sales were stagnated. Figure 15 shows 
how car manufacturing in Brazil kept following a trend of increasing labor costs.  
 
Figure 14. Gross margins (as a % of sales): total sales minus total costs 
 
Source: PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual) - IBGE 
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Figure 15.  Labor Costs 
 
Data Source: PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual) - IBGE 
 
Labor costs in the automotive sector did not fall as production, thus putting pressure 
on margins. In fact, they rose for cars and light commercials. These movements can 
be better pictured looking at Unit Labor Costs (calculated as the ratio between total 
labor costs and the value of industrial transformation), as depicted in figure 16. 
According to this measure, between 2011 -2014 automakers faced an increase of 29% 
in its ULCs, while auto parts producers faced an increase of 12%. 
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Figure 16. Unit Labor Costs (ratio of labor costs and value of industrial 
transformation) 
 
Data Source: PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual) - IBGE 
 
Vehicles' prices did increase after Inovar Auto, but in line with the overall 
manufacturing prices ( 
Figure 17). However, if we take into consideration that prices for vehicles had been 
relatively stable at least since 2009 (figure 18), Inovar Auto appears to have had a 
clear impact, allowing domestic automakers to increase their prices, as competition 
from imports was reduced. 
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Figure 17. Price index (2012 = 100)  
 
Source: IBGE - IPP (Price Index to Producers) 
 
Figure 18. Price index (2009 = 100) 
 
Source: IBGE - IPP (Price Index to Producers) 
 
Table 2 introduces three measures to provide a better understanding of the degree of 
competition in the market and also about the recent evolution of average production 
scale. The Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) and the C4 indexes are measures of 
concentration in a market, allowing us to make some inferences about the intensity of 
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competition. The HHI is the sum of the squared market-shares of all participants, while 
the C4 is simply the sum of the four biggest market-shares in the market under study: 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 𝑝  
 
𝐶4 = 𝑝 + 𝑝 + 𝑝 + 𝑝  
 
The United States Department of Justice considers that a market with a HHI under 
1,500 is competitive, while for a result between 1,500 and 2,500 the market would be 
moderately concentrated.  
 
For scale, we used production per firm, instead of production per plant, because we 
assume that strategic decisions by firms in how they allocate their production across 
plants is optimal. Furthermore, our calculations of concentration indexes and average 
scale take into consideration only the 12 biggest firms that produce cars, and the 
numbers include only passenger and light commercial vehicles. Among car producers, 
the selection of the biggest 12 allow us to exclude the small "luxury" producers such 
as Mercedes, BMW and Audi (as their required scale levels are probably smaller, as 
they are “niche" suppliers in Brazil). 
  
Table 5. Production of cars and light commercial vehicles by the top 12 
manufacturers in Brazil    
Year  C4 HHI 
Average 
production per 
automaker 
(units) 
2007 84,98% 2,049 233,186 
2008 82,91% 1,972 248,248 
2009 83,50% 1,975 251,004 
2010 83,50% 2,002 283,288 
2011 79,78% 1,853 264,037 
2012 78,67% 1,833 272,652 
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2013 72,15% 1,539 292,424 
2014 70,01% 1,495 250,067 
2015 63,74% 1,298 195,747 
Data source: Anuario Anfavea 2016. 
 
Data for the Brazil’s 12 biggest automakers show that concentration is falling. The 
Brazilian domestic market became less concentrated since 2011 and this trend has 
been accelerating, suggesting that Inovar Auto might have increased competition in 
the domestic market. This is a fair hypothesis, as the policy attracted not only new 
players, but also new investments from existing producers, increasing the availability 
of new models, for example. This increase in competition is potentially beneficial for 
the consumer, although data on prices showed that prices did not fall, but rather 
increased. Two potential explanations are that imports are more important than 
domestic competition as a price-setter; and/or that production costs were higher.  
 
Regarding average scale of production, the picture is less clear. Average scale, 
measured as production per automaker, did not show a clear trend, especially if we 
take into consideration that total production in 2015 was drastically reduced by the 
recent crisis. 
 
The effort in terms of R&D can be assessed through the comparison of the two most 
recent and comprehensive national surveys on the subject: Pintec 2011 (covering 
investments from 2009 to 2011) and Pintec 2014 (released in December 2016, and 
covering investments from 2012 to 2014). As can be seen from table 6, the absolute 
number and the percentage of automakers that implemented innovation increased 
slightly (7% and 5% respectively). On the other hand, the absolute number and the 
percentage of auto parts producers that implemented innovation increased 
substantially (23% and 34% respectively).  
 
Table 6. Number of Firms that Implemented Product or Process 
Innovation 
Sector 
(CNAE 2.0) 2009-2011  2012-2014 Change  
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Numbe
r of 
firms 
Percentag
e of total 
Numbe
r of 
firms 
Percentag
e of total 
In 
number 
of firms 
In 
percentag
e of total 
Vehicle 
manufacturin
g      27 75%      29 79% 7% 5% 
Autoparts      581 34%      716 46% 23% 34% 
Source: IBGE, Innovation Surveys of 2011 and 2014 (Pintec 2011 and Pintec 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Expenditures in Innovative Activities 
Sector     
(CNAE 
2.0)     2 011     2 014 Change 
  
Total 
expenditures 
(R$) 
Internal 
R&D (R$) 
% of 
internal 
R&D 
Total 
expenditures 
(R$) 
Internal 
R&D (R$) 
% of 
internal 
R&D 
Total 
expenditures 
(R$) 
Internal 
R&D 
(R$) 
% of 
internal 
R&D 
Vehicle 
mfg. 4,772,018 2,372,089 50% 3,694,765 1,907,944 52% -23% -20% 4% 
Autoparts 1,792,668 921,607 51% 2,338,596 874,895 37% 30% -5% -27% 
Total: 6,564,686 3,293,696 50% 6,033,361 2,782,839 46% -8% -16% -8% 
Note: Incurred by firms that implemented a new or substantially improved product or 
process. Source: IBGE, Innovation Surveys of 2011 and 2014 (Pintec 2011 and 
Pintec 2014) 
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Table 7 shows that the total expenditure in R&D activities84 decreased substantially (-
23%), and internal R&D also decreased substantially (-20%). On the other hand, total 
expenditures by auto parts producers increased substantially (30%), although internal 
R&D decreased slightly (-5%). 
 
In sum, there was a small increase in the number of automakers innovating, but those 
who innovated spent substantially less on innovation and on internal R&D. On the 
other hand, there was a substantial increase in the numbers of auto parts producers 
innovating and in the amount spent by these firms, even with a small decrease in 
internal R&D. Comparing 2011 with 2014, automakers spent less on innovation, while 
auto parts producers spent more. However, there was a reduction in innovation 
expenditures overall. 
 
 
 
 
4.4 EMBRAER INSIGHTS AND COMPARISON  
 
It is interesting to compare Brazil`s automotive sector with the country`s far more 
successful production of aircraft, centred on the company Embraer.  
 
According to the Embraer website (http://www.embraer.com/br/essencia), the 
company history started in 1946, with the strategic plans for a domestic aeronautical 
sector. In 1947/1950 there was the building of “Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial” (CTA) 
and the “Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica” (ITA), in Sao Paulo, to offer 
aeronautical engineering degrees, previously offered only in Rio de Janeiro. Only in 
1968 is that the first prototype of a twin-engine 20 passenger plane, the “Bandeirantes” 
was conceived, and the company was officially founded in 1969, as a state-owned 
firm, when it started to produce the tion of Embraer, as a state-owned company, to 
produce the “Bandeirantes”, and, from 1971, the military “Xavante”, under licence of 
the Italian Aermacchi. In 1977: the firm presented the first plane 100% designed by 
Embraer, the “Xingu”. Several new planes started production after that: “Tucano”, a 
 
84 Taking into consideration only those who innovated.  
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training military plane, in 1979, the civilian “Brasilia”, in 1980, and the military jet AMX, 
in partnership with the Italian Aeritalia, in 1985, with a total of 200 jets produced. In 
1994 Embraer was privatized. Then, the launches of regional jets characterized the 
company`s strategy: between 1997 and 1999 several regional jets, ranging from 70 to 
118 passengers, were produced. In the 2000`s new regional jets and executive jets 
(Phenon, Legacy, Lineage) were added to the company portfolio. In 2009 there as the 
start of the development of the KC 390, a military cargo aircraft, with first flight in 2015, 
and in 2016 Embraer launched a new generation of commercial jets. 
 
Differences between Embraer and the Brazilian automotive sector 
 
Analysing the Brazilian automotive sector and Embraer, with the aid of the literature, 
and specialized and institutional websites (Fonseca, 2012; Embraer web site, Ferreira 
and Salermo, 2011; Bastos, 2006; Mansueto`s blog; and Invest in Sao Paulo website) 
we can identify some differences that may partially explain why the Brazilian aircraft 
sector became more competitive than its vehicle sector.   
 
First difference: focus on exports. 
The company was established in 1969 as a state-owned firm and since its start it 
focused on the export market. In 2011 the company opened a factory in the USA, and 
in 2012 in Portugal. The domestic market accounts for roughly 10%-20% of Embraer`s 
production.  
 
Second difference: Investments in R&D and partnerships with foreign suppliers. 
To be able to export the company invested heavily in R&D, and in many cases had 
the support of partnerships with suppliers.  
 
Third difference: labour costs are lesser than its main competitors 
The labour costs in US dollars are smaller than those faced by Boeing, Bombardier 
and Airbus.  However, China is a threat to this competitive advantage.  
The firm was privatized in 1994 and faced a process of restructuring that contributed 
to large gains in competitiveness.  
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Fourth difference: Strategic advantages towards suppliers and dominance of 
key design capabilities 
Embraer is very efficient in designing and assembling its products, but its 
competitiveness is due also to the vast share of partnerships with world leaders’ 
suppliers in their fields. The strategic advantage of Embraer in its relations with its 
suppliers is that Embraer have the capability to substitute suppliers, as it has the 
capability to alter designs, projects and to produce some parts.  
 
Fifth difference: it does not need to incur in transportation costs 
As the factory is close to its main domestic suppliers, in an aeronautical cluster in Sao 
Jose dos Campos/SP, Embraer`s suppliers producing domestically do not face the 
transportation costs faced by automakers` around Brazil. Some imports are also 
relatively cheap to transport, as the ones that come by ship arrive through Brazils` 
main port, relatively close to its factory. But the most important aspect regarding 
infrastructure is that the products Embraer exports fly directly to its clients.  
 
A sixth difference would be that Embraer is Brazilian owned. However, this is not 
necessarily a reason for substantial differences in terms of outcome and performance, 
as there are international investors owning shares of Embraer and the company is run 
like most private defence firms around the world: seeking efficiency but relying on 
public contracts. Moreover, some of the car manufactures in Brazil are in fact Brazilian 
firms, producing cars under licence of a multinational that owns the brand – such as, 
for example, CAOA group, that produces Hyundai and Cherry models. 
 
The start of Embraer was possible given a combination of public money and resources 
and strategic partnerships. Later, after privatization, its success was based on access 
to imported goods, and more partnerships. It is not straightforward to replicate these 
conditions for other sectors, but the main lessons could be applied: investments in 
R&D as public goods to be used to a wider number of sectors and companies, and 
access to imported inputs could be essential.  
 
Embraer has more than 4,000 engineers working with R&D.  This emphasis in R&D 
was crucial for the company success. Although very high in comparison with the 
domestic operations of the automakers operating in Brazil, the investment in R&D is 
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not too far from the levels seen in the headquarters of the main automakers. However, 
the examination of the company`s financial statements allow us to see that the 
investment in R&D is showing a declining trend from the average between 2000 and 
20008 and the average between 2008 and 2016 (figure 19). This could be the result 
of the conditions faced after the financial crisis of 2008, or due to the fact that R&D is 
increasingly made by suppliers, also in the aircraft sector. However, if we compare the 
latest figures with the percentage of revenues that is invested in R&D by the 10 biggest 
aircraft and defence manufacturers that have production plants in the UK, it is clear 
that Embraer is reducing its investments in R&D: These investments in 2016 ranged 
from 2.1% of sales for Lockheed Martin, to 9.1% for Bombardier. The average of the 
10 biggest was 4.6% of sales invested in R&D (The Aerospace Technology Institute, 
2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 – R&D as a percentage of revenue  
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Source: Income statements: http://ri.embraer.com.br/ 
 
Suppliers can take a fundamental role in the development of new products, alongside 
the producers of the final goods. However, for this cooperative system to work well, 
the producers need to efficiently coordinate all suppliers and activities to generate 
innovations and improvements in products and processes. Ferreira and Salerno 
(2011) says that the Brazilian aeronautical industry is an example of successful 
partnerships.  
 
A special type of partnership is the one where all parts share financial risks and 
rewards (Bastos, 2006). There are, however, variations in terms of how dependant is 
the assembler from the suppliers: if the assemblers can easily or not change suppliers 
if they do not deliver as expected. There is also variation in terms of who coordinates 
each process.  (Ferreira and Salerno (2011)) 
 
Within Embraer, some of its suppliers are partners with technical and financial stakes 
in the development of the products. There are, however, “regular” suppliers, that just 
sell their intermediate goods. Embraer has gained bargaining power with its suppliers 
thanks to its dominant position in the market. In some products, Embraer opts for a 
verticalization process, for different reasons: in the case of the Phenon, the firm 
decided to produce more parts internally in order to accelerate the launch. In the case 
of the Legacy, the firm wanted to master some technologies and also use some of tax 
benefits to produce in its plant in Portugal (Ferreira and Salerno, 2011) 
 
There is some modularity in aerospace, as in the automotive sector, but given the 
complexity of the sector, the assembler always needs to coordinate everything 
(Ferreira and Salerno, 2011) 
  
The “custo-brazil” affects Embraer to a lesser extent than it affects other sectors, but 
it still has an effect. From the demand side, roughly 10-20% of Embraer`s sales are to 
domestic buyers. From the supply side, the potential bottlenecks for gains in 
competitiveness are somehow under control: labour costs; labour qualification, 
exchange rate and transport infrastructure.  As said, these are to some extent smaller 
problems given the reasons explained in this chapter. Moreover, most of them have 
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been addressed: On top of the specialized and highly respected aeronautical 
engineering university ITA – “Instituto Tecnologico de Aeronautica”, Embraer has set 
up, since 2001, specific graduate programs of aeronautical engineering, having 
already graduated more than 1,500 engineers. Exchange rate is a crucial component 
for Embraer profits, but the company has natural hedge, as most of its components 
are imported and most of its sales are in foreign currency.  
 
The main differences between Embraer and most of the Brazilian industrial sector is 
that the aeronautical company can buy the best inputs in the world, at almost no extra 
cost (this is due to the tariff suspensions of inputs, that are then exempted after the 
final good – the plane – is exported) and the lower susceptibility to part of the Brazilian 
business environment. 
 
All aeronautical companies in Brazil benefit from a “suspension” of import taxes and 
IPI-import taxes. This means that they can import intermediate goods without paying 
those taxes, provided that later on the final goods are exported. If they do not export, 
the firm needs to pay those suspended taxes. It is a drawback regime, very common 
in other sectors and countries – and indeed used by the automotive sector as well. 
One difference is that in the case of the aeronautical industry the system is also fully 
automatic since 2002:  the imported goods can go directly to the manufacturing plant 
in Brazil, without the need to pass through customs control. As the customs process 
in Brazil is very slow and costly, this measure solves one of the biggest bottlenecks in 
Brazilian ports. This system, called “Regime Aduaneiro Especial de Entreposto 
Industrial sob Controle Informatizado (Recof Aeronautico)85” 
 
Investe Sao Paulo (2009) indicate that the local content of Embraer in 2009 was very 
low (around 5%). In this sense, it is as if Embraer is an assembler that adds value in 
design, coordination of process, and labour, but that does not create a dense domestic 
supply chain. The firm uses a logistic center in Taubate to keep all supplies it needs, 
and then deliver them “just in time” to the manufacturing plant. Most (75%) of its 
 
85 This supports mainly the biggest aeronautical Brazilian companies - Embraer and Helibras 
(helicopters), but there are similar systems for other sectors. 
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exports and imports, in terms of value, are done by air. In terms of weight, 70% is done 
by maritime transportation.  
 
The cluster in São Paulo 
 
According to the Survey “Relação Anual de Informações Sociais” (Rais), collected by 
the Brazilian Labour Ministry, in 2016 there were 83 companies manufacturing 
aircrafts and parts, located within Sao Paulo.  Minas Gerais has the second position 
among the Brazilian sates, both in terms of number of firms and employment in the 
sector. This is due to the presence of Helibras, a helicopter manufacturer. 
 
According to the “Invest in Sao Paulo” state agency, there is an aeronautical cluster in 
Sao Jose dos Campos, with Embraer as the main company. The aerospatial cluster 
is located in the São José dos Campos` technological park (PqTec) and comprises 
over 100 technology-based enterprises in 188 thousand square meters. Firms that are 
part of this cluster have many benefits, such as support for participation in international 
trade fairs and trade missions, setting up of consortia, technical certifications, training, 
infrastructure, partnerships and subsidies from governmental institutions like Finep, 
APEX, ABDI, Sebrae, SDECTI/SP and BNDES, and with other clusters in Canada, 
Sweden, England, Netherlands, and China.  
 
The cluster also benefits from the proximity to the Aeronautical Technology Institute 
(ITA), created in 1950. In its campus, the institute offers graduate and post-graduate 
(masters and PhDs) degrees in engineering (in 28 different areas, related to 
aeronautics, aerospatial, electronics, mechanics and physics. In 2017 ITA had 2,400 
students and 180 professors. Moreover, in the city there is also a facility of the National 
Institute for Space Research (Inpe), and agency part of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. 
 
Other research centers that contribute to the cluster are the “Laboratório de Estruturas 
Leves (LEL)”, part of the “Centro de pesquisas ligado ao Instituto de Pesquisas 
Tecnológicas (IPT)”86, from the São Paulo State government;  the “Departamento de 
 
86 Created in 1889. 
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Ciência e Tecnologia Aeroespacial (CTA), part of the Brazilian airforce; the “Instituto 
de Aeronáutica e Espaço (IAE)”; the “Instituto de Estudos Avançados (IEAv)”; the 
“Instituto de Fomento e Coordenação Industrial (IFI)”, to supply certifications; and the 
“Instituto de Pesquisas e Ensaios em Voo (Ipev)”. 
 
Industrial policies should aim to increase productivity or innovation, the drivers of 
economic growth, and not to protect vested interests. A good example of good 
industrial policy is what was done with Embraer. But that is hard to be replicable. There 
are others in Brazil, as, for example, Petrobras, Vale, Embrapa, etc, with different 
degrees of initial difficulties, different degrees of scope and type of instruments, and 
different degrees of success. 
 
Mansueto Almeida, in his blog, said, in 4/January/2012, that he received a reply from 
a former Embraer CEO, Ozires Silva, after he made a comment about the company. 
The comment made by Mansueto was that the company survived in its early days 
thanks to the support of the Government. The reply, however, stated that although 
initially a state-owned enterprise, Embraer was always managed as if it was a private 
company. In this sense, and against all odds, it proved itself in the market and it can 
be considered a success case, for all metrics. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although for most of the 20th century the automotive sector was one of the most 
important industries worldwide, its future importance to development and developed 
countries alike has been questioned, as the industry is seen as “old” and “dying” in 
face of new technologies and behaviour patterns, such as shared vehicles (potentially 
reducing demand for cars), for example. Partly because of sharper demand limitations 
in developed countries, and partly because of cost-issues, vehicle manufacturing has 
been moving to developing countries. However, among these, the bigger and more 
integrated Asian economies seem to receive the bulk of new investments.  
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In the past, all Brazilian automotive industrial policies since the 1950s have made use 
of protectionism, within the import-substitution framework. Moreover, domestic 
content87 ensured that the policy benefits reached not only the automakers, but also 
the auto parts producers. The level of import barriers erected was – and still is – quite 
high. Exports were used only to compensate for periods of low domestic demand, as 
since its conception, the industry always focused on the domestic market. All in all, 
although the previous policies were the drivers for the relatively successful attraction 
of FDI into the Brazilian automotive sector88, they generated serious shortcomings in 
terms of competitiveness for the sector. Because the scale of production was limited 
to the size of the domestic market, and fragmented among many automakers, 
productivity was compromised. In addition, without a more export-oriented approach, 
and within a very protected market, there was less competition from abroad and less 
incentives to produce better vehicles. Although the automakers in Brazil are 
multinationals, and therefore part of GVCs, their domestic production was inferior in 
terms of quality and has a higher price tag than what could be seen in the international 
markets.  
 
Protectionism was used as a tool to attract FDI in all policies, but besides that, for the 
1950s and the 1990s the intention was also to avoid trade deficits, while for Inovar the 
additional motivation was also to protect domestic producers from losing market-share 
to imports. Finally, Inovar Auto added R&D and fuel efficiency targets. None of the 
three policies directly promoted exports. 
 
The automotive industry in Brazil is then facing a double risk: being uncompetitive 
given the highly protected domestic market and the high costs of producing 
domestically (“custo-Brazil”), and being an industry facing existential threats 
worldwide. As pointed out before, scale gains are necessary, and exports seem to be 
 
87 The local content requirements and protection were higher in the 1950s, as the industry was in its infancy. For 
the “Regime” of 1995-1996 as for Inovar Auto of 2012, the local content requirements were smaller, although 
explicitly 60% in the 1995 Regime, and implicitly around this percentage for Inovar Auto. Furthermore, 
protection in the 1995 and 2012 policies were similar. 
88 The literature suggests that the Target Plan of the 50s did play a decisive role in attracting investment, but the 
following policies of the 1990s and 2010s had a less clear impact: investment was increasing before these policies 
were set up and thus policy could have had only a partial role in the results. 
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the logical way forward, together with easier access to imported inputs and a better 
business environment.  
 
Many studies tried to estimate the minimum efficient scale for the automotive sector. 
As Natsuda, Otsuka and Thoburn (2015) summarizes, the optimal scale for some 
autoparts, such as engines, is larger than for producing vehicles itself. The authors 
also argue that, given the consolidation of the industry in large conglomerates, the 
minimum efficient scale per plant was probably reduced to 150 thousand vehicles per 
year (although, still according the studies surveyed by Natsuda, Otsuka and Thoburn 
(2015)89, the minimum size of production to achieve efficiency could be as low as 30 
thousand vehicles, if assembled as CKD (completely knocked-down)). Nonetheless, 
the authors support that the minimum efficient size of firms has increased, reaching 
something around 5 million vehicles, in the case of mass-market models, and around 
1 million in the case of luxury brands.  
 
Moreover, the location of automaker`s plants can hide important information about 
investments and trade, as an increasing part of the value-added is traded between 
subsidiaries of those automakers worldwide and also between autopart suppliers and 
their automaker buyers located in different countries. These global value chains are 
one of the main characteristics of the global automotive industry90. Participation in 
GVCs as an exporter implies a need for cost-competitiveness, and this is more easily 
achieved in more liberalized countries, where imports of intermediates and capital 
goods help to boost export competitiveness, or at least in countries with sufficient trade 
agreements to boost export competitiveness and market access. The contrast with ISI 
policies pushes us to the debate between specialization versus diversification, as a 
development strategy.  
 
As explained in the previous sections, domestic demand is among the key advantages 
of Brazilian manufactures, and it was the main attraction for multinational automakers 
since the 50s. However, domestic demand is not solely a function of population, as 
income level and distribution, economic growth, domestic integration, general 
 
89 Nolan (2012). 
90 The importance of these GVCs varies according to the type of product and its location in the value-chain, 
with estimates pointing to around 50% of autoparts being outsourced worldwide (Rudolf Traub-Merz, 2017). 
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business environment and trade and industrial policies all impact the potential for 
domestic vehicle sales and production. However, exports remain a key variable, in a 
world characterized by monopolistic competition among globalized automakers.   
 
The domestic market is simply not enough anymore to guarantee the required scale 
of production. Although Brazil is a major market for motor vehicles91, and has been 
able to incentivize the multinationals to establish production in the country, recent data 
point to an exhaustion of this inward-looking model. The last industrial policy for the 
sector, for example, did not promote exports (as neither did the previous policies), and 
had mixed results: a) it reduced competition from Chinese imports (firms not yet 
producing in Brazil), while allowing for imports from the firms with production in the 
country; b) it probably contributed to only half of the new investments seen after the 
launch of the Program; c) the policy did not increase overall R&D in the sector; d) it 
did not increase scale of production.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 – QUALITATIVE DATA AND 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
In this chapter we explore qualitative data gathered from interviews, to gain insights 
on the relationships between trade-related barriers and industrial competitiveness 
within the Brazilian automotive sector. Following the methodology established in the 
previous chapter, we will use thematic analysis as a method to help us to classify and 
critically interpret the results of the interviews, comparing those results to the literature, 
and taking into consideration the context of the case study. The outcome of this 
analysis is then a list of insights. 
 
91 The motor vehicle sector is a large employer in Brazil’s manufacturing sector. 
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Building on the theoretical empirical linkages identified from our literature review, we 
developed the following thematic blocks to guide our data collection during interviews, 
and to organize our interpretation efforts:  
 
 
 
BLOCK “A” 
Internal + external economies of scale 
Comparative advantages 
Location and investment decisions based on scale 
Local content requirements (domestic diversification) x Global Value Chains 
(specialization) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BLOCK “B” 
Foreign and domestic competition 
X-efficiency 
Markups 
Firm heterogeneity and changes in market-share 
Competition and Innovation 
Resource allocation (inter and intra-sectoral) 
 
 
 
 
 
BLOCK “C” 
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Technologial spillovers 
Access to imported inputs 
Lessons from Embraer 
 
 
 
 
BLOCK “D” 
Business environment, institutions, regulations and industrial policies (including 
Inovar-Auto and R&D policies) 
Location and investment decisions based on the business environment 
New technologies 
Income levels and quality of labour 
Current firm-level productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first subsection – Results from Interviews - we describe the findings that 
emerged from the transcripts. Initially, this description is done in the most neutral way 
possible, without any value judgement or critique. For the description we first highlight 
the similarities – or eventually the consensus – and then we highlight the differences, 
pointing to its sources in terms of origin of the interviewee. Quotations are used both 
to clarify and to allow for further interpretation. In the second subsection – 
Interpretation/Analysis - we interpret the partial results found in the previous 
subsection, contrasting them to the literature and establishing potential connections 
among each partial result. The subsection ends with a list of insights generated from 
this analysis.     
 
 
 
5.1 - RESULTS FROM INTERVIEWS – PARTIAL FINDINGS 
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OVERALL INSIGHTS 
 
The results from our interviews point to a general acceptance that the levels of 
protection faced by the Brazilian manufacturing sector in general, and the automotive 
sector in particular, need to be reduced. However, it was also exhaustively mentioned 
that before tariff reductions, it is necessary to improve domestic competitiveness 
conditions.   
 
During the interviews we asked about the consequences that two opposite strategies 
– higher and lower trade protection – could have on the scale of domestic production, 
on the productivity of domestic firms, and on the allocative efficiency within the 
domestic economy. The findings indicate that the levels of trade protection enjoyed by 
the Brazilian automotive sector are still too high and could be compromising the long-
term competitiveness of the sector. But the interviews also indicate that without proper 
polices and reforms in the Brazilian business environment and institutions, the auto 
sector and most of the manufacturing sector would suffer severely from a full trade 
liberalization.   
 
We then have apparently contradictory results here: trade protection is damaging 
competitiveness, but in order to reduce it, it is necessary first to improve 
competitiveness?   
 
Although it was a near-consensus that lower overall trade protection could improve 
Brazilian industry competitiveness, it was very debatable under what conditions, how, 
and to what extent, this trade liberalization should happen: most answers point to a 
gradual liberalization, mainly through regional trade agreements, with some answers 
explicitly pointing to the need of a pari-passu reduction of "custo-Brasil": 
 
“Trade openness is necessary to increase competitiveness. An important question is 
what type of trade openness. The industry believes that the best path is a gradual and 
negotiated process, through trade agreements. This would allow predictability, time 
for adjustments, and better terms to access foreign markets. The most important trade 
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agreement to date to be signed is the one with the European Union. Besides this, other 
important agreements under negotiation are Mexico; United States and Japan. 
Mercosur needs to be renegotiated as well, to rationalize the TEC92.. reducing tariffs 
for inputs and capital goods, increasing tariff escalation... The industry in general, 
including the automotive sector, does not support a unilateral tariff reduction” (Industry 
Association) 
 
“An abrupt trade liberalization is not the solution. If the country does it, it would end up 
like Australia: without an automotive industry. It is very difficult to compete with China 
and other countries that have much lower production costs”.  (Automaker) 
 
” Tariffs are not so important compared to other variables. We would be happy to 
dropout the 35% import tariff alongside competitiveness gains” (Industry automaker). 
 
Some answers, however, were more vocal on the benefits of even a unilateral trade 
liberalization: 
 
“With complete trade liberalization we risk turning ourselves into Australia. But, is this 
bad?” (Industry supplier tier1). 
 
The respondents that argued for a faster and deeper trade liberalization were those 
who would be under a lower risk of eventually loosing from that, either because they 
are firms already very internationalized or because they are not from the industry, but 
academics or policymakers. On the other hand, the discourse for a more careful trade 
liberalization had more echoes in firms from within the industry. One of these firms, for 
example, added that protection is necessary not only to compensate for cost-
disadvantages, but also to avoid trade deficits: 
 
“Trade balance deficits trigger protectionist policies, and, in the case of the automotive 
industry, there are currently 12 protectionist programs around the world”. (Industry 
automaker). 
 
92 Acronym in Portuguese for “Common External Tariff”, applied by Mercosur countries against imports from 
outside the bloc. 
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Respondents from the suppliers defended that protection levels are not that high, and 
that there is competition in the domestic market. For these interviewees, the focus on 
exports is necessary, but this does not mean that there should be intense trade 
liberalization: 
 
“To increase competitiveness, we do not need more competition, as the mark-up in 
the domestic market is similar to the one verified in foreign markets”. (…) “The shelter 
against imports for autoparts is around 25% (+- 16% import tariff and +- 9% logistic 
costs)” (Industry supplier tier 1) 
 
The move to a more liberalized economy would face opposition by manufacturing firms 
based on decades under heavy protection, despite the trade liberalization of the 90s. 
There were those who pointed to the existence of an equilibrium with trade protection 
among the Brazilian industry. One respondent said that Brazilian firms got used to this 
and count on this to survive: 
   
“Firms in Brazil want protection. They do not focus on long term competitiveness 
without protection”. (Academic) 
 
Another insight is regarding the heterogeneity within the autopart producers in the 
Brazilian automotive sector: 
 
“We have good domestic companies, producing top notch autoparts… they are global 
players, very innovative and competitive, and were able to achieve this despite 
Brazil…usually setting operations abroad or just searching to increase exports…but 
these are not the norm…the norm is a tier3 or 4 “surviving” business, that in the past 
made some nice profits, but now is just surviving.” (Industry association)    
 
There were suggestions that the overall effects, both from the business environment 
and “custo-Brazil”, and also from the inefficiencies related to entry and exit barriers, 
and from the general extra cost imposed on imports, impacts all economic sectors, not 
only directly, but also indirectly, making all production factors more expensive, 
especially labour. 
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“Workers spend hours in congested public transport to get to and from their workplace. 
And compromise big chunks of their salaries to pay for overpriced goods” 
(Government).  
 
Confronted with a series of questions that included all the themes presented in his 
answers, one small autopart producer gave a detailed account on how different 
aspects are inter-related and combined to negatively affect competitiveness:  He said 
that what explains the low competitiveness is a combination of custo-brasil and low 
average scale. And this low average scale would be a result of both low overall scale 
and an excessive number of smaller firms. The low overall scale would then be a result 
of the low income in the domestic market, while the excessive number of smaller firms 
a result of cultural aspects (family-owned firms) and institutional aspects (tax law and 
other regulations disincentivising growth; and labour liabilities that are a disincentive 
to the sale of firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BLOCK “A” 
 
There is a consensus that higher scale is paramount to be competitive: 
 
“When you have scale in production you can bring technology and investment” 
(Government). 
 
“Scale is paramount, and maybe the only way for Brazil to be in the global markets” 
(Industry automaker). 
 
“Multinational firms decide to invest in another country based on a combination of: the 
size of the market; the availability of good and cheap production factors, such as 
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labour; the level of protection; and the government incentives; usually in this order of 
importance. (…) Usually, a multinational follows the rule of “one product, one place”, 
in order to extract the maximum in terms of scale gains”. (ABEIFA Association) 
Note: he did not mention any strategical aspect in the investment decision, such as 
search for market-share; securing supply chain; increase of brand recognition; 
technology absorption.  
 
Some even suggested that scale – and logistic costs - dwarf tariff structure as a driver 
for competitiveness: 
 
“Scale and logistic costs are very important factors in the decision to import or produce 
locally. The nominal tariff, however, is not”. (Industry automaker) 
 
It was remembered that Tier-1 suppliers are located where automakers are located. 
Thus, the evaluation of having or not enough scale usually applies similarly to both 
automakers and Tier-1 autopart firms:  
 
“Nobody imports complete systems. So, having automakers implies having tier-1 
firms”. (Government)  
 
“Bosch, for example, import its parts, assemble and deliver to automakers. It competes 
with other Bosch plants around the world. Tier-1 suppliers have systems to collect 
prices and bid from suppliers around the world”. (Government) 
 
“the automakers make their own engines, except for trucks, who outsource this”. 
(Government) 
 
An automaker listed the necessary conditions to be competitive in foreign markets, 
synthesizing most of the responses from interviews on these topics: 
  
“Competitiveness is the key word. First, we need to have competitiveness to compete 
within the domestic market (against imports and among the domestic producers). Then 
we need to have competitiveness to compete in foreign markets. The main bottlenecks 
for the Brazilian automotive sector competitiveness are: a) high taxation, which is part 
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of Custo-brazil, and means that 33% of the revenue goes to the Government; b) there 
is no proper financing, that means it is very costly for  consumers to buy in instalments, 
and thus demand is lower than what it could be (this is also part of “custo-Brasil”); c) 
the lack of scale, especially for better and most expensive vehicles: the purchase 
power of the Brazilian consumer is very low. They can only buy very simple vehicles; 
d) there is not enough long-term planning by the firms, because there are not credible 
long-term policies. Without this, it is impossible to plan properly and therefore there is 
less efficiency and competitiveness”. (automaker) 
 
Some specific mentions about how the low-income level and infrastructure 
deficiencies contribute to lower scale in Brazil: 
 
“Logistic costs and infrastructure difficulties make productive integration within the 
domestic market more difficult in Brazil. Therefore, production should be even more 
concentrated than it is now”. (Automaker) 
 
“Income is very concentrated…this affects the potential scale of the domestic market” 
(Autopart producer).  
 
When discussing if the Brazilian automotive sector has enough scale to be competitive 
in foreign markets, answers pointed to the need of more specialization around specific 
types of products:  
 
Brazil has not scale for medium-sized and large vehicles. We should open up the 
market for these segments, as well for some inputs.  (Automaker) 
 
“The size of the Brazilian market did not justify the local production of Volvo cars, even 
with Inovar-Auto. The decisions made by BMW and Audi were made on an unrealistic 
demand projection, and also on the assumption that high levels of protection would 
prevail”. (ABEIFA ASSOCIATION) 
 
“Brazil has no comparative advantage for vehicle production. It is not close to any 
important consumer centre; it has not cheap labour; it has not low energy costs; and 
its domestic market is only big enough for cheaper vehicles – given the income level 
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of the population – and for pick-ups – given the agroindustrial economy”. (Automaker 
with low scale).  
 
The same interviewee gave examples of investments made by automakers with lower 
scale, explaining that the rationale of these investments is to sell not only to the 
domestic market, but also to Mercosur and other South American markets.   
 
Others emphasize that firms should face a combination of better local suppliers and 
lower protection, to increase specialization and competitiveness, as there are 
advantages in having a domestic supply base: 
 
“Because they stamp, automakers buy more steel than autopart firms. One of the 
problems regarding this material is that there are no long-term contracts… they should 
have a cooperative buying process, to buy in larger scale”. (Government) 
 
“The cost of steel is a problem. There are partnerships, but not many and not enough”. 
(Industry automaker) 
 
“To be competitive, some inputs need to be produced domestically”. (Government) 
 
Besides the need of having a domestic supply base, answers pointed to the need to 
tap on imports of autoparts not efficiently produced in the country: 
 
“For some electronic components there are only two suppliers in the world: There is 
no domestic scale even to “scratch” this”. (Government) 
 
“Specialization can generate the necessary scale”. (…) “Access to technology via 
imported inputs is important”. (Industry supplier tier 1) 
 
The discussion regarding how much inputs to import could be framed as a discussion 
about the optimal local content. This is viewed as a major discussion, complementary 
to the discussion related to scale. In this sense, some respondents explained that 
scale dictates the "natural local content": 
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“There is an ongoing debate, among industry associations, between the pros and cons 
of local content policies versus specialization”. (Industry association) 
 
“The costs of local content are a result of scale: Honda, with lower scale, needs to 
have a lower local content” (…) “The natural local content is defined by scale” 
(Government) 
 
“Local content was applied in Inovar Auto based on ideological premises, not sound 
theory or robust empirical evidence”. (Government) 
 
“The natural local content within the Brazilian automakers is around 75%-80% for the 
4 biggest producers in Brazil, 60-65% for the medium-sized producers arriving in the 
90s, such as Renault, and 45%-50% for the Japanese producers that arrived later on, 
such as Honda and Toyota. These values are in terms of value of domestically 
produced parts/ total value of parts, for 2012”. (Government) 
 
“Honda, Toyota and Hyundai have lower local content than the most traditional 
automakers established in Brazil. As the traditional automakers - Ford, GM, Fiat and 
Volkswagen - lost market-share recently (thanks to the protection of the domestic 
market, and the consequent attraction of new players), so the autopart firms lost sales 
as well. This was a direct result from Inovar Auto, and it added to the overall demand 
fall. This difference in local content is due to two things: a) the time required for long-
term relationships with domestic suppliers; b) the smaller scale of the newcomers 
justify a higher percentage of input imports (as the local autopart suppliers do not see 
economic viability in producing at so small scale for a specific automaker)”. 
(Government) 
 
“Domestic prices are high because there is not sufficient scale of production, and 
because machines and equipments are expensive”. (Automaker with low scale) 
 
Refining this perception, some respondents said that to increase scale there should 
be more trade integration and the industry should be more export oriented. Moreover, 
it was said that exports could be a source of technology upgrading, although this 
channel is seldom used by Brazilian firms. A more specialized and export-oriented 
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economy is viewed as beneficial to increase scale in Brazil, but most of the 
respondents that said this also said that the most important consequence of an export-
oriented market was to reduce domestic demand uncertainty: 
 
“Low average scale is a consequence of protection” (Automaker with low scale) 
 
“Scale is everything. Our firm is in Brazil because the market is relatively big, and we 
believe we need to accept the conditions of the market, but the local mind-set is heavily 
focused on the domestic market” (Industry supplier tier 1) 
 
“The majority of Brazilian companies that invest abroad do this to access foreign 
markets. Only a minority do this to gain access to new management practices and 
new technologies. This minority is formed mainly by software, chemicals, and metal-
mechanics, and they make use of the innovation structure existing in foreign countries. 
As examples of firms that improved management practices through foreign exposition, 
we have Coteminas and WEG. The third reason for investing abroad would be to be 
less exposed to the domestic business cycle”. (Industry association) 
  
“The internationalization of companies would be highly recommended to intensify the 
flow of knowledge”. (Academic) 
 
“Internationalization is necessary for the autopart sector. The recent crisis helped to 
forge this perception”. (Industry association) 
 
More integration into Global Value Chains or Global Production Networks is then 
viewed as a way to foster specialization, competitiveness, and scale, but respondents 
also express concerns regarding the size of the domestic supply base that would 
survive:  
 
“Integrators, like Embraer, are becoming the norm in industrial sectors” (industry 
supplier tier 1) 
 
“The quest is how to engage more in Global Value Chains without turning into Mexico” 
(Industry Association).  
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There is hesitation about the current degree of production density within domestic 
value chains, as some interviewees suspected imported inputs and assembling of final 
products are increasingly the norm within Brazilian industry in general: 
 
“Machine manufacturers, such as Industrias Romi, who sell some machines and also 
some steel parts for the autopart sector, are in fact just assemblers, using a vast 
amount of imported inputs within their production line”. (small autopart producer) 
 
“Brazil only assemble cars, like in maquiladoras, it does not really innovate and does 
not produce the most value-added parts”. (ABEIFA Association) 
 
This last quote is from an association of importers; thus, it may carry an extra bias 
against trade barriers. 
 
The need for a more export-driven mentality was also pervasive in some answers, as 
such: 
 
“Brazilian domestic firms always looked to the rear-view mirror, as if the domestic 
market was sufficient to grant competitiveness and profitability forever”. (Autopart 
producer). 
 
“The domestic product is bad because there is low average scale per plant, and, for 
the few models produced with good scale, there are limitations in terms of quality and 
equipment – caused by the limited income of the consumers. Thus, with these 
vehicles, Brazil is not competitive as an export platform…there is no regulation 
pushing up their quality and equipment levels”. (Government)    
 
 
 
 
BLOCK “B” 
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Regarding the levels of both foreign and domestic competition, answers seems to 
point that domestic competition is higher than competition from abroad. Moreover, it 
seems that there is much more domestic competition among smaller firms, while 
foreign competition affects firms according to the sector where they operate 
(producers of low value-added goods seems to be more shielded from foreign 
competition). Finally, as foreign competition seems to be dependent on the levels of 
the exchange rate and tariffs, and as exchange rates fluctuates, pressure from foreign 
competition also fluctuates. 
 
Too many small firms do not pay taxes, or do not comply with regulation, but are still 
competing for market-share. These small firms make the market very fragmented and 
as a result scale is down. (Small autopart producer).  
 
“There are few imports of trailers, thanks to the transport costs of such low value-
added good, and also because to import you need to go through some heavier 
bureaucracy, similar to the one applied to the import of regular vehicles”.  (small 
autopart producer) 
 
 “Lower value-added parts would be locally sourced anyway, even without tariffs, given 
transport costs and timing”. (Automaker with low scale) 
 
“Simpler imported cars are not competitive given the current exchange rates and tariff 
levels. The current imports are concentrated in more expensive vehicles”. (ABEIFA 
Association) 
 
 “Imported cars, currently, have no power to influence the prices of domestic 
producers, either because of its market-share and because their prices are too high, 
given the factors already mentioned”. (…) “However, in 2011, the volume and prices 
of imports indeed had the capacity to curb prices within the domestic market”. (ABEIFA 
Association) 
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The low pressure from imports does not lead to reduced efficiency and innovation, as 
we have enough pressure from domestic competition. Moreover, firms in Brazil need 
to be very efficient in order to overcome “custo-brasil”. (Automaker) 
 
Some respondents defended that although higher levels of protection indeed reduce 
competition from imports, current protection levels do not allow for high mark-up levels. 
There were basically two explanations for this view: a) protection did not reduce 
competition between domestic firms, and the Brazilian automotive sector is a 
competitive market, according to them; b) protection just compensate for the high 
production costs, the high interest rates and the bad business environment in general, 
in Brazil: 
 
“We (in Brazil) have plenty of automakers disputing the domestic market, by price and 
by product. You cannot charge too much…consumers have choices.” (Automaker) 
 
“The automakers are in a competitive market, and you can see this happening as they 
loose and gain market-share”. (Industry association) 
 
“If you consider all the costs incurred in producing in Brazil, the net profits barely 
compensate for those. Firms that internationalized and shifted part of their production 
to other countries are better off than firms that stayed completely in Brazil” (Autopart 
supplier). 
 
Some respondents explicitly compared Brazilian operations with foreign counterparts, 
to illustrate their argument, while others provided an account of how profitability 
fluctuated within Brazil during the last 40 years: 
 
“Mark-up levels of automakers in Brazil fluctuate a lot. Currently, some automakers 
are making loss in Brazil.” (Government) 
 
“Profits in Brazil fluctuate a lot. In short, automakers have around 4 years of high profits 
followed by around 4 years of losses, and then 4 years of high profits again, and losses 
again” (Academic). 
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Asked about the main determinants of this fluctuation the interviewee pointed to a 
combination of the costs and difficulties caused by “custo-Brazil”, the intense 
consumer demand fluctuation (“booms” and “busts”), and the changes in industrial 
policies: 
 
“When situation gets bad a policy is set up to help firms, but this help is usually 
exaggerated” (Academic).   
 
However, specifically for smaller autopart suppliers profitability seems to be much 
more squeezed. It was said by some interviewees that lower tier autopart suppliers 
operate under intense competition within the domestic market, and also that they 
struggle to compete with imported autoparts, and have their margins squeezedby 
oligopolistic buyers (automakers and tier 1 autoparts) and suppliers (steel suppliers):  
 
“The domestic competition among smaller suppliers barely allow any mark-up, while 
for tier-1 the margins are higher”. (Industry association) 
 
The interviewees usually pointed that most firms in Brazil invest in R&D just to escape 
competition. Just a few bigger firms invest in R&D to increase mark-up.  
 
Some results also highlighted the difference in terms of competition intensity and 
public benefits between bigger and smaller firms: 
 
“Competition in many cases is about who get the best regulatory advantage, or special 
treatment. And these are usually the big firms”. (Autopart producer). 
 
A more dynamic domestic market is suggested as important to raise productivity. But 
a more competitive and dynamic environment needs to use better technology, and this 
seems to be another bottleneck related to regulation and the business environment, 
as we shall see in the next block of insights:  
 
“We need to help new entrants… to channel resources to better and more innovative 
uses…this is the only way to go forward if we do not want to lose the trip”. (Academic) 
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“Internet connection is bad around here, and this is going to be a bigger issue in the 
next years, as 5G will be e reality in most advanced countries, bringing new 
possibilities” (Academic). 
 
Regarding intrasectoral factor allocation, some responses cited that protection allows 
the surviving of inefficient firms. This argument, however, was disputed by others, who 
claimed that the excessive number of inefficient and small firms within the Brazilian 
autopart sector was caused by cultural and institutional factors, not necessarily 
affected by trade protection levels. A third group pointed to the combination of the cited 
causes:    
 
“The excessive protection, together with institutional failures (law forcing that banks 
assume debts in cases of Mergers and acquisitions, for example) contributes to the 
existence of more small and family firms in Brazil, as they neither grow nor exit the 
market” (Industry supplier tier 1) 
 
“Between 1997 and 2002, foreign firms acquired the best autopart suppliers in Brazil. 
Those who remained domestically owned, but that invested in professional 
management, became relatively successful. Those, however, who were family-owned 
and kept an amateurish management are surviving just because of protection and are 
mainly in the replacement market. What keeps them alive, despite a huge competition 
from Chinese suppliers, is the combination of protection with regulatory policies set up 
by Inmetro. Only a few of these family-owned suppliers still supply to Tier-2 or tier-1 
firms, but are within low technology subsectors, such as forging and rubber parts. 
These subsectors are naturally more protected against foreign competition given the 
transport costs” (Industry association) 
 
The following interviewees directly blame protection for allowing the survival of 
inefficient firms: 
 
“The goal of trade liberalization is to free available resources to more productive uses, 
within and out of the original sectors, and allowing the Brazilian economy to cope with 
the technological transformations. This process involves firms dying.” (Industry 
supplier tier 1) 
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“There is not enough “creative destruction” within the Brazilian industrial sector: the 
"inefficient" is still there, disrupting the "efficient"”. (Industry association) 
 
A smaller portion added the amateurish characteristic of smaller familiar firms in Brazil. 
Thus, despite most of the respondents saying that there are too many small firms in 
the market, the discussion regarding a potential general lack of managerial quality in 
Brazil reached less consensus: 
 
“The management culture in Brazil is not a main problem. Although there are deficits 
in terms of managerial quality, this is probably due to the fact that there are relatively 
more small and familiar firms in Brazil” (industry supplier tier 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BLOCK “C” 
 
Interviews indicate that Brazil appears not to be very competitive, thanks to higher 
production costs and lower quality. The production costs would be a result of “custo-
brasil”, oligopolized markets, and the relatively higher wages (in comparison to 
developing countries, especially in Asia), and these costs would add up throughout 
the entire value chain. Although labour costs are losing importance as cost-factor, this 
seems to still play an important role, at least among competing emerging markets, 
when explaining FDI decisions. 
 
“One input that is really damaging our competitiveness is the cost of steel. Although 
we know the price is largely given by world markets, the domestic prices are also 
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influenced by the fact that we have an oligopoly of steel producers in Brazil”. The 
import of steel happened when the exchange rate was more valued, but now, imports 
cannot help.” (Small autopart producer) 
 
“Input costs in Brazil were 60% higher than in Argentina, and 30% higher than in 
Mexico, before Inovar-Auto. The costs in Mexico were lower because Mexico hold 
labour costs down within the entire value chain” (Government). 
 
Specifically, regarding the access to better and cheaper production inputs and 
technology, it was widely acknowledged that multinationals (all automakers and most 
of Tier-1 autopart firms) face no barrier to access foreign technology, apart from the 
costs to import it. Some interviews also pointed out that there are mechanisms to 
reduce the tariffs for imported inputs, when these inputs are used to produce goods 
for exports or when there is no domestic production of similar inputs:   
 
A simple lack of access to imported technology, or lack of absorptive capacity, does 
not exist in the sector. (Automaker with high volume) 
 
“Access to imported inputs is not a big barrier, as automakers and Tier 1 bring parts 
and components and only assemble it in Brazil. This happens with most parts with 
high value-added. The only parts bought from domestic producers are the ones with 
lower aggregated value. These would always be domestically sourced anyway, thanks 
to transport costs and also to the low level of technology required. On the other hand, 
the more technology-intense parts would tend to be imported anyway”. (ABEIFA 
Association) 
 
“Access to imported inputs is not that important as well. Multinational assemblers in 
Brazil import all auto parts they need with higher technological content. Example: 
Toyota pickups have on average 60% local content, including labour and profits, 
meaning that 40% of the value of each pickup is made of imported autoparts. The 
tariffs paid on these imports can be partially offset by drawback schemes, when 
assembly is done in one country to export to another, as is the case in the bilateral 
trade between Brazil and Argentina, for example. The tariff exemption for autoparts 
186 
 
without “similarity” in the domestic market also helps in the case of some autoparts. 
(Automaker with low scale) 
 
However, the same respondent highlighted that the situation is not so favourable for 
producers of premium cars, and another automaker pointed out that the existing 
mechanisms for import tariff reduction or exemption are flawed and costly, thus 
arguing that the access to imported technology comes with an unnecessary extra cost: 
 
On the other hand, these imports pay average tariffs of around 14%, and the 
exemption for parts not domestically produced does not work well for premium cars, 
as these cars use autoparts “similar” to the ones produced domestically, but at a higher 
quality” (Automaker with low scale) 
 
Low access to technology, given the high costs involved, is an important reason for a 
lower competitiveness. Brazil does not produce any electronic component. Despite 
this, the industry needs to pay high tariffs to import these components. The country 
protects indiscriminately, and this negatively affects the competitiveness of our 
industry (Automaker with high volume) 
 
“The import tariff is high – the mode for autoparts is 16% - but you have ex-tariffs”. 
(Government) 
 
““ex-tarifario”93 does not work properly. It is a poor and weak mechanism”. (Automaker 
with high volume)  
 
Despite the existence of different mechanisms to reduce import tariffs for inputs, firms 
were divided on the issue of seeing tariffs as a major or as just a minor problem. 
Among the ones that said this was a minor problem, the majority said that it would be 
more important to have better domestic suppliers. On the other hand, respondents 
from the government and academia see the access to foreign inputs as an important 
source of short-term cost-reduction and long-term competitiveness through the 
 
93 “ex-tarifario” is a temporary tariff reduction for Capital and Information Technology goods, and also for autoparts, when there 
is no domestic production of a similar good. Under this scheme, the tariff is reduced either to zero (capital and IT goods) or to 
2% (autoparts). 
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incorporation of better technologies, at least for smaller suppliers, as multinationals 
have access to all the technology they may need, as already mentioned. This was 
highlighted for the electronics goods and for specialized services in general. However, 
the reduction of costs to import higher technology inputs is also viewed as important 
by firms, thus adding to the argument that frontier technologies are better absorbed in 
more open economies, and that this facilitates catching up.   
 
“The importance of having access to foreign inputs is there, because Brazil is a 
relatively closed economy and thus it has either less access to technology or it has 
less incentives to adopt technology. The costs of inputs are a problem today. Besides 
this, there is also a problem with availability of some goods… one example: light steel 
is not produced in Brazil. Embraer relies primarily on access to imported parts… The 
question of "what to domestically produce within the value chain" is important and does 
not have easy answers, but there is no way to have local content without sufficient 
scale. There is, however, room for government stimulus for specific sectors, if this is 
done properly: encouraging new industries, not specific companies!” (Academic). 
 
“It is not possible to be competitive in everything. In many cases it makes more sense 
to open for inputs, to gain competitiveness in the final goods”. (Government) 
 
“The access to imported intermediate goods, tools and capital goods would definitely 
benefit the domestic industry in terms of cost-reduction. This would also potentially 
allow the use of better technologies, as costs goes down. There is not, however, any 
constraint in terms of knowing a better technology, as the multinationals could access 
these technologies from their headquarters”. (Government) 
 
“In the automotive sector, nobody imports the full system. Instead, firms import parts 
and pieces, and assemble it in a system domestically. The level of imports is given by 
the differences in scale for that input – domestically and abroad, adjusted by tariffs 
and logistic costs. Therefore, for some very innovative or high technology inputs, it 
may be too costly to avoid imports. Example: for some electronic components there 
are just two suppliers in the world”. (Supplier Tier 1) 
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“Vehicles are becoming more electronic. This needs to be imported. Even using “ex” 
the import process makes these inputs at least 10% more expensive” (Industry 
supplier tier 1). 
 
“More technology-intensive inputs are either produced by tier-1 or tier-2 firms, usually 
with a project developed abroad, or imported directly by automakers”. (Industry 
association) 
 
“The domestic electronics segment, for example, is not competitive. This segment 
sells not only to the automotive sector, but also to other industrial sectors. This 
segment also uses inputs from other electronic suppliers”. (Industry association) 
 
Another mentioned source of high costs and a barrier for technology adoption was the 
high tariffs levied on the import of specialized services:  
 
“Tariffs on services are very high” (Industry association) 
 
“One very negative factor for our competitiveness is the high tariffs levied on imported 
services. We do not face high tariffs for imported inputs, but our imported services are 
heavily taxed” (Embraer) 
 
Most respondents that argued that the costs of imported inputs and the lack of access 
to technology in these goods were a less important problem typically came from the 
industry, including automakers and autoparts. Moreover, answers from automakers 
and Tier 1 autoparts tended to downplay the importance of accessing technology 
through imported inputs, probably reflecting the fact that these firms, as multinationals, 
already have access to most of the technology they need from their headquarters. In 
this case, the potential advantage of having more access to imported inputs would 
come by cost reduction. These respondents also are predominantly keen on the need 
to have a good domestic supply of inputs, arguing that this is very important for 
competitiveness: 
 
“To avoid exposure to exchange rate fluctuations most firms prefer to buy local inputs” 
(Industry supplier tier 1). 
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The nominal import tariffs are high, but if you consider all the tariff exceptions, it does 
not get so high: it is between 3% and 4%. For example: the problem of tariffs for raw 
materials is not critical…the biggest problem is that raw materials are not produced 
with enough capacity to "support" its domestic clients. In addition, having a locally 
produced raw material or input is an important advantage in terms of logistics (costs 
and time) and potential strategic partnerships. The most important import barriers are 
not tariffs. No one survives by importing more than 20%. It has to be located here. A 
firm business model would rely on importing more than that only if the domestic scale 
is small, to justify it”. (Industry Association).  
 
Regarding machinery, this small autopart producer said that imported machines are 
cheaper than Brazilian, but because there is subsidized financing for the purchase of 
domestic machinery, domestic production has a competitive edge. According to him, 
in 2011 one specific Brazilian machine could be bought for 74 thousand Reais, with 
an available subsidized loan, while a similar Chinese machine would cost 55 thousand 
Reais, but without any subsidized loan. He chose to buy the Brazilian one, because 
he had no resources to pay in cash. The same small autopart producer also gave an 
example of how regulation can damage an industry: in the 90s a driving regulation 
established that to drive motorhomes a person needed to have the highest level of 
driver licence. This drastically reduced the market for motorhomes in Brazil. This 
legislation was only revoked in 2011. Regarding the new labour law, the interviewee 
said that it gave more flexibility in terms of working schedule and also softened the 
power of labour unions, but it did not reduce labour costs. Although not mentioned in 
the interview, there is a direct link between more work schedule flexibility and less 
litigation, that can then relate to future reductions in labour-associated costs.  
 
A comparison between the automotive sector and the aeronautical sector is insightful, 
as the aeronautical sector, represented mainly by Embraer, face different 
competitiveness conditions. 
 
 “Embraer uses high value-added components, at low scale, while vehicle assemblers 
are the opposite: they use lower value-added components, at high scale”. (Automaker 
with low scale) 
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A representative of the firm explained that Embraer is much less negatively affected 
by the high logistic costs of Brazilian infrastructure, as the firm receives its imported 
inputs usually by air and exports its final goods also by air. Another reason for not 
being that affected by transport costs is because Embraer operates within a cluster, in 
Sao Paulo. Finally, as Embraer exports 90% of its production, it takes advantage of a 
series of tax reliefs aimed at major exporters.  
 
The same respondent said that the firm outsources many inputs that it would be able 
to produce by itself, but that are cheaper when bought from other companies abroad. 
Even if not used, this ability is strategic, as the firm is insured against eventual 
excessive rising prices for these inputs (Embraer would be able to produce them if 
they become expensive to import).    
 
Although there was always a good supply of domestic specialized labour (aeronautical 
and mechanical engineers), Embraer is equally affected by labour costs. The 
interviewee also explained that the company needs to import a vast amount of 
specialized services, to develop new technologies, but the import of services in Brazil 
is heavily taxed. So, despite the fact that Embraer is able to import input goods with 
none or at very low import tariffs, it is heavily taxed – as any other Brazilian industry – 
when it imports services.  
 
These services are provided by other global clusters and could not be supplied 
domestically, as they require global scale to be competitive. Thus, the interviewee 
argued that protection in this case is pointless.    
 
However, although able to easily import any required part or machinery, the firm 
considers it simpler to negotiate and do business with firms established domestically. 
It makes financial sense for many suppliers to be located domestically, and many of 
them are small firms with domestic capital. Asked about the competitiveness of these 
firms, the representative of Embraer said they are competitive, but that they need to 
expand their operations abroad to keep abreast of the competition. According to him, 
these domestic suppliers rely too much on Embraer, and face difficulties related to 
“custo-brasil” to export more.      
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The Embraer representative also highlighted that protection from international 
competition reduces efforts by firms, thus making them less competitive in the future. 
On the other hand, when a firm is exposed to international competition – as is the case 
of Embraer – it needs to invest in technology and productivity. The firm invests 10% 
of its turnover in R&D. The interviewee also commented that the simple focus on the 
domestic market would not imply a lower effort or competitiveness, as these results 
would happen only if there is protection against the competition.  
 
He also said that Embraer is the final buyer and its suppliers can use the company to 
gain technology and market. In this sense the company is an “anchor-firm”. There are 
also clear external scale gains due to agglomeration economies of scale.  
 
He also said that the global value chain where Embraer operates is characterized by 
quality and innovation, and not so much based on price. Moreover, trade tariffs are not 
a problem for Embraer, as tariffs are very low.  
  
He said that the aeronautical sector does not pay much trade tariffs worldwide, and 
that there are few players in this value chain.  “The trade barriers we see in the 
automotive sector in Brazil would be disastrous in the aeronautical sector, as while 
Brazil does have part of the production chain, our competitors are in developed 
countries” (EMBRAER)  
 
 
 
 
 
BLOCK “D” 
 
Meanwhile, the lower innovation and quality could be a result of the following 
competing explanations: (i)) weak regulation; (ii) demand based on low income 
individuals; and (iii) low trade openness, to import both inputs and final goods. The 
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first explanation was usually put forward by policymakers, while the second was 
usually brought by automakers.  
 
“Brazilian consumers cannot afford to pay the costs of more equipped models. This is 
our market” (Automaker) 
 
“Wages are low and there is no credit for vehicle purchase. Demand is necessarily for 
simpler and cheaper cars” (Automaker)   
 
“Imported vehicles bring innovation and foster innovation by the domestic producers. 
This happens because consumers will demand better domestic products when they 
are exposed to better imported cars”. (ABEIFA Association)  
 
Given either the high production costs or the lower product quality, some respondents 
stated that Brazilian plants can only export to less competitive and closer markets, 
such as neighbouring Latin America ones: 
 
“For the local production to be competitive we need a better business environment 
(reduction of custo-brasil. Tariffs are of secondary importance. Currently, our 
competitiveness allows us to export only to Latin America” (Automaker) 
 
According to some comments, the Brazilian market is important for the multinationals, 
but is viewed as a "second class" one. Citing decisions made by headquarters, an 
academic stated that: 
 
“Models developed in Brazil are usually solely for the domestic market. The Brazilian 
market is important for them but is viewed as a "second class" one”. (Academic) 
 
This view is supported by arguments put in different ways: 
 
“Some models were developed in Brazil but are not exported to Europe because they 
were not designed as global products. One example is the Fiat Argo. (Automaker)  
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“Automakers would not abandon Brazil. They can, however, let the country lag in terms 
of technology and do not upgrade their plants”. (Industry Association).  
 
There were opposite views regarding labour productivity within the Brazilian industry 
in general and the automotive sector in particular. Industry representatives argue there 
is no labour productivity problems, while the government and the academia say there 
is: 
 
“There is a shortage of human resources within autopart producers, as Sesi/Senai are 
not enough to train all the work force”. (Academic) 
 
 “There are productivity problems within the sector. There are not enough qualified 
workers, including automotive engineers”. (Government). 
 
“The productivity of the workforce in Brazil is not a problem. There are no problems 
regarding labour supply (engineers and technicians). Neither is the exchange rate the 
problem”. (Industry association) 
 
“Labour productivity within vehicle production, inside the factory, in Brazil is as high as 
in foreign plants” (Industry automaker) 
 
During the interviews it was not clear how cultural factors could be separated from an 
eventual lack of management quality. The cultural factor was related to the existence 
of a "type of capitalism" in Brazil, where business owners, especially of smaller firms, 
do not have the necessary professionalism nor the required mindset to engage in 
M&A, to increase productivity in the face of higher competition, or to seek growth 
beyond the domestic market. This would be a “cultural characteristic” and would 
include less interest in international exposure, less ability to face competition, and less 
ability and interest to merge, buy or sell its business: 
 
“The focus on the domestic market is a cultural characteristic” (Industry association). 
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Others, however, said that this “cultural trace” is not the only cause for the lack of M&A 
among smaller and familiar firms, pointing to institutional constraints (especially law 
and litigation biases by lawyers) as another reason: 
 
Another problem, besides being in a competitive market squeezed between two 
oligopolies, is that smaller autopart firms – tier 3 and 4 – do not have CADIN94. This 
means they cannot get financing. To overcome this limitation many of these firms use 
materials supplied by their clients. Why do they not simply die or merge? Well, there 
are two main reasons for that: one is that banks are not willing to accept these 
liabilities; and the other is that most of these firms lack a more professional managerial 
approach…they are extremely amateur. Some consultancies stated that “forging” is 
messed up, but a small number of firms would be economically viable. (Government) 
 
Others emphasise the institutional failures that make very difficult for smaller firms 
under financial distress to be sold or merge: 
 
“The smaller family-owned autopart firms are without any financial condition to invest, 
and they are not competitive by all means”. (…) “The small autopart firms have 
financial problems: they do not have a clean credit history to get new credit. These 
firms need help before a trade liberalization”. (Industry association) 
 
“The main bottleneck in Brazil is the autopart sector. There are too many small and 
inefficient firms in the market, unable and incapable of doing better and for less. More 
supply agreements could help those firms to access much needed finance, for 
example”. (Industry automaker) 
 
One respondent explicitly contradicted those who claimed there was any cultural 
aspect involved: 
 
“The lack of mergers and acquisitions and the existence of “zombie companies” is 
characteristic of the Brazilian system, not a cultural aspect of the Brazilian 
 
94 CADIN is the acronym for “Cadastro de Inadimplentes”, a database with the name of persons and firms that 
have non-paid debts with the Government.  
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businessman: banks must be able to take on the management of debtors, without 
having to pay the previous liabilities” (industry association). 
 
Although the view that protection may just compensate for “custo-Brasil” is the 
dominant one, especially among industry representatives, one interviewee raised an 
interesting question regarding a potential inverse relationship: protection may cause  
non-cooperative behaviour among the business community and therefore reduces the 
incentives for fighting for a better business environment: 
 
“Businessmen in Brazil do not face the full strength of foreign competition, either in the 
domestic market or in the export markets, and thus are not that interested in solving 
international competitiveness bottlenecks such as the business environment. Instead, 
they prefer to find ways to get advantages against their domestic competitors, within 
a bad business environment that can ultimately be an entry barrier in their favour” 
(Government)    
 
This point of view was also indirectly mentioned by an industry representative: 
 
“Any protection given to the industry should have a clear end. The current protection 
structure did not generate true benefits. On the contrary, it generated a certain ease 
and it avoided the needed discussion of the real problems” (Industry representative) 
 
It seems likely that there is an equilibrium, where the government fears rising 
unemployment and loosing important segments of manufacturing, while the private 
sector does not move forward a stronger agenda for future competitiveness: 
 
“The arguments for keeping the current level of protection, or even to increase it, are 
now mostly based on employment considerations or on the fear of premature 
deindustrialization, caused by both unfair Chinese competition and poor 
competitiveness conditions among Brazilian firms. The discourse from some industrial 
associations is that without these (manufacturing) tariffs Brazil could turn into a big 
farm. It is a myopia that is costing a lot in terms of our future economic prospects” 
(Government official).      
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Directly questioned about why there is no successful lobby/pressure to improve the 
business environment, an automaker answered that “the business sector in Brazil lost 
part of its coordination capabilities. Today there is not an organized group of 
Congressman defending the industrial sector. This is partly due to a short-term vision 
by most of the businessmen in Brazil” (Automaker) 
 
Further questioned if this lack of effort to improve the business environment could be 
the result of a dispute between producers of final goods and producers of inputs, the 
same interviewee said: “Maybe, to some extent. But I believe the short-term vision 
explanation accounts better for it” (Automaker) 
 
There was a consensus that "custo-Brasil" is among the most important reasons for 
the relatively low competitiveness of the Brazilian industry in general, and the 
automotive sector, in particular. Most respondents put issues related to the business 
environment together with issues related to the lack of scale in production as the main 
causes oflower competitiveness: 
 
“To gain competitiveness (defined previously as a combination of innovation, quality 
and productivity), the most important factors to improve are the “Custo-Brazil”; the 
average scale of production; the participation in GVCs; and the access to foreign 
markets” (Industry association);  
 
“To promote long term competitiveness, it is essential to tackle the “custo-Brasil”. 
Besides, the low scale is a problem in Brazil…for some goods simply there is no viable 
scale in the country…this is also caused by limitations in income” (academic). 
 
Some responses – all from the industry - were even more incisive, saying that this was 
the most important problem:  
 
“Business environment is really bad in Brazil, and the main cause for the lack of 
competitiveness” (Industry supplier tier 1); 
 
“The biggest problem for investments in Brazil is uncertainty and high taxation (…) 
“Custo-Brazil” is fundamental” (Industry automaker). 
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A much stronger criticism of the tax aspect of the business environment identify it as 
a crucial factor negatively affecting overall competitiveness:  
 
“The taxation system in Brazil is a machine of inequality and inefficiency, for people 
and for firms. A cumulative PIS/COFINS disincentive value added. Exports are taxed, 
because part of the domestic taxes is not recovered. Only firms that are big enough 
can afford to pay good accountants and tax lawyers and then reduce their risk of being 
fined for some compliance error. And there are sectors who do not pay, because they 
got “incentives”, and firms that do not pay because they just avoid taxes, thus creating 
an unfair competition. It is a mess, a total mess.” (small autopart producer).   
 
According to some responses, a bad business environment not only damages 
competitiveness of current industries, but also make it more difficult to adapt or 
develop new technologies. One channel for this negative effect on technology 
adoption would be protection, which is higher to compensate for a worse business 
environment:  
 
“Custo-Brasil leads to protection and protection leads to lower technology” (Industry 
supplier tier 1).  
 
However, the negative effect on adoption and innovation could also happen regardless 
of protection:  
 
“The business environment in Brazil is not good for the attraction and creation of more 
modern industries or platforms” (Academic).  
 
“The problem is a combination of custo-brasil, tariff structure and demand instability. 
Tariff protection for inputs damages technology adoption, while protection in the final 
goods damages competition, that, is in turn, a disincentive to innovation” 
(Government). 
 
“The industry worldwide is going through a deep technological transformation. The 
Brazilian industry is finding it difficult to follow these technological developments, 
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mainly because of the difficulties imposed by “Custo-Brasil” (high logistical costs, 
among others). The proof that the problem is out of the gates of the factories is that 
we have “industry 4.0” engine factories within Brazil, exactly as the ones built in China, 
but we do not have the same competitiveness “(Automaker) 
 
The most negative aspects of "custo-Brasil" cited by the interviewees are political, 
economic and legal uncertainties; high interest rates; high levels of litigation and 
regulatory burden; poor infrastructure and urban violence.  
 
As pointed out by a Tier 1 supplier: “The problem is not sectoral, it is macroeconomic, 
it is mainly the high interest rates and the legal uncertainty (lack of rule of law), but it 
also includes poor infrastructure, a complex tax system and labour legislation”. 
 
The interviewee cited examples to demonstrate that among multinationals operating 
in Brazil, the litigation related to labour was heavily concentrated in the Brazilian 
operations: in a specific example it was declared that this specific type of litigation 
could easily consume around 2% of the firm`s net income. The same interviewee also 
cited violence (property and personal security) and irrecoverable tax credits as other 
sources of costs related to the business environment and Brazil`s characteristics in 
general. 
 
It was repeatedly said that without "custo-Brasil" the Industry would be competitive 
even without tariffs. Moreover, among some interviewees we noted a disbelief in the 
political will to improve the business environment, as can be seen from this excerpt: 
“Manufacturing is not a priority in Brazil” (Automaker with low scale) 
 
It was repeatedly mentioned that the bad business environment is a cause for the level 
of protection and that “custo-brazil” is a more important factor in reducing 
competitiveness than tariffs on inputs: 
 
“A reduction in the import tariffs for electronics that are used in autoparts, as, for 
example, electronics to be used in electronic injection systems, would be beneficial for 
these autoparts. But this benefit is overshadowed by the “custo-brasil”, in terms of cost 
reduction. However, if we consider the benefits in terms of technology embodied, it 
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may gain relative importance. The tariffs try to compensate for “custo-brasil”. If “custo-
brasil” was sufficiently reduced, firms could face zero tariffs and survive”. (Industry 
Association). 
 
A business association devoted to imports within the automotive sector argued that 
“political and economic instability” are the reasons for making the bad business 
environment a drag on competitiveness. 
 
“The Brazilian industry is not competitive basically, because of “custo-brasil. The 
profitability within small manufacturing firms is low, as well as within some bigger firms. 
As an example, a supplier of Renault said once that the assembler (Renault) makes 
only around 200 US dollars as net profit per car sold in the medium segment”. (Small 
tier autopart producer) 
 
“Most of the small firms are in a “subsistence mode”, and if you are able to grow you 
start to face even higher increases in costs: you need to deal with more labour and 
environmental regulations, and also the taxation system gets more expensive. For 
example, the “Simples” tax regime gets much more expensive when you have a higher 
turnover” (Small tier autopart producer) 
 
 
Although Embraer relies on the world market, a better business environment is always 
important. Moreover, as a very dynamic sector, innovation is always happening. “We 
need better conditions to face upcoming competition from new players, and also to 
keep abreast with innovations such as electric airplanes, for example” (Embraer).  
 
There was widespread support for a more “horizontal” type of industrial policy, based 
on clusters and partnerships with the Government to identify bottlenecks and to 
promote competitiveness, exports and internationalization of firms. It was mentioned 
that more and better regulation, in terms of standard settings, is needed to promote 
technology adoption and development, but the low-income levels of domestic demand, 
and even an alleged lower capacity from Brazilian firms, could be a barrier, unless the 
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investment is focused on exports. Moreover, regulation/industrial policy95 should not 
bring uncertainty and should not be too costly: 
 
“Safety and fuel efficiency regulations for popular cars are a problem in terms of costs. 
In this sense, it would be very difficult for Brazil to be able to produce millions of low-
cost cars with high levels of quality and equipment. Despite this, the way forward is to 
invest in small cars fuelled by ethanol”. (Industry automaker)   
 
“Any technical regulatory change brings costs and reduces the productivity of the 
production line” (Industry automaker) 
 
“The decision to invest in technology takes into consideration the potential demand. 
Regulation may complement this demand, but there are limitations in terms of 
infrastructure and consumers` income. Anyway, predictability is essential!” (Industry 
automaker) 
 
Academics and policymakers tend to be more incisive in saying regulation needs to 
push the industry harder, but emphasize the limits in terms of domestic income to pay 
the higher prices of better vehicles: 
 
“Regulation is key. Brazil should focus on vehicles with highest technological content, 
to export to the headquarters in Europe and USA. At the same time, it should 
concentrate on technology that could build on some comparative advantages: for 
example, instead of trying an electrical car, Brazil should focus on hybrids with alcohol. 
For these actions to take place there is the need of regulation. Brazil should rely on a 
more demanding regulation to force firms to improve their products. Otherwise the 
domestic companies would lag behind. Some Chinese firms, for example, have 
capability to export to top markets”. (Academic) 
 
“The limits in terms of regulation would be the costs and the local demand (given the 
new prices)”. (Academic) 
 
95 Regulation was mainly referred to, in the interviews, as product or production standards, while industrial 
policy encompass broader themes such as taxation, subsidies and trade-related measures (including tariffs)  
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“A way to induce innovation even within a protected market is to use regulation96”. 
(Government) 
 
Besides demand bottlenecks, there are also constraints related to institutional and 
firm-level capacities: 
 
“Only relatively big domestic markets can impose tough regulatory requirements”. 
(Government) 
 
“Regulation is important, but regulation alone is not enough. It would not be possible 
to rely just on regulation, because Brazil is not California. The Brazilian industrial 
sector is not efficient and not structured enough to be regulated in a proper way”. 
(Academic)  
 
The industry emphasizes the costs and uncertainty brought by regulation in general, 
but welcome it in the form of "standard-setting", to help to coordinate private-sector 
efforts, and believe that, if done “properly”, regulation can promote competitiveness: 
 
“Standard settings are a good way for Government to solve coordination problems”. 
(…) “Regulation needs to be more incisive and focused more on product and less on 
process”. (…) “Industrial policy should be based on coordination and clusters. The 
current one is ineffective”. (Industry supplier tier 1) 
 
Some respondents expressed the combined view that R&D investments in Brazil 
should be pushed by tougher product regulation, accompanied by proper incentives: 
 
“We need a system of regulation that imposes a higher level of technology. We need 
incentives to engage in real R&D, something that currently is not done in Brazil. As 
potential paths for these incentives to innovation we would cite the development of 
hybrid cars using the alcohol technology (comparative advantage). Partnerships with 
 
96 Standard settings. 
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research institutions and other firms would be important for R&D, but this does not 
happen often in Brazil”. (Academic)  
 
Regarding incentives for R&D, responses pointed to more room for engineering 
improvements, instead of trying to develop pure innovations, and to the need f or 
government incentives: 
 
“Brazil could try to improve its engineering, not necessarily innovation. And for this it 
is necessary to have better government incentives”. (Automaker with low scale) 
 
Still regarding R&D incentives, the overall opinion is that there are reasonably good 
instruments in place, two of them being explicitly mentioned by several respondents: 
"Lei do bem" and Embrapii. Part of those who praised the current system of R&D 
incentives also said that sectoral industrial policies for R&D are unnecessary and even 
counterproductive: 
 
“Lei do bem is complex, but it works. Together with Embrapii and other instruments, 
there is no need for more R&D incentives; Sectoral industrial policies are “smoke 
screens”, ideological bias, to hide behind the true causes of lagging behind” (Industry 
supplier tier 1) 
 
“R&D investment is not a problem in Brazil, as the country is one of the most 
aggressive ones in promoting R&D. Regulation is important, as long it is made from 
the point of view of the product, not the process. Moreover, it needs to be done 
realistically. What is not important or efficient are the incentives”. (Industry association) 
 
Another strand of criticism, consistently mentioned, was that both “Lei do bem” and 
Embrapii are not easily accessible by smaller firms, and a smaller proportion of 
respondents argued that R&D promotion should be enhanced through partnerships 
with research institutions and more innovation clusters. Moreover, it was pointed that 
demand uncertainty negatively affects R&D: 
 
 “There is too much uncertainty, both in terms of policy and domestic demand; 
Incentives for R&D are reasonable and in place. To improve it there is the need to 
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promote more partnerships between the private sector and research institutions. This 
would be better if linked to clusters” (LLC: as in Embraer)” (Industry supplier tier 1) 
 
Some interviews discussed more details about the R&D environment in Brazil, to 
suggest that current legislation is not sufficiently flexible and public institutions 
(especially universities) are not sufficiently market-oriented: 
    
 “Corporate-university partnerships are essential, as we see in the USA. In Brazil, the 
patent problem is not so complicated. The problem is negotiation. Universities only 
want to participate "50% to 50%", but the legislation does not allow flexibility. There 
are also problems of regulatory incentives and tax incidence”. (Academic) 
 
Inovar-Auto and the technological gap 
 
Overall, the responses indicated that the technological gap is increasing in the last 
decades, for most respondents, from al groups, but there are recent exceptions in 
some subsectors and, for example, energy efficiency (arguably improved by Inovar-
Auto, according to one government source and two automakers). 
 
Most answers depicted Inovar-auto as a bad policy: generated costs and did not 
promote innovation. The responses also highlighted that the local content 
requirements did not alter the existing local content levels of the biggest plants, and 
that the protection levels brought about by the policy provided conditions for the arrival 
of smaller plants but did not change any investment plant for bigger plants (these were, 
arguably, driven by expectations related to  domestic demand).  Supporters of Inovar-
Auto were among automakers and policymakers, and stressed fuel efficiency gains. 
Another point raised by the interviewees was that Inovar-Auto did stop the rising import 
trend of vehicles, but this result was achieved in combination with exchange rate 
movements as well:  
 
“The technological gap is increasing. Inovar Auto made the automakers less prone to 
innovate. Custo-Brasil and the exchange rate also played a role. Inovar Auto was only 
responsible for attracting low-scale plants: the bigger scale plants that came would 
have come anyway. Inovar Auto did not alter R&D in the sector, nor competition among 
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autoparts. It did, however, increase competition among automakers. (Industry 
association)   
 
“The local content requirements of Inovar-Auto did not impact the biggest automakers, 
as they already had a higher local content. It impacted only the “newcomers” that 
arrived in the country in the 90s, Honda and Toyota, for example. These are smaller 
producers in the Brazilian market and as such, it is efficient to import more than do the 
firms with bigger domestic scale”.  (Government) 
 
“The new small producers, such as BMW, in fact are bringing CKDs to bypass both 
the Inovar-Auto protection (30%) and the imports protection (35%)”. (Industry supplier 
tier 1)  
 
“Inovar-Auto contributed to improving fuel efficiency. We have good emissions 
regulations” (Industry automaker) 
 
“Inovar-Auto was a disaster for the autopart sector: it reduced scale per plant and 
indirectly damaged the industry by damaging the government budget. It simply blocked 
the flow of imported cars”. (Industry association) 
 
“Imports of vehicles (after Inovar-Auto) went down because of the combination of 
Inovar auto and exchange rate movement” (industry supplier tier 1) 
 
Specifically regarding whether the higher levels of trade protection generated by 
Inovar-Auto induced or not a reduction of the average scale per plant, answers were 
contradictory: 
 
“Inovar-Auto decreased average scale, and then productivity, both within automakers 
and autoparts”. (Industry association)  
 
The level of tariffs protecting a domestic market against foreign competition seems to 
play a minor role in FDI attraction, as tariffs contribute only to part of the profits, and a 
diverse array of cost factors and strategic considerations can be of greater importance: 
according to the interviews, profit maximization and strategic decisions are the aspects 
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that explain the investment decisions of multinationals. For most, industrial policies 
designed by potential hosting countries do not play a decisive role in the attraction of 
investments:  
 
“Multinationals decide their investments based on a combination of profit maximization 
and strategic considerations. Financial aspects of industrial policies do not have much 
impact on their decisions”. (Government) 
 
“The headquarters decide who will be the export platform based on relative costs” 
(Automaker) 
 
“To decide where to invest, the headquarters search for a combination of profit 
maximization, market-share (especially the Chinese), and strategic considerations”. 
(Academic) 
 
One automaker, for example, explained that they do not take into consideration any 
financial aspect of industrial policies, when deciding where to invest. He said his firm 
make use of these subsidies only to improve their cashflow: 
 
“Once the location is decided, sectoral policies are welcomed to support cashflow 
generation and further justify the investment to the headquarters” (Automaker) 
 
It was also mentioned that vehicle assemblers need to operate near with Tier-1 firms, 
and thus investment decisions take supply availability and the investment decisions of 
these firms into account as well. Moreover, the investment decisions of Tier-1 
suppliers are becoming more important:  
 
“Tier-1 firms are gaining importance in relation to automakers”. (Government)  
 
“What brought automakers to Brazil was not Inovar-Auto. The policy gave only a small 
favour for some producers to start a very small domestic production (…) the 
automakers that built bigger plants in Brazil  came  because  of  the domestic  market, 
only.  Moreover, if we discard from the calculations those very small plants (like BMW 
and Audi, for example), we will see that there was not any reduction in the average 
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scale per plant after Inovar-Auto. On top of that, apart from the crisis` years, firms are 
operating, on average, at 85% of their plant capacity. This means that they are 
operating close to their optimal scale. There are plants that function at lower optimal 
scales, depending on the technology that is used in the production process. For 
example, if you are producing a vehicle using glass fibre, it could have a much-reduced 
scale of production, as the process is very manual. Some of these plants can be 
efficient producing only 6 vehicles per day!  They are low volume plants, designed for 
that”. (Automaker) 
 
It is important to notice, however, that the same interviewee acknowledged that the 
lack of scale is among the biggest obstacles for the competitiveness in Brazil.  
 
New technologies 
 
It was mentioned, by part of the industry and part of the academics, that the importance 
of imported inputs is higher when the technology is evolving faster, and that protection 
of high-end inputs should be minimal.  It was also mentioned, from all types of 
respondents, that labour costs are losing importance and that traditional industrial 
policy is becoming meaningless: 
 
When technology is evolving faster it is more important to have access to foreign 
technology in general, including through foreign inputs, especially for frontier 
technology and products. In this sense, for the Brazilian case we should not protect 
too much the electronics components as an input (Government) 
 
“Future competitiveness will not be based on labour costs…traditional industry is 
important for transition but is not the future…we need to be exposed to competition 
and technological change. To do this, we need to go abroad, both exporting and 
investing”. (Industrial supplier tier 1) 
 
“Everything is automated, with robots. The new Honda factory is totally automated! 
The cost-advantages related to labour are losing importance…they are not impacting 
competitiveness as they used to do. The future is for technology integrators, such as 
Embraer”. (Government)  
207 
 
 
“Automakers can easily access imported technology...the only exception is for really 
high-end technologies. In this case there are problems to bring them to the domestic 
market”. (Industry automaker) 
 
“Access to the best inputs, from domestic or foreign suppliers, is essential for our 
competitiveness. As technology evolves, this gain even more importance. For 
example, in a few years we will have electrical airplanes, meaning that a whole new 
set of inputs will be needed”. (Embraer) 
 
As already mentioned, “Custo-Brasil” is also viewed as a barrier for the adoption of 
new technologies: 
 
“The industry worldwide is going through a deep technological transformation. The 
Brazilian industry is finding it difficult to follow these technological developments, 
mainly because of the difficulties imposed by “Custo-Brasil” (high logistical costs, 
among others). (Automaker) 
 
It was also mentioned that current competitiveness in some parts of the value chain 
does not guarantee a future competitiveness, as technologies can change the entire 
composition of the value chain:  
 
“Brazil is currently competitive in casting (iron and aluminium), but these are “old 
technologies” and for these there will be excess capacity and the price will go down in 
the future”. (Industry supplier tier 1) 
 
There was a widespread belief that R&D activities are becoming more concentrated 
in global centres, and an acknowledgement that Brazil is not – and probably will not 
be - among these centres: 
 
“GM recently turned off its entire R&D division in Brasil, in favour of China. GM has 
different production lines for the developing countries and thus decides where to 
concentrate its R&D activities for these countries. As Brazil and China are among 
them, it was an obvious decision to choose China, as this country is much more 
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competitive to be a R&D centre, at least among the developing markets”. (Automaker 
with low scale) 
 
“Protection does not affect innovation by multinationals, as this is done at the global 
level anyway, mainly at the headquarters. Besides, it is quite often an industrial 
secret.” Automaker with low scale) 
 
“Electrical and hybrid vehicles will never be developed in Brasil”. (…) “High level 
technology will not be developed in Brasil”. ABEIFA Association) 
 
As mentioned before, according to some respondents, the way forward for Brazil 
would be to provide right incentives for innovation, including R&D incentives and also 
a better business environment. And these incentives should be channelled to the 
production of small cars fuelled by ethanol/hybrids with ethanol/ electric cells by 
ethanol, according to the current trends: 
 
“Brazil lacks a really effective policy for innovation”. (ABEIFA Association) 
 
“First we need to differentiate R&D from Engineering. R&D is being located in the 
headquarters, and there is not much scope for trying to make it domestically. On the 
other hand, engineering is necessary and also viable to be made domestically: this 
consists in the adaption of materials, tools and processes to the local conditions. For 
example, the composition of the grease within engines, needs to be altered in function 
of the wax type used.  We need to incentivize engineering! We need to bring more 
engineering to Brazil. However, it is expensive to have engineering. The vehicle 
Ecosport, that is sold in the USA as well, was entirely designed in Brazil. To keep and 
bring more engineering to Brazil we need more government incentives, because the 
current ones are not enough”. (Automaker)  
 
“There is not enough government support for innovation within Brazil (…) Firms will 
not innovate without the help of the State” (Automaker) 
 
“R&D by automakers is going to be totally done at firms` headquarters. The room is 
for tier 2 and tier 3 domestic autopart producers, that engage in R&D, sometimes in a 
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heroic individual effort, but that could make much more with appropriate support from 
research institutions or by more cooperation with buyers and suppliers”. (Academic)  
 
Only two interviewees mentioned the advantages of a national car: 
 
“Brazil should try to produce a genuinely national car, as it would make the profits to 
stay in the country, and the strategic decisions would be within the country”. 
(Academic)  
 
“A national car would be important for domestic R&D” (Small scale automaker) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 - INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS  
 
 
According to the partial analysis from the interviews we have the following: 
 
 
BLOCK “A” 
Internal + external economies of scale 
Comparative advantages 
Location and investment decisions based on scale 
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Local content requirements (domestic diversification) x Global Value Chains 
(specialization) 
 
 Scale is fundamental; scale dictates the efficient local content; and 
specialization can generate scale gains;   
 The lack of openness of the economy, combined to the relative low average 
income limits the potential size of domestic production and make Brazil a 
location for production of “second class” vehicles. 
 
 
 
BLOCK “B” 
Foreign and domestic competition 
X-efficiency 
Markups 
Firm heterogeneity and changes in market-share 
Competition and Innovation 
Resource allocation (inter and intra-sectoral) 
 
 Trade protection is potentially negatively affecting factor allocation, and thus 
productivity;   
 Regarding the effects on firms’ effort to improve productivity (the so-called x-
efficiency), interviews pointed to a mixed situation: while the high levels of 
protection indeed reduces competition from imports, the high domestic 
production costs (“custo-Brazil”) and a high domestic competition does not 
allow for high mark-up levels. However, for smaller firms, besides the high 
levels of domestic competition pressure, there is also pressure from domestic 
oligopolized suppliers and buyers. The result is a very volatile mark-up for the 
bigger firms (arguably fluctuating according to the business cycle of the 
Brazilian economy and the movements of exchange rates that increase or 
decrease foreign competition), and a more squeezed mark-up for smaller firms 
(although they also fluctuate through the business cycle);  
211 
 
 Regarding the levels of both foreign and domestic competition, answers seems 
to point that domestic competition is higher than competition from abroad. 
Moreover, it seems that there is much more domestic competition among 
smaller firms, while foreign competition affects firms according to the sector 
where they operate (producers of low value-added goods seems to be more 
shielded from foreign competition). Finally, as foreign competition seems to be 
dependent on the levels of exchange rate and tariffs, and as exchange rates 
fluctuates, pressure from foreign competition also fluctuates. 
 
 
 
BLOCK “C” 
Technologial spillovers 
Access to imported inputs 
Lessons from Embraer 
 
 R&D activities are becoming more concentrated in global centres, and Brazil is 
not – and probably will not be - among these centres; 
 Usually, multinationals – automakers and most tier-1 suppliers – face no 
problem to access better and cheaper foreign technology apart from a relatively 
small extra cost; 
 Some high technology imported inputs would be always imported, given the 
required scale to produce them domestically;  
 Smaller autopart producers do face restrictions in accessing foreign 
technology, and, for them, lower tariffs for high technology inputs would be even 
more important, as it would not only be an advantage in terms of costs, but also 
in terms of technology adoption;  
 Tariffs on the import of specialized services are increasingly becoming a threat 
to domestic competitiveness;  
 The importance of imported inputs is higher when the technology is evolving 
faster, and protection of high-end inputs should be minimal, to improve 
catching-up;  
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 It was disputed if tariffs are high, after all available mechanisms to reduce it. As 
stated, the mode for autoparts is 16% and the average is 14%, but if there is no 
domestic production the tariff is either 0% or 2%, thanks to the “ex-tarifario” 
regime. The caveat is that the regime is bureaucratic and costly to be accessed 
by smaller firms (interested firms need to ask for the inclusion of the required 
imported good in the list of “ex-tarifario”). Moreover, the system also does not 
work properly when a domestic firm produces a “similar” good of inferior quality 
and thus hinder the tariff reduction. It is therefore important to measure how 
comprehensive is the regime of “ex-tarifario”, specially the one for autoparts.  
One interviewee already suggested a final average of 3 to 4%, after all 
reductions.  It was also said that even with “ex” imports could cost at least 10% 
more, due to the process involved; 
 The example of Embraer, as an “anchor firm”, can be viewed as another 
argument against LCRs, as a competitive final good producer can generate the 
conditions for the suppliers to come after, while the imposition of not so 
competitive suppliers can deter the development of a competitive final good 
producer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BLOCK “D” 
Business environment, institutions, regulations and industrial policies (including 
Inovar-Auto and R&D policies) 
Location and investment decisions based on the business environment 
New technologies 
Income levels and quality of labour 
Current firm-level productivity 
 
 Interviews favoured a more “horizontal” type of industrial policy, based on 
clusters and partnerships with the Government to identify bottlenecks, and 
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setting standards for final goods, to promote competitiveness, exports and 
internationalization of firms. The standard-setting type of regulation is viewed 
as needed to promote technology adoption but bounded by the limited income 
levels of domestic demand; 
 Regarding R&D incentives, the overall opinion is that there are reasonably good 
instruments in place, two of them being explicitly mentioned: "lei do bem" and 
Embrapii; 
 Overall, the responses pointed that the technological gap is increasing in the 
last decades, for most respondents, from al groups, but there are recent 
exceptions in some subsectors and, for example, energy efficiency (arguably 
improved by Inovar-Auto, according to one government source and two 
automakers). However, most answers depicted Inovar-auto as a bad policy and 
pointed that this policy did not contribute to reverse the aforementioned 
increasing technological gap: it generated costs and did not promote 
innovation; 
 Inovar-Auto did stop the rising import trend of vehicles, but this result was 
achieved in combination with exchange rate movements as well; 
 Firms may not be interested in improving the business environment if it serves 
as an entry barrier in the domestic market and if protection gives them what 
they need to survive competition from abroad. An alternative explanation for 
this lack of effort to improve the business environment is just the lack of 
organization, generated by a lack of long-term vision; 
 Business environment is pointed as the single most important factor affecting 
competitiveness, and among it the worst aspects are political, economic and 
legal uncertainties; 
 The bad business environment causes not only higher production costs, but is 
also a disincentive innovation and the adoption of technology; 
 There is a degree of skills shortage within firms, but productivity within 
automakers and tiers 1 and 2 is similar to the levels verified in developed 
countries;  
 Business environment is pointed as the single most important factor affecting 
competitiveness, and among it the worst aspects are political, economic and 
legal uncertainties. It was also widely expressed that the bad business 
214 
 
environment causes not only higher production costs, but also disincentive 
innovation and the adoption of technology. According to some, with a better 
business environment tariffs could be reduced to zero;  
 Contrasting the automotive sector with Embraer, it was said that the 
aeronautical sector is less affected by the business environment (it does not 
have to face the same transport infrastructure problems, and it benefits from 
lower taxation, as an exporter) and it can import inputs in an easier way. As 
such, the interview with Embraer does indicates that being less affected by the 
business environment is a competitive advantage, but it does not provide 
evidence of its prominence relatively to the easier access to foreign inputs, for 
example. Moreover, the interviewee related that Embraer is heavily exposed to 
foreign markets, being under intense competition and relying on a worldwide 
scale of production of its parts and for its final demand. This is thus a 
confirmation of the previous statements that the most important determinants 
for industrial competitiveness for Brazilian firms would be the business 
environment and scale of production (both for its final goods and for its inputs, 
what is another way to view the importance of accessing better and cheaper 
imported inputs); 
 Regarding R&D incentives, the overall opinion is that there are reasonably good 
instruments in place, being two of them explicitly mentioned by several 
respondents: "lei do bem" and Embrapii. Part of those who praised the current 
system of R&D incentives also said that sectoral industrial policies for R&D are 
unnecessary and even counterproductive; 
 Labour productivity is controversial: some argue there is no productivity 
problem or skills shortage within firms, while others say there is.  
 
 
Overall conclusions 
 
These partial results need to be analysed in conjunction, to extract more meaningful 
insights, and to eventually solve contradictions. This analysis will also make use of the 
insights brought by the literature review and by the case study presented in the 
previous chapter 4. 
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According to the interviews, confirming a vast theoretical and empirical literature, scale 
is the single most important factor for competitiveness in the automotive sector.  
 
One of the main questions raised by the literature is if scale is promoted by trade 
protection or trade liberalization. It is straightforward to build a theoretical model 
showing that trade protection can allow the survival of more firms and sectors within 
the protected domestic market. This would imply more scale of production for more 
sectors and firms that would not even exist under free trade. On the other hand, free 
trade could promote specialization and thus much larger scale of production for some 
sectors and firms. This, of course, comes at the expense of the dying sectors and 
firms. The literature, however, adds more complex issues, such as the degree of 
importance of the existence of domestic suppliers to allow for the emergence of 
sectors and firms (potential positive impact), and also the costs implied by mandatory 
purchases of costly domestic inputs (potential negative impact). These considerations 
are related to the consequences of trade protection in terms of specialization and 
scale. Interviews showed a consistent line of argument favouring more specialization. 
it seems that a focus on specific models, technologies, or stages of value chains, could 
promote dynamic gains in terms of competitiveness and growth. 
 
Moreover, although the domestic market is relatively big, it has two main factors 
reducing this overall scale: a) poor infrastructure makes more difficult for some 
industries to reap the benefits of the entire Brazilian market, either in terms of potential 
suppliers or in terms of potential buyers; b) the Brazilian market is not big enough to 
counterweight the average scale that is being observed in the global value chains. 
This is a phenomenon that, although not entirely new, is growing in importance.  
 
Although more and better regulation, in terms of standard settings, is needed to 
promote technology adoption and development, the low-income levels of domestic 
demand could be a barrier, unless the investment is mainly focused on foreign 
markets. The domestic market is then clearly both not big enough or specialized 
enough for the required scale to be competitive, and not competitive enough to set 
higher quality and innovation standards. 
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There is also a spread disbelief that traditional industrial policies could help. Instead, 
the interviews point to a more coordinated effort to solve problems in the business 
environment, together with well-calibrated regulation to foster quality and innovation, 
and a well-calibrated trade liberalization to foster scale and productivity gains and 
innovation efforts.   
 
The results from the interviews seems to indicate that the level of protection in Brazil 
is too high. This means that the allocation of productive resources is very inefficient in 
the country. An example of this is the fact that the country produces almost everything, 
apart from the most high-end sectors. Lower protection would make it less profitable 
to invest in some areas, making specialization more compelling. This is clearly 
observed within the automotive sector. Measures of productivity, including from the 
literature and from our exercises, also points to an overall relatively stagnant picture. 
 
So, besides the questions regarding “custo-brasil”, the interviews do not suggest at all 
that protection, at least in the Brazilian case, promote overall scale of production. 
 
In the interviews, it was mentioned that local content requirements should be set at 
levels that do not deviate too much from the scale of production of that good, in the 
country, thus confirming what the literature has to say about the risks of setting too 
high local content requirements. A clear message from the interviews is that Brazil 
should not produce everything, because it simply does not have the required scale to 
do it competitively. Thus, a main policy question is to decide what would be produced 
locally – and what would not. 
 
Interviews also showed that, although the importance of a domestic supply base is 
diminishing, there is a percentage of supplies that need to be sourced domestically, 
both because of costs and strategic considerations. Still according to some responses, 
this domestic base would exist even under free trade. 
 
As discussed in the literature review, some studies suggested that managerial 
activities in Brazil are usually less professional than in comparable countries, and this 
would reflect a relatively higher number of family-owned and smaller firms in Brazil. 
The rationale for the argument that family-owned firms have a weaker performance is 
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that these owners have incentives sometimes dissociated from the firm’s growth and 
modernization. Another strand of the literature reviewed in this thesis argue that in 
Brazil there are too many small firms because of barriers to entry and barriers to exit: 
protection against competition and even the bad business environment provides a 
barrier to entry, while subsidies to operate (tax breaks, access to privileged regulation 
etc) and institutional obstacles to mergers, acquisitions and closing of businesses 
provide barriers to exit. Many aspects of these barriers to entry and barriers to exit 
were confirmed by the interviews.    
 
The interviews are also consistent with the view that production costs are higher than 
in less developed countries, but the quality and innovation are lower than in more 
developed countries.  
 
We also found evidence from interviews that the combination of protection (thus, less 
competition from abroad and thus a domestic equilibrium with higher prices, allowing 
less efficient firms to survive) and a structure of incentives that make mergers and 
acquisitions difficult generates a high number of small, family-owned, less productive 
and less innovative firms in Brazil. Thus, not only trade protection, but also entry and 
exit barriers in general, could be contributing to deter productivity and innovation.  
 
Protection – not only trade tariffs, but also subsidies - seems to allow for the survival 
of inefficient firms, but the bad business environment, with institutional problems that 
make mergers, acquisitions and the closing of firms difficult, also contribute to the 
situation. The way forward for Brazil would be to improve its business environment 
and to provide right incentives for innovation, channelled to the production of goods or 
models where the country has some comparative advantage or higher scale of 
production.  
 
Sectoral industrial policies and incentives for R&D are then seen as secondary factors: 
they can be important and help, but without addressing the main problems related to 
business environment, industrial policies and incentives have very low effectiveness. 
However, among the types of industrial policies and incentives the most effective 
strategy is the one that generates public goods, scale, and coordination, setting 
guidelines and regulations to allow for firms to plan years ahead. Thus, examples of 
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suggested policies would be: promotion of more traditional clusters; more R&D 
partnerships with research institutions; interactions between the government and the 
private sector to identify and solve bottlenecks, in a transparent way; discussion and 
elaboration of consensus legislation and regulation with a long-term view. Moreover, 
attention is needed for the smaller firms, that are somehow out of the current system 
of support and incentives. As these firms lack the representative power that bigger 
firms have, it would be important to set up special channels for these smaller firms to 
access and to be contacted by the Government.  
 
Because most (but not all) of the responses blaming the business environment came 
from the Industry, we need to take this with a pint of salt. They have all the incentives 
to blame the Government or ask for better conditions, instead of focusing on the 
potentially excessive structure of protection against foreign competition. However, the 
sheer number of mentions to “custo-Brasil”, and the details provided to exemplify 
different aspects of it, suggests this is indeed one of the causes for the low 
competitiveness of the Brazilian automotive sector. And it is important to note that 
government officials also acknowledged this.  
 
In this sense, there was also suggested that lower levels of trade protection would 
provide the necessary push to move these agenda on business environment, and, on 
the other hand, a better business environment can shape dynamic comparative 
advantages, working together with the structure of protection.  
 
According to the interviews, confirming a vast theoretical and empirical literature, scale 
is the single most important factor for competitiveness in the automotive sector. The 
interviews also suggested that the technological gap in the Brazilian auto sector is 
increasing, and production in Brazil is at lower quality standards. 
 
Automakers have plants distributed around the world with different scales, but R&D is 
concentrated in developed countries, where these multinationals usually come from.  
Although in the last decade we saw an intensification in the transferring of production 
from developed countries towards large developing countries, the overall picture is of 
excess capacity worldwide. Interviews and data confirmed the most important factors 
for investment decisions within the automotive sector: existence of potential for scale 
219 
 
(mainly from the domestic market and trade agreements); the availability of good 
suppliers and technical expertise; productivity and production costs; the overall 
structure of protection; and the overall business environment.  
 
Interviews also suggested that faster technological progress reduces the scope for 
trade protection, as it increases the risks of lagging behind. This is not to say industrial 
policy should not use tariffs, but responses indicated that other measures are less 
risky and potentially more effective. These can be seen collectively as improvements 
in the business environment.  
   
The contradictory responses about labour productivity and also the survival of 
inefficient firms can be understood as a result of firm heterogeneity in the sector:  
labour productivity within some firms are world-class, while within others it is not. On 
the same token, management quality probably has huge variations among Brazilian 
firms. The effect of trade protection on the survival of Brazilian firms is theoretically 
sound, and the existence of institutional problems also affecting this result is also well-
known and acceptable within Brazil. 
 
The distribution of production worldwide follows two main patterns: investments 
seeking to explore a domestic market, and investments seeking to use that market as 
an export platform. The literature also identifies that labour costs are losing importance 
as a driver for cost-competitiveness. As developing countries traditionally have lower 
labour costs as one of its key advantages, the falling in its importance may represent 
a drag in investment plans directed to developing countries in the future. This could 
counteract the vastly recorded migration of automotive investments towards the 
biggest developing countries, even if these are driven by the intention to explore that 
domestic market.  The existence of a domestic supply base is arguably also losing 
importance, as supply is becoming increasingly global (thanks to global platforms 
increasing average scale). But the debate regarding the consequences of having a 
less dense economy is still on top of the policymaking agenda. In this sense, it is 
recommended to provide a comparison of Brazil and an economy that followed the 
integration in GVC path, such as Mexico, and the other main automotive producers. 
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In the interviews, it was mentioned that LCRs should be set at levels that do not deviate 
too much from the scale of production of that good, in the country, thus confirming 
what the literature has to say about the risks of setting too high local content 
requirements. A clear message from the interviews is that Brazil should not produce 
everything, because it simply has not the required scale to do it competitively. Thus, a 
main policy question is to decide what would be produced locally – and what would 
not. This question is related to the previous discussion about the existence of 
inefficient firms within the Brazilian automotive sector. To provide insights to this, we 
need to take a close look at the heterogeneity of autopart firms, analysing firm-level 
data.  
 
According to the literature, specialization (fostered by trade liberalization) allows more 
participation into GVCs, and this could generate more exports. One potential 
alleviating factor under the heavy protectionist Brazilian structure is the “ex-tarifario” - 
temporary tariff reductions for capital and IT goods. But this system is depicted as not 
efficient, by some interviewees.  
 
The “GVC framework” gives a clue on how to upgrade “segments” within the current 
value chains, in a more “static” approach, while the “industrial policy framework” 
usually tries to discover how to upgrade all industrial sectors that may have a dynamic 
comparative advantage. This is one of the main discussions of the thesis: our 
hypothesis is that the benefits of engaging in GVCs would rise if you really need to 
use more imported inputs. And you need to use more imported inputs when scale is 
important and when technological progress is relatively fast. A usual colorary in the 
GVC literature is that participation in GVCs can provide a growth opportunity for 
developing countries, through either the upgrading of their industry; the increase of its 
scale; or the gains from specialization.  
 
There are major suppliers that operate globally, and these companies are gaining 
importance in R&D within the sector, sometimes even surpassing automakers. 
Moreover, countries still compete for investments from the multinationals, using 
policies that sometimes go against WTO rules. As the main R&D activities are located 
near the headquarters of the multinationals, there is a reduced scope for technological 
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spillovers within developing countries. The most important externality would be in the 
form of employment and learning by doing.  
 
Contrasting the automotive sector with Embraer, it was said that the aeronautical 
sector is less affected by the business environment (it does not have to face the same 
transport infrastructure problems, and it benefits from lower taxation, as an exporter) 
and it can import inputs in an easier way. As such, the interview with Embraer does 
indicate that being less affected by the business environment is a competitive 
advantage, but it does not provide evidence of its prominence relatively to the easier 
access to foreign inputs, for example. Moreover, the interviewee related that Embraer 
is heavily exposed to foreign markets, being under intense competition and relying on 
a worldwide scale of production of its parts and for its final demand. This is thus a 
confirmation of the previous statements that the most important determinants for 
industrial competitiveness for Brazilian firms would be the business environment and 
scale of production (both for its final goods and for its inputs, what is another way to 
view the importance of accessing better and cheaper imported inputs); 
 
These results are assuming the maintenance of the current paradigm where we have 
automakers buying autoparts from suppliers and selling vehicles to consumers. 
However, this paradigm is likely to change to a market where automakers could 
become providers of transport services, instead of selling products. Moreover, industry 
4.0 technologies have the potential to drastically alter the geography of investment 
and production worldwide.      
 
As industry 4.0 technologies evolve, investment costs and optimal scale tend to be 
reduced, thus potentially intensifying the speed of changes in production location. 
Moreover, the existence of a domestic supply base is also losing importance, as the 
existence of global vehicle-model platforms allow for the concentration of suppliers at 
the world level, with increasing scale. In this fast-evolving scenario, technology can be 
developed or adopted more easily where there is a better business environment. 
 
The interviews suggest that a faster pace of technology can make harder for industries 
that are not connected to the technological frontier to follow through.  
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We could see this trend as an evidence that the technology development is increasing 
the gap between leading and lagged countries: developing countries are competing 
for “failing” industries, with ever lower value-added, while developed countries are 
competing for the “frontier” industries, with much higher value-added. However, the 
suggestion by Rodrik (2015) that the reduction of protection left developing countries 
exposed and lead them to premature deindustrialization is much more controversial. 
This is because, as suggested by the author, comparative advantages in 
manufacturing made the difference for Asian countries. Thus, if you do not have such 
comparative advantages you will need to catch-up faster. The revolving question is 
then how to promote a faster catch-up in a world with a faster technology growth? 
Protecting or integrating with the potential sources of technology?     
 
Technology is viewed as a factor that makes protection even riskier, as the 
technological frontier is moving faster and any step disconnecting the domestic market 
from this frontier could led to a much more difficult catch-up in the future. This result 
is also of particular importance for this thesis. 
 
Combining the result that protection is damaging the competitiveness of Brazilian 
industry, with the result that technology is making protection even riskier, it is not a 
surprise that virtually all respondents suggested that Brazil should engage in a trade 
liberalization process. However, because of the “custo-brazil”, the country should do 
it in a controlled manner, mainly through regional trade agreements – and together 
with a reduction of the “custo-brasil”. Without reducing custo-brasil and promoting a 
corresponding trade liberalization the prospects for the competitiveness of the 
Brazilian industry is quite negative. 
 
The view that bottleneck-coordination activities and clusters are the best way to go is 
also compelling. In a developing country, with so many constraints to growth and 
innovation, it doesn`t come as a surprise that that single-targeted and fixed policies 
are ineffective. To tackle the vast number of problems it is necessary to start with the 
ones that are limiting the most, and then evolving to other problems that become 
clearer during the process. It is not simply a comprehensive package of measures, 
with priorities, but one that evolves along time according to the solution of the previous 
problems.  
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A survey conducted by the National Industry Confederation (CNI, 2018), with its 
associates, concluded that trade barriers negatively affecting competition, and this is 
negatively affecting Brazilian competitiveness. “Brazil has the second largest average 
trade tariff on goods imports, of 12.08% in 2016, only behind India, with 12.91%. The 
tariffs are much higher than other countries and its negative effects are dominant”. In 
other words, the Brazilian industrial sector is acknowledging that trade protection in 
the country is too high and reduces competitiveness! 
 
CNI (2018) point to the fact that, from 2006 to 2016, Brazil lagged behind in terms of 
labour productivity in comparison with its 10 most important trade partners, and this 
negatively affects the Brazilian competitiveness both in the domestic and in the foreign 
markets.  CNI (2018) also show that the Brazilian Industry vision of how to become 
competitive and innovative for the medium term (2018 to 2022) highlights the need to 
solve recurrent and old problems. These would be basically education and the so-
called “custo-brasil”. The Brazilian Industry also recognizes the need to develop the 
capabilities needed for the new type of industry that is emerging. These assessments 
are not new. What is now becoming evident is that the Brazilian Industry in general 
believes that solving “custo-brasil” and increasing labour productivity will not be 
enough to make them competitive at the world stage: they are starting to concede that 
more foreign trade is necessary (what potentially means not only more exports, but 
also more imports (CNI, 2018). 
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CHAPTER 6 – QUANTITATIVE DATA AND 
ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter we turn to quantitative data to gain further insights on the relationships 
between trade-related barriers and industrial competitiveness within the Brazilian 
automotive sector. Following the methodology established in chapter “3”, we will: (i) 
build and measure new variables and new data series; (ii) analyse the co-evolution of 
selected secondary and primary data; (iii) derive economic and econometric 
relationships. 
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Interviews pointed to the business environment, the quality of regulation, and the 
structure of protection as potential drivers to changes in scale, competition, innovation, 
factor allocation (intra and intersectoral), productivity, and the consequent impact on 
other productivity components and on the competitiveness. However, to keep the 
present chapter independent from the qualitative one, allowing for the triangulation, as 
explained, we need an independent departure point that guides our choice of variables 
and relationships to be analysed. For this we use theory. As we are mainly interested 
in the relationship among firms, industries and market structures, we use as theoretical 
background the Industrial Organization branch of Economics. 
 
Following the framework developed in chapter 2, and in view of the research 
questions, the main questions this chapter will answer are: how competitive is the 
Brazilian production? What holds it back: lack of scale? High input costs? High taxes? 
High production costs overall, and “custo-Brasil”? Low competition in the domestic 
market and against imports? Poor labour and total factor productivity?  
 
The first subsection builds an entirely new dataset to check how competitive is the car 
production in Brazil, and which are the potential causes for the differences in 
competitiveness among a set of countries. In the second subsection, we calculate and 
explore the evolution of real car prices, a central variable for our analysis, also based 
on a new data set. In the third subsection we analyse the Brazilian domestic 
automotive sector in terms of market structure and related industrial organization 
variables of interest. In the fourth we gather data on the cost structure of automakers 
and of other industrial sectors, in Brazil, to make comparisons and a sensitivity 
analysis to show the potential impact of changes in key variables on profits, and thus 
on cots-competitiveness. In the V subsection we estimate the changes in Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) for the Brazilian automotive sector, gaining further insights on the 
interactions among labour productivity, capital intensity, scale of production and TFP 
from 1996 to 2017. In the last subsection – VI - we run a series of regressions to 
disentangle aspects of the relationships among variables of interest. We provide 
reasons for the chosen models, and a brief explanation of unsuccessful attempts as 
well.  
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This chapter 6 is then divided into the following subsections: 
I – International Comparison of Toyota Corolla prices, using exchange rate 
adjustments, and testing scale, specialization, trade barriers, taxation and business 
environment measures as potential explanatory variables; 
II - Evolution of real prices of cars from 1989 to 2019 and potential explanations; 
III – Industrial organization background, an analysis of the evolution of domestic 
competition and market-power, and inferences about the interactions among 
exchange rate movements, imports, scale, concentration and prices;   
IV – Comparison of cost structures and sensitive analysis: a) comparison of the 
average cost structure for automakers in Brazil in 2017 versus the average cost 
structure of other manufacturing sectors (agricultural machines, motorcycle, 
aeronautical) in Brazil in 2017; b) sensitivity analysis – how performance and 
competitiveness are affected by changes in variables related to: i) trade barriers; ii) 
business environment; iii) scale of production; iv) specialization and labour 
productivity. This analysis can clarify the effects of inputs costs and also of “custo-
Brasil” on different industrial sectors, thus allowing us to estimate its relative 
importance; 
V – Estimation of changes in Total Factor Productivity for the Brazilian automotive 
sector from 1996 to 2017. 
VI- Times series regressions with markups as the dependent variable, both for 
automakers and autopart producers. 
 
6.1 – INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF TOYOTA COROLLA 
PRICES. 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this exercise is to assess the competitiveness of the Brazilian automotive 
production. Usually, the literature use exports as a proxy for competitiveness, but this 
can be misleading, as some countries simply have their production devoted for their 
domestic market, for strategic reasons. In this section we look at final domestic prices 
as a proxy for competitiveness, and then contrast the results with some traditional 
export ratio measures. To be able to compare it properly we chose a car model that is 
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produced in different locations around the world – the Toyota Corolla97, selecting 
similar models and making several adjustments, as explained below.  
 
Prices of Toyota Corolla around the world are available in specialized websites. 
However, the idea that Toyota Corolla is a global platform can be misleading, as, until 
the 11th generation, Corollas have been sold worldwide under different names and 
body shapes. Moreover, prices may differ because of different model specifications, 
market positioning98, and the inclusion of different taxes, fees, and insurances. To 
minimize these potential distortions and to overcome the difficulties in comparing 
different models and names, we engaged in a carefully examination of each chosen 
model and price, choosing models that are as comparable as possible. The research 
included an account of how the 11th generation evolved, how it differs around the 
world, and how is the new 12th generation, that, as explained below, aim to reunify the 
Corolla as a truly single global platform.  
 
The second adjustment is to separate the eventual short-term effects of the exchange 
rates movements on the prices measured in an international currency. Any 
international price comparison is sensitive to the exchange rate of the moment. To 
alleviate this measurement difficulty, we used the market real exchange rate average 
from the last 13 years (2006 to 2018). The calculation is explained in the following 
sections. 
 
The third adjustment is to eliminate from our sample the countries where the Corolla 
plant has a scale of production substantially below the minimum efficient scale of 200 
thousand vehicles per year. Industrial Organization literature points to the existence 
of a minimum viable scale, instead of an optimal scale (thus, we do not set a superior 
limit). According to our interviews, the minimum efficient scale would range from 150 
to 200 thousand cars per year, depending on the production chain arrangements: a 
production with less local content, and more access to inputs within Regional Trade 
Agreements, or with a bigger external economy of scale, resulting from a bigger total 
 
97 Another option would have been to use the Volkswagen Golf. 
98 Pricing and marketing strategies also contribute to different prices around the World. As pointed by 
some of interviewees in chapter 5, price reductions for specific models, time, and market are a way to 
respond to competition and consumer demands. 
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domestic production, for example, can reach the minimum efficient plant scale at a 
lower level.  
 
The fourth adjustment is to deduct sales taxes, aiming to reach a proxy for the ex-
factory prices, and thus deducting the effects of taxes that would be exempt in case of 
exporting. This adjustment will be made only for he models from plants with production 
scale above the minimum efficient threshold. 
  
We do not adjust for differences in dealer`s margins and neither for differences in 
country-specific equipment packages, as we do not have precise data on it for the 
entire sample and we assume they tend to cancel each other: higher dealer`s margins 
are usually seen in developing countries99, while models sold in developed countries 
usually come with a better equipment package.   
 
After the necessary adjustments we can compare consumer selling prices in all 
countries that manufacture a Toyota Corolla (or the same car under another name)100. 
We restricted our comparison list to producing countries because we want to check 
relative production competitiveness in production.  
 
Background information: Toyota`s production strategies and main data 
 
Toyota is the biggest automotive producer in the World, in sales101. It is widely 
acknowledged that the company gained market-share worldwide applying successful 
managerial techniques, including a lean manufacturing idea and efficient quality 
controls, translated into the “Toyota Production System (TPS)”102. Moreover, because 
the company is the biggest in the world, scale gains are secured throughout its global 
value chains. Toyota is consistently among the best performers in terms of operating 
 
99 Based on two interviews (one automaker and one tax specialist with experience in the automotive 
sector) that stated that Corolla is considered a small car for developed markets, where the dealerships` 
markup would be between 5%-15%, while in developing markets, where Corolla is considered a 
medium sized car, and margins need to be higher to compensate for a worse business environment, 
the dealer` markup would be around 10-20%. 
100 We did not include Venezuela, as its production was almost zero in 2018, due to the economic crisis 
faced by the country, and hyperinflation would make impossible to compare prices. 
101 Source: OICA, available at http://www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/2016-statistics/  
102 https://www.toyotauk.com/the-toyota-charitable-trust/lean-approach/ 
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and profit margins103. For the fiscal year ending in March 31st, 2018, Toyota had the 
following main results, with worldwide production and sales, but concentrated in Asia 
and North America (table 1). In fact, almost 50% of Toyota`s production (and 25% of 
sales) comes from Japan, its headquarters and main export base in absolute terms: 
 
Vehicle production and sales: 8,964,000 vehicles  
Net revenues: 29,380,000,000 ¥ 
Operating income: 2,400,000,000 ¥ 
Operating margin (in % of net revenues): 8.2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Toyota`s worldwide production and sales, per region 
Production location Sales location 
Japan: 47.8% Japan: 25.2% 
North America: 21.2% North America: 31.3% 
Asia: 17.9% Asia: 17.2% 
Europe: 7.5% Europe: 10.8% 
Other regions: 5.5% Other regions: 15.5% 
Source: https://www.toyota-global.com/investors/financial_data/high-light.html 
 
In its strategy of increasing scale and reducing costs through shared platforms Toyota 
faces the need to make all Toyotas produced worldwide more similar to each other. 
This is a shift from the previous strategy of trying to adapt products to local markets, 
keeping a few different platforms. The result of the previous strategy is that, for the 
 
103 According to company reports gathered by the specialized finance press, global profit margins for 
the main automakers vary substantially, ranging from near zero to almost 7% annual, on average, in 
the last decade. An average of around 4% annual is somehow representative. By the same token, the 
average operating margins would be around 5% annual, lower than the average for Toyota. 
230 
 
Corolla case, for example, there are different models in different markets104. The 
upcoming 12th generation of Corolla will be based in the Toyota`s New Global 
Architecture (TNGA) set of global platforms. As explained in the specialized press, 
“The outgoing 11th-generation is actually three different cars on three different 
platforms. That finally changes with the introduction of the Corolla hatchback that hits 
U.S. showrooms this summer. It is the lead model for a new family of Corollas, 
including an upcoming sedan and wagon, that will all be based off the same completely 
re-engineered global platform”105. The text further confirms that “Migrating all versions 
of the Corolla to the Toyota New Global Architecture platform is an important evolution 
for the compact. It will help build brand value and marketing power and simplify product 
engineering as well as help achieve better economies of scale. But it also is testing 
Toyota's manufacturing acumen by requiring the company to quickly convert all 16 of 
its Corolla plants worldwide to the TNGA production setup”106. 
 
Moreover, the names adopted varied, as well the body type (sedan/saloon; hatchback; 
narrow body). The sedan/saloon is based on the platform E170 (2,700mm wheelbase); 
while the hatchback uses the E180 platform (2,600 mm wheelbase) and a narrower 
sedan107 that uses the E160 platform (2,600 mm wheelbase). The names are quite 
diverse, including “Auris”, “Corolla”, “Altis”, “Levin” etc. The new TNGA platform will 
unify the currently different ones, and the new models will also share the “Corolla” 
name, globally108109110. According to the Toyota website, the Toyota New Global 
Architecture will comprise four segments. In the C-segment, the new Corolla (TNGA 
E210) will have 2,700 mm and 2,639 mmm for sedan and hatchback, 
respectively111112.  
 
 
104 According to the information gathered in specialized magazines, Corolla used to share the same 
platform worldwide before 2011, but the 11th generation (presented in 2012) of Corolla changed this 
pattern.  
105 https://autoweek.com/article/car-news/2019-toyota-corolla-goes-global#ixzz5Yo6PmE7X 
106 https://autoweek.com/article/car-news/2019-toyota-corolla-goes-global#ixzz5Yo6waY8F 
107 Intended for the Japanese, Hong Kong, Sri Lanka and Macau markets, due to size governmental 
regulations and incentives.  
108 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toyota_Corolla_(E210) 
109 https://www.toyota-global.com/company/profile/facilities/ 
110 https://www.toyota-global.com/company/vision_philosophy/toyota_production_system/ 
111 https://www.toyota-global.com/company/profile/facilities/ 
112 https://www.toyota-global.com/company/vision_philosophy/toyota_production_system/ 
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Toyota has assembly plants for Corolla in the following countries: Brazil; Canada; 
China; United Kingdom; Venezuela; India; Japan; Pakistan; South Africa; Taiwan; 
Thailand; Turkey; and the United States.  However, production of the new hatchback, 
started in June 2018, and of the new sedan and wagon, expected for 2019, will be 
held initially at the following plants113114115:  
 Japan: Toyota, Aichi (Takaoka plant) 
 China: Guangzhou (GAC Toyota); Tianjin (FAW Toyota) 
 United Kingdom: Burnaston 
 Turkey: Sakarya 
 United States: Blue Springs, Mississippi (TMMMS); Huntsville, Alabama 
 
Models and prices per country 
 
In the appendix we provide details about each model we chose as a valid comparator, 
for each country. As a general rule, we chose sedan E-170 models, but for the markets 
where these are not produced, we chose the most similar, as the hatchback E-180 
(usually around 10% more expensive, in markets were both options are available). 
The engine sizes and trims were also chosen to be the most similar possible. In this 
sense we chose the cheapest model with automatic gearbox, petrol, and engine size 
between 1.6 and 1.8 litres.  
 
As we are interested in comparing cost-competitiveness across countries, we ideally 
would use export prices for Corollas. These export prices would be exempt of indirect 
taxes not charged in exports. However, as this data is not available, we need to use a 
proxy based on retail prices. For this to be useful we need to identify the sales taxes 
charged in each country and verify if the retail price is inclusive or not of these taxes.  
We recognize the limitation of this exercise and thus results should be taken with a 
pinch of salt.  
 
As an example, the table 2 below analyses in detail the tax structure for car 
manufacturing in Brazil: 
 
113 https://www.toyota-global.com/investors/financial_data/high-light.html 
114 https://www.toyota-global.com/company/vision_philosophy/toyota_production_system/ 
115 https://www.toyota-global.com/company/profile/facilities/ 
232 
 
 
Table 2 – An example of the taxation incurred by a car in Brazil 
Retail price: R$ 77,000.00 
Dealer`s margin: R$ 7,000.00 
Invoice price to the dealer: R$ 70,000.00 
Cost to manufacture: R$ 40,000.00 
IPI (13% on the total cost to manufacture): R$ 5,200.00 
ICMS (18% on the total cost to manufacture): R$ 7,200.00 
PIS and COFINS (1.65% + 7.6% on the gross revenue): R$ 6,475.00 
Sum of IPI, ICMS, PIS and COFINS, paid by the automaker: R$ 18,875.00 
Gross profit by the automaker: R$ 70,000.00 – R$ 40,000.00 – R$ 18,875.00 = R$ 
11,125.00 
Income tax (25% on gross profits): R$ 2,781.00 
Net profits: R$ 8,344.00  
Export price: R$ 30,000.00 + international freight 
Source: Author`s calculation 
 
Thus, Toyota Brazil could export a car that it sells domestically for R$ 70,000.00, for 
as low as R$ 30,000.00 plus freight. Each country has a different tax structure. For a 
country with very high tax rates the retail price will hide a greater part of its 
competitiveness. Different profit margins in the domestic market – both for the 
automakers and for the dealers - can also make an important difference.  
 
Further details about sales taxes; and delivery, processing and handling fees is 
explained in the notes for each case. No optional accessory is included.  
 
 
Adjustments 
 
We converted the prices in domestic currencies in 01/12/2018, using market exchange 
rates. However, this market exchange rate may be biased, because of some 
conjunctural factor affecting the exchange rate at that time. Therefore, we setup a 
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procedure to minimize potential conjunctural discrepancies in the market exchange 
rates, using the average real (constant) exchange rate from 2006 to 2018. 
 
This adjustment provides a clear account for our main concern: the possibility that the 
market exchange rate used in the moment of the price comparison be under or 
overvalued in relation to its long-term average because of conjunctural/short-term 
factors (such as, for example, an economic crisis or a sudden influx of capital). 
 
We transform the annual average nominal exchange rates of national currencies per 
U.S. dollar into constant values using the consumer price index, both provided by the 
International Financial Statistics/IMF. For 2018, most data are updated up to 
November, and we work out the 2018 average as usual. When data is less updated 
(to the first, second or third quarter of 2018) we calculate a linear extrapolation of the 
previous changing rate. As there is no consumer price index data at the IMF for 
Taiwan116 we use instead the National Statistics Bureau of Taiwan as data source.   
 
The average exchange rate is calculated summing the annual period average of the 
exchange rate at constant values, from 2006 to 11/2018117, and them dividing the 
result by 13, the number of years: 
 
 
116 “Taiwan, China, is not listed as a separate country for World Development Indicators. For most 
indicators, Taiwan, China, data is not added to the data for China, but Taiwan, China, is added to the 
world aggregate and the high-income countries aggregate. There are some exceptions”. Source: 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114933-where-are-your-data-on-taiwan 
117 Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS)      
http://data.imf.org/?sk=388DFA60-1D26-4ADE-B505-A05A558D9A42 
http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61545862 
http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61545861 
Source: National Statistics Bureau - Taiwan 
https://eng.stat.gov.tw/point.asp?index=2 
234 
 
Table 3 – Corolla prices 
 
 
The adjustments by the average exchange rate provide a more accurate perspective 
of the price differences among our sample. The chart below presents the prices 
(before the sales tax deduction) using each of the two exchange rates used. There we 
see, for example, that the December 2018 exchange rate against the U.S. dollar (the 
blue circle dot) for Turkey, Brazil and the UK are undervalued relative to its 13-years 
average (the orange square dot).  The Turkish case is the most pronounced in our 
sample. Thus, if we adopt the nominal current exchange rate, a Corolla in Turkey 
would seem much cheaper (around 21,000 dollars) than if we adopt the average 
exchange rate for the same price conversion (around 27,000 dollars). These exchange 
rate differences are in line with the fact that Brazil and Turkey experienced recent 
economic downturns and political uncertainty. This last reason also applies to the UK, 
after the Brexit vote.  
 
It is important to notice that the E-180 platform is usually 10% more expensive than 
the E-170. In the sample, the E-180 platform is used by Japan and by the UK. In this 
Country
Corolla price, in domestic currency, on 
01/12/2018, with sales taxes included         
(A)
Nominal exchange rate to the 
US dollar, on 01/12/2018               
(B)
Corolla price converted to 
nominal US dollars on 
01/12/2018                         
( C = A/B)
Average of real (constant) 
market exchange rates 
(2006-2018)                    
(D)
Corolla price converted by 
the average constant 
exchange rate                     
(E = A/D)
Canada $25.031,00 1,3280 $18.848,64 1,2584 $19.891,06
China ¥119.800,00 6,9540 $17.227,49 7,8973 $15.169,72
Pakistan Rs 2.674.000,00 140,1990 $19.072,89 138,7848 $19.267,24
Japan ¥2.138.000,00 113,5640 $18.826,39 106,6194 $20.052,64
Turkey ₺110.000,00 5,2140 $21.097,05 3,9889 $27.576,52
Taiwan NT$656.000 30,8670 $21.252,47 33,2268 $19.743,10
USA $22.135,00 1,0000 $22.135,00 1,1168 $19.819,41
Brazil R$ 90.990,00 3,8670 $23.529,87 3,3992 $26.767,71
South Africa R330.000,00 13,8680 $23.795,79 13,4601 $24.516,96
India ₹ 1.788.000,00 69,7100 $25.649,12 80,1229 $22.315,73
Thailand ฿869.000 32,9740 $26.354,10 36,4480 $23.842,18
UK £21.520,00 0,7900 $27.240,51 0,7217 $29.818,10
Vietnam 733.000.000 ₫ 23.317,6320 $31.435,44 28.341,0787 $25.863,52
Sources: (1) Corolla prices from dealers price l ists at national Toyota websites; (2) exchange rate raw data and consumer price indexes for al l  countries from the IMF, except the Consumer Price Index for Taiwan, 
sourced from the Taiwanese Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics.
Adjustments and calculations by the author, as explained in the text. Prices includes freitgh, when this  information is  available
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sense, if we deduct this 10% from the UK price, we would have the British and the 
Turkish model as approximately equally expensive.  
 
Graph 1 – Corolla prices, converted into U.S. dollars using nominal 
December/2018 and 13-years average constant exchange rates 
 
 
On the other hand, China, the USA, India, Thailand, and mainly Vietnam seem to have 
an overvalued exchange rate, vis a vis its own long-term average.  
 
However, although it is necessary to adjust for potential conjunctural misalignments of 
the exchange rates, the use of an averaged measure has also its potential drawbacks:  
 
(i) One potential problem is that it is possible for the long-term average 
exchange rate to be either undervalued or overvalued, against other metrics 
or timespans. In our sample, this may be the case of Vietnam, as explained 
further in this section; 
(ii) Another potential source of measurement problem is that exchange rate 
variations can be buffered by profit margins. If this is the case, a calculation 
using the average exchange rate would not take into account eventual 
reductions or increases in the profit margins as a response to that exchange 
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rate movement (as this averaged exchange rate is calculated but was not 
observed in the real world). Thus, it is plausible to assume that the price 
change, in dollars, resulting from an exchange rate equal to the average 
exchange rate, would be smaller than our calculation. For example: as 
already showed, the Brazilian Corolla price tag was around 23.5 thousand 
dollars in December 2018, using the exchange rate of that time. An eventual 
regression towards the 13-years-mean would imply a price around 27 
thousand dollars, also accordingly our calculations. However, as this long-
term average exchange rate implies a more valued Brazilian currency, and 
thus a costlier Brazilian Corolla, Toyota would probably try to counteract this 
exchange rate movement. The company could do this by reducing its profit 
margins to do not pass through the entire price increase resulting from the 
exchange rate movement; 
(iii)  In a similar way, although a currency appreciation against the dollar can 
increase the tag price of the domestic final good, it can also make imported 
inputs cheaper. The net effect on costs, and then on prices, is potentially 
smaller than the exchange rate movement. 
 
Another potential measure would be to use Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange 
rates. This adjustment would allow us to convert domestic prices into a common 
currency (chosen to be the US dollar) using the implied exchange rate that would make 
average prices in each pair of countries the same. The rationale behind the purchasing 
power parity is that, in equilibria, prices for any tradable good would be the same, 
when converted by the PPP exchange rate. This is a generalization of the Law of one 
price: one dollar in Geneva should by the same apple as one dollar in New York, 
otherwise someone would move or import the good from the cheapest country118. 
Obviously, this hypothesis is only valid in a world free of transaction costs 
(transportation costs, tariffs, taxes) and in absence of effects from non-tradables (cost 
of services involved in the selling of the apple, for example).  
 
Despite the unrealistic assumption of the existence of a comparable basket of goods 
(same goods, with the same quality) and the absence of transaction costs and 
 
118 Until there would be no arbitrage opportunity left.  
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restrictions (tariffs, transport costs, barriers to competition…), average PPP exchange 
rates could provide a good approximation of the true purchasing power of different 
currencies, when converted to other currencies. It would be then a way to make values 
expressed in different currencies more “comparable”, reflecting an equilibria long-term 
exchange rate implied by the law of one price.  However, it is expected that exchange 
rates converge to PPP values only in the long-term and provided relative income levels 
also converge. Therefore, PPP values could only be a rough approximation of what 
would be the “long-run” exchange rate. Moreover, the fact that PPP values are usually 
calculated using a vast number of non-tradable goods and services make these 
measurements not entirely suitable as an exchange rate determinant. Because of this, 
PPP values are usually used to measure the size of economies, providing a better 
account of differences in countries` GDPs, instead of being an equilibria exchange 
rate predictor.  Thus, PPP values of vehicles would be more suitable to measure the 
purchasing power of the citizens in that market.  
 
Regarding the minimum efficient scale, we initially applied our minimum range of 150 
to 200 thousand vehicles per year, for a given plant, and then look at the scale at 
model level – the production of Corollas in that plant119.  
 
The scale data for the entire sample was: 
 
 
 
 
 
119 We could also take into account a proxy for the external economies of scale (total domestic 
production, for all cars) and also the extent of Regional Trade Agreements for each country, but this 
would bring an excessive discretionary level to the analysis, in an unnecessary way for our purposes.  
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Table 4 – Scale at model and plant level 
 
 
Countries below the minimum efficient scale at plant level: Pakistan; Taiwan; South 
Africa and Vietnam. Among these, Vietnam also shows a very small production of 
Corollas. Among the countries that show a plant level scale above the minimum 
efficient point, India presents a very small production of Corollas. Therefore, taking 
into consideration the scale at model and at plant level, we will withdraw the following 
countries from our sample: Vietnam, Pakistan, Taiwan, and India. We will keep South 
Africa in the sample, despite its low scale, because it is an example of a Corolla 
producer that is similar to Brazil in terms of geographical distance to the main global 
value chains and consumer markets.  
 
We then estimated the sales taxes applied to each country in our subsample, for the 
specific model into consideration (table 5). It is important to note that the World Trade 
Organization does not allow the exemption of direct taxes120 linked to export targets 
 
120 Annex I (Illustrative List of Export Subsidies), in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures:  
“(e) The full or partial exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes(58) or 
Country
Scale at model level: total production of 
Corollas, Auris and Levin, in 2018
Scale at plant level¹ (Corolla plant) 
units
Canada 188.710 572.000
China FAW 371.525 536.000
China GAC 200.118 599.000
Pakistan 53.998 61.000
Japan 156.984 397.000
Turkey 59.102 280.000
Taiwan 48.948 118.000
USA 136.240 164.000
Brazil 79.432 198.000
South Africa 18.797 129.000
India 3.345 154.000
Thailand 38.826 524.000
UK 131.850 145.000
Vietnam² 2.500 41.000
¹ China has two plants producing Corollas: FAW and GAC (this produces it under the name Levin). The total production is around 1,1 mill ion 
vehicles per year. We then considered it separately. Japan has two plants producing Corollas, but the version comparable with the other 
countries is the Corolla Sport. Therefore we use only this plant in our exercise.
²Estimated on the basis of news from various websites. 
³For Japan and the UK, the production includes the Corolla hatchback sometimes called Auris.
Sources: Automotive Industry Portal - Marklines; Toyota worldwide website; Toyota automakers in each country.
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or to domestic content in exports. However, indirect taxes can be exempted from 
exports, a practice followed by all countries listed in this exercise. 
 
Table 5 – Sale taxes applied to the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises.(59)” Source: 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm_03_e.htm#fnt-58 
Country Taxes and rates Total implied sales taxes
Canada GST (5%) included in the HST (13%)* 13%
China VAT (17%), Purchasing tax (10%), and CT (5%) 35%
Japan Acquisition tax (3%) and JCT (8%) 11%
Turkey VAT (18%) and SCT (45%) 71%
USA Total VAT (local and state): 8.87% 9%
Brazil ICMS (12%)+IPI(13%)+PIS/COFINS (9.25%) 33%
South Africa VAT (14%) 14%
Thailand VAT (7%) + excise tax (10%) 18%
UK VAT (20%) 20%
Sources: 
Price Waterhouse Coopers - Global  Automotive Tax Guide. November 2018. Available at: https://www.pwc.de/de/automobil industrie/2018-pwc-global-automotive-tax-guide.pdf
ACEA tax guide 2018. Available at: https://www.acea.be/uploads/news_documents/ACEA_Tax_Guide_2018.pdf
KPMG tax rates onl ine:https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online.html
EY Worldwide VAT, GST and sales tax guide – 2018:
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_Worldwide_VAT,_GST_and_Sales_Tax_Guide_2018/%24File/Worldwide%20VAT,%20GST%20and%20Sales%20Tax%20Guide%202018.pdf
Research on dealer`s websites, specialized press, and governamental bodies.
Notes: 
Taxes on vehicle ownership are only considered in the table - and thus deducted from the calculated retail  prices - if this is attached to the retail price
 and paid at the purchase moment. The calculations on the percentage size of sales taxes on the final sale price are approximated and for the most 
 general rates applied. It does not include rebates, exemptions and any special law requirement regarding goods and firm specificities, as well  eventual
 interactions with other taxes.
Some rates varies accordingly to the region, state or city. As an example, we assumed the rate for Ontario, Canada; New York, for the USA; and Sao Paulo for Brazil .
When i t was not clear how the different taxes were aplied - if cumulatively or not - we just added the diferent taxes as they were not cumulative.
*HST includes GST (apart from Quebec, where there is the GST (5%) plus the QST (9,97%).
Taxes imposed on sales to final consumers, at the domestic market
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Results 
 
The table below presents the main results. Brazil, for example, has a price tag of 90 
thousand Brazilian Reais for a Corolla (as depicted in the previous sections). This, 
converted by the market exchange rate at 01/12/2018, would be the equivalent to 23.5 
thousand US dollars. On the other hand, the domestic price converted by the average 
of the constant market exchange rates in the last 13 years would be approximately 27 
thousand dollars. The table also brings an estimative of sales tax applied for 
production from countries that reached the minimum efficient scale threshold, as 
discussed before. After examining which ones were already in the tag price or not, we 
discounted this from the retail prices, as we are interested in a proxy for the cost to 
produce the car in that country. It is a very heroic exercise and by no means we intend 
to provide a measure of real sales taxation.  
 
It is important to note that differences due to freight, trims and dealer`s margins are 
not taken into account.  
 
Scale measures were calculated using two different levels: model (Corollas); and plant 
(Toyota plant were the Corolla is manufactured).  
  
Table 6 – Corolla prices and scale 
 
 
 
Country
Corolla price converted 
by the average constant 
exchange rate              
Corolla price converted by the 
average constant exchange 
rate, net of sales taxes              
Scale at model level: 
total production of 
Corollas in 2018
Scale at plant level 
(Corolla plant) units
Canada $19.891,06 $17.602,71 188.710 572.000
China FAW $15.169,72 $11.236,83 371.525 536.000
China GAC $15.169,72 $11.236,83 200.118 599.000
Japan $20.052,64 $18.065,44 156.984 397.000
Turkey $27.576,52 $18.023,87 59.102 280.000
USA $19.819,41 $18.182,95 136.240 164.000
Brazil $26.767,71 $20.126,10 79.432 198.000
South Africa $24.516,96 $21.506,10 18.797 129.000
Thailand $23.842,18 $20.205,24 38.826 524.000
UK $29.818,10 $24.848,42 131.850 145.000
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Graph 2 – Adjusted-price and scale at model level 
 
 
The results show a very strong negative relationship between prices and scale at 
model level (graph 2). In this case, Brazil seems to be close to the trend line, indicating 
the prices in the country are relatively as expected given its scale121. As we explained 
before, the UK produces a platform that is on average 10% more expensive than the 
one produced by the other countries in the table (with the exception of Japan). 
However, even considering this, its costs are far higher than what would be justifiable 
by its scale.  
 
At plant level (in other words, total scale of production of the factory where Corolla is 
produced, including other models) the picture (graph 3) is different: 
 
 
121 Scale of production is pointed by our reviewed literature as the main explanatory variable for the 
production costs. There are, however, different measures of scale applicable to the automotive sector:  
• at the vehicle/production line level; 
• at the factory level;  
• at the firm level; 
• at the country level (as a proxy for external economies of scale); and 
• at the regional level (if countries are sufficiently integrated, both by physical infrastructure and 
by trade agreements). 
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Graph 3 – Adjusted-price and scale at plant level 
 
 
At plant level there is still a trendline that relates more scale with less prices – and 
therefore less costs, according to our assumptions. However, in this case, the USA 
shows more competitiveness than expected by the trendline, while Thailand and 
Canada show a relatively more expensive price and cost. Brazil remans at the 
trendline. 
 
One important note is that there can be several taxes applied throughout the domestic 
production value chain that are not fully deducted when the vehicle is exported. This 
is a recurrent complaining among Brazilian automakers, but we did not assess these 
eventual differentials in our exercise, and it is expected that other countries face similar 
problems with their own tax credit and refund systems.    
 
Scale also can influence costs through the scale of the autopart producing 
domestically. In this sense, we tend to see a more developed autopart industries in 
countries with a higher measure of country-level scale (proxy for external economies 
of scale) and/or, alternatively, in countries with regional trade agreements with 
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important partners122. Within our sample, we would expect efficiency gains from 
regional sourcing mainly for the Asian producers: China, Japan and Thailand. On the 
other hand, Brazil and South Africa are relatively isolated from global supply chains 
and the main consumer markets.   
 
To better understanding the dynamics that brought Brazilian costs and prices to the 
pictured levels we analyse the car price evolution in Brazil, and the domestic market 
structure, on sections II and III respectively. As we will see, car prices in Brazil were 
much higher in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Conclusions from this section 
 
We infer that Toyota`s decision to change strategy (making models more similar 
worldwide)123 could be a result of two different reasons: a) scale is becoming even 
more important; b) demand and tastes are becoming more similar across the world. 
 
Retail prices for Toyota Corolla, in November 2018, among all countries that produces 
the car, converted by the exchange rate valid on 1st December 2018, Brazil would be 
around the middle of the sample, with a price tag equivalent to 23.529 US dollars. If 
 
122 In fact, a myriad of factors can affect the optimal scale of production. As examples of these factors 
we cite: 
• the degree of participation in global or regional value chains; 
• the level of local content; 
• the number of production phases undertaken; 
• the degree of technological spillovers, availability of specialized labour, and availability and cost 
of inputs. These factors are part of the Marshalian economies of scale: suppliers; knowledge spillovers; 
and labour pooling. Since these factors were described by Marshall the underlying mechanisms for 
them to operate has changed. For example, it is acknowledged by the economic literature that 
technological progress in communications and transportation allows technological spillovers to be 
received further away from its geographical source; 
• the technology and materials used;  
• the degree of standardization of the platform/design; 
• the market size or niche; 
• the market structure and degree of market concentration/dominance. Examples are Drucker 
and Faser (2012); Drucker (2011). The conclusion of both studies is that market concentration 
negatively affects the plant-level productivity for the smaller competitors and industry-level employment, 
respectively. Moreover, as pointed by Drucker (2011), following a literature review, large firms usually 
present a higher degree of vertical integration, thus making more difficult for the emergence of 
independent or specialized suppliers. On the other hand, the author also points that specialized 
suppliers tend to favour bigger clients, either supplying them from long distances or locating nearby. 
The result of both facts is that market concentration reduces the availability of specialized supplies to 
smaller competitors. In short, according to the literature reviewed by Drucker (2011), higher market 
concentration makes more difficult the attainment of Marshallian economies of scale.    
123 https://www.toyota-global.com/company/vision_philosophy/toyota_production_system/ 
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we adjust these prices for the 13 years average exchange rate, and for sales tax`s 
differentials, Brazil moves towards the higher price portion of the sample, but it is still 
not on neither extreme.  
 
Taking into consideration only the countries close to the minimum efficient level of 
scale at plant level, in conjunction with an analysis of the scale at model level, Brazil 
seems to be very close to the trend line that relates price and scale.  Therefore, it 
seems that inside the factory, Brazilian competitiveness is relatively well explained by 
its scale. However, once a vehicle departs the factory, transport costs and other types 
of costs related to the business environment can take a toll on this competitiveness. 
These costs are the theme of the next subsection.    
 
 
6.2 - EVOLUTION OF REAL PRICES OF CARS FROM 1989 TO 
2019 AND POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS 
 
A brief note on import tariffs and the trade liberalization in the Brazilian 
automotive sector 
 
Tariffs were elevated in the 1970s and up to 1989 cars and light commercials imports 
were prohibited. There were only minor exceptions, such as for vehicles used by 
foreign diplomats.  Trade liberalization started in 1988 with the lift of several non-tariff 
barriers and a reduction in the tariffs average and standard deviation among tariff lines. 
In 1987 the average ad valorem tariff was 51%, the median 45% and the maximum 
105%. In 1989 these values were lower: 35.5%, 35% and 85%, respectively124. 
 
In 1990 the government ended the prohibition of car imports. Initially, new and used 
cars could be imported, but later in the same year the import of used cars was 
prohibited. According to data from Anfavea, only 115 cars were imported by the 
automakers in 1990, number that jumped to 19.561 cars and 276 light commercials in 
 
124 Data from the Ministry of Trade (MDIC). Available at 
http://www.mdic.gov.br/images/REPOSITORIO/secex/deint/cgam/tec/tabela-e-grafico-da-evolucao-
das-tarifas-nominais-de-importacao-do-brasil-1983-a-2016.pdf 
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1991125. This increase in imports is related to the reduction in tariffs, explained in table 
7. Thus, 1991 can be seen as the first year of real import competition for vehicles. 
 
Table 7 shows the tariffs applied since the ban on car imports was lifted, showing that 
the main reduction took place between 1990 and 1994 (from 85% to 20% tariff). In 
1995 a reversal started, fuelled by balance of payments problems (in 1995 a record of 
364,748 cars and light commercials were imported by Anfavea affiliates). The tariffs 
reached 70%, and later decreased again, to reach the current consolidated level of 
35% in 1999. 
 
Table 7 – Evolution of import tariffs applied to cars and light 
commercials in Brazil 
 
 
Prices 
 
There is a price index for new cars sold in Brazil, covering from July 1989 to the 
present day. It is the IPCA new vehicles, a subindex of the IPCA inflation index. 
However, probably due to the difficulties in collecting comparable vehicle prices in the 
long-term (when models and trims can encompass huge price variations), added to 
 
125 Anuario Anfavea 2018. Available at http://www.anfavea.com.br/anuarios.html 
Start date Nominal import tariff applied
1980s 65%, 85% and 105%*
04/May/1990 85%
15/feb/1991 60%
01/feb/1992 50%
01/october/1992 40%
01/july/1993 35%
01/September/1994 20%
26/December/1994 20%
13/February/1995 32%
30/March/1995 70%
01/January/1997 63%
01/January/1998 49%
01/January/1999 35%
Sources: Several Decress and Resolutions listed in the Annex III.
*Up to 1990 the import of cars were prohibited, with only minor exceptions. The tarif was 85%
 for cars over 100 horse power and 105% for cars over 100 horse power. In 1989 the tariff was reduced to 65%.
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the very high inflation up to 1994, we suspect there are methodological problems in 
this price survey carried on by IBGE. When we deflated this series, using as deflator 
the whole IPCA index, the result is a 74% reduction in real prices between July 1989 
and March 2019. Although several pieces of evidence (some discussed here) point to 
important real price reductions within this period of time, the magnitude showed by the 
IPCA index raises caution. Therefore, to check for the consistency of the data and to 
provide evidence of the behaviour of real car prices in Brazil, we will use three 
complementary data sources and approaches:  
 
a) point data from specific models, available in the specialized press, for some 
years. This data is important to compare prices in the early years of the trade 
liberalization and the data collected allow us to have a clear notion of what 
happened with the same car model, in a time span of 2 years, thus not incurring 
in methodological problems related to different model specifications and also 
being able to cover the immediate period of trade liberalization;  
b)  data from FIPE/University of Sao Paulo, that has a car price index, covering 
prices of new models from January 2001 to the present date. This data does 
not cover the entire period of 1989-2019 but allow us to analyse price changes 
for each model that was manufactured in Brazil in 2001 and was still 
manufactured in 2019. We selected one or two trims of each of these models, 
and were able to gain important information regarding the effects of scale at 
firm level; 
c)  the quotient between total sales value and total vehicles sold, to get a proxy 
for the average sale price of vehicles. This will be adjusted by the market-share 
of vehicles under 1000cm3, as these vehicles are cheaper and pay 
substantially less tax.  
 
IBGE IPCA Index 
 
Monthly car and light commercials real prices oscillated intensively between July 1989 
and July 1994, due to the high inflation experienced by Brazil. After 1994 inflation is 
controlled and real price variation only oscillated heavily in 1999 and 2000. Both 
periods of high fluctuation can generate potentially higher measurement errors. The 
period between oct/1991 and may/1992 is specially worrying in this sense.  
247 
 
 
Graph 4 – Historical monthly real price changes of new cars 
 
 
 
We calculated the real price index for cars and light commercials making June 1989 
=100. As a result, we arrived at an index of 25.68 in January 2019. Thus, in a period 
of 30 years, including the whole period of trade liberalization for cars, we had a real 
price reduction of 74.41%. 
 
The formula for real price variation is:   
 
(1 + 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) = [
1 + 𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
] 
 
The car price nominal change accumulated in the whole period was 300.173.622,56%, 
while the inflation was 1.165.297.330,55% 
 
Graph 5 shows the evolution of the real car price IPCA index. It can be seen that the 
index falls sharply from 1989 to 1995, despite a huge oscillation around 1992. After 
1995 real car prices kept their decreasing trend, but at a smaller pace, with the 
exception of 1999, when real car prices increased. These overall movements can be 
explained by competition with imports: trade liberalization (allowing imports and 
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reducing tariffs) happened between 1989 and 1985. The explanation for the 1999`s 
spike could rest on the exchange rate devaluation of that year, that reached 50% in 
real terms between December 1998 and March 1999.  
 
Graph 5 – Real car price IPCA index 
 
 
To check the robustness of the real price reduction results, we undertake three other 
measurement exercises. 
 
a) Price comparison of a same model between 1989 and 1992 
 
Anecdotical evidence found on the internet contains accounts of very high prices 
charged for vehicles before the trade liberalization process, and strong price falls 
following the first tariff reductions. These accounts, from the Brazilian specialized 
press, contains either prices updated using Brazilian price index IPCA or converted to 
US dollars, what is always problematic given the exchange rates fluctuations. 
According to one of these reports, a Volkswagen Gol GTi (a car smaller than a VW 
Golf), one of the four most expensive cars in Brazil, had a price tag in February 1989 
of NCz$ 22,535.00, the equivalent to R$ 181,824.00 in December 2016126. The same 
car, in July 1992 cost Cr$ 65,900,000.00, the equivalent of R$ 121,737.00 in April 
 
126 Revista Quatro Rodas (2016). Teste QUATRO RODAS, published on 9 december 2016. Available 
at https://quatrorodas.abril.com.br/testes/grandes-comparativos-gol-gts-x-gol-gti/ 
249 
 
2016127. As between April and December 2016 the car prices were virtually the same, 
we can conclude that between February 1989 and July 1992 (roughly 3 years) the 
price of a VW Gol GTi decreased 33% in real terms. 
 
However, other factors besides import competition could have played a role in this 
price movement. To disentangle the effects of import competition lets first discharge 
any factor that probably did not play a role, and then, quantify the factors still valid. 
The factor that was discharged was movements in total demand: as domestic 
production in 1989 and 1992 were very similar, demand was probably not an important 
factor to explain the real price decrease within this period. The increase in demand 
and production following domestic taxes reductions happened only in 1993, thus not 
affecting the price comparison above. However, changes in domestic taxation and 
effective prices above the price list could have distorted this comparison. It could be 
affected by IPI tax reductions, and by other incentives under the sectoral agreements 
of 1992 and 1993, although the first agreement was signed only in July 1992128. Table 
2 shows the IPI tax rates applied to vehicles of the category of the example used (Gol 
GTi).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 Revista Quatro Rodas (2016). Teste QUATRO RODAS, published on11 April 2016. Available at 
https://quatrorodas.abril.com.br/testes/uno-1-6-r-x-gol-gts-x-escort-xr3-x-gol-gti-x-kadett-gsi/ 
128 In 1992 and 1993 the government and the private sector negotiated a series of tax reductions, 
investment and employment targets, and margins reductions. In 1993 the taxation on vehicles under 
1cubic meter cylinders were reduced and this type of small car started to gain market-share (from 15.5% 
in 1992 to its all-time high of 69.8% in 2001). A new industrial policy (discussed in the literature review) 
were put in place between 1995 and 1997, attracting a great deal of new foreign investments. 
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Table 8 – Changes in the excise tax (IPI) on cars with 2,0 cubic meters 
petrol cylinder – 1988 to 1993 (tax codes 8703.23.01 and 8703.23.02 
 
 
It can be seen that in February 1989 the IPI rate was 50%, while in July 1992 was 
36%. To disentangle the effects from the evolution of IPI rates, we calculated the price 
change deducting the amount of IPI, in both years (1989 and 1992) and then 
calculated the percentual change: 
 
𝑈𝑃𝑊𝑇1989 = 𝑈𝑃1989 ∗ (1 + 𝐼𝑃𝐼 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒1989) 
Where:  
UPWT1989 = Updated Price including IPI tax of the VW GTi 1989 
UP1989 = Updated Price without IPI tax of the VW GTi 1989 
IPI rate1989 = IPI tax rate applied in 1989 
 
The same for the VW Gol GTi 1992: 
 
𝑈𝑃𝑊𝑇1992 = 𝑈𝑃1992 ∗ (1 + 𝐼𝑃𝐼 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒1992) 
Where:  
UPWT1992 = Updated Price including IPI tax of the VW GTi 1992 
UP1992 = Updated Price without IPI tax of the VW GTi 1992 
Year Vehicle specification Tax rate Start date Decree
1988 less than 100hp 45% 23/december/1988 DECRETO No 97.410, DE 23 DE DEZEMBRO DE 1988.
more than 100hp 50% 23/december/1988
1989 less than 100hp 33% 01/april/1989 DECRETO No 97.598, DE 30 DE MARÇO DE 1989.
more than 100hp 38% 01/april/1989
1989 less than 100hp 37% 15/march/1990 DECRETO No 99.182, DE 15 DE MARÇO DE 1990.
more than 100hp 42% 15/march/1990
1991 less than 100hp 27% 08/july/1991 DECRETO No 173 DE 8 DE JULHO DE 1991.
more than 100hp 32% 08/july/1991
1991 less than 100hp 22% 06/septmber/1991 DECRETO No 207, DE 6 DE SETEMBRO DE 1991.
more than 100hp 32% 06/septmber/1991
1992 less than 100hp 31% 31/march/1992 DECRETO No 483, DE 31 DE MARÇO DE 1992.
more than 100hp 36% 31/march/1992
1993 less than 100hp 25% 19/feb/1993 DECRETO No 755, DE 19 DE FEVEREIRO DE 1993.
more than 100hp 30% 19/feb/1993
Sources: Legislation database at the Brazilian Presidency (http://www4.planalto.gov.br/legislacao/)
The Decree 97410/1988 (http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivi l_03/decreto/1980-1989/D97410.htm) has links to the subsequent Decrees
Notes: (1) Tax rates appl ied to vehicles classified under the codes 8703.23.01 and 8703.23.02, on the IPI table val id for those years. Other tax 
rates were appl ied to other vehicle specifications/classifications.
(2) Decree 799, from 17/April/1993 reduced to 0,1% the IPI tax rate on vehicles under 1000 cm3 cylinder capacity.
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IPI rate1992 = IPI tax rate applied in 1992 
 
As we know the updated prices and the IPI tax rates of both cars we do a simple 
algebra to get: 
UP1989 = Updated Price without IPI tax of the VW GTi 1989 = 121,220.00 
UP1992 = Updated Price without IPI tax of the VW GTi 1992 = 89,510.00 
 
The percentual reduction is therefore 26.2%, net of the IPI tax change. 
 
Exchange rates did not affect the results, as real prices were calculated using 
domestic currency price indexes. Neither the fact that the prices charged by dealers 
in 1992 were usually higher than the price list of the automakers, as consumers used 
to buy cars to protect themselves against inflation on those years: the important price 
in our analysis is the price charged by automakers.  
 
b) Price comparison between selected models from 2001 to 2019 
 
At the FIPE website it is possible to see prices of new cars since January 2001. 
Although it is a shorter time range, it allows for a time comparison per model, thus 
avoiding problems related to index aggregation. For this, we chose all models that 
were continuously manufactured in Brazil, from January 2001 to January 2019, 
accepting only minor changes in the specifications and the obvious facelifts or new 
generations of the model (if it does not reposition the model in the market). Table 9 
brings all data used in this subsection. 
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Table 9 – Car price variation, selected models (2001 to 2019) 
 
 
The weighted average (based on units sold in January 2019) real change, based on 
dealer`s average price list was -7,29%, from January 2001 and January 2019. It is 
important to notice that both 2000/2001 and 2018/2019 production levels happened in 
crisis` years (2000-2001 GDP, 2018GDP). Therefore, we assume demand changes 
did not play an important role for those prices. Moreover, domestic taxation (IPI, ICMS 
Models
Current 
(historical) 
price in 
January 2001 
(automaker 
suggested 
retail prices)
Current 
(historical) 
price in 
January 2019 
(automaker 
suggested 
retail prices)
Current 
(historical) 
price in 
January 
2019 
(average 
dealer price)
Difference 
between 
automaker 
suggested 
retail price list 
and average 
dealer price
Nominal 
change 
(automaker 
suggested 
retail 
prices)
Real change 
based on 
automkare`s list 
(assuming 
general 
inflation of 
205% between 
Jan/2001 and 
January/2019
Nominal 
change 
(average 
dealer 
price)
Real change 
based on 
dealer`s list 
(assuming 
general 
inflation of 
205% 
between 
Jan/2001 and 
January/2019
2001 Fiat Palio Weekend Sport 1.6 mpi 16V 4p R$ 29.209,00
2019 Fiat Weekend adventure 1.8 82.990,00 76.900,00 -7,34% 184,12% -5,99% 163,28% -12,89%
2001 Fiat Uno Mille/ Mille EX/ Smart 4p R$ 12.959,00
2019 Fiat Uno 1.0 Attractive 44.590,00 42.990,00 -3,59% 244,09% 13,85% 231,74% 9,76%
2001 Fiat Strada/ Strada Working 1.5 mpi 8V CS R$ 15.374,00
2019 Fiat Strada 1.4 working CS 51.990,00 49.290,00 -5,19% 238,17% 11,89% 220,61% 6,08%
2001 GM Celta 1.0/1.0 MPFi VHC 8V 3p R$ 14.618,00
2019 GM Onix 1.0 flex LT 47.090,00 48.150,00 2,25% 222,14% 6,59% 229,39% 8,99%
2001 GM Corsa Wind 1.6 MPFi 4p R$ 19.696,00
2019 GM Onix 1.4 flex LTZ 58.190,00 58.990,00 1,37% 195,44% -2,25% 199,50% -0,90%
2001 GM Vectra GLS/ Challenge 2.2 MPFI 16V R$ 42.634,00
2019 GM Cruze 1.4 turbo LTZ 108.290,00 109.790,00 1,39% 154,00% -15,96% 157,52% -14,79%
2001 GM S10 Pick-Up 2.4 MPFI 8v 128cv CD 4p R$ 38.203,00
2019 GM S10 CD 2.5 4x2 advantage 105.990,00 93.000,00 -12,26% 177,44% -8,20% 143,44% -19,45%
2001 Honda Civic Sedan EX 1.6 16V Aut. 4p R$ 45.707,00
2019 Honda Civic 2.0 flex EX 102.400,00 99.900,00 -2,44% 124,04% -25,87% 118,57% -27,68%
2001 Peugeot 206 Rallye 1.6 R$ 27.261,00
2019 Peugeot 208 allure 1.2 64.690,00 61.209,00 -5,38% 137,30% -21,48% 124,53% -25,71%
2001 Renault Clio RL / Yahoo/ Authent. 1.0 8V 5p R$ 17.265,00
2019 Renault Kwid 1.0 life 32.490,00 32.500,00 0,03% 88,18% -37,73% 88,24% -37,72%
2019 Clio Sedan RN/ Expression 1.6 16V 4p R$ 25.795,00
2019 Renault Logan 1.6 expression 58.490,00 57.900,00 -1,01% 126,75% -24,97% 124,46% -25,73%
2001 Toyota Corolla XLi 1.8/1.8 Flex 16V Aut. R$ 34.727,00
2019 Toyota Corolla 1.8 Gli automatic 90.990,00 79.900,00 -12,19% 162,02% -13,31% 130,08% -23,87%
2001 Toyota Corolla XEi 1.8/1.8 Flex 16V Aut. R$ 35.649,00
2019 Toyota Corolla 2.0 Xei 105.990,00 102.000,00 -3,76% 197,32% -1,63% 186,12% -5,33%
2001 Toyota Corolla SE-G 1.8/1.8 Flex 16V Aut. R$ 44.890,00
2019 Toyota Corolla 2.0 Altis 118.990,00 110.000,00 -7,56% 165,07% -12,30% 145,04% -18,92%
Source: FIPE - USP. 
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and PIS/COFINS) was similar in both periods. The same can be said for the real 
effective exchange rate and for import tariffs. Thus, the real price variation obtained 
here can potentially be mainly attributed to both increases in scale and/or domestic 
competition. A carefully and detailed examination of the results ate firm and model 
levels allow us to make some considerations about these effects: 
 
The cheapest cars – with 1,0-cylinder capacity, produced by the traditional automakers 
(GM and Fiat, established in the country for decades and with a dominant market-
share, together with Volkswagen) increased in price. In the same period, the market-
share of 1,0 cars was reduced in half. Thus, their relative scale of production was 
reduced. Their absolute scale of production was also reduced: from 69,8% market-
share in 2001 (920 thousand cars) to 35,3% market-share in 2018 (741 thousand 
cars)129. However, we need to look at firm-level or model-level scale to analyse the 
scale effects. For example, the Renault 1,0 cylinder in the sample was the biggest 
price decrease.    
 
There is a correlation between increases in scale and decreases in process, at firm-
level. Although the data does not allow us to confirm the direction of the causality, it is 
reasonable to assume that lower prices generated more scale and more scale allowed 
lower prices, in a mutual reinforcing movement.   
 
The automakers Fiat and GM had a very small increase in scale, and, on average, a 
much less pronounced price reduction. On the other hand, the newcomers (Honda, 
Peugeot, Toyota and Renault) had a sharp increase in scale and a decrease in 
average real prices: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 Anuario Anfavea 2019. 
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Table 10 – Average growth in production and prices between 2001 
and 2018: incumbent and newcomers 
 
 
A closer look, at firm-level, shows that price variation and the change in number of 
units are highly correlated. In fact, correlation between production increase (quantity) 
and price was a strong -0,59. 
 
Table 11 – Percentage and unit growth in production versus price 
change – selected automakers (2001 and 2018) 
 
 
Fiat total car production: 385,000 in 2001 to 333,000 in 2018;  
GM total car production: 452,000 in 2001 to 400,000 in 2018;  
Fiat total car light commercial production: 51500 to 164000; 
GM light commercial production:  57000 to 66000. 
 
The mid-sized cars, from brands that had smaller scale in the 1990`s and 2000`s, 
showed an important price reduction as those automakers gained scale: 
Honda:  22000 in 2001 to 138000 in 2018; 
Toyota: 13000 in 2001 to 209000 in 2018. 
 
Meanwhile, smaller vehicles from brands that also gained scale, also had important 
price drops:  
average growth 
in vehicle 
production - %
average growth 
in vehicle 
production - 
unities
average real 
price change
Traditional automakers 2,77% 8992 -2,78%
Newcomers: 623,29% 147604,5 -25,29%
Assembler 2001 2018
Percentage 
growth Assembler
Growth in 
units Price change
GM 509.411 466.445 -8,43% GM -42.966 -6,54%
Fiat 436.218 497.168 13,97% Fiat 60.950 0,98%
Toyota 14.649 209.384 1329,34% Toyota 194.735 -16,04%
Peugeot 18.116 77.636 328,55% Peugeot 59.520 -25,71%
Honda 22.058 137.983 525,55% Honda 115.925 -27,68%
Renault 71.108 291.346 309,72% Renault 220.238 -31,72%
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Renault: 71000 in 2001 to 243000 in 2018; 
Peugeot: 18000 to 78000. 
 
 
c) Total sales divided by number of vehicles sold 
 
The quotient between net industrial sales value130 and total sales of new domestically 
produced cars and light commercials give us a proxy for the average sale price of 
vehicles. As this average price can change because of a change in the sale mix (with 
more or less participation of cheaper or more expensive cars) we will provide a 
comparison with the evolution of market-share of vehicles under 1000cm3, as these 
vehicles are substantially cheaper. Moreover, it is important to note that 
dealers`margins are not considered into the calculations. Therefore, to compare with 
the other data sources we are using in this chapter we are assuming that dealer`s 
margins were constant from 1996 to 2017. 
 
Data is only for firms producing in Brazil and covers 1996 to 2017. Before 1996 data 
for net sales revenue from Anfavea aggregates cars, light commercials, trucks and 
buses, and there is no data at PIA/IBGE available for net industrial turnover for before 
1996. Moreover, as the monetary stabilization in Brazil happened in 1994, data in 
nominal currency is more reliably converted into real values if it is after 1995. Data on 
sales of new vehicles (units), domestically produced, is available from Anfavea, from 
1957 to 2018, as are data on the participation of 1000cm3 cylinder cars. 
 
The results are in the table 12 and in the graph bellow: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 “Receita líquida de vendas” in portuguese. It is equal the gross industrial turnover minus deductions 
for returned vehicles, discounts, and taxes (IPI, ICMS, ISS, and PIS/COFINS). The data is for cars and 
light commercials, as available in PIA/IBGE. 
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Table 12 – Average constant car prices based on turnover and sales 
 
 
Vehicles` price increased 53,14% in real terms between 1996 and 2004. As the 
market-share of smaller cars were on the rise, this increase in price is probably 
underestimated. On the other hand, between 2004 and 2017 real prices decreased by 
-22,29%. As the market-share of smaller cars were going down, this decrease in price 
is also probably underestimated. Overall, between 1996 and 2017, real prices would 
have increased by 19%. However, if we look at the evolution of the market-share of 
1,0-cylinder vehicles (the cheapest ones) it felt from more than 50% in 1996-1997 to 
around 34% in 2016-2017 (graph 6). Thus, the real price increase is probably 
overestimated: as the market-share of smaller vehicles decreased, the units sold were 
of a bigger (and usually more expensive) category.  
Year
Net Industrial 
Turnover (current 
R$ thousands)*
Constant Net 
Industrial Turnover 
(R$ thousands of 
2016, deflated by 
IPCA)
Sales of new 
domestically 
produced cars and 
light commercials 
(units)**
Average 
Constant 
Price
IPCA Index 
01/01/1996 
=100***
Market-
share of 
1000cm3 
cars****
1996 18.950.471,00 66.374.696,25 1.453.621,00 45.661,62 109,56 49,20%
1997 21.700.783,00 72.236.990,59 1.573.847,00 45.898,36 115,28 54,80%
1998 18.377.023,00 60.179.976,88 1.122.590,00 53.608,15 117,18 60,10%
1999 19.347.195,00 58.157.736,53 1.020.635,00 56.981,91 127,66 60,40%
2000 24.553.539,00 69.649.924,50 1.237.296,00 56.292,05 135,28 64,50%
2001 27.909.493,00 73.529.868,04 1.335.666,00 55.051,09 145,65 69,80%
2002 32.059.663,00 75.058.948,03 1.283.264,00 58.490,65 163,90 65,90%
2003 40.858.688,00 87.520.094,03 1.274.556,00 68.667,12 179,15 61,00%
2004 49.880.525,00 99.298.366,23 1.420.025,00 69.927,20 192,76 54,80%
2005 55.777.016,00 105.058.807,19 1.534.628,00 68.458,81 203,73 52,00%
2006 60.800.090,00 111.033.565,07 1.693.100,00 65.580,04 210,13 53,40%
2007 71.790.087,00 125.506.009,24 2.067.460,00 60.705,41 219,50 51,70%
2008 84.763.530,00 139.930.735,01 2.300.116,00 60.836,38 232,45 48,30%
2009 88.006.436,00 139.281.222,15 2.523.188,00 55.200,49 242,47 50,10%
2010 98.060.273,00 146.532.603,24 2.671.413,00 54.852,10 256,80 48,10%
2011 98.161.643,00 137.731.532,02 2.571.869,00 53.553,09 273,49 42,10%
2012 111.668.263,00 148.037.413,65 2.850.509,00 51.933,68 289,46 38,50%
2013 121.364.653,00 151.913.713,01 2.876.423,00 52.813,41 306,57 36,30%
2014 114.220.216,00 134.358.545,62 2.718.542,00 49.423,02 326,22 36,00%
2015 99.470.470,00 105.727.162,56 2.067.634,00 51.134,37 361,03 33,50%
2016 95.804.438,00 95.804.438,00 1.716.989,00 55.797,93 383,74 33,00%
2017 112.231.516,00 105.075.934,05 1.933.678,00 54.339,93 409,87 34,50%
*"Receita liquida de vendas". Source: PIA Empresa, IBGE
** "Licenciamento de autoveiculos novos nacionais". Source: Anfavea
***Based on data from IPEADATA
**** Source: Anfavea
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Graph 6 - Relationship between constant prices and market-share of 
small cars 
 
 
It is important to remember that this calculation is free from the effects of changes in 
IPI taxation. What can be said with confidence is that real car prices rose between 
1996 and 2004 and decreased between 2004 and 2014. This behaviour is consistent 
with the exchange rate movements, as depicted in graph 7. A fall in the exchange rate 
index means a devaluation of the Brazilian Real. Thus, we can see that in periods of 
Brazilian currency appreciation car prices are reduced, and in periods of Brazilian 
currency depreciation, car prices increase. The import tax was reduced from 1996 to 
1999 and stayed at the same level since them. This suggests that variations in the 
exchange rate had an effect on domestic car prices. On graph 8 we can see that 
exchange rate movements match import penetration, thus supporting the conclusion 
that competition with imports had an important impact on domestic price behaviour.  
 
Graph 8 also allow us to see that between 1996 and 1999 import penetration rose – 
despite the relative stability of the exchange rate – because the import tariffs were 
reduced from 70% in 1996, to 63% in 1997; 49% in 1998, and finally 35% in 1999. But 
overall, when the Brazilian currency loses value, domestic prices rise, and when the 
currency gains value, domestic prices fall. The channel for this to happen is likely to 
be the imports, as we can see from Graph 6. 
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Graph 7 - Relationship between constant prices and real effective 
exchange rate index 
 
 
Graph 8 - Relationship between constant prices and import 
penetration 
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Thus, competition from abroad seems to be a driver for domestic prices, and the 
current import tariff level (35%) seems to be not enough to annulate the effects of 
exchange rates: when imports rise, domestic prices fall, and when imports fall, 
domestic prices rise (graph 8). Combining graphs 7 and 8 we clearly see that 
movements in the exchange rates alter import penetration and then domestic prices, 
at least after 1999.  
 
Conclusions from this section 
 
The results from the first price comparison suggest a real price reduction of 33% from 
February 1989 and July 1992 (here we are not disentangling the effects of changes in 
taxation).  The IBGE/IPCA data does not cover the period between February 1989 to 
June 1989 but taking into consideration the period of July 1989 to July 1992, the IBGE 
data points to a real price reduction of 19%. In this sense, IBGE data seems not to be 
overstating the price reduction. However, as we analysed only a specific high-end 
model, arguably more affected by imports of better and more advanced cars, it could 
be the case that cheaper models had a smaller price decrease. 
 
The results from the second price comparison suggest a weighted average real price 
reduction of 7,29% between January 2001 and January 2019. However, the IBGE data 
for the same period points to a real price reduction of 60%. For these 18 years` period 
IBGE data do seems to be seriously overstating the price reduction.   
 
As explained by IBGE in their Nota Tecnica n. 01/2000, up to August 2000 the price 
estimation for new cars used the retail price list suggested by the automakers. Since 
them, IBGE used prices collected in dealers. As we used prices collected in dealers 
as well, this would not be the reason for the discrepancy. The only potential reason 
we can think of to justify such discrepancy in the data is that IBGE used a different 
basket of models, and different weights. The combination of other models and other 
weights can generate important differences, but this could be in both ways, and so it 
is very difficult for this explanation alone to justify such difference.  
 
The third comparison, when we calculate a proxy for the average price, based on net 
turnover divided by units sold, delivers a potentially small real variation between 1996 
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and 2017, if we consider the change in the sale model mix. If we use the time range 
from 2001 to 2017, thus similar to the second comparison, we would have nearly flat 
real prices (in contrast with the 7% reduction found in the second comparison, that is 
free from problems related to sales mix).  
 
Despite the magnitude of the numbers, their direction and correlations would suggest 
that the real price reductions were concentrated in the years of trade liberalization 
(1990-1994), and after 2004, when the automakers that came to Brazil in late 90s and 
early 2000s started to gain scale. Exchange rates also seems to have contributed to 
the real price behaviour, adding to the effects of tariffs. Thus, data from prices indicates 
a degree of competition within the domestic market and with imports. The oligopoly 
structure would be non-collusive, from this perspective. The next subsection takes a 
closer look on indicators of concentration and market-power, to gain further insights.  
 
If after 1999 import penetration is driven by exchange rate changes, the tariff level of 
35% from 1999 to 2011 and of 35% plus the extra IPI tax on imports, brought by Inovar-
Auto, from 2011 to 2017, is innocuous. This could have happened because before 
2010 most automakers without plants in Brazil were not actively seeking the Brazilian 
market, and after 2010, when they started to direct their exports to the Brazilian 
markets (mainly the Chinese) the government set up the Inovar-Auto extra tariff, thus 
frustrating most of the Chinese imports. The bulk of imports after Inovar-Auto came 
from automakers with operations in Brazil, under quotas free of the extra taxation 
imposed by Inovar-Auto. Therefore, these intra-firm imports were sensitive to the 
exchange rate fluctuations, while the Chinese imports were virtually blocked by the 
sum of 35% import tariff and the extra 35% IPI from Inovar-Auto. From another 
perspective, this suggests that there would be water in tariff for tariff levels above a 
level between 35% and 70%.  
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6.3 - INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION BACKGROUND AND THE 
EFFECTS OF TRADE PROTECTION ON THE BRAZILIAN AUTO 
INDUSTRY 
 
In this subsection we are interested in knowing (i) the evolution of domestic 
competition levels in the Brazilian automotive sector and (ii) the evolution of 
competition with imports. To assess these two questions, we will gauge the market 
power of Brazilian automakers since the 80`s, using concentration indexes, and 
compare this with the level of import penetration and the evolution of trade tariffs and 
exchange rates. 
 
Before going to data analysis, we need to state the case for the concentration indexes 
and for the market structure under analysis. The Industrial Organization branch of 
Economics mainly studies how firms behave (or compete) under imperfect 
competition. It advances from simpler perfect competition and monopoly models, 
usually dealt with standard microeconomics.  Therefore, it models market structures 
such as oligopolies and monopolist competition and provides insights on the 
appropriate policies to tackle market power and to increase efficiency131.   
 
At an aggregated level, monopoly power results in charging prices above the marginal 
costs, and, therefore, above the prices that would prevail under perfect competition. 
These higher profits received by the monopolist firm are, however, smaller than the 
losses suffered by consumers. In a static framework, this difference is the result of an 
inefficient allocation of resources and gives rise to a welfare loss. The size of this 
welfare loss is the so-called “deadweight loss”. In a dynamic framework the results 
can be quite different, as the monopoly power (or the expectancy of that) can 
eventually lead to more investments, innovation, and scale gains, for example.  
 
131 As presented in the conceptual framework of this thesis, efficiency correspond to the best use of 
resources, and in Economics it can be divided into two main types: allocative efficiency (obtained when 
price equals marginal cost and thus the economy is producing the goods and services that the 
consumers want, at the quantity and price they want – their marginal utility); and productive efficiency 
(firms producing at their lowest average cost).When firms produce at their lowest long-run average cost 
there is the productive efficiency of the type efficiency of scale. X-inefficiency arises when a firm does 
not increase its productive efficiency but can still survive, as it is not threatened by competition. 
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The automotive sector is usually depicted as an example of oligopoly around the world, 
with differentiated products, mainly because the high fixed costs that provide an 
important entry barrier to new firms. In this case, their prices are setup following a 
strategic approach taking into consideration the moves of each competitor. However, 
if technology changes allow a sufficient decrease in the minimum scale of production, 
and suppliers provide sufficient technological support for newcomers, more 
automakers could enter the market. If this reduction in entry barriers is enough to 
counteract the consolidation among the current players, the market structure of the 
industry could shift to something more like a monopolistic competition132. Arguably, 
this is not yet the case, as most automakers show positive economic profits (contrary 
to the monopolistic competition, where in the long-run firms tend to face a zero-profit 
equilibrium). Toyota, for example, keep delivering net profits higher than usual 
measures of opportunity costs133. 
 
An oligopoly is characterized by fewer firms, in a market with entry barriers that could 
be generated by all sorts of factors, including, for example, economies of scale, 
regulation, and product differentiation134. Under both market structures is possible to 
have intense competition, either by price, by product, or by a combination of both. If 
they collude, oligopolists can increase their profits close to monopoly levels. This 
collusion can be tacit or formal and is facilitated when the domestic market is relatively 
closed, as imports do not threat the tacit arrangement among domestic producers.  
 
132 The luxury car segment, for example, is clearly an oligopoly, as very few firms dominate the market, 
but for the overall car production the discussion if the market structure is an oligopoly or a monopolistic 
competition is possible. Monopolistic competition is characterized by many firms competing in a market 
but able to charge different prices because of product differentiation. Their market power is proportional 
to the degree of product differentiation they can provide.   
133 As in the 6-months financial report summary consolidated in 6 November 2018, Toyota Motor 
Corporation has 52.5 trillion yens in total assets and generated a net income of 1.24 trillion yens. This 
represents a 2.36% in six-months. To gauge the opportunity costs, we assume that the total assets 
could be invested in a reduced-risk government bond, such as the Japanese 30-year bond, or the U.S. 
30-year-bond. According to the financial data provider Bloomberg (Bloomberg, 2019), the current 
annualized yield for this Japanese bond is 0.66%, while the current annual yield for the north American 
counterpart is 3.06%. The positive difference between Toyota`s net profit (2.36% in six months) and the 
chosen bond yield (roughly half of either the 0.66% or the 3.06%, to arise at 6-months yields) is an 
indication of economic profits.   
134 One characteristic of an oligopolized market structure is that the behaviour of each firm is very 
dependent on the perceived or forecasted behaviour of each one of its competitors in that market. The 
New Industrial Organization economics use game theory to analyse different models of imperfect 
competition and thus trying to describe how markets function under different structures and how market 
structures change given firms` performance and behaviour. 
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A firm is said to have “market power” when it is able to charge prices higher than 
marginal costs in a sustainable way. Differently from the perfect competition model, in 
an imperfect competition model the demand curve has a downward sloping, meaning 
that for each price reduction there would be an increase in the demanded quantity. 
The highest profit is made when the firm maximizes the difference between total 
revenues and total costs. The less price-sensitive a consumer is, the higher the scope 
for monopolists to rise prices. In other words, a lower demand elasticity allows for 
higher mark-ups over marginal costs.  
 
As known, in a market we can find more than one firm with some degree of monopoly 
power, not necessarily one monopolist. In this sense, a measurement of the monopoly 
power – or, more broadly, “market power”, is welcomed. Firms facing a demand curve 
with demand elasticity less than infinite would have some monopoly power. A widely 
used measure of monopoly power is simply the mark-up level charged by the firm. 
This is the so-called Lerner index: 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =  
P − MgC
P
 = 1 −  
𝑀𝑔𝐶
𝑃
 
 
The highest the index, the highest the monopoly power. At first, it is reasonable to 
assume, as a simplification, that the lowest the number of competitors in the market, 
the highest will be their market power. This is a result both from the fact that less firms 
mean smaller elasticity of supply; and from the fact that with fewer firms each demand 
curve would be less elastic. Nevertheless, other factors can play a role and the result 
can be different from just considering the number of firms. Two main examples can be 
(i) strategic interactions among firms, such as cartels and (ii) potential entry of 
competitors, keeping the market price lower, even if the competitors do not effectively 
enter the market. 
 
Market power can be gauged by market concentration (under the so-called “structure 
performance hypothesis”), or by market-shares measures (under the so-called 
“efficiency structure hypothesis”). Market concentration allow firms to act strategically, 
including through collusion. On the other hand, higher market-shares can be viewed 
as a result of previous cost-advantages (efficiency). Furthermore, bigger firms have 
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competitive advantages in terms of scale or access to technologies and inputs, for 
example.  
 
Market-share can also be a proxy for firm-level productive efficiency. Therefore, the 
evolution of market-shares can give us an idea about the dynamics of the market: 
markets where firms` market-shares vary through time can be an indication of a more 
competitive environment; and markets with higher concentration – and thus higher 
market-shares for the leading firms – allow for higher economies of scale (and thus 
productive efficiency).   
 
As explained by Bresnaham (1987), empirical estimations of market power can be of 
two main types: a) explicit indicators, such as price-cost margins; and b) estimation of 
structural equations of supply and demand.  
 
Bresnaham (1987) consider the use of some explicit indicators as unsuitable for single 
industries, because they rely on accounting concepts that barely can be used as 
proxies for the economic variables. He gives the example of profits, that can be 
affected by accounting rules, related to how fixed costs would be spread over time.  
   
The indicators we are using in this study are not related to accounting ones. Market-
shares, concentration indexes and price differentials are all “economic” concepts, free 
from the criticisms found in Bresnaham (1987). However, even profitability and mark-
ups could be used, provided some conditions are met. Mark-up levels, for instance, 
are a case “in between” an accounting and an economic variable: if revenue and costs 
reflect the economic revenue and costs for that time, mark-ups would be a reliable 
economic variable. Otherwise, it would suffer from the same problems as the profit 
measure. 
 
As said in the beginning of this subsection, we are interested in evaluating the degree 
of domestic and foreign competition for the industry in Brazil. Implicitly, we are testing 
three hypotheses135:  
 
135 Among the game models used in the literature to analyse the behaviour of an oligopoly with product 
differentiation and tacit collusion there is the kinked demand curve. According to this model, oligopolist 
firms do not rise prices, because the other firms would not follow and then the firm would lose market-
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a) domestic firms act cooperatively (in this case, a tacit collusion) and are 
protected from foreign competition; 
b)  domestic firms act non-cooperatively (no tacit collusion), but are still protected 
from foreign competition; 
c) domestic firms act non-cooperatively (no tacit collusion) and are not effectively 
protected from foreign competition. 
 
For a cooperative oligopoly we would then expect relatively stable market-shares, 
concentration ratios and price movements. Even given that competition in the industry 
is heavily based on quality, oligopolies are usually characterized by a relative price 
stability136. However, any measure of price alone could be misleading. In this sense, 
we will use measures of market power (market-shares and concentration ratios), as 
these capture the effects of the combination of prices and quality (product 
differentiation). 
 
Two potential complications are: (i) when a specific producer is hit heavier by imports, 
thanks to the type of models it produces; and (ii) it may be the case that a domestic 
producer changes its prices because it wants to reposition itself, accepting/seeking a 
correspondent change in market-share.  
 
We will then provide the evolution of domestic market-shares, concentration indexes 
(C4 and HHI), import penetration, number of brands, total production, prices and 
currency movements, calculate the correlations and analyse the evolution of each 
indicator through time. The variables we use are the following: 
 
 
 
share. They also do not reduce prices, because in this case other firms would do the same, thus 
impeding any gain of market share and reducing the overall profit. Given its results, this model could 
well explain a tacitly collusive oligopoly. The Brazilian automotive sector is viewed by the public as an 
example of this structure. As we already mentioned, barriers to entry (in our case, trade protection) can 
help this behaviour to happen. So, a market sufficiently protected could display oligopolistic firms 
making economic profits thanks to a tacit collusion where market shares are kept fixed and prices 
stable. If automakers in Brazil behave this way, we would have a suggestion of trade protection reducing 
domestic competition. This finding would be adding to the canonical fact that trade protection reduces 
competition from abroad. And, assuming that competition is a positive driver for competitiveness, we 
would have an indication that trade protection damages competitiveness in the Brazilian auto-sector 
through the channel of reducing domestic competition.   
136 The exception being mainly what is conventionally known as “price wars”.  
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Market-shares 
Market-shares of the domestic producers 
 
Concentration indexes  
C4 = the total production of the 4 biggest firms, in relation to the total market production 
HHI = ∑ 𝑠  
Where “n” = number of firms in the market; “s” = market share of each firm “I” 
 
Import penetration 
The import penetration coefficient shows the percentage of domestic consumption that 
is supplied by imports.  
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)
 
    
Real effective exchange rate 
The real effective exchange rate is weighted average of the nominal exchange rate 
against trade partners, adjusted by inflation in all trade partners and in the domestic 
country. 
 
Constant prices of new cars 
Nominal index of prices of new cars deflated by the overall price index IPCA 
 
Real variation of prices for new cars 
Variation of the prices of new cars in constant prices. 
 
The domestic market 
 
Table 13 brings an overview of the production of cars and light commercials in Brazil, 
emphasizing the market-share and average scale of each producer, and comparing 
their evolution between 2013 and 2018. 
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Table 13 – Automakers operations in Brazil 
 
 
The pioneers Ford, GM, Volkswagen and Fiat dominated the domestic market for most 
of the time. Only in the late 2010s automakers such as Toyota, Honda, Renault, Nissan 
and Hyundai changed this picture. Toyota was a pioneer as well, but in the 50s, 60s, 
70s and 80s it only manufactured light commercials. Only in 1998 it started to 
manufacture the Corolla in Brazil, thus effectively entering the domestic car market.    
Automaker
Start of 
production in 
Brazil
Production in 
2013
Production in 
2018
Number of plants 
producing cars, 
l ight commercials, 
engines and other 
parts***
Number of plants 
producing cars 
and l ight 
commercials, with 
metal bodies
Average scale per 
plant in 2013
Average scale per 
plant in 2018
Ford 1957 333.124 267.758
3(BA;SP)+1(CE) for 
Troller 2 166.562 133.879
GM 1957 680.737 466.445 5(SP;SC;RS) 3 226.912 155.482
Volkswagen 1957 761.193 433.466 4(SP;PR) 3 253.731 144.489
Fiat-Chrysler (FCA) 1976 756.717 497.168 3(MG;PE; PR) 2 378.359 248.584
Toyota 1959 129.653 209.384 4(SP) 2 64.827 104.692
Honda 1997 135.065 137.983 2 (SP) 2 67.533 68.992
Mitsubishi and Suzuki 
(MMC/HPE)* 1998 (2013) 43.101 22.363 1(GO) 1 43.101 22.363
Renault 1999 282.595 291.346 4(PR)**** 1 282.595 291.346
Mercedes-Benz** 1999 (2016) 0 7.620
Up to 2010: 
1(MG). After 2016: 
1 (SP) 1 0 7.620
Peugeot-Citroen 2001 143.634 77.636 2(RJ) 1 143.634 77.636
Nissan 2002 26.809 104.317 1(RJ) 1 26.809 104.317
Hyundai-Subaru (CAOA) 2007 35.117 14.792 1 (GO) 1 35.117 14.792
Hyundai 2012 166.269 191.646 1 (SP) 1 166.269 191.646
BMW 2014 0 8.563 1(SC) 1 0 8.563
Audi 2015 0 4.942 1(PR) 1 0 4.942
Cherry (CAOA Cherry since 
2017) 2015 0 8.634 1(SP) 1 0 8.634
Jaguar-LandRover 2016 0 4.295 1(RJ) 1 0 4.295
Totals 3.494.014 2.748.358 25 154.621 93.663
* Suzuki  model s  were manufactured at the plant from 2013.
** Between 1999 and 2010 i t produced the smal l  clas s-A, in Minas  Gerai s . Since 2016 i t produces  the class  C and the GLA in a new plant in Sao Paulo. 
Anfavea production data  for thi s  Mercedes plant i s  not avai lable. Instead, we us e data  for regis tration of nationa l ly manufactured vehicles  for thes e years . 
Thes e numbers  can be s l i gthly smal ler than the production figures  becaus e they do not account for any vehicl e eventua l ly exported, for example. 
*** It does not include proving grounds, dis tributi on centers  and plants  producing s olely trucks , buses  or agricul tura l  machines.
****Sharing a  manufacturing unit with Nis san.
Sources : Anuario Anfavea 2019 and Abei fa  (http://www.abei fa .com.br/Mercado)
Automaker operations in Brazil - cars and light commercials
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Average scale per plant that produces cars and light commercials (excluding the plant 
that produces the light commercial Troller, with a non-metal car body) was 155 
thousand in 2013, high before the economic crisis, and before the new entrants started 
production, following the incentives of Inovar-Auto. In 2018 this average scale went 
down to 94 thousand.  
 
There are different types and levels of partnership among automakers, including small 
technical collaborations, partial cross-ownerships, mergers, joint product 
development, joint input purchases etc. We then also calculated the concentration 
coefficients and other variables considering the partnerships that made brands behave 
as if they were one, either by sharing facilities, ownership control or being subsidiaries 
or representants of the same brand. Taking into consideration only the brands that 
had production in Brazil, even for part of the period under analysis, we then make the 
following partnership considerations among car brands: 
 
Brands taken together in the second roll of market analysis:  
a) Volkswagen and Ford, between 1990 and 1995. Between 1990 and 1995 
there was Autolatina, a new structure where Volkswagen (51%) and Ford (49%) 
unified their operations in Brazil, keeping their brands and retailers 
independent, but exchanging autorparts and knowledge; 
b) Peugeot and Citroen, for the entire dataset. Both brands are one firm, as the 
later was taken over by the former in the 70s. PSA (Peugeot and Citroen) 
started a joint production in Brazil in 1998, at Porto Real (RJ); 
c) Hyundai and CAOA Hyundai, for the entire dataset. The Brazilian group 
CAOA started the manufacturing of Hyundai in Brazil in 2007, at Anapolis 
(GO)137, where it manufactures the SUVs ix35 and New Tucson. However, 
since 2012 Hyundai motors have its own plant in Piracicaba (SP), where it 
manufactures the SUV Creta and the small HB20; 
 
137 The Brazilian press informed that Hyundai motors does not want to renew its partnership agreement 
with CAOA, expired since April 2018. Source: 
https://carros.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2018/05/08/separacao-de-hyundai-e-caoa-nao-tem-volta-
diz-fonte-como-ficam-as-marcas.htm 
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d) Renault and Nissan, for the entire dataset. The global Renaut-Nissan-
Mitsubishi alliance includes sharing product development, input purchasing and 
partial cross-ownership, while keeping independent product brand and 
competing among themselves. Globally, Renault owns 43,4% of Nissan and 
Nissan owns 15% of Renault. Nissan bought 34% of Mitsubishi in 2016. As 
Mitsubishi entered the alliance between those two brands only in 2016, and the 
manufacturing of Mitsubishi cars in Brazil is under licence to a 100% Brazilian 
industrial group (MMC/HPE), we consider this as an independent competitor in 
Brazil. Nissan and Renault started a joint production in Brazil in 2001, at Sao 
Jose dos Pinhais (PR), being the first in the world to produce jointly Renault 
and Nissan vehicles. In 2014 Nissan started a solely production in Rezende 
(RJ), while still sharing the manufacturing plant with Renault in Sao Jose dos 
Pinhais as well; 
e) Mitsubishi and Suzuki, for the entire dataset. In 1995 the Brazilian industrial 
group MMC started the production, under licence, of Mitsubishi light 
commercials in Manaus, initially as SKD. A new plant in Catalao (GO) was 
inaugurated in 1998, initially producing a light commercial vehicle with only 
around 50% domestic inputs. In 2001 a new version, totally developed in Brazil, 
lead to the creation of another company – HPE, in order to respect the 
contractual terms with Mitsubishi. Since 2013 the MMC/HPE group also 
manufactures Suzuki vehicles (producing the model Jimny between 2013 and 
June 2015 at Itumbiara (GO), and from 2015 at Catalao (GO), in the same 
factory that produces Mitsubishis). Furthermore, data from Anfavea is 
aggregated with the two brands, under the name of the manufacturer 
MMC/HPE, while data from Abeifa are solely for Suzukis manufactured 
between 2015 and 2018138. 
 
Special remarks: 
i. In August 2014 Cheery inaugurated its plant in Jacarei (SP). In 2017 Caoa 
bought 50.7% of Chery Brasil, where it manufactures the Cherry QQ, Cellar, 
Arrizo, Tiggo 2, 5 and 7. The plant is the first of a Chinese brand in Brazil and 
 
138 Suzuki and Cherry are automakers producing in Brazil but represented by Abeifa, instead of Anfavea. 
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has a production capacity currently set at 50 thousand vehicles per year, but 
potentially scalable to 150 thousand139; 
ii. Volkswagen owns Audi, but they do not share suppliers and industrial and 
management facilities in Brazil; 
iii. We also do not take into consideration partnerships for product development 
on global stage, such as the one by Renault and Mercedes. 
 
The results from comparing market concentration indexes with and without these 
partnerships show only a substantial difference between 1989 and 1996, as shown in 
graph 9.  
 
 
Graph 9 – HHI with and without partnerships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 The Brazilian press also informs that the CAOA group plans to manufacture some Cherry models at 
the plant in Anapolis(GO) where it currently manufactures Hiundays. 
https://carros.uol.com.br/colunas/alta-roda/2018/04/04/caoa-chery-e-so-o-comeco-plano-e-fazer-
marca-chinesa-virar-apenas-caoa.htm 
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Results (source-tables are in the annex): 
 
Table 14 summarizes the evolution of data regarding market-power measures, 
production, exchange rates, scale, import penetration and real (constant) prices. Data 
availability constraints allow us to use only a limited time-span, varying according to 
the chosen indicator. For the purposes of our analysis we did not need to use the data 
taking into consideration the partnerships among automakers140. Regarding prices, we 
will use data resulting from the quotient between total turnover from sales of 
domestically manufactured cars and light commercials and total units produced. As 
explained in our subsection 1, this measure is relatively consistent with other data, 
although more conservative (in the sense that other data sources point to a steeper 
decline real in prices). As the series ends in 2017, we estimated a value for 2018 
based on the vehicle price inflation measured by IPCA for the year 2018.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 The main use of the HHI information (the measure most affected by partnerships, is to compare it 
with constant average prices. As these prices are only available from 1996 and partnerships only 
affected HHI up to 1996, there would be no intersection among these two data. 
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 Table 14 - Concentration indexes, scale, prices, and imports of cars 
 
Year 
Market-
share of 
the 
leader Leader C4 HHI
Number 
of 
brands*
Total 
production 
(units)
Average 
production 
per brand
Average 
real 
(constant) 
car price
Real car 
price 
variation
Real 
effective 
exchang
e rate 
index
Import 
penetration 
coefficient
Change 
in 
exchange 
rate 
index**
Change in 
import 
penetration
1975 61,38% VW 99,89% 4.509,05 4 818.816 204.704 0,00%
1976 61,32% VW 99,83% 4.466,72 5 863.710 172.742 0,00%
1977 60,47% VW 99,65% 4.205,14 5 780.928 156.186 0,00%
1978 55,08% VW 99,61% 3.736,91 5 941.496 188.299 0,00%
1979 52,38% VW 99,59% 3.510,42 5 1.003.578 200.716 0,00%
1980 49,61% VW 99,58% 3.323,37 5 1.036.537 207.307 80,89 0,00%
1981 42,95% VW 99,41% 2.922,40 5 687.510 137.502 94,06 0,00% 16,27%
1982 40,48% VW 99,66% 2.821,33 5 800.764 160.153 101,95 0,00% 8,40%
1983 40,01% VW 99,71% 2.815,99 5 853.096 170.619 78,20 0,00% -23,29%
1984 37,48% VW 99,59% 2.715,13 5 807.604 161.521 69,75 0,00% -10,82%
1985 38,79% VW 99,71% 2.769,94 5 892.006 178.401 67,46 0,00% -3,28%
1986 38,91% VW 99,64% 2.784,95 5 957.720 191.544 64,38 0,00% -4,56%
1987 37,27% VW 99,55% 2.758,48 5 829.578 165.916 66,83 0,00% 3,80%
1988 37,07% VW 99,49% 2.708,43 5 976.597 195.319 66,16 0,00% -0,99%
1989 33,81% VW 99,46% 2.614,33 5 933.369 186.674 88,63 0,00% 33,96%
1990 33,23% VW 99,40% 2.622,41 5 844.563 168.913 109,91 0,02% 24,00%
1991 32,50% VW 99,24% 2.625,02 5 884.166 176.833 92,40 2,42% -15,93%
1992 33,89% VW 99,70% 2.723,72 5 1.015.879 203.176 81,29 2,69% -12,02% 10,88%
1993 34,12% VW 99,80% 2.707,66 5 1.324.228 264.846 85,48 5,33% 5,16% 98,35%
1994 33,24% VW 99,75% 2.781,38 5 1.499.817 299.963 89,07 11,63% 4,19% 118,24%
1995 37,90% VW 99,76% 2.931,01 5 1.536.866 307.373 97,45 20,04% 9,42% 72,27%
1996 35,40% VW 99,82% 2.928,08 5 1.738.273 347.655 45.661,62 102,82 11,84% 5,51% -40,94%
1997 32,36% VW 99,77% 2.784,40 6 1.984.403 330.734 45.898,36 0,52% 105,48 14,33% 2,59% 21,04%
1998 31,95% VW 98,56% 2.675,31 7 1.497.409 213.916 53.608,15 16,80% 102,54 21,26% -2,79% 48,43%
1999 31,20% Fiat 94,40% 2.587,56 9 1.281.463 142.385 56.981,91 6,29% 68,18 13,88% -33,51% -34,73%
2000 30,86% VW 92,49% 2.520,34 9 1.590.716 176.746 56.292,05 -1,21% 73,54 11,21% 7,85% -19,26%
2001 30,21% VW 91,53% 2.501,43 10 1.714.893 171.489 55.051,09 -2,20% 61,41 10,59% -16,49% -5,48%
2002 30,44% GM 90,77% 2.380,95 11 1.698.848 154.441 58.490,65 6,25% 58,54 7,27% -4,67% -31,39%
2003 29,73% GM 88,01% 2.143,07 11 1.720.800 156.436 68.667,12 17,40% 55,32 5,09% -5,50% -29,96%
2004 29,65% VW 87,22% 2.115,78 11 2.180.206 198.201 69.927,20 1,84% 58,09 3,49% 5,00% -31,34%
2005 29,18% VW 86,68% 2.057,46 11 2.376.296 216.027 68.458,81 -2,10% 70,94 4,78% 22,12% 36,70%
2006 29,63% VW 86,76% 2.076,98 11 2.470.613 224.601 65.580,04 -4,21% 79,16 6,89% 11,59% 44,15%
2007 28,43% VW 84,83% 2.041,65 12 2.803.051 233.588 60.705,41 -7,43% 85,08 10,99% 7,48% 59,54%
2008 28,28% VW 82,27% 1.941,83 12 3.002.091 250.174 60.836,38 0,22% 88,89 13,02% 4,47% 18,55%
2009 28,38% VW 83,22% 1.961,94 12 3.022.183 251.849 55.200,49 -9,26% 88,11 15,39% -0,87% 18,15%
2010 31,34% VW 82,06% 1.995,96 11 3.404.663 309.515 54.852,10 -0,63% 100,00 18,32% 13,49% 19,04%
2011 26,28% VW 80,19% 1.869,98 11 3.152.355 286.578 53.553,09 -2,37% 103,50 24,48% 3,50% 33,66%
2012 26,23% VW 79,23% 1.857,10 11 3.248.601 295.327 51.933,68 -3,02% 93,16 21,64% -9,99% -11,60%
2013 21,79% VW 72,46% 1.550,94 12 3.494.014 291.168 52.813,41 1,69% 87,91 19,19% -5,64% -11,34%
2014 22,60% Fiat 70,32% 1.506,91 13 2.987.817 229.832 49.423,02 -6,42% 87,08 18,67% -0,94% -2,68%
2015 20,66% Fiat 63,73% 1.295,94 15 2.349.390 156.626 51.134,37 3,46% 73,40 17,40% -15,71% -6,84%
2016 17,95% Fiat 59,39% 1.198,65 17 2.096.528 123.325 55.797,93 9,12% 78,29 14,43% 6,66% -17,09%
2017 18,76% Fiat 61,69% 1.247,14 17 2.633.699 154.923 54.339,93 -2,61% 85,84 11,28% 9,64% -21,77%
2018 18,09% Fiat 61,43% 1.226,86 17 2.748.358 161.668 54.856,16 0,95% 79,05 12,54% -7,91% 11,09%
*Peugeot-Ci troen are considered as  one brand. Al l  other brands cons idered independently of partns ers hips  or plant ownsership.
** A higher index means  a more appreciated currency 
Sources:
Market-s hares  and concentration indexes ca lculated by the author, with raw data  from Anuario Anfavea  2019 and Abei fa website
Number of brands ca lculated by the author
Tota l  production ca lculated by the author, with data  from Anuario Anfavea  2019 and Abei fa  webs ite
Average production per brand ca lculated by the author, with data  from Anuario Anfavea  and Abei fa  webs ite
Constant prices  of new cars  and annual  real  varia tion ca lculated by the author, wi th data for car prices  and overa l l  infla tion (IPCA) from SIDRA (www.ibge.gov.br)
Rea l  effective exchange rate index from the WDI (World Bank) and the IMF - Internationa l  Financial  Stati s tics . Annua l i zed data based on period average.
Import penetration coefficient ca lculate by the author, with data  from Anuario Anfavea  2019 and Abei fa  website. Tota l  annua l  numbers .
Average real  car pri ces  ca lculated dividing tota l  sa les  of manufactured cars  and l ight commercia ls  by the tota l  number of cars  and l ight commercia l s  produced. 
Sources: PIA/IBGE and Anfavea . Obs : Prices  for 2018 resul ting from the expla ined ca lculation plus  IPCA inflation in 2018 for vehicles: 0,95%
Concentration indexes and scale - Production of cars and lights commercials in Brazil
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The market-share of the leader has been decreasing since 1975, even during the 
period with only 5 brands producing cars and light commercials (graph 10). It is 
important to note that our market concentration indicators are based on production. 
Therefore, they do not include imports. This was in line with the decreasing HHI (graph 
10). Both indicators indicate the existence of competition, even in a very concentrated 
domestic market virtually insulated from import competition until the early 90s. We do 
not have real car price data for that period but given the closeness of the market and 
the absence of any news of price war, there is indication that the car-prices increased 
relatively paripassu to the overall price index, and thus such competition seems to 
have been mainly based on product differentiation.   
 
The first vertical line refers to 1991, the year were a combination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers reduction effectively exposed the domestic market to foreign 
competition141.The second green line marks the start of the automotive policy of 1995-
1997 (and its tariff increases and investment attractions). The third line marks the start 
of Inovar-Auto. The circles highlight periods of intense change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 As explained in the previous subsection, the lift of import prohibition was in 1990, but tariffs were 
reduced only in 1991, and although imports initiated in 1990, they were very small, until they started to 
surge in 1991, although still in relatively small numbers.  
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Graph 10 – Market-share of the leader 
 
 
Graph 11 - HHI 
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Concentration indexes (graphs 10, 11 and 12) only decreased when the new players 
started to arrive, seeking to heap part of the market growth, and following government 
incentives put in place in the 90s. 
 
Graph 12 – C4 
 
 
 
Total production relatively stagnated until 1991, with a bottom in 1981 (graph 13), as 
well average production per brand (graph 14), given that there was no new player until 
the late 90s. Following the trade openness of early 90s and the inflation control of 
1994, total production started to increase. Average production per brand reaches a 
peak in 1996, signalling that the domestic producers were enjoying a buoyant market 
just before the arrival of the new players. The number of brands increase sharply, and 
concentration decreases as from 1997 to 1999 four new automakers started producing 
cars in Brazil, and another one (Toyota) setup a plant for mass production of cars for 
the first time.  Average production per brand went down sharply, as a combined result 
of more players and another economic crisis that reduced total production from 1997 
to 1999.  
 
As depicted in graph 13, a production boom occurred following the trade liberalization 
(1990-1993) and the monetary stabilization of 1994, but the Asian crisis and the 
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subsequent increase in interest rates lead to a sharp decline in production after 1997. 
The domestic market rebounded from 1999, following the devaluation of the domestic 
currency, but it took more 4 years for the growing total production lead to an increase 
in the average production per brand, as new players started production in 2001 and 
2002.   
 
Graph 13 – total production 
 
 
Graph 14 – average production per brand 
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From 2003 the domestic market started a full recovery and both total production and 
average production per brand increased strongly. Concentration measures kept 
falling, as well real car prices. The domestic market was very strong in 2011, even with 
an appreciated currency. Imports were increasingly taking market-share, and the 
government put in place another automotive policy (Inovar-Auto) to both increase 
protection against imports (thus counteracting the valuation of the currency) and to 
attract new producers to the market. It is interesting to note that the increase in total 
production before the setup of Inovar Auto indicates that, as happened in the 90s, new 
players would probably be already interested in the domestic market. Following the 
new government policy new players arrived (although, as discussed in chapter 4, 
some investment decisions were probably taken before, and thus independently from, 
the government policy). 
 
Again, as happened in the 90s, the start of production of new players coincided with 
another economic crisis (from 2013) and thus average production per brand and total 
production fall sharply between 2013 and 2016 (graph 14). 
 
As noted in the previous subsection, the real effective exchange rate seems to be very 
correlated with the import penetration: an increase in the value of the domestic 
currency matches an increase in the market-share of imported cars and light 
commercials in the domestic Brazilian market (graph 15). Moreover, it seems that the 
movements in the exchange rate precedes the movements in import penetration. The 
differences seen between 1990 and 1998 can be attributed to the process of trade 
liberalization and the changes in import tariffs. After 1999, when import tariffs were 
stable at 35%, exchange rate movements seem to “granger-cause” import penetration.  
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Graph 15 – Real effective exchange rates and import penetration 
 
 
The dotted lines on graph 15 shows periods of strong import tariff changes: after the 
trade liberalization of late 1980s/early 1990s, import tariffs fell from 50% to 20% in 
September 1994, as part of the inflation control efforts. Following the successful 
monetary stabilization program (Plano Real) and the subsequent exchange rate 
appreciation of the Real, a hike in imports and a subsequent balance of payments 
problem (aggravated by the financial outflows caused by the Mexican crisis) lead to 
an increase in the import tariffs to 70% in March 1995. This was decreased year by 
year until 1999, when it reached the 35%. In late 2011 the IPI rate for imported cars 
was increased, thus acting similar to an increase in the Import tariff.  
 
The increase in total production can be seen as an increase in external economies of 
scale, independently of the behaviour of average scale per plant. Graph 15 suggest 
that the growth in total production may have had an impact on prices only in the long 
term: we saw a growing production (external economies of scale) between 1999 and 
2011 but only after 2004 a real price decline. Alternatively, we could interpret it as an 
evidence that total production had no correlation with real price movements, thus 
corroborating that other factors, such as the exchange rate (foreign competition) or 
concentration indexes (domestic competition) may explain prices. The potential 
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lagged effect of external economies of scale and prices makes sense from the 
theoretical point of view, but it is impossible from this data to make any definitive claim 
on this. 
 
Graph 16 – Total production and average real prices – 1996-2018 
 
 
Graph 17 suggests that after 1999, more import penetration do reduce domestic 
prices, in the same period, but this relationship is not very clear as well. Other factors 
play a role and the resulting effect cannot be analysed from a single explanatory 
variable. The period between 2015 and 2018 may have been the result of the 
economic crisis.  
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Graph 17 – Import penetration and average real prices 
 
Graph 18 shows a potential effect from decreases in concentration (HHI) to decreases 
in real prices, but only after 2004. This is a result compatible with the hypothesis of 
growing domestic competition affecting domestic prices after the automakers that 
arrived in Brazil in the late 90’s and early 2000’s reached enough scale of production 
to start affecting domestic prices around 2004142. Again, this effect is competing with 
the effects from exchange rate variations and total production. A multivariate inferential 
analysis would be needed to provide further understanding on the drivers of domestic 
prices. Meanwhile, some correlation coefficients can also shed more light on some of 
the relationships described.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
142 Honda, for example, one of the new automakers arriving in the 90s, produced only 837 cars in 1997, 
but 56,544 in 2004. The total number of cars and light commercials produced by the so-called 
“newcomers” in 1997 represented only 0,23% of total domestic production. In 1999 its was already 
5,6%, and in 2004 12,78%. 
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Graph 18 – HHI and average real prices 
 
 
The last piece of data in this subsection is the evolution of markups for automakers 
and for autopart producers in Brazil, from 1996 to 2018. The definition of markup we 
use is the following: 
 
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠 (𝑅$)–  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠(𝑅$)) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠(𝑅$)
 
 
 
Data comes from PIA-Empresa/IBGE, tables 1998, 1999, 1847, and 1845, and are 
also used as data in our subsection VI. 
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Graph 19 – Gross markups 
 
 
Graph 19 thus shows that markup levels for automakers are, on average, smaller than 
those for autoparts. This is apparently contradictory to the results from our interviews, 
that exposed a more difficult situation for small tier 3 and 4 autopart producers. We 
therefore can see that there is potentially very high heterogeneity within the autopart 
subsector. Moreover, it can be seen that firms increased markups up to the financial 
crisis of 2009, when the profitability fell sharply, until the bottom line of the Brazilian 
crisis of 2015. Inovar-Auto seems to have not been capable of reverting this downward 
trend. Finally, automakers do presented periods of negative markups, both between 
1998-2003 (post Asian crisis and up to political uncertainties in Brazil, a period marked 
by very high interest rates) and between 2013 and 2017.  
 
We calculate the Pearson`s correlation for the sample (r). Our data seems to show a 
linear relationship, thus there is no indication for the need of a different correlation 
statistics. 
 
However, we need to make an important note on what kind of variables can be used 
here and what is the effect of time trends. As widely known, the Pearson coefficient is 
calculated as a deviation from the mean, and thus will tend to show a positive 
correlation when two series are increasing, even if they do it in an inverse pattern 
(thus, in fact, showing negative correlation). To avoid this problem, we could detrend 
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the series before we calculate the correlation coefficient. The same “correction” would 
be obtained when we assess the relationship between price changes instead of simply 
prices, for example. The trick is that sometimes we just want to see if both series 
increase or decrease together, without any need for them to do so in a perfect 
matching way. Therefore, if this is the case, no detrend is needed and we can estimate 
the correlation between two level variables, for example. Thus, we need to carefully 
examine each variable under analysis, before proceeding with the correlation.  
 
The real exchange rate index and the import penetration coefficients are level 
variables with no time trend. Therefore, they do not need to be detrended.  
 
Cars at constant prices (index) and total production are level variables.  Although it is 
expected that production grows and real prices decreases in time, this process can 
take many years and can be reversed. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they 
do not have a clear trend.  Thus, we assume there is no strong or clear time trend in 
the variables used for the correlation analysis.  
 
In the first comparison, between real exchange rate index and import penetration 
coefficient, using annual data from 1991143 to 2018, we are interested in knowing if 
imports are affected by the level of the exchange rate, as this is a factor affecting the 
costs of imported goods. Thus, we are looking at its inflation-adjusted value, as if it 
was a tariff. Annualized data minimizes problems related to timing of exchange rate 
movements and its impact on prices. Exchange rate is annualized using period 
average. Import penetration is based on total annual numbers.   
 
 
 
The positive and relatively high correlation (0,57) indicate that a more appreciated 
domestic currency is related to higher import penetration levels, as expected. Although 
the correlation cannot provide any assessment of the causality, the potential 
 
143 Despite we have data for 1990, we started with 1991 because in 1990 imports were still incipient 
because of the trade liberalization was in its starting process. Therefore, using 1990 would bias the 
correlation result. 
Real exchange rate index X Import penetration coefficient 0,56669
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explanation for the relation between these two variables is straightforward: a valuation 
of the domestic currency makes the price of imports cheaper.  
 
The second comparison is between Real car price and the exchange rate index, from 
1996 to 2018. 
 
 
As expected, we had a strong negative correlation. The value of -0,66 indicates that 
real car prices move in the opposite direction of exchange rates: a depreciation of the 
domestic currency is associated with an increase in car prices in the domestic market. 
Again, this is in line with the argument that a weaker domestic currency acts as a tariff 
against imports and that this reduces import competition and thus allow for higher 
domestic prices. 
 
If we compare directly the import penetration level with the real car price level, from 
1996 to 2018, we get: 
 
 
 
Thus, we confirm that less import competition is associated with higher domestic 
prices, and vice-versa. But how the imports made by automakers with production lines 
in Brazil could affect our results` insights? The following table brings the evolution of 
car imports made by domestic producers as a % of total car imports: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rea l  exchange rate index X Rea l  car price -0,6576047
Import penetration X Real  car price -0,70863643
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Graph 20 – Relative importance of imports by domestic automakers 
 
  
The percentage of imports made by domestic automakers departed from around 65% 
between 1996 and 2000 (when imports were in any case relatively low) to around 90% 
between 2001 and 2009. The peak was in 2007, when 94% of all cars and light 
commercials imported in Brazil was done by automakers with domestic production. 
These figures were reduced to the new bottom of 76% in 2011, but quickly increased 
to an average of 83% between 2012 and 2015 and to around 91% from 2016 to 2018. 
 
We can then see from the graph that the surge in imports verified from 2004 (with a 
peak in 2011) was increasingly accompanied by an increase in competition from 
imported vehicles from producers that had no plant in Brazil: these were mainly the 
Chinese producers. The increase in market-share of imported Chinese vehicles can 
be seen as a worldwide phenomenon. What is clear, in the Brazilian case, is that 
Inovar-Auto policy - the added 35% tax on imports from producers without domestic 
production, set up in 2011/2012 - do seems to have had an impact in reducing imports 
from non-domestic producers. This effect is quite difficult to be disentangled from the 
overall fall in imports that followed the 2011 peak, but it is visible in the graph and is 
consistent with the evidence gathered in our interviews.  
 
If we take graph 20 into consideration, it seems that the relative importance of imports 
made by non-domestic producers did not change the previous result of more import 
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penetration leading to lower prices. In this sense, it could be argued that imports made 
by domestic producers can indeed add to the competition pressure in the domestic 
market. This could be the case if we assume that (i) subsidiaries exporting to Brazil 
are in fact competing with the same companies` Brazilian subsidiaries or (ii) when the 
exchange rate is overvalued, automakers choose to bring other models from 
subsidiaries outside Brazil.  
 
Now, apart from foreign competition, are domestic competition and scale also 
associated with changes in domestic prices? Comparing the level variables cars at 
constant prices with the HHI measure of concentration (a proxy for domestic 
competition), from 1996 to 2018, we get: 
 
 
 
There is a very small negative correlation between these two series of variables, 
suggesting no clear relationship. Given the low value obtained, other variables are 
probably contributing to this result, as demonstrated in the other correlation 
coefficients.  
 
Now, let’s see the relationships between real car prices and scale of production. First, 
total production (a proxy for external economies of scale), from 1996 to 2018. In this 
case we got a small negative association (-0.10). The negative signal is as expected, 
as it seems external economies of scale are affecting Brazilian automakers. Then, 
using average scale per firm, in the same years, we got a strong negative one, again, 
as expected. This means average scale per firm is associated with the reduction in 
real car prices.   
 
 
 
 
 
Ca rs  a t cons tant prices  X HHI -0,02746458
Cars  a t constant pri ces  X tota l  production -0,10737769
Cars  a t constant pri ces  X average production per fi rm -0,41154911
287 
 
Conclusions from this section 
 
Different measures generated different results of real prices` evolution for cars in Brazil 
from 1989 to 2018. The insight   is that real prices went down during the trade 
liberalization process, and that they probably went up from 1997 to 2004 and down 
again from 2005 to 2014. 
 
It seems that after the trade liberalization of early 90s, exchange rates played an 
important role in the total import barrier against imports, and the import tariff was a 
complement for that. These cost barriers to imports probably had an impact on 
domestic prices, together with an impact from the increasing domestic competition 
brought by newcomers, attracted by different industrial policies during the last 30 
years. And import competition apparently had a stronger effect on domestic prices 
than domestic competition, although it is not possible to disentangle these effects 
based solely on univariate analysis. In section 6.6 we indeed develop some 
multivariate analysis but were restricted by the low number of annual observations.   
 
Total production rose during the period, as also the number of domestic producers. 
The average scale per producer, a result from these two previous measures, showed 
an oscillated behaviour. In the qualitative chapter there was the argument that 
although new entrants may have increased domestic competition, these new entrants 
also contributed to reduce average scale vis a vis what would be observed without 
them. However, our correlation results show that average scale per firm seems to have 
had an important impact on price reduction. As said before, only a multivariate analysis 
could try to disentangle these effects.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
288 
 
 
6.4 – COMPARISON OF COST STRUCTURES AND 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
  
In this subsection we estimate a representative cost structure for autopart firms, using 
real average data, and conduct simulations to assess the relative importance and 
impact of changes in the business environment, scale, and protection levels. The 
comparison is among the average cost structure for automakers in Brazil in 2017 
versus the average cost structure of other manufacturing sectors (agricultural 
machines, motorcycle, aeronautical) in Brazil in 2017. 
 
The data collected from PIA/IBGE and is in Appendix III.  
 
As can be seen on table 15, the value added of vehicle manufacturers (here including 
not only cars and light commercials, but also chassis, buses and trucks) is relatively 
smaller than the average value added for total manufacturing. Autoparts, tractors, 
motorcycles and aircrafts, for example, all have a higher proportion of value added as 
a percentage of revenues. This suggests that automakers are directly contributing with 
a relatively small amount to the total value added in the economy, although with a high 
amount in absolute terms.  The potential explanation from the data is because vehicles 
have a relatively smaller use of labour, an important part of value added. 
 
In terms of costs, raw materials and inputs comprise on average 48% of the total costs 
incurred in the manufacturing of final goods in the vehicles, chassis and trailers 
segment. Autopart production has a similar number, with around 45% of its production 
costs coming from raw materials and inputs. These numbers contrast with the labour 
costs: they represent only 7.2% of the costs for vehicle manufactures, while 14% of 
the production costs for autopart producers.  
 
On table 15 we compare the segment of cars and light commercials with other 
segments of the automotive sector. It can be seen that wages are relatively even less 
important for automakers than for any other segment, while raw materials and inputs 
is relatively more important for automakers than for the other segments of the industry. 
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Autoparts rely relatively more on labour, and slightly less on raw materials and inputs 
than automakers.  
 
Table 15 – Comparison among sectors (vehicles and parts) 
 
 
 
Table 16 goes even further in the details, analysing the results from different autoparts. 
Brake systems parts have the lowest value-added and the highest proportion of costs 
coming from raw materials and inputs. This suggest this subsector is the closest to a 
situation of just assembling pre-built parts. On the other hand, are engine parts, 
transmission and gearbox parts, with a relative high amount of value added and a 
relatively higher participation of wages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29-VEHICLES, 
CHASSIS, TRAILLERS 
AND AUTOPARTS
29.10-CARS, SUVs 
AND LIGHT 
COMMERCIALS
29.20-TRUCKS AND 
BUSES
29.30-CABINS AND 
CHASSIS 29.4-AUTOPARTS
GROSS REVENUE AS % OF TOTAL VEHICLES, CHASSIS, TRAILERS AND AUTOPARTS
100% 53.53% 9.88% 3.63% 32.89%
WAGES AS % OF TOTAL COSTS (INTRASECTOR)
9.25% 6.33% 8.10% 15.98% 13.71%
RAW MATERIALS AND INPUTS AS % OF TOTAL COSTS (INTRASECTOR)
46.74% 48.64% 45.21% 43.12% 44.53%
FINANCIAL EXPENSES AS % OF TOTAL COSTS (INTRASECTOR)
5.00% 5.63% 2.56% 7.32% 4.45%
PROFIT BEFORE TAXES AS % OF GROSS REVENUE FROM SALES AND SERVICES (INTRASECTOR)
-5.53% -6.72% -6.43% -5.43% -3.32%
VALUE ADDED AS % OF GROSS REVENUE FROM SALES AND SERVICES (INTRASECTOR)
12.87% 7.98% 9.32% 19.11% 21.14%
Data source: PIA/IBGE. Calculations by the author
COMPARISON AMONG SECTORS - SELECTED INDICATORS (VEHICLES AND PARTS)
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Table 16 – Comparison among subsectors - autoparts 
 
 
With these data we carry on a sensitivity analysis, to verify how performance and 
competitiveness could be affected by changes in variables related to: a) trade barriers; 
b) business environment; c) scale of production; d) specialization and labour 
productivity. 
 
On table 17 we see that, for cars and light commercials, the total costs potentially 
affected by trade tariffs are 46.35% of the total gross revenue, while the total costs 
potentially affected by the business environment are 12,67% of the total gross 
revenue. These are of course estimates of the direct impact, as the business 
environment can also affect the purchase process of inputs and industrial services. 
 
For the autopart sector the situation is: the total costs potentially affected by trade 
tariffs are 42.13% of the total gross revenue, while the total costs potentially affected 
by the business environment are 11.18% of the total gross revenue. These are, as 
said before, estimates only of the direct impact, as the business environment can also 
affect the purchase process of inputs and industrial services. 
 
29.4-
AUTOPARTS
29.41-ENGINE 
PARTS
29.42-
TRANSMISSIONS 
AND GEARBOX 
PARTS
29.43-BREAK 
SYSTEM PARTS
29.44-DRIVING 
WHEEL AND 
BUMPER 
SYSTEMS PARTS
29.45-ELECTRIC 
AND ELCTRONIC 
MATERIAL 
PARTS, EXCEPT 
BATTERIES
29.49-OTHER 
AUTOPARTS
GROSS REVENUE AS % OF TOTAL AUTOPARTS
100% 16.32% 9.36% 6.25% 10.35% 18.72% 39.00%
WAGES AS % OF TOTAL COSTS (INTRASECTOR)
13.71% 15.55% 15.58% 11.47% 11.67% 13.74% 13.28%
RAW MATERIALS AND INPUTS AS % OF TOTAL COSTS (INTRASECTOR)
44.53% 36.20% 42.69% 54.77% 50.83% 38.84% 48.36%
FINANCIAL EXPENSES AS % OF TOTAL COSTS (INTRASECTOR)
4.45% 5.78% 2.97% 3.01% 4.99% 3.24% 4.92%
PROFIT BEFORE TAXES AS % OF GROSS REVENUE FROM SALES AND SERVICES (INTRASECTOR)
-3.32% -4.29% -3.23% -5.35% -1.98% -4.04% -2.61%
VALUE ADDED AS % OF GROSS REVENUE FROM SALES AND SERVICES (INTRASECTOR)
21.14% 26.49% 22.40% 13.56% 16.95% 22.03% 20.49%
Data source: PIA/IBGE. Calculations by the author
COMPARISON AMONG SECTORS - SELECTED INDICATORS (AUTOPARTS)
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Table 17 – Costs affected by tariffs and by the business environment 
 
 
Given these results, in table 18 we undertake an exercise to simulate the impact of a 
trade liberalization that reduces tariffs for inputs and autoparts to zero. This would 
generate a cost reduction of 6% of the total production costs for automakers. This, in 
terms of final prices, would be a relatively small number.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29.10-CARS, SUVs 
AND LIGHT 
COMMERCIALS 29.4-AUTOPARTS
TOTAL GROSS REVENUE FROM SALES AND SERVICES 149,928,958.00 92,114,219.00
TOTAL NET REVENUE (-TAXES AND RETURNED ITEMS + OTHER INCOMES) 131,445,776.00 79,456,549.00
TOTAL COSTS AFFECTED BY TRADE TARIFFS 69,526,136.00 38,840,321.00
PURCHASES OF RAW MATERIALS AND INPUTS 68,845,458.00 36,738,668.00
PARTS, ACESSORIES AND SMALL TOOLS 137,093.00 1,110,297.00
INDUSTRIAL SERVICES 543,585.00 991,356.00
TOTAL COSTS AFFECTED BY THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 19,012,843.00 10,309,928.00
FUEL FOR MACHINES 168,158.00 317,876.00
ELETRICITY 497,057.00 1,531,775.00
FREIGHT 3,340,817.00 1,068,195.00
TAXES 769,676.00 532,212.00
INSURANCE 93,027.00 104,027.00
PASSIVE MONETARY VARIATIONS 6,110,526.00 3,014,181.00
FINANCIAL EXPENSES 7,966,234.00 3,669,349.00
WATER AND SEWAGE 67,348.00 72,313.00
TOTAL COSTS AND EXPENSES 141,527,273.00 82,510,239.00
PROFIT BEFORE TAXES
PROFIT BEFORE TAXES -10,081,497.00 -3,053,690.00
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Table 18 – Scenario 1: trade tariffs to zero 
 
 
In table 19 we undertake a similar exercise, but this time regarding an improvement in 
the business environment. It is not straightforward to calculate cost reductions directly 
transform from changes in business environment indexes. To avoid such heroic 
exercise, we opted for calculating the impact of a change in the interest rates. This 
variable is perhaps the most representative of the business environment, as the most 
successful countries tend either to have more monetary stability in the long-term (thus, 
lower interest rates), and also a better institutional environment to issue debt at lower 
interest rates.  
 
The baseline annual interest rate set by the Brazilian Central Bank was 6.5% on 31 
December 2018. This interest rate target felt, gradually, from 14,25% between 
2015/2016 to the 6.5% level on early 2018. This directly impacts the costs related to 
“financial expenses”. In our exercise this accounts for 5,63% of the total costs for 
automakers, and 4,45% for autoparts. If the interest rate is set to zero, financial 
expenses would go to zero. Therefore, the savings would be almost 6% for 
automakers. Again, in terms of final prices, would be a relatively small number. 
 
Another cost item potentially directly affected by a better business environment would 
be freight. Data on the costs to import autoparts, from the 2018 Doing Business 
Report144 point to 1.076 US dollars. The same data for New Zealand, the best overall 
 
144 Documentary and border compliance costs, gathered by the Doing Business Report, 2018, from the 
World Bank. Available at https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-
HOW TO CALCULATE
Initial  tariffs for inputs and autoparts: 14%
Assuming complete passtrough from tariffs to prices, tariff reduction would reduce the costs of
raw materials, inputs, autoparts, acessories, small tools and industrial services.
Conversion factor for initial  prices of inputs and autoparts without the tariffs (100/(1+14%))/100: 0,88
Cost reduction of inputs and autoparts: 12,28%
CARS, SUVs AND LIGHT COMMERCIALS AUTOPARTS
Cost reduction:
8.538.297,40 4.769.863,98
Cost reduction as % of total  costs
6,03% 5,78%
SCENARIO 1 - TRADE TARIFFS REDUCED TO ZERO
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business environment according to the report, points to 447 US dollars, and for the UK 
or Portugal, both at the best in this particular indicator, the cost is zero. However, there 
is no comprehensive and internationally comparable data on domestic freight costs 
using the different transport modes. If we arbitrary assume a potential freight cost 
reduction of 50%, we would be arriving at another 0.65% to 1.2% reduction in total 
costs.  
 
Table 19 – Scenario 2 – Interest rates to zero 
 
 
 
Conclusions from this section 
 
The maximum direct cost reductions that would be possible with a zero-import tariff 
for inputs would be around 6%, for automakers and autopart producers alike. On the 
other hand, the maximum direct cost reductions that would be possible with a zero 
interest rates (a proxy for the ceiling in terms of business environment improvement) 
would be around 5,6% for automakers and 4,5% for autopart producers. 
 
As said before, these cost reductions are only the direct ones. Such changes in tariffs 
and interest rates would affect the entire supply chain, thus potentially increasing the 
effect of cost reductions. 
 
 
Reports/English/DB2018-Full-Report.pdf . According to the Report, for the calculations it is assumed 
the import of containerized auto parts from the most important trade partner for these goods.  
HOW TO CALCULATE
Initial  financial expenses:
CARS, SUVs AND LIGHT COMMERCIALS: 7.966.234,00
AUTOPARTS: 3.669.349,00
Assume interest rates go to zero.
The result would be financial expenses (interest rates on financing) also beeing zero.
CARS, SUVs AND LIGHT COMMERCIALS AUTOPARTS
Cost reduction:
7.966.234,00 3.669.349,00
Cost reduction as % of total  costs
5,63% 4,45%
SCENARIO 2 - INTEREST RATES REDUCED TO ZERO
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Although we used interest rates as a proxy, there is scope for further improvements in 
the business environment affecting the cost of freight.   
 
Tariffs and business environment thus seem to have a similar (in value) contribution 
to total costs.    
 
 
 
 
6.5 – Estimation of changes in Total Factor Productivity for 
the Brazilian automotive sector from 1996 to 2017. 
 
 
We now check if and how the productivity of the automotive sector in Brazil evolved, 
using traditional measures of productivity. Under competition, the productivity 
behaviour is the main driver for costs, although prices can also be affected by trade 
barriers and other entry barriers, as seen in the previous subsections. 
 
Initially we will provide an overview of the key concepts necessary to proceed with the 
analysis. Productivity is a measure of efficiency and relates how well inputs are 
transformed into outputs. There are different concepts of productivity, but the three 
most important for the study of economic production are:  
 Labour productivity: measures the efficiency of the labour force. The main 
sources of labour productivity are: a) capital per worker, reflecting that more 
machinery and tools can increase the efficiency of the worker; b) a better use 
of the capital available, by the worker, given a better training or cognitive 
abilities.  
 Capital productivity: the efficiency of the stock of capital used in production.  
 Total Factor Productivity – TFP: measures how efficiently a firm or an economy 
uses its inputs to generate its outputs, usually discounting the effect of 
increases in labour and capital and is a proxy for the technological progress.  
 
295 
 
However, TFP can be the result of many sources of efficiency, not only technological 
progress. Among these there are the gains from economies of scale and market-share 
reallocation, for example.  
 
As summarized by Van Ark (2014), potential sources of TFP thus include a myriad of 
factors, from where we point the following as examples: 
 Economies of scale; 
 Network effects; 
 Better allocation of resources (via competition, for example); 
 Labour and capital quality improvements; 
 Better institutions; 
 Innovations and adoption of new technologies etc. 
 
Van Ark, Bart (2014). Total factor productivity: Lessons from the past and directions 
for the future, NBB Working Paper, No. 271, National Bank of Belgium, Brussels. 
Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144483 
 
As already discussed in the conceptual chapter, economies of scale relate the 
reduction of average production costs to the increase in production size. As potential 
sources of economies of scale we could cite: 
 Increasing returns to scale within the firm production function (thus, a source of 
technical efficiency145); 
 Spreading of fixed costs; 
 More labour specialization and learning; 
 More negotiation power for input purchases, including finance. 
 
Increasing returns to scale is a concept slightly different from economies of scale, as 
the former only implies that output grows more than proportionally to the increase in 
inputs, given the technical characteristic of the production function of the firm. It is 
therefore only one of the many potential sources of economies of scale.  
 
 
145 Technical efficiency can be viewed as a situation where the producer reaches maximum output with 
minimum cost. 
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A better use of installed capacity can also promote economies of scale gains.146 
Besides economies of scale, there are other sources of productivity and thus ways to 
reduce average costs: 
 Technical efficiency not related to scale (maximum output with minimum cost, 
as already mentioned); 
 Allocative efficiency not related to scale147 (how well inputs are combined to 
produce an output).  
 
The standard way to estimate the Total Factor Productivity is using a production 
function to obtain the TFP as a residual, after measuring the effects of capital and 
labour on production. As it is calculated as a residual, its measurement quality 
depends on the measurement quality of the other factors that enter the production 
function. The literature suggests different ways to measure the contribution of capital 
and labour, and sometimes accounting for other factors as well, that enter the 
production either independently, or interacting with the original labour or capital 
measure. For example, the use of a measure of human capital as part of the production 
function, for the calculations of TFP148.   
 
The usual production function is a Cobb-Douglas one, and therefore it is necessary to 
obtain the right share of capital and labour in that economy or sector, to properly set 
up the function.  
 
The results for the TFP evolution in Brazil were very diverse, because it depends on 
the time-period reported, on the sectors included, on the type of measurement and 
data used for the production factors, and on the production function itself. Therefore, 
it is quite difficult to provide useful accounts of the results from the literature. The main 
message that is possible to extracted from key studies – for Brazil - is that overall TFP: 
 
146 Nonetheless, capacity utilization refers to producing at an output below the rated capacity of a given plant, 
and economies of scale refers to the fact that larger size plants have lower costs. 
147 One way to understand how allocative efficiency operates is to think of a technology that reduce the 
cost of some input (or bring a new and more productive input) but requires a complementary input. An 
eventual lack of this complementary input (in quantity or quality) would reduce the allocative efficiency 
(potentially departing further away from the maximum allocative efficiency point where the marginal rate 
of technical substitution equals the ratio of input prices).  
148 Taking labour as an example, it can be understood as the result of labour supply (quantity) and 
human capital (quality). A higher human capital would lead to higher labour productivity. 
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 Decreased in the 80s; 
 Increased after the trade liberalization of early nineties, but at a low rate, as it 
combined a faster increase in the early nineties with a slower increase – or even 
a decrease – in the late nineties; 
 Increased in the 2000`s at a faster pace, on average; 
 Decreased in the 2010`s. 
 
Overall, between the 90`s and the 2010`s it seems that TFP in Brazil also lagged in 
relative terms with the technological frontier (the United States). The literature 
suggests that the main contributors to Brazilian economic growth from the 90`s to the 
2010`s were factor accumulation, not TFP:  both an increase in the labour supply 
together with an improvement in labour capital (quality of labour, resulting from 
improvements in education) and capital accumulation. In fact, it is argued that the main 
drag was the low levels of competition and exit rates within economic sectors149.   
 
These measures can be misleading because some studies combine the results from 
extractive industries with manufacturing sectors. Moreover, some studies include in 
their analyses the agriculture, the services and the industrial sectors all together. This 
can hide important differences: agriculture TFP increased strongly, at a faster pace 
than the technological frontier, while manufacturing`s TFP decreased, even in 
absolute terms in some periods of time150.  
 
We will provide an account of the evolution of TFP for the automotive sector - isolated 
from other sectors - thus allowing an analysis with our other quantitative and qualitative 
results.   
In this subsection we do not intend to provide an exhaustive study of the evolution and 
determinants of the TFP for the Brazilian automotive sector, but only obtain another 
piece of information, to be contrasted with all other data we have, enhancing our 
triangulation methodology.  
 
149 Qian, Araújo and Nucifora (2018). Brazil’s Productivity Dynamics. The World Bank. 
150 According to Barbosa Filho, Pessoa, and Veloso (2010), the weak performance of TFP during the 
80s is shared mainly with other Latin American countries, suggesting that common characteristics of 
this region could explain it. 
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The production function is the following: 
 
 
𝑌𝑡 = At(𝐾𝑡) (L𝑡)  
 
Where Alfa is the share of income from capital in the total income and 1-alfa is the 
share of labour151. K is the stock of physical capital, L is the stock of Labour, A is the 
Total Factor Productivity, and Y is the total production. Both L and K can be adjusted 
to incorporate variables that can make them more realistic.  
 
To estimate aggregated TFP using the accounting process we do not need to run any 
econometric regression, but only to get data for the selected variables and organize 
them into a specific production function. Following the literature this will be a Cobb-
Douglas. We then apply natural logarithms and difference it in relation to time (getting 
a measure of variation). The transformed Cobb-Douglas production function is then 
expressed as: 
 
𝛥𝐴 = 𝛥𝑌 − 𝛼𝛥𝐾 − (1 − 𝛼)𝛥𝐿 
 
 
The following table brings a list of alternative measures for K, L and Y, usually used in 
the literature that calculates the TFP for Brazil (if not explicitly stated, the calculations 
are for the overall economy, not only for the manufacturing sector): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
151 This would be true under the hypothesis that labour marginal productivity equals wage, and capital 
marginal productivity equals the interest rate, their remuneration.  
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Table 20 – Different measures of Y, K, L and α 
Authors and scope 
considered in this 
review 
Y K L α 
(capital 
income 
over 
total 
income) 
Barboa Filho, Pessoa, 
and Veloso (2010): 
overall economy 
GDP at 
constant prices, 
from National 
Accounts at 
IBGE. 
Stock of capital, calculated 
using the method of 
investment and 
depreciation, adjusted by 
the capacity utilization 
Number of 
hours 
adjusted by a 
measure of 
human capital 
0,4 
Gazzoli and Messa 
(2017)²: industrial 
sector (manufacturing 
and extractive industry) 
Gross Revenue Capital stock, derived by 
the author following a 
methodology as in Alves e 
Silva (2008) 
Employed 
personnel 
Data at 
firm level 
Messa (2017): 
industrial sector 
(manufacturing and 
extractive industry) 
Value added Methodology from Alves 
and Silva (2008) 
Average 
number of 
workers in the 
year 
Data at 
firm level 
Hidalgo and Mata 
(2009): industrial 
sector (manufacturing 
and extractive industry) 
Value of 
industrial 
transformation 
for each firm 
Energy consumption Total 
employment 
Data at 
firm level 
Ellery (2017): overall 
economy 
GDP at 
constant prices, 
from National 
Accounts at 
IBGE. 
Stock of capital, calculated 
using the method of 
investment and 
depreciation. 
Hours worked 0.4 
Gomes, Pessoa, and 
Veloso (2003): overall 
economy 
GDP Stock of capital, calculated 
using the method of 
investment and 
depreciation. 
Employed 
personnel 
0.4 
BONELLI and 
FONSECA (1998)¹: 
manufacturing sector 
Physical 
production OR 
value added 
Electricity consumption, 
from Eletrobras 
Employed 
personnel in 
manufacturing 
0.6 
¹Based on section 4.2 (TFP for the manufacturing sector). 
²As observed by Bonelli and Fonseca (1998), when we use Gross Revenue as a proxy for Y we need 
to include intermediate goods in the equation. Gazzoli, Emerson, and Messa, Alexandre (2017) included 
this variable and also used it as an instrumental variable for their econometric specification.  
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As seen, for the manufacturing sector in Brazil “α” have been usually estimated as 0.6, 
while for the whole economy it is around 0.4. We will then use 0.6 as the share of 
capital in the income of the automotive sector in Brazil. For “Y” we use the value added 
(value of industrial transformation, from PIA/IBGE), for “K” we use energy consumption 
(electricity and fuel)152, for “L” we use the total employment in production on 
31/December for each year153. Our data covers from 1996 to 2017.  
 
Graph 21 – Labour productivity and capital intensity – automotive 
sector 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
As can be seen from graph “21”, labour productivity increase from 1996 to 2008 can 
be almost entirely explained by the increase in capital intensity. Similarly, labour 
productivity decreasing from 2008 to 2015 can be explained by the fall in capital 
intensity. In comparison with the overall manufacturing industry, the automotive sector 
is a capital-intensive industry, and thus it is expected that labour productivity is 
significantly affected by the intensity in capital using. If we look at the overall 
 
152 This measure is better than the stock of capital or the investment in machines, as electricity and fuel 
used in production can account for idle capacity. 
153 Initially we would use the average employment in production, but there is an important break in 2007, 
when IBGE moves from CANE 1.0 to CNAE 2.0. The measure used instead does not present such 
problem. However, we acknowledge that would be better to use a measure of the number of hours 
worked, as this would account for differences in working hours. Moreover, we did not adjust it for 
changes in human capital.  
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manufacturing in Brazil, this relationship is weaker: labour productivity increased at a 
much slower pace than capital intensity (graph “22”). 
 
Graph 22 – Labour productivity and capital intensity – overall 
manufacturing 
 
 
TFP variation can be explained by the changes in production scale. Graph “23” shows 
a very synchronized path between these two variables, and the relatively small 
differences could be easily attributed to measurement error.  
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Graph 23 – Changes in TFP explained by changes in production scale 
 
 
The first conclusion from this is that scale of production was the main driver of both 
TFP and labour productivity (through capital intensity) for the Brazilian automotive 
sector. 
 
In this sense, the data does not allow us to observe trends for TFP or labour 
productivity, free from the effect of changes in production scale.  We can, however, 
compare the evolution of the TFP index for the automotive sector and for the overall 
manufacturing industry. Graph “24” does this. What can be observed is that the 
automotive industry strongly increased its scale (and thus its TFP) from 2005 to 2014, 
followed by a steep fall in 2014-2016. The overall manufacturing industry has been 
showing a decrease in TFP since 1999. This can corroborate the argument that the 
automotive sector was the beneficiary of several subsidies and industrial policies 
aimed to foster its scale, but these were short-lived, as the sector suffered relatively 
more in the following 2014-2016 crisis. 
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Graph 24 – TFP index for the automotive sector and for the overall 
manufacturing sector 
 
 
Conclusions from this section 
 
Labour productivity increase from 1996 to 2008 can be almost entirely explained by 
the increase in capital intensity, and labour productivity decreasing from 2008 to 2015 
can be explained by the fall in capital intensity154. In comparison with the overall 
manufacturing industry, the automotive sector is a capital-intensive industry, and thus 
it is expected that labour productivity is significantly affected by the intensity in capital 
using. If we look at the overall manufacturing in Brazil, this relationship is weaker: 
labour productivity increased at a much slower pace than capital intensity. 
 
Thus, within the Brazilian automotive sector, between 1996 and 2017, labour 
productivity can be explained by changes in capital intensity. Total Factor Productivity, 
however, seems to do not have contributed to the overall productivity, as most of the 
variation follows the changes in production scale. The automotive industry strongly 
increased its scale (and thus its TFP) from 2003 to 2008, followed by a period of small 
falls and then a steep fall in 2014-2016. Meanwhile, the overall manufacturing industry 
has been showing a decrease in TFP since 1999. This can corroborate the argument 
 
154 This was probably the result of an increase in the number of workers that was higher than the increase in 
total value-added. 
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that the automotive sector was the beneficiary of several subsidies and industrial 
policies aimed to foster its scale, but these were short-lived, as the sector suffered 
relatively more in the following 2014-2016 crisis. 
 
Apart from the very early years after the trade liberalization of 1990`s, since then very 
little changed in terms of efficiency (TFP). Apparently, production scale is the main 
driver for productivity in the automotive sector in Brazil. 
 
 
 
6.6 – Linear regression analysis (multifactorial) 
 
As we cannot use randomized experiments (experimental design), we need to take 
into consideration all variables that could have an important effect on the dependant 
variable, either directly or indirectly. The methods to be deployed here can be 
classified as quasi-experimentals. They can only infer causality, never prove it. 
However, we do can obtain a stronger claim if we make a proper use of the best 
available methods in conjunction with an underlying context, based both on theory and 
other data sources. This will allow us to interpret the results even if they are statistically 
fragile, as our sample size is quite small. As we work with only 23 annual observations, 
we need to use the minimum number of explanatory variables and also interpret the 
statistical results with more leniency. To achieve this, the relationships among all 
variables needs to be understood to a high degree, meaning that our statistical tests 
need to be well grounded by either theory or strong empirical evidence, even by 
observation. This, together with the timing order, also helps to assess the direction of 
causality.   
 
The understanding of each variable under use comes from our literature review, our 
interviews (qualitative chapter) and the previous subsections of this quantitative 
chapter. 
 
Thus, complementing the statistical analysis developed in the previous subsections, 
we now use quantitative data to perform a linear regression analysis. The aim is still 
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to describe relationships among variables of interest, seeking evidence of potential 
causal relationships (although, as explained before, this is never adamant without a 
randomized control trial). We are not interested in estimation for predicting future 
values, therefore our chosen techniques need only to give us insights about the 
statistical significance and the direction of effect (signal of the variable). 
 
We test both univariable and multivariable regressions. Although linear regression is 
able to show the individual effects of each explanatory variable on the explained 
variable, any combined contribution (linear relationship) from any two or more 
explanatory variables will be not counted as an individual effect of any of those 
variables.  Thus, if there is a high degree of linear relationship among the chosen 
explanatory variables, the model will lose explanatory power. On the other hand, with 
lower degrees of linear relationship among the explanatory variables, a more complete 
model (with more explanatory variables) may not only give us the effect of the other 
variables, but also better explain the true effect of the variable previously taken as the 
only explanatory variable in a univariate regression.  
 
 In other words, as stated in Kennedy (2008)155: using separated equations, each for 
a different explanatory variable, can generate more bias because all collinear effects 
of the omitted variables could be captured by the explanatory variable156. However, 
using a multivariable single equation could increase our variance, as the combined 
effects of any linearly related variables would be discharged. As best practice we 
therefore need to either ensure that our explanatory variables are not strongly linearly 
related or proceed using separated equations. 
 
First, we will present the models tested that did not perform well, or the specifications 
that could be useful to our study but were not pursued because of data limitations. 
This exposition can provide some insights from the unsuccessfully specifications and 
tests. Later, we present the tests and results we consider as meaningful, from the point 
of view of getting more evidence to understand overall relationships. As explained 
 
155 Kennedy, Peter. A Guide to Econometrics, 6th edition. 2008  
156 The information that is not colinear and belongs to omitted variables would be reflected in the error term. 
306 
 
before, we are not interested in make predictions or in assess the exact size of any 
parameter – therefore, our data limitations are not that limiting for our purposes. 
 
Equations not successfully specified and tested 
 
Our variables of interest were chosen on the basis of what was suggested by our 
previous analysis as important, but we needed to confront this with data availability. 
Based on the qualitative and quantitative results obtained so far, the main dependent 
variables we would be interested in are proxies for competitiveness and market 
behavior. Focusing on the dynamics of the Brazilian automotive sector and given data 
constraints we therefore had the following options: 
 
a) A time series to explain our calculated TFP variation as a function of variation in 
the foreign competition, in the domestic competition, in the scale of production, and 
also the Program Inovar-Auto. For proxy for foreign competition we have a variable 
comprising the real effective exchange rate and the tariffs applied to vehicle 
imports. Domestic competition is proxied by our calculated concentration index – 
HHI. Total scale of production is the direct measure used in previous subsections 
and that seemed to be the most important driver for TFP. However, we believe that 
the variable related to competition would have to be lagged in order to impact TFP, 
as this productivity measure is arguably the result of advancements in technology 
potentially driven by learning from workers and managers and also implementation 
of new techniques and tools. All this is supposed to take some time to respond to 
competition, while the effects of scale would be more direct. Given our annual data 
limited number of observations any lagged variable will reduce our degrees of 
freedom. Therefore, we applied just one-year lag for both REER+TARIFS and HHI. 
We chose to use the variation of variables, instead of the level variables. Our model 
was: 
 
∆𝑇𝐹𝑃 =  𝛼    + 𝛽 ∆(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠) +  𝛽 ∆(𝐻𝐻𝐼) +  𝛽 ∆(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒) +  𝜇 + 𝜀 
 
Where: 
 TFP: total factor productivity 
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 REER+tariffs: the sum of the real effective exchange rate and the import tariffs 
applied for final goods (cars) – it is our proxy for foreign competition 
 HHI: Concentration index for the domestic market production of cars and light 
commercials – It is our proxy for domestic competition. 
 Total scale: total scale of cars and light commercial production in Brazil – it is 
our proxy for costs. 
 
This model aimed to provide evidence of the relative importance of total scale, 
domestic competition, and foreign competition (real or potential), on TFP. If total scale 
was confirmed to be the main – or the sole, driver of TFP, as suggested by the previous 
subsection, we would have more evidence that there was no real technological 
advance applied in the goods of the process of car production in Brazil other than the 
ones resulting from a better allocation of production factors allowed by scale or a 
higher capital intensity.  .   
 
However, the model did not perform well. There was unit root even using differencing 
variables, and the coefficients were not significant.  
 
b) A time series to explain domestic prices 
 
Based on the previous data we considered that would be insightful to make a 
multifactorial analysis to test the relative importance of domestic competition and 
foreign competition, to the prices and to the mark-ups of automakers. As proxy for 
foreign competition we would use either a combination of exchange rate and tariffs, or 
the import penetration coefficient. The first option is indirect but can encompass 
potential foreign competition. The second option is direct but can include imports by 
the domestic automakers that do not compete with domestic production in a stricter 
sense. For domestic competition, our proxy is the HHI index.  
 
The equations would have other explanatory variables, to control for other important 
sources of price or markup variation, but also to test the relative importance of these 
sources as well: a measure of the total scale in the industry, to capture eventual costs 
savings given economies of scale; and the GDP as a proxy for demand. The scale 
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measure, as a variable that impacts costs, is expected to impact markups, but not 
necessarily prices, as the industry is not under perfect competition (price is not equal 
to marginal cost).  
 
We also could add a dummy variable to test for the effects of Inovar Auto. However, 
as we are working with annual observations between 1996 and 2017, and the Program 
was in place between 2012 and 2017, the number of observations is probably too 
small to meaningfully test this effect. Nonetheless, the signal of the dummy could at 
least indicate if the policy was important enough to have had some impact on prices 
or markups. This suspicion about its impact comes from the potential prominence of 
exchange rate movements: a) Inovar Auto just added tariff protection to an exposed 
domestic market, suffering from imports brought by an overvalued Real, in 2012/2013, 
thus potentially only contributing to cease the growth of imports in the first two years; 
b) but since 2013/2014 the Real started its devaluation and then Inovar tariffs could 
be simply redundant, given the exchange rate levels; c) our interviews pointed that 
Inovar Auto successfully stopped the imports of low-cost Chinese cars. But these were 
just part of the overall imports. Thus, regressing this dummy variable to the prices or 
markups of the entire domestic industry is expected to generate either non-significant 
results or a very small value. 
 
The specifications we tested involved as dependent variables: constant car prices; 
mark-ups for cars; and mark-ups for autoparts. We tested all of them both as level and 
as variation. The first model was  
 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
=  𝛼    +  𝛽 ∆(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠) + 𝛽 ∆(𝐻𝐻𝐼) +  𝛽 ∆(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒)
+  𝛽   (𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟 − 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜) + 𝛽 ∆(𝐺𝐷𝑃) + 𝜇 + 𝜀 
  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
=  𝛼    + 𝛽 (𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠) + 𝛽 (𝐻𝐻𝐼) +  𝛽 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒)
+  𝛽   (𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟 − 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜) +  𝛽 (𝐺𝐷𝑃) + 𝜇 + 𝜀 
 
309 
 
 
The model was not significant overall. Prices are relatively stable in the short run. 
Moreover, HHI has a downward trend, while total scale an upward trend, making very 
difficult to have any impact of both variables on a relatively constant dependent 
variable such as car prices. 
 
 
Equations specified and tested 
 
The last model tested were the ones with “markup” as the dependent variable. This 
was calculated using data from PIA/IBGE, considering all manufacturing firms with 
more than 5 employees operating in the sector under study, in the following way: 
 
(Total gross revenue of industrial goods (R$) – Total costs and expenses (R$)) 
(Total costs and expenses (R$)) 
 
However, we reckoned that this variable is problematic. One reason for this is that 
markups may measure only a “dirty” competitiveness, as they usually follow the 
business cycle, thus not being a good proxy for competitiveness. Moreover, markups 
can be an indicator of market power with very few relation to competitiveness. Finally, 
as the markup measures collected from IBGE are the ones derived from what the firms 
declare, there may be accounting practices and incentives that make profits appear to 
be smaller than what they really are.   
 
1) Markup for cars and light commercials 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑠
= 𝑎 + 𝛽  (𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠) + 𝛽  (𝐻𝐻𝐼) + 𝛽  (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽  (𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟)
+ 𝜇 + 𝜖 
∆𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑠
= 𝑎 + 𝛽  ∆(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠) + 𝛽  ∆(𝐻𝐻𝐼) + 𝛽  ∆(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒)
+ 𝛽  ∆(𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟) + 𝜇 + 𝜖 
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The basic characteristics of the data is in the summary table 21: 
 
 
Table 21 
 
 
The list and details of each variable is the following: 
 REERTARIFFs is a combination of exchange rates and tariffs. When this 
variable increase, it means that the Brazilian Real lost value. Tariffs are treated 
as another layer of this loss of domestic currency value, as both movements 
make imports less competitive. 
 HHI is just the measure of concentration: a lower HHI means lower 
concentration. 
 Ytotal is the total scale of production of all automakers together. 
 Dummy Inovar is a dummy for the years were Inovar Auto was valid. 
 
From inspection of the graph, our dependent variable is normally distributed.  
 
      YTOTAL           23     2399855      668380    1281463    3494014
                                                                       
         HHI           23    2020.273    512.1239   1198.653   2928.084
 REERTARIFFS           23    1.820614     .321951   1.294704   2.422167
 DUMMYINOVAR           23    .2608696    .4489778          0          1
   CARMARKUP           22    .0024674    .1036974  -.1759663   .2049696
        Time           23        2007     6.78233       1996       2018
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize
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However, neither of the independent variables is normally distributed: 
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Thus, our t-statistics would be inefficient, and a parameter significance needs to be 
seen as just loosely indicative. 
 
 
1.1 Full multivariate model: 
 
Table 22 
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YTOTAL
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2543192   .3083278    -0.82   0.421    -.9048339    .3961956
      YTOTAL     9.74e-08   4.09e-08     2.38   0.029     1.11e-08    1.84e-07
         HHI      .000085    .000066     1.29   0.215    -.0000542    .0002241
 REERTARIFFS    -.0730251   .0683744    -1.07   0.300    -.2172824    .0712322
 DUMMYINOVAR    -.0613633   .0556291    -1.10   0.285    -.1787304    .0560038
                                                                              
   CARMARKUP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .225816065        21  .010753146   Root MSE        =    .07137
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5263
    Residual    .086590818        17  .005093578   R-squared       =    0.6165
       Model    .139225247         4  .034806312   Prob > F        =    0.0018
                                                   F(4, 17)        =      6.83
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        22
. reg CARMARKUP DUMMYINOVAR REERTARIFFS HHI YTOTAL
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There is no evidence of heteroskedasticity neither evident autocorrelation. 
 
The model is jointly significant (F statistic is significant at 1%) and has a high R2 of 
62%. However, all variables apart the total scale are statistically insignificant. Despite 
this, as our independent variables are not normally distributed, we may have flawed t-
tests. 
 
Moreover, the correlation matrix among the independent variables show that some of 
these are strongly correlated, and therefore the model presents higher variance due 
to the very small amount of information left in the data, after the model discount all 
collinear movements of each pair of variables.  
 
Table 23 
 
 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic(  5,    22) =  1.842821
. estat dwatson
         Prob > chi2  =   0.3098
         chi2(1)      =     1.03
         Variables: fitted values of CARMARKUP
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. estat hettest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.3098
         chi2(1)      =     1.03
         Variables: fitted values of CARMARKUP
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. estat hettest, mtest
REERTARIFFS HHI YTOTAL Dummy Inovar
REERTARIFFS -0.1364 -0.4507 0.2595
HHI -0.1364 -0.6068 -0.6850
YTOTAL -0.4507 -0.6068 0.3584
Dummy Inovar 0.2595 -0.6850 0.3652
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Inovar Dummy and HHI are the highest correlation, but all others have relatively high 
correlations as well, indicating that, given the low amount of data we need to be very 
parsimonious. Therefore, to provide insights beyond a simple correlation (provided by 
a univariate model), we chose to run the following models with two independent 
variables: 
 
MARKUPcars = f(REERTARIFS + HHI), to assess the relative importance of foreign 
and domestic competition; 
 
MARKUPcars = f(REERTARIFS + TotalScale), to assess the relative importance of 
prices and costs; 
 
MARKUPcars = f(REERTARIFS + Inovar), to assess the relative contribution of Inovar 
Auto, beyond the exchange rate movements. 
 
1.2 MARKUPcars = f(REERTARIFS + HHI) 
 
Table 24 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2963635   .1354924     2.19   0.041     .0127747    .5799522
         HHI      .000033   .0000362     0.91   0.375    -.0000429    .0001088
 REERTARIFFS    -.1980338   .0544687    -3.64   0.002    -.3120382   -.0840294
                                                                              
   CARMARKUP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .225816065        21  .010753146   Root MSE        =    .08068
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3947
    Residual    .123661061        19  .006508477   R-squared       =    0.4524
       Model    .102155004         2  .051077502   Prob > F        =    0.0033
                                                   F(2, 19)        =      7.85
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        22
. reg CARMARKUP REERTARIFFS HHI
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There is evidence of some autocorrelation, as would be expected from the deliberate 
omission of variables. 
 
The model is jointly significant (F statistic is significant at 1%) and has a high R2 of 
45%, lower than the full model, as expected.  The variable that accounts for exchange 
rates and tariffs (REERTARIFS) is significant at 1%, while HHI is not significant. The 
signal of REERTARIFFS is negative, meaning that a loss in the value of the Real 
reduce markups. This would not be expected if one thinks that a devaluation of the 
currency – or the imposition of more tariffs, would make imports less competitive and 
therefore increase markups. However, as most imports that follow an exchange rate 
valuation are made by domestic automakers, these imports contribute to their 
markups. Our results are then an evidence that the automakers with operations in 
Brazil can benefit from currency appreciations – at least up to a point. This caveat is 
important because, from the interviews and from earlier quantitative results we 
realized that when the exchange rate is very overvalued it becomes profitable for 
independent importers to start importing, even with all extra costs involved in terms of 
marketing and setting low scale operations. Moreover, an increase in the value of the 
exchange rate also reduce the costs of production – one of the two components of the 
markup.  
Durbin-Watson d-statistic(  3,    22) =  1.525813
. estat dwatson
         Prob > chi2  =   0.8593
         chi2(1)      =     0.03
         Variables: fitted values of CARMARKUP
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. estat hettest, mtest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.8593
         chi2(1)      =     0.03
         Variables: fitted values of CARMARKUP
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. estat hettest
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Therefore, foreign competition from automakers without operations in Brazil are 
verified only when the exchange rate is relatively sufficiently overvalued, while 
domestic competition do not seems to have impacted domestic markups. Therefore, 
this is another evidence that automakers compete in quality, not price. 
 
 1.3 MARKUPcars = f(REERTARIFS + TotalScale) 
 
Table 25 
 
 
A weaker evidence of autocorrelation, but no heteroskedasticity. 
 
       _cons     .3025878   .1556622     1.94   0.067    -.0232168    .6283925
      YTOTAL     1.90e-08   2.92e-08     0.65   0.523    -4.21e-08    8.02e-08
 REERTARIFFS    -.1891897   .0605073    -3.13   0.006    -.3158329   -.0625465
                                                                              
   CARMARKUP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .225816065        21  .010753146   Root MSE        =    .08151
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3822
    Residual    .126222361        19  .006643282   R-squared       =    0.4410
       Model    .099593704         2  .049796852   Prob > F        =    0.0040
                                                   F(2, 19)        =      7.50
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        22
. reg CARMARKUP REERTARIFFS YTOTAL
         Prob > chi2  =   0.5319
         chi2(1)      =     0.39
         Variables: fitted values of CARMARKUP
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. estat hettest, mtest
Durbin-Watson d-statistic(  3,    22) =  1.795112
. estat dwatson
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Again, the model is jointly significant (F statistic is significant at 1%) and has a high 
R2 of 44%.  The variable REERTARIFS is significant at 1%, while total scale (Ytotal) 
is not significant. The signal of REERTARIFFS is still negative, as explained above. 
Total scale affects costs, while the exchange rates and tariffs, as explained in the 
previous item, can also affect costs, because most imports are made by the same 
automakers that manufacture domestically. In this sense, given the previous results 
and insights, we cannot compare effects through costs to effects through prices. 
  
1.4 MARKUPcars = f(REERTARIFS + Inovar)   
 
Table 26 
 
 
No heteroskedasticity and just a weak autocorrelation. 
                                                                              
       _cons     .3594416     .09733     3.69   0.002     .1557274    .5631557
 DUMMYINOVAR    -.0564528   .0386511    -1.46   0.160    -.1373505    .0244448
 REERTARIFFS     -.187031   .0536609    -3.49   0.002    -.2993445   -.0747174
                                                                              
   CARMARKUP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .225816065        21  .010753146   Root MSE        =    .07814
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.4322
    Residual    .116016172        19  .006106114   R-squared       =    0.4862
       Model    .109799892         2  .054899946   Prob > F        =    0.0018
                                                   F(2, 19)        =      8.99
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        22
. reg CARMARKUP REERTARIFFS DUMMYINOVAR
Durbin-Watson d-statistic(  3,    22) =  1.795112
. estat dwatson
         Prob > chi2  =   0.5178
         chi2(2)      =     1.32
         Variables: REERTARIFFS DUMMYINOVAR
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. estat hettest, rhs
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Again, the model is jointly significant (F statistic is significant at 1%) and has a high 
R2 of 49%.  The variable REERTARIFS is significant at 1%, while the Inovar-Auto is 
not significant. The signal of REERTARIFFS is still negative, as explained above.  
 
Therefore, the evidence points to a non-contribution of Inovar on markups. This can 
be explained because as said before, domestic automakers benefit from exchange 
rate movements altering their mix of imports/domestically produced vehicles, while 
Inovar just added protection against third-country imports, without improving the 
conditions for imports by domestic automakers. Domestic automakers were allowed 
to import, under a quota, without paying the extra tariffs brought by Inovar-Auto. 
Moreover, as explained in the previous chapters, Inovar-Auto was designed to protect 
the market from new chines imports, what in fact happened. But this fact does not 
allow to have a counterfactual to test, as there was not enough time for pre-Inovar-
Auto Chinese imports to affect domestic markups in 2010.  
 
We now turn to the autopart sector. 
 
 
2) Markup for autopart producers 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠
= 𝑎 + 𝛽  (𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠) + 𝛽  (𝐻𝐻𝐼) + 𝛽  (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽  (𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟)
+ 𝜇 + 𝜖 
∆𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠
= 𝑎 + 𝛽  ∆(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠) + 𝛽  ∆(𝐻𝐻𝐼) + 𝛽  ∆(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒)
+ 𝛽  ∆(𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟) + 𝜇 + 𝜖 
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Table 27 
 
 
From inspection of the graph, our dependent variable is approximately normally 
distributed. There is no need for a normally distributed independent variable: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      YTOTAL           23     2399855      668380    1281463    3494014
                                                                       
         HHI           23    2020.273    512.1239   1198.653   2928.084
 REERTARIFFS           23    1.820614     .321951   1.294704   2.422167
 DUMMYINOVAR           23    .2608696    .4489778          0          1
AUTIOARTMA~P           22    .1620344    .0780206   .0264483   .2943843
        Time           23        2007     6.78233       1996       2018
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize
0
1
2
3
4
5
D
e
n
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3
AUTIOARTMARKUP
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2.1 Full multivariate model: 
 
Table 28 
 
There is no strong evidence of residual autocorrelation (DB statistic is close to 2) 
neither of heteroskedasticity (p-value in the Breusch Pagan test is higher than 0.05). 
 
 
The model is jointly significant (F statistic is significant at 1%) and has a very high R2 
of 87% - thus almost all variations in the markups for the autopart sector could be 
explained by the variables in the model. However, only two independent variables are 
statistically insignificant: Dummy Inoavr-Auto and Total scale (Ytotal). Despite this, as 
our independent variables are not normally distributed, we may have flawed t-tests. 
These results are not only very different from the case for automakers, but also 
       _cons     -.080165   .1351065    -0.59   0.561    -.3652147    .2048848
      YTOTAL     1.11e-07   1.79e-08     6.20   0.000     7.33e-08    1.49e-07
         HHI     .0000204   .0000289     0.71   0.490    -.0000406    .0000814
 REERTARIFFS    -.0254041    .029961    -0.85   0.408    -.0886163    .0378082
 DUMMYINOVAR    -.0665338   .0243762    -2.73   0.014     -.117963   -.0151045
                                                                              
AUTIOARTMA~P        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .127831459        21  .006087212   Root MSE        =    .03127
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.8393
    Residual    .016626425        17  .000978025   R-squared       =    0.8699
       Model    .111205034         4  .027801258   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 17)        =     28.43
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        22
. reg AUTIOARTMARKUP DUMMYINOVAR REERTARIFFS HHI YTOTAL
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encompass a different interpretation: this complete model suggests that the 
concentration among automakers do not affect the markup of autopart producers. This 
is expected, as each autopart producer has long-term supply contracts with 
automakers, thus being a variable not directly related to the concentration degree of 
the final buyers. However, the statistical insignificance could be the result of 
collinearity, as explained before, as the insignificance of the exchange rate is likely to 
be, as well.   
 
The correlation matrix among the independent variables is the same as before (table 
23), as the only difference between these two models is the dependent variable – 
automakers or autoparts. Therefore, the candidates to be dropped because of high 
correlation are the same:  Inovar X HHI and Ytotal X HHI.  
 
Thus, we proceed similarly as in the previous models, running bivariate models: 
 
MARKUPautoparts = f(REERTARIFS + HHI), to assess the relative importance of 
foreign competition with autoparts and domestic concentration of automakers. These 
two variables were statistically insignificant in the full model; 
MARKUP autoparts= f(REERTARIFS + TotalScale), to assess the relative importance 
of prices (competition with imported autoparts) and costs (purchase volumes from 
automakers); 
MARKUPautoparts = f(REERTARIFS + Inovar), to assess the relative contribution of 
Inovar Auto, beyond the exchange rate movements. 
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2.2 MARKUPautoparts = f(REERTARIFS + HHI).  
 
Table 29 
 
 
There is evidence of autocorrelation. This is expected, as we know that some variables 
were omitted. The implication is that our hypothesis tests are not efficient anymore, 
because our parameter estimations are biased. 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .5527328   .0974322     5.67   0.000     .3488048    .7566607
         HHI    -.0000413   .0000261    -1.59   0.129    -.0000959    .0000132
 REERTARIFFS    -.1674039   .0391683    -4.27   0.000    -.2493842   -.0854236
                                                                              
AUTIOARTMA~P        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .127831459        21  .006087212   Root MSE        =    .05801
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.4471
    Residual    .063945269        19   .00336554   R-squared       =    0.4998
       Model     .06388619         2  .031943095   Prob > F        =    0.0014
                                                   F(2, 19)        =      9.49
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        22
. reg AUTIOARTMARKUP REERTARIFFS HHI
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The model is jointly significant (F statistic is significant at 1%) and has a high R2 of 
50%. The two variables were statistically insignificant in the full model, but now the 
exchange rate (REERTARIFFS) is significant at 1%. This is probably due to a high 
correlation with Total scale, that is not present in this bivariate model. The signal is 
negative, however. Even considering that a devaluation of the Real (a higher 
REERTARIFFS) could reduce the markups because it increases production costs, the 
net effect should positive (accounting for less competition with imported autoparts and 
also more exports). Therefore, we suppose the model is biased because of omitted 
variables. In this sense, we cannot use the full model (because of collinearity 
problems) neither this bivariate model (because of omitted variable problems). We 
therefore test another bivariate model, without HHI, that was insignificant and is also 
very correlated with both Inovar-Auto and Total scale.  
 
 
2.3 MARKUP autoparts= f(REERTARIFS + TotalScale) 
 
Table 30 
 
 
The model is jointly significant (F statistic is significant at 1%) and has a very high R2 
of 73%. The two variables were statistically significant at 1%, but the exchange rate 
(REERTARIFFS) is still negative. 
       _cons     .1601911   .0802414     2.00   0.060    -.0077561    .3281384
      YTOTAL     7.07e-08   1.51e-08     4.69   0.000     3.92e-08    1.02e-07
 REERTARIFFS    -.0912748   .0311906    -2.93   0.009    -.1565574   -.0259922
                                                                              
AUTIOARTMA~P        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .127831459        21  .006087212   Root MSE        =    .04202
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.7100
    Residual     .03354034        19  .001765281   R-squared       =    0.7376
       Model    .094291119         2   .04714556   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 19)        =     26.71
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        22
. reg AUTIOARTMARKUP REERTARIFFS YTOTAL
324 
 
However, there is evidence of heteroskedasticity. Therefore, we run a robust standard 
error estimation: 
 
Table 31 
 
The results are similar. 
 
 
Conclusions of this section 
 
We have limitations in terms of data availability and therefore the results were 
analyzed with this in mind and with the proper care and pint of salt. However, we can 
offer some indications, or suggestions of possible insights. 
 
For automakers, Inovar-Auto just avoided a potential influx of Chinese competition, 
being innocuous in relation to the other variables under test. More importantly, a loss 
in the value of the Real reduce markups. This would not be expected if one thinks that 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0023
         chi2(2)      =    12.16
         Variables: REERTARIFFS YTOTAL
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. estat hettest, rhs
                                                                              
       _cons     .1601911   .0770827     2.08   0.051    -.0011449    .3215271
      YTOTAL     7.07e-08   8.00e-09     8.83   0.000     5.39e-08    8.75e-08
 REERTARIFFS    -.0912748   .0396701    -2.30   0.033    -.1743052   -.0082444
                                                                              
AUTIOARTMA~P        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                Root MSE          =     .04202
                                                R-squared         =     0.7376
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(2, 19)          =      75.29
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =         22
. regress AUTIOARTMARKUP REERTARIFFS YTOTAL, vce(robust)
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a devaluation of the currency – or the imposition of more tariffs, would make imports 
less competitive and therefore increase markups. However, as most imports that 
follow an exchange rate valuation are made by domestic automakers, these imports 
contribute to their markups. Our results are then an evidence that the automakers with 
operations in Brazil can benefit from currency appreciations – at least up to a point. 
This caveat is important because, from the interviews and from earlier quantitative 
results we realized that when the exchange rate is very overvalued it becomes 
profitable for independent importers to start importing, even with all extra costs 
involved in terms of marketing and setting low scale operations. Moreover, an increase 
in the value of the exchange rate also reduce the costs of production – one of the two 
components of the markup.  
 
Therefore, foreign competition from automakers without operations in Brazil are 
verified only when the exchange rate is relatively sufficiently overvalued, while 
domestic competition does not seems to have impacted domestic markups. Therefore, 
this is another evidence that automakers compete in quality, not price. 
 
For autopart producers, Inovar-Auto was not a good policy – it did not provide effective 
protection against imports, neither impacted positively on markups. This is in line with 
our interviews results. The most important factor to increase markups for autoparts is 
the growth in total production (demand) of automakers – a straightforward result. For 
the exchange rate, the effects are mixed, as with more imports from 
automakers`headquarters, there is smaller room for domestic supply of autoparts. 
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6.7 Overall conclusions from the chapter 
 
Different measures generated different results of real prices` evolution for cars in Brazil 
from 1989 to 2018. The insight is that real prices went down during the trade 
liberalization process, and that they probably went up from 1997 to 2004 and down 
again from 2005 to 2014. Despite the magnitude of the numbers, their direction and 
correlations would suggest that the real price reductions were concentrated in the 
years of trade liberalization (1990-1994), and after 2004, when the automakers that 
came to Brazil in late 90s and early 2000s started to gain scale. However, exchange 
rates seem to have had a more important effect on the real price behaviour, adding to 
the effects of tariffs. Although import competition apparently had a stronger effect on 
domestic prices than domestic competition, it is not possible to disentangle these 
effects based solely on univariate analysis. Thus, we can only say that data from prices 
indicates a degree of competition within the domestic market and with imports. The 
oligopoly structure would be non-collusive, from this perspective.  
 
Total production rose during the period, as also the number of domestic producers. 
The average scale per producer, a result from these two previous measures, showed 
an oscillated behaviour. In the qualitative chapter there was the argument that 
although new entrants may have increased domestic competition, these new entrants 
also contributed to reduce average scale vis a vis what would be observed without 
them. As said before, we need to develop a multivariate analysis to disentangle the 
effects.    
 
Adjusted prices for Toyota Corolla, among all countries that produces the car, 
indicates that Brazil would be around the higher price portion of the sample, but it is 
still not on neither extreme. If we take into account the scale of production at model 
level (thus, the production of Corollas in the plant), Brazil seems to be very close to 
the trend line that relates price and scale.  Therefore, it seems that inside the factory, 
Brazilian competitiveness is relatively well explained by its scale. However, once a 
vehicle departs the factory, transport costs and other types of costs related to the 
business environment can take a toll on this competitiveness.  
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The decisions of automakers and the evidence of the importance of scale seems 
converging. Thus, there is evidence that scale was, and it is still one of the main factors 
affecting competitiveness in an industry based on mass production and intensive in 
capital as the automotive one.   
 
Tariffs and business environment seem to have a similar (in value) contribution to total 
costs, either for automakers or for autopart producers. The maximum direct cost 
reductions that would be possible with a zero-import tariff for inputs would be around 
6%, for automakers and autopart producers alike. On the other hand, the maximum 
direct cost reductions that would be possible with a zero interest rates (a proxy for the 
ceiling in terms of business environment improvement) would be around 5,6% for 
automakers and 4,5% for autopart producers. 
 
As said before, these cost reductions are only the direct ones. Such changes in tariffs 
and interest rates would affect the entire supply chain, thus potentially increasing the 
effect of cost reductions. Moreover, although we used interest rates as a proxy, there 
is scope for further improvements in the business environment affecting the cost of 
freight.  Those values, seem similarly important in comparison to potential exchange 
rate variations: although Brazilian exchange rates can vary by far more than 6%, the 
net effect on competitiveness is always lower than the exchange rate variation itself, 
as it changes the costs for both the final goods and the inputs.  
 
Within the Brazilian automotive sector, between 1996 and 2017, labour productivity 
can be explained by changes in capital intensity, and TFP can be explained by scale 
of production (in fact, capacity utilization). The automotive industry strongly increased 
its scale (and thus its TFP) from 2005 to 2014, followed by a steep fall in 2014-2016. 
Meanwhile, the overall manufacturing industry has been showing a decrease in TFP 
since 1999. This can corroborate the argument that the automotive sector was the 
beneficiary of several subsidies and industrial policies aimed to foster its scale, but 
these were short-lived, as the sector suffered relatively more in the following 2014-
2016 crisis. 
 
Overall, the picture that emerges from the data is that: 
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a) automotive production costs and productivity in Brazil are mainly determined by 
the scale of production; 
b) prices are determined by the competition with imports, and thus by the 
exchange rate, despite the import tariffs of 35%; 
c) Tariffs on imported inputs and a bad business environment seem to be similarly 
important in the cost structure of Brazilian automakers and autopart producers. 
 
The behaviour of production in the past 30 years suggest limits for the domestic market 
scale, thus indicating that increase exports is necessary to gain competitiveness. On 
the other hand, domestic concentration indexes suggest that domestic competition do 
exist, although domestic prices are more affected by import competition. This happens 
even taking into consideration that most of the imports are made by automakers with 
domestic production.  
 
The trade liberalization of early 90s reduced prices and increased quality but is not 
possible to affirm which factor was preponderant. However, after that shock, there is 
indication that competition between automakers in Brazil is based on quality/product, 
not price – in line with the monopolistic competition model. There is also some 
evidence that prices respond to total domestic scale. 
 
If we consider that production within factories in Brazil are indeed in line with the costs 
expected given its scale, and that the main remaining factor contributing to a lower 
export competitiveness is the amount of tax that is not recoverable when exporting, 
this is an evidence that the business environment may have a bigger impact than other 
factors affecting competitiveness. However, the automakers are a sector that tend to 
suffer relatively less from the business environment, as they had access to foreign 
sources of capital at lower costs, or even domestic sources at subsidized costs 
(BNDES). This is not the case of smaller autopart producers. 
 
Autopart producers are very heterogenous: some smaller firms struggle to survive, 
while others have markup levels potentially higher than those of automakers. 
However, we could not verify the impact that potential transfer-prices within 
automakers headquarters and its subsidiaries could have on the markup measure we 
obtained. 
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For automakers, Inovar-Auto just avoided a potential influx of Chinese competition, 
being innocuous in relation to the other variables under test. More importantly, a loss 
in the value of the Real reduce markups. This would not be expected if one thinks that 
a devaluation of the currency – or the imposition of more tariffs, would make imports 
less competitive and therefore increase markups. However, as most imports that 
follow an exchange rate valuation are made by domestic automakers, these imports 
contribute to their markups. Our results are then an evidence that the automakers with 
operations in Brazil can benefit from currency appreciations – at least up to a point. 
This caveat is important because, from the interviews and from earlier quantitative 
results we realized that when the exchange rate is very overvalued it becomes 
profitable for independent importers to start importing, even with all extra costs 
involved in terms of marketing and setting low scale operations. Moreover, an increase 
in the value of the exchange rate also reduce the costs of production – one of the two 
components of the markup.  
 
Markups for automakers do oscillate in function of the industrial policies in place and 
accordingly to the domestic business cycle. This oscillation and domestic demand 
uncertainties may explain part of the relatively higher average of markup levels, in 
comparison with their operations in other countries, including headquarters. At the 
same time, this positive high markup average may explain the attractiveness of the 
domestic market to the new entrants in the past years. 
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 CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION 
 
In this conclusion we will compare and analyze the combined results of the literature 
review, the context data from chapter 4, the qualitative data study (interviews of 
chapter 5) and the quantitative exercises of chapter 6. The aim is to triangulate 
(secondary, primary qualitative and primary quantitative data) to gain further insights 
and answer our research questions.  
 
This chapter is then organized under the following sub-headings, related to the 
theoretical framework developed in chapter 2 and to our research questions presented 
in chapter 1: 
 
1. Competitiveness of the Brazilian auto industry 
2. Channels linking trade policy and competitiveness 
a. Scale 
b. Foreign and domestic competition 
c. Access to technology and imported inputs 
3. Business environment 
4. Implications of new technologies and changes in industrial policymaking 
5.  Overall conclusions 
 
 
1. Competitiveness of the Brazilian auto industry 
 
According to the empirical literature, Total Factor Productivity in Brazil in the last 30 
years has stagnated and is among the main causes for the low long-term economic 
growth in the country. The cause for the productivity stagnation is debatable, with the 
main hypotheses being (i) the low rates of entry and exit of firms, resulting in a lower 
average productivity, (ii) low investments, notably in R&D, caused by high interest 
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rates; (iii) not enough incentives in a bad business environment157, and, for some, (iv) 
an appreciated currency. The first explanation is subdivided into two main links: a) to 
the hypothesis of a bad business environment making more difficult both the entry and 
exit of firms; b) to an excessive level of protection, translated into low levels of 
competition.  
 
Putting in another way, the literature could be summarized saying that the 
consequences of a bad business environment (including high interest rates and lower 
competition) can explain most of the productivity deficit  
 
Our interviews pointed that the closeness of the economy, combined to the institutional 
difficulties to mergers and acquisitions, the weak infrastructure, the long geographical 
distances, and the relatively low average income make Brazil a location for production 
of “second class” vehicles, with an inferior price-quality combination. However, 
Brazilian automakers cannot be said to be uncompetitive. Provided the plant operate 
with enough scale, and the exports are correctly exempted from direct taxation, 
Brazilian-made vehicles are internationally competitive.  
 
Moreover, the interviews pointed to an industry that is efficient inside the factory, but 
that loses this efficiency outside, due to business environment problems. However, 
there is qualitative evidence that there is a degree of skills shortage within firms, but 
productivity within automakers and tiers 1 and 2 is similar to the levels verified in 
developed countries. Therefore, the difference between the price and quality required 
for exporting, on the one hand, and that for the domestic market, on the other, must 
then be caused by a combination of bad domestic business environment, higher 
margins from the biggest firms, and a very inefficient operation on the part of the 
smaller autopart producers.    
 
However, within the overall Brazilian automotive sector, TFP apparently did not 
change much in its own right, just varying in function of the scale of production. The 
automotive industry strongly increased its scale (and thus its TFP) from 2005 to 2014, 
 
157 Mainly R&D and startup incentives, but also includes other incentives related to the business environment 
besides the “entry and exit” umbrella and the interest rates.  
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followed by a steep fall in 2014-2016. Meanwhile, overall manufacturing industry has 
been showing a decrease in TFP since 1999. This can corroborate the argument that 
the automotive sector was the beneficiary of several subsidies and industrial policies 
aimed to foster its scale, but these were short-lived, as the sector suffered relatively 
more in the following 2014-2016 crisis. 
 
As we are measuring TFP within the automotive sector, a stagnant TFP suggests that 
there is no movement of resources from the less productive to the more productive 
firms, neither much adoption of new technologies nor innovation. Given that the 
multinational automakers in Brazil have the knowledge of all innovations available in 
the world for the industry, our results suggest that the stagnant efficiency within 
automakers is the result of not enough adoption of new technologies in production, 
either due to supply side reasons (production costs) or to demand side reasons (not 
enough import competition or income to support enough scale for better equipped 
vehicles).  
 
Therefore, the automotive sector in Brazil cannot be considered “infant” by any 
measure, as the biggest firms, with enough scale, in some models, can be quite 
competitive inside the factory. The reality is one of huge heterogeneity, and potentially 
high factor misallocation, caused by a combination of bad business environment, high 
overall levels of protection, and low levels of specialization.  
 
 
2.a Channels linking trade policy and competitiveness: scale 
 
One of the main questions raised by the literature is whether scale is promoted by 
trade protection or trade liberalization. It is straightforward to build a theoretical model 
showing that trade protection can allow the surviving of more firms and sectors within 
the protected domestic market. This would imply more scale of production for more 
sectors and firms that would not even exist under free trade. On the other hand, free 
trade could promote specialization and thus much more scale of production for some 
sectors and firms. This, of course, at the expense of the dying sectors and firms. The 
literature, however, adds more complex issues, such as the degree of importance of 
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the existence of domestic suppliers to allow for the emergence of sectors and firms 
(potential positive impact), and also the costs implied by mandatory purchases of 
costly domestic inputs (potential negative impact). These considerations are related 
to the consequences of trade protection in terms of specialization and scale. Interviews 
showed a consistent line of argument favouring more specialization. Even as 
specialization can be achieved either with more or with less protection, it seems that 
focus on specific models, technologies, or stages of value chains, could promote 
dynamic gains in terms of competitiveness and growth. Complementing this 
discussion, more recent endogenous growth models point to the need of either more 
domestic or international integration, to foster scale gains and thus growth.  
 
The intensification of moving production to domestic markets that shows more demand 
potential, and the willingness to increase sharing platforms among models, are 
indicators of the importance of economies of scale for car making. Thus, there is 
evidence that scale was, and still is one of the main factors affecting competitiveness 
in an industry based on mass production and intensive in capital as the automotive 
one.   
 
So, besides the questions regarding “custo-brasil”, the combined evidence from 
quantitative and qualitative sources suggest that protection, at least in the Brazilian 
case, generates less, and not more, overall scale of production. Moreover, the 
Brazilian market is not big enough to counterweight the average scale that is being 
observed in the global value chains. This is a phenomenon that, although not entirely 
new, is growing in importance.  
 
In the interviews, it was mentioned that local content requirements should be set at 
levels that do not deviate too much from the scale of production of that good, in the 
country, thus confirming what the literature has to say about the risks of setting too 
high local content requirements. A clear message from the interviews is that Brazil 
should not produce everything, because it simply has not the required scale to do it 
competitively. Thus, a main policy question is to decide what would be produced 
locally – and what would not. 
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It was suggested by the interviews that the way forward is to increase scale through 
exports and specialization. This is also suggested by data: The behaviour of 
production in the past 30 years suggest limits for the domestic market scale, thus 
indicating that increase exports is necessary to gain competitiveness. For this, a 
careful trade liberalization, based on more trade agreements, would be paramount. 
The reasons are twofold: a) to increase competition pressures to force specialization 
on models where Brazil has more comparative advantages, such as small cars 
powered by hybrid electric-ethanol engines, and on specific autoparts and systems; b) 
to allow more market access to these Brazilian exports.  
 
Overall, our quantitative data points to the fact that automotive production costs and 
productivity in Brazil are mainly determined by the scale of production. Adjusted prices 
for the Toyota Corolla, among all countries that produce the car, indicates that Brazil 
would be internationally competitive, at a given scale level: if we take into account the 
scale of production at model level (thus, the production of Corollas in the plant), Brazil 
seems to be very close to the trend line that relates price and scale.  Therefore, it 
seems that inside the factory, Brazilian competitiveness is relatively well explained by 
its scale.  
 
However, thanks to the already mentioned heterogeneity among firms in the sector, 
and also because of the combination of a bad business environment with overall high 
trade barriers, there is not enough entry and exit and many firms in the domestic 
market are not internationally competitive. The interviews pointed out that the Brazilian 
automotive sector has high production costs and lacks, in many subsectors or product 
ranges, enough scale to be internationally competitive.  
 
 
2.b Channels linking trade policy and competitiveness: 
foreign and domestic competition 
 
A strand of the literature reviewed in this thesis argues that in Brazil there are too many 
small firms because of barriers to entry and barriers to exit: protection against 
competition and even the bad business environment provides a barrier to entry, while 
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subsidies to operate (tax breaks, access to privileged regulation etc) and institutional 
obstacles to mergers, acquisitions and closing of businesses provide barriers to exit. 
Many aspects of these barriers to entry and barriers to exit were confirmed by the 
interviews. Our interview results massively argue that weak competition (specially from 
imported final goods) allows less productive firms to stay in the market, while at the 
same time, firms are not pushed to export and increase their standards to the world 
frontier.  
 
The literature suggests that the setting up of the Brazilian automotive sector was 
possible because Brazil defied comparative advantages in the 1950s, but also that 
there is no evidence of the costs in terms of distortion costs (foregone production in 
other sectors and income taken from consumers). More importantly, protection seems 
to have been too high for a too long time.  
 
Different measures generated different results of real prices` evolution for cars in Brazil 
from 1989 to 2018. The insight is that real prices were reduced during the trade 
liberalization process, and that they probably increased from 1997 to 2004 and 
reduced again from 2005 to 2014. Despite the magnitude of the numbers, their 
direction and correlations would suggest that the real price reductions were 
concentrated in the years of trade liberalization (1990-1994), and after 2004, when the 
automakers that came to Brazil in late 90s and early 2000s started to gain scale. 
However, exchange rates seem to have had a more important effect on the real price 
behaviour, adding to the effects of tariffs. Although import competition apparently had 
a stronger effect on domestic prices than domestic competition, it is not possible to 
disentangle these effects based solely on univariate analysis. Thus, we can only say 
that data from prices indicates a degree of competition within the domestic market and 
with imports. The stability of market-shares is in line with what would be expected from 
an oligopolized market-structure. The only strong change came from a transference 
of market-share from Ford to some automakers that came to the Brazilian market after 
the 90`s wave of FDI, notably Hyundai. Thus, data suggest the existence of a non-
cooperative oligopoly: prices vary according to the firm-level scale of production, and 
market-shares do vary, although not substantially. 
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Relatively stable market-shares and prices changing according to imports suggest that 
domestic competition has been weaker than foreign competition. Thus, domestic 
competition could not be viewed as a perfect substitute for foreign competition 
(contradicting what some interviewees from the industry claimed). Overall, our 
quantitative data points that prices are determined by the competition with imports, 
and thus by the exchange rate, despite the import tariffs of 35%. On the other hand, 
domestic concentration indexes suggest that domestic competition do exist, although, 
as said, domestic prices are more affected by import competition. This happens even 
taking into consideration that most of the imports are made by automakers with 
domestic production. One potential explanation is that domestic competition is more 
by product, while competition against imports is what limits domestic price.     
 
As accounted for in the interviews, Chinese were disruptive in terms of price, 
especially around 2009-2012. Inovar-Auto seems to have had an impact in reducing 
this Chinese competition, but the exchange rates were the responsible for the overall 
change in imports. Therefore, we can say that the main impact of Inovar Auto was to 
reduce foreign competition from automakers without a production presence in Brazil, 
and therefore supporting domestic prices (reverting, helped by the Brazilian currency 
appreciation, the price downward trend that started around 2005). 
 
Nonetheless, qualitative evidence indicate that foreign competition tends to affect 
more intensely firms in high value-added sectors, while domestic competition is 
relatively more important for lower tech and smaller firms.  
 
 Furthermore, the measures on prices and on TFP and the R&D and innovation data 
analysed in this thesis suggests that other sources of entry and exit barriers besides 
trade protection are also contributing to deter productivity and innovation.   
 
Regarding the effects on firms’ effort to improve productivity (the so-called x-
efficiency), interviews pointed to a mixed situation: while the high levels of protection 
indeed reduce competition from imports, the high domestic production costs (“custo-
Brazil”) and the domestic competition does not allow for high mark-up levels. However, 
for smaller firms, besides the domestic competition pressure, there is also pressure 
from domestic oligopolized suppliers and buyers. The result is a very volatile mark-up 
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for the bigger firms (arguably fluctuating according to the business cycle of the 
Brazilian economy and the movements of exchange rates that increase or decrease 
foreign competition), and a more squeezed mark-up for smaller firms (although they 
also fluctuate through the business cycle).  
 
If the “inverted U” relationship between competition and innovation effort, discussed in 
this thesis, were to hold, the intermediary level of competition depicted here would 
imply relatively high levels of innovation effort. However, as suggested in this research, 
it seems that business environment aspects not related to competition (such as 
interest rates, access to technology, quality of judicial system etc) may play a bigger 
role in defining risk-taking and overall investment patterns, including innovation efforts. 
 
 
2.c Channels linking trade policy and competitiveness: 
access to technology and imported inputs 
  
Besides effects related to scale, trade protection can raise production costs because 
of (i) lower access to cheaper imported inputs; (ii) because of lower firm-level 
productivity of domestic firms, allowed to survive under protection; and (iii) because of 
overall lower scale of production throughout all value chains. 
 
Moreover, technology is viewed as a factor that makes protection even riskier, as the 
technological frontier is moving faster and any step disconnecting the domestic market 
from this frontier could led to a much more difficult catch-up in the future. The 
interviews suggest that a faster pace of technology can make harder for industries that 
are not connected to the technological frontier to follow through.  
 
Developing countries are competing for “failing” industries, with ever lower value-
added, while developed countries are competing for the “frontier” industries, with much 
higher value-added. On the other hand, Rodrik (2015) suggests that the reduction of 
protection left developing countries exposed and led them into premature 
deindustrialization. The question is then how to promote a faster catch-up in a world 
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with a faster technology growth.  The literature suggests that it depends on where the 
main source of technology is: domestic or foreign.     
 
As stated by interviews, multinationals – automakers and most tier-1 suppliers – face 
no problem to access better and cheaper foreign technology apart from a relatively 
small extra cost. Moreover, some high technology imported inputs would be always 
imported, given the required scale to produce them domestically. However, smaller 
autopart producers do face restrictions in access foreign technology, and, for them, 
lower tariffs for high technology inputs would be even more important, as it would not 
only be an advantage in terms of costs, but also in terms of technology adoption.  
 
The data from the Brazilian automotive sector shows that the nominal protection for 
autoparts is the second highest among all sectors in Brazil, but instead of causing a 
less protected final good (vehicles), what we see is that vehicles are even more 
protected, depicting the highest effective protection among all economic sectors in the 
country. Thus, the Brazilian automotive sector shows an equilibrium with high effective 
protection for both final goods and its inputs. The result is a higher price than it would 
prevail at world prices, both because of lower foreign competition for autoparts and 
higher costs (autoparts for vehicles) and because of lower foreign competition for final 
goods. 
 
It was disputed if tariffs are high, after all available mechanisms to reduce it. As stated, 
the tariff mode for autoparts is 16% and the average is 14%, but if there is no domestic 
production the tariff is either 0% or 2%, thanks to the “ex-tarifario” regime. The caveat 
is that the regime is bureaucratic and costly to be accessed by smaller firms (interested 
firms need to ask for the inclusion of the required imported good in the list of “ex-
tarifario”). Moreover, the system also does not work properly when a domestic firm 
produces a “similar” good of inferior quality and thus hinder the tariff reduction. Thus, 
the high transaction costs to claim special regimes suggest that access to foreign 
inputs is a bigger problem for the smaller and lower tier firms, as confirmed by 
interviews. Moreover, it was suggested that tariffs on the import of specialized services 
are increasingly becoming a threat to domestic competitiveness.  
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Within the Brazilian Automotive Industry, automakers and tier 1 autoparts have the 
knowledge and the ability to use (as they are mainly multinationals), but not always 
access in terms of costs (especially for higher technological content, as pointed in our 
interviews), and no incentive to fully apply it. The costs would be reduced if tariffs are 
decreased and if there is enough purchase scale. The willingness to apply it would 
depend on competition, or regulation (as accepted by all types of interviewees, with 
different “nuances”). For smaller firms, like many autopart producers, there is no 
knowledge, ability, access, or incentive to use higher technologies.  
 
Taking the aircraft maker Embraer as an illustrative comparison, a cost reduction of 
around 10% (resulting from zero import tariffs, 50% less interest rates, and 30% less 
freight costs, in our cost-structure simulation) would not explain its success in 
exporting. According to the interview, despite important cost advantages, the main 
reason for Embraer’s success was the access to technology and its use.  By “access”, 
we mean the combination of (i) knowledge; (ii) ability to use; (iii) accessible cost; and 
(iv) incentive to apply. 
 
Nonetheless, a reduction in the costs of inputs and an improvement in the business 
environment, as depicted in chapter 6, could directly reduce total costs in around 10%. 
This, together with a potential extra reduction of taxes embedded in the production 
value chain – and that allegedly are not properly compensated before the vehicle is 
exported – could represent a cost reduction of nearly 20%. As the industry operates 
in an imperfect competition, the impact on final prices would be probably less, but even 
a 15% decrease in final prices would mean a significant competitiveness gain for 
Brazilian vehicles. All this independently of the dynamic benefits arriving from the 
technology incorporated in better imported inputs, as this is not measured in our 
chapter 6. 
 
Interviews also pointed that, although the importance of a domestic supply base is 
diminishing, there is a percentage of supplies that need to be sourced domestically, 
both because of costs and strategic considerations. Still according to some responses, 
this domestic base would exist even under free trade. 
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The overall conclusion is that access to foreign technology and to foreign scale 
through the access to imported inputs is an ever-increasing advantage to catching up 
and to increase competitiveness of one`s own industrial sector.   
 
 
3. Business environment 
 
Import tariffs and business environment seem to have a similar (in value) contribution 
to total costs, either for automakers or for autopart producers. The maximum direct 
cost reductions that would be possible with a zero-import tariff for inputs would be 
around 6%, for automakers and autopart producers alike. On the other hand, the 
maximum direct cost reductions that would be possible with a zero interest rates (a 
proxy for the ceiling in terms of business environment improvement) would be around 
5,6% for automakers and 4,5% for autopart producers. 
 
As said before, these cost reductions are only the direct ones. Such changes in tariffs 
and interest rates would affect the entire supply chain, thus potentially increasing the 
effect of cost reductions. Moreover, although we used interest rates as a proxy, there 
is scope for further improvements in the business environment affecting the cost of 
freight.  Those values, seem similarly important in comparison to potential exchange 
rate variations: although Brazilian exchange rates can vary by far more than 6%, the 
net effect on competitiveness is always lower than the exchange rate variation itself, 
as it changes the costs for both the final goods and the inputs.  
 
Moreover, these two factors are mutually interlinked: Overall, lower levels of trade 
protection would provide the necessary push to move these agenda on business 
environment, and, on the other hand, a better business environment can shape 
dynamic comparative advantages, working together with the structure of protection.   
 
According to some interviewees, with a better business environment tariffs could be 
reduced to zero. The bad business environment causes not only higher production 
costs, but also disincentivises innovation and the adoption of technology. However, 
firms may not be interested in improving the business environment if it serves as an 
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entry barrier in the domestic market and if protection gives them what they need to 
survive competition from abroad. An alternative explanation for this lack of effort to 
improve the business environment is just the lack of organization, generated by a lack 
of long-term vision. 
 
Moreover, recent empirical literature has demonstrated that better institutions and 
business environment – that are able to generate more efficient and safer contracts – 
can promote the growth of more contract-intense and complex activities, potentially 
changing a country comparative advantage.    
 
 
4. Implications of new technologies and changes in 
industrial policymaking 
 
In the current paradigm we have automakers buying autoparts from suppliers and 
selling vehicles to consumers. However, this paradigm is likely to change to a market 
where automakers could become providers of transport services, instead of selling 
products. Moreover, industry 4.0 technologies have the potential to drastically alter the 
geography of investment and production worldwide as countries without access to it 
risk losing competitiveness at a faster pace. Labour costs are losing importance and 
thus traditional industrial policy focusing on subsidies for production costs in general 
are becoming less effective. Current competitiveness in some parts of the value chain 
does not guarantee a future competitiveness, as technologies can change the entire 
composition of the value chain. Therefore, constant innovation is needed.  
  
Institutions shape the business environment and the structure of protection in parallel, 
and the business environment and the structure of protection seems to have mutual 
effects upon each other. In a world with cheaper and easier transport of goods, and 
where most value added is not on assembly anymore, the mere competitive advantage 
on labour or capital is not the main source of overall competitiveness. In this sense, 
the business environment and institutions could be more important to shape 
comparative advantages than traditional availability of capital or labour. This view is 
already presented in the literature, and it seems confirmed by most of our interviews. 
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Another aspect with the potential to dictate the future of the automotive sector in Brazil 
is the possibility of entering the global stage in electrical vehicle production. There is 
already a small market for EV vehicles in Brazil, essentially filled by imported vehicles. 
Interviews in this thesis suggested a potential competitiveness advantage in hybrids 
with ethanol. Whatever the technology chosen, it is clear that petrol or diesel engines 
will no longer be used in the near future. This, together with the trend of automobiles 
being seen as a service, and not as a consumer good anymore158, will drastically 
change the conditions for having a competitive and value-adding domestic industrial 
base. In turn, industrial and trade policies need to change accordingly.  And the need 
for a better business environment, better infrastructure (electricity and 
telecommunications) and more scale, is even more important. 
 
Participation in global value chains can indeed deliver higher competitiveness but is 
not a panacea and needs to be seen against some potential risks. Perhaps the biggest 
counterargument is the need to consider the resilience risks of such chains, as 
demonstrated, for example, by the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, when several 
automakers faced supply disruptions of parts and inputs imported from Japan. This 
caveat with regard to global value chains can also be a reason for some “reshoring” – 
the movement to relocate production sites back to the company’s original home 
country. But it is not only the risks of supply disruptions that are potentially limiting the 
attractiveness of global value chains: the rapid technological transformation seen in 
manufacturing plants, as a result of industry 4.0 technologies, can make manpower a 
much less important factor in the cost structure. This means that the main 
attractiveness of some developing countries – cheap labour – is losing importance as 
a competitiveness determinant, thus leading also to a potential reshoring. But there 
will still be reasons to justify foreign direct investment: the proximity to consumers 
(linked to domestic market size) and tax benefits being the most cited among 
interviewees. However, these factors need to be balanced against several others, 
such as domestic access to skilled labour (linked to digital literacy), infrastructure 
 
158 Meaning that increasingly cars will be owned collectively (e.g. in car pools where people simply make an 
initial contribution and then hire them for a small fee) rather than being purchased by individual consumers. 
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(mainly telecommunications), an overall better business environment and lower 
institutional risks, and even natural disaster risks.  
 
As seen in this thesis, regional value chains, as an alternative to global value chains, 
can also be seen as a potential source of competitiveness, while the expansion of 
regional trade agreements  can provide a safer path to trade liberalization from the 
perspectives of developing countries. But for these to be part of viable long-term 
developing strategy there is the need of allowing true competition to take place.    
 
The overall implication from all the previous paragraphs, for a middle-income 
developing country with a reasonable industrial base, such as Brazil, is that industrial 
policies should actively promote the use of the best technology in a widespread way. 
Single-sector approaches may not be enough, as the entire value chain needs to be 
connected and engaging with industry 4.0 technologies. Trade policies need to be 
seen as part of the strategy, allowing the access to foreign technology, and not 
contributing to the maintenance of firms or sectors that are not competitive without 
high levels of tariff protection. Moreover, as in all public policies, any given subsidy 
needs to be well designed, targeted to solve a clearly identified problem in a 
transparent way, and time-limited to avoid misuse. The evidence provided in this thesis 
exemplifies the costs of lacking these basic conditions, and thus confirms the need for 
them.  
 
The spread of new technologies that allow a firm to tap services provided by suppliers 
all around the world, together with the availability of funds to finance promising 
startups, makes it possible for small initiatives to rapidly create not only new goods 
and services, but also entire sectors. Technologies allowing for a smart factory - such 
as the ones presented in the concept of Industry 4.0 - can provide a form of 
leapfrogging (a way to skip traditional processes or technologies to arrive at the 
technological frontier). As noted by Lee et al (2019), based on ILO (2016), developing 
countries still relying on mass production (industry 2.0) could potentially jump to 
industry 4.0 production (smart factories) without the need to invest in industry 3.0 
(automation) production. Combining these views with the one that value-added is not 
in traditional manufacturing anymore, there is a clear indication that developing 
countries with enough human capital should promote innovation and technology 
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adoption, and those without enough human capital should improve on it, instead of 
promoting protectionist policies that build white elephant projects with short-lived jobs. 
Moreover, the coordination role of Governments is important, both to make sure that 
information flows unimpeded and to foster the necessary Information Technology 
infrastructure, such as 5G.   
 
The caveat is that Industry 4.0 technologies can also increase the distance between 
the technological frontier and the less advanced countries, as developed countries 
are, arguably, better prepared to make full use of those technologies.  
 
Thailand and Malaysia are identified by Lee et al (2019) as examples of the middle-
income trap, a group into which we can easily put Brazil. Their emphasis on the need 
for better education and training to increase adoption capabilities is then 
complemented by our emphasis on a renewed need for a better business environment. 
Going even further, based on the findings of this thesis, we believe that factors such 
as the safety and overall quality of life of cities and countries will become increasingly 
important in defining the physical locations of (home) offices for high-skilled and mobile 
labour. Regarding business headquarter and R&D facilities` location, we see the 
primary role of a good business environment and institutions. Taking these two 
aspects into consideration, the future may be bright for places already leading the 
tables, while developing countries need to invest now, and strongly, to both improve 
the business environment, fostering both the adoption of industry 4.0 technologies and 
the creation of innovative business, and also to improve the overall quality of life and 
safety of their population. These will be the factors behind success or failure in the 
decades to come. 
 
Industrial policy can be potentially beneficial, if implemented with care, with more 
horizontal and pro-competitive policies, and with minimum distortions and rent-seeking 
behaviours. As part of the literature believes this is impossible, they simply rule out 
industrial policies as a whole, arguing that the risks far outreach the potential benefits 
(that would be the development of more productive sectors and firms, with more 
innovation and income generated domestically). However, interviews favoured a more 
“horizontal” type of industrial policy, based on clusters and partnerships with the 
Government to identify bottlenecks, and setting standards for final goods, to promote 
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competitiveness, exports, and internationalization of firms. The standard-setting type 
of regulation is viewed as needed to promote technology adoption but bounded by the 
limited income levels of domestic demand. 
 
Inequality is also a problem for upgrading. The Brazilian inequality negatively affects 
competitiveness both because it restricts access to education and thus the supply of 
skilled labour and because it reduces demand, making the domestic market smaller 
than otherwise. In other words, with a better income distribution the domestic demand 
could be higher, and more in line with what would be expected from a country with 
such population. Another implication of a demand composed mainly by lower-income 
individuals is that, without the access to cheaper imported vehicles, domestic 
consumption pattern will be characterized by lower quality and less innovation. 
 
Sectoral industrial policies and incentives for R&D are then seen as secondary factors: 
they can be important and helpful, but without addressing the main problems related 
to business environment, industrial policies and incentives, may have very low 
effectiveness. However, among the types of industrial policies and incentives the most 
effective strategy is the one that generate public goods, scale, and coordination, 
setting guidelines and regulations to allow firms to plan years ahead. Thus, examples 
of suggested policies would be: promotion of more traditional clusters; more R&D 
partnerships with research institutions; interactions between the government and the 
private sector to identify and solve bottlenecks, in a transparent way; discussion and 
elaboration of consensus legislation and regulation as state policies, instead of 
governmental policies. Moreover, attention is needed for the smaller firms that are 
somehow out of the current system of support and incentives. As these firms lack the 
representative power that bigger firms have, it would be important to set up special 
channels for these smaller firms to access and to be contacted by the Government.  
 
Regarding R&D incentives, the overall opinion is that there are reasonably good 
instruments in place, being two of them explicitly mentioned by several respondents: 
"lei do bem" and Embrapii. Part of those who praised the current system of R&D 
incentives also said that sectoral industrial policies for R&D are unnecessary and even 
counterproductive. 
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However, R&D activities are becoming more concentrated in global centers, and Brazil 
is not – and probably will not be - among these centers, in the near future. 
 
Automakers in Brazil are mostly multinationals, with full access to innovation from 
headquarters, but still enjoying very high effective protection against import 
competition. Meanwhile, domestic autopart producers face more obstacles from 
“custo-Brazil”, as they have less access to foreign technology, to cheaper funds, and 
have less scale to deal with the high fixed costs brought by the bad business 
environment. Inovar-Auto is an example of ill-conceived policy, as it lacks the proper 
identification of the market-failure that could justify such a policy, and, therefore lacks 
a clear objective. Some interviewees` claims resembled infant industry arguments, 
although automakers, at least, are clearly not an infant industry in Brazil. As noted in 
this research, protectionist strategies, such as local content requirements or tariff 
barriers, may have helped the industrialization process up to the 1980s, but at an 
unknown cost and, more importantly, in a context that does not exist anymore. 
 
There is no evidence, either from our interviews or from our quantitative results, that 
Inovar-Auto promoted any increase in innovation. The TFP measures are still too short 
in time (2018) to consistently capture longer terms potential effects from Inovar-Auto 
(2012-2017), but the behaviour of TFP indicates that it did not change for any reason 
apart from changes in scale.  
 
Overall, the responses pointed that the technological gap is increasing in the last 
decades, for most respondents, from al groups, but there are some exceptions. As an 
example, there are improvements in energy efficiency - arguably improved by Inovar-
Auto, according to one government source and two automakers. However, most 
answers depicted Inovar-auto as a bad policy and pointed that this policy did not 
contribute to reverse the aforementioned increasing technological gap: it generated 
costs and did not promote innovation. 
 
Moreover, some investment decisions made during the years under Inovar-Auto would 
be done independently from Inovar-Auto. This is in line with the literature, as it points 
that industrial policies are only the “cherry on the cake”, as forecasted demand is the 
real driver for investment. In Brazil, interviews suggest that the smaller BMW, 
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Mercedes and Audi plants are the ones who potentially came only because of the 
protectionist policy, in order to bypass the increased tariff. However, their production 
is quite low in Brazil, and they rely on much more foreign inputs than the average 
Brazilian automaker.  
 
Regarding the effects on scale, during Inovar-Auto, total production rose during the 
period, as also the number of domestic producers. The average scale per producer, a 
result from these two previous measures, showed an oscillated behaviour. In the 
qualitative chapter there was the argument that although new entrants may have 
increased domestic competition, these new entrants also contributed to reduce 
average scale vis a vis what would be observed without them. However, if we discard 
the niche operations, that in Brazil would include the Ford brand Troller, with their low 
scale fiberglass light commercials (as explicitly mentioned in our interviews) and 
producers such as BMW, who have basically a CKD small operation, there was no 
significant average scale reduction.     
 
As a final note, Inovar-Auto did stop the rising import trend of vehicles, but this result 
was achieved in combination with exchange rate movements as well. 
 
 
5. Overall conclusions 
 
In the previous century, total protection indeed allowed the creation of Brazilian 
Automotive Industry. Absolute protection given to the Industry lasted until the trade 
liberalization of late 80s/early 90s, in a similar way verified in most of the manufacturing 
sectors in Brazil. However, the duration was probably too long, in accordance with the 
prevision of the theories about lobby and the critics of the infant industry argument. 
Moreover, increasing technological developments tend to make the social costs of 
protection higher than before, as protectionist policies risk to make catching up less 
likely. This is confirmed by our interviews, who stated that few big firms dominate 
specific technologies around the world. The Brazilian experience did not have either 
export targets neither an earlier protection reduction, conjugated with a better business 
environment, or even with a more specialized economy (horizontally or vertically). 
348 
 
Moreover, the domestic competition was not a substitute for this foreign competition, 
as could be seen from our data, for the automotive sector.  
 
Currently, inefficiencies in Brazilian auto production are mostly found outside the 
factories, while within their plants the multinational automakers and first-tier suppliers 
are themselves efficient in terms of their own production. Our results suggest, as a 
potential path for increased competitiveness, more specialization, a better business 
environment, and a lower structure of protection (mainly allowing for cheaper access 
to high tech inputs). 
 
However, the import of inputs is not a sufficient condition to gain the required 
competitiveness. More input imports would generate more competitiveness and then 
more exports only in the long-term, as it takes time either to make better use of the 
imported inputs (given complementarity issues, learning by doing etc) and it takes time 
to open up export markets. Moreover, only imported inputs that aggregate a better 
technology can have the dynamic effects of improving competitiveness through 
technology adoption. If the imported input brings only a cost-advantage, the effect in 
competitiveness is more limited and tend to be short-lived. A more important condition 
is the improvement of the business environment: the direct impact is as important than 
the direct impact of cheaper inputs, but with better institutions, infrastructure and 
capacity to adopt new technologies there is the potential for not only more technology 
adoption (as is also the case of accessing foreign inputs), but also for more 
investments and innovation. The import of inputs, without the improvement of the 
business environment does not disseminate the technology into the economy, and 
only promotes the specific change of the domestic input by the imported one. Thus, 
the potential social benefit is almost entirely lost, as the final goods maybe does not 
gain competitiveness and then scale. In other words, it could be not sufficient to trigger 
a virtuous cycle. Only real “maquiladoras”, or export processing zones, would export 
more using more imported inputs despite a bad business environment. Moreover, 
lower protection to the final goods is needed, in order to do not attract the wrong type 
of FDI. 
 
It is possible to group Brazilian industries into four main types: (i) firms that use almost 
only domestic inputs, and do not trade because they do not have the quality or the 
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interest to export. Usually they are in the low technology sectors; (ii) firms that rely 
heavily on imported inputs, with very limited domestic value added.  This is not a 
guarantee for their competitiveness, though, as they still can face huge constraints 
given the bad business environment (especially if they pay a lot for their inputs, and 
their logistics represent an important part of their costs, for example, or if they rely 
heavily on financing and do not have access to subsidized loans or foreign loans, or if 
they are not hedged against currency fluctuations). Some of these firms and sectors 
only exist because of trade protection (final goods); (iii) industries that have a 
reasonable domestic value added and that can choose to export more or less, such 
as the automotive industry; (iv) industries that rely heavily on imported inputs and 
export a lot, such as Embraer. Usually, on the high-technology sectors. An important 
note to make here is that, although Embraer relies heavily on imported inputs, there is 
an important value added in the design and R&D made by the firm in Brazil. 
 
Automakers have plants distributed around the world with different scales, but R&D is 
concentrated in developed countries, where these multinationals usually come from.  
Although in the last decade we saw an intensification in the transferring of production 
from developed countries towards large developing countries, the overall picture is of 
excess capacity worldwide. Interviews and data confirmed the most important factors 
for investment decisions within the automotive sector: existence of potential for scale 
(mainly from the domestic market and trade agreements); the availability of good 
suppliers and technical expertise; productivity and production costs; the overall 
structure of protection; and the overall business environment. As industry 4.0 
technologies evolve, investment costs and optimal scale tend to be reduced, thus 
potentially intensifying the speed of changes in production location. Moreover, the 
existence of a domestic supply base is also losing importance, as the existence of 
global vehicle-model platforms allow for the concentration of suppliers at the world 
level, with increasing scale. In this fast-evolving scenario, technology can be 
developed or adopted more easily, where there is a better business environment. 
 
Interviews confirmed the literature in that scale of production can be promoted by a 
higher access to imported inputs (potentially produced at higher scale abroad); by 
more exports; and by specialization. Interviews also suggested that a faster 
technological progress reduce the scope for trade protection, as it increases the risks 
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of lagging behind. This is not to say industrial policy should not use any tariffs, but 
responses pointed that other measures are less risky and potentially more effective. 
These can be seen collectively as improvements in the business environment.  
 
The empirical evidence gathered in the literature suggest that the new technologies 
are shifting value added from manufacturing to specialized services, and that the 
frontier between different sectors is becoming less clear. These two aspects, 
conjugated with the fact that technology evolves increasingly faster and knowledge 
and information are the key assets, leads to the conclusion that horizontal industrial 
policies that improve the business environment, education, and that promote basic 
R&D, together with integration into world markets, are the way forward. However, this 
menu should not be applied in the same way for all countries, as the development 
stage and the endowments should be taken into consideration, before deciding the 
degree of trade integration (structure and dynamics of trade protection).   
 
There is a need for horizontal more than vertical industrial policies, partly to improve 
the business environment. Industrial policy can aim to create new comparative 
advantages, and this indeed can be better than accepting the present comparative 
advantages, but, to do this, they need to enhance the chances of self-discovery 
(business environment), promote chain competitiveness (specialization and not total 
protection), and, if targeting a sector, be sure to limit protection (in level and in time), 
and to foster either domestic competition or exports. It should promote “activities”, in 
a broader sense, with no discrimination and no entry or exit barriers. Moreover, 
cooperation for R&D etc with the government and research centres is a must. 
 
The scope for a more direct and sectoral policy intervention is for cases where there 
are unequivocal and enough positive externalities. Among these, reason for 
intervention that is growing in importance for economies based on network scale, are 
coordination problems, such as for example the provision of infrastructure for electrical 
cars. In this case, regulation may not be enough, and some initial subsidies or public 
policy regarding charging stations, for example, may be needed to induce further 
investments.   
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Contrasting the automotive sector with Embraer, it was said that the aeronautical 
sector is less affected by the business environment (it does not have to face the same 
transport infrastructure problems, and it benefits from lower taxation, as an exporter) 
and it can import inputs in an easier way. As such, the interview with Embraer does 
indicates that being less affected by the business environment is a competitive 
advantage, but it does not provide evidence of its prominence relatively to the easier 
access to foreign inputs, for example. Moreover, the interviewee related that Embraer 
is heavily exposed to foreign markets, being under intense competition and relying on 
a worldwide scale of production of its parts and for its final demand. This is thus a 
confirmation of the previous statements that the most important determinants for 
industrial competitiveness for Brazilian firms would be the business environment and 
scale of production (both for its final goods and for its inputs, what is another way to 
view the importance of accessing better and cheaper imported inputs). No single 
channels stand out alone. Rather, is the sum of those, and their interaction effects, 
that make them crucial to a development strategy.  Each variable can contribute to 
vicious or a virtuous cycle, compounding the problems or the solutions. Our research 
confirmed that these variables are mainly within three umbrellas: the business 
environment, the structure of protection, and the relative low specialization and scale. 
The former has a potentially greater importance in more technologically advanced 
industries, and the two later ones are strongly related, as more protection seems to 
have induced less specialization. 
 
There is a need for gradual reduction of protection, but not necessarily its complete 
removal. Moreover, there should be attention to the fact that tariffs reductions 
concentrated into autoparts and components could make effective protection for 
automakers even higher. Therefore, tariffs should be necessarily reduced also for final 
goods (cars), and in a way to do not increase effective protection. Moreover, the 
strategy of the transition is key: a too fast liberalization without a proper improvement 
in the business environment would potentially generate too much unemployment and 
transition costs. 
 
The protection enjoyed by the Brazilian firms, together with a focus on the domestic 
market, instead of exports, makes international competitiveness a less appealing 
target by these firms. Firms prefer to ask for individual gains than to contribute to 
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improve the business environment, in a low-level Nash equilibrium. This, for instance, 
reduces the incentives for a coordinated effort to tackle the deficiencies of the 
domestic business environment. Given that, the bad business environment – or 
“Custo-Brasil” is higher than otherwise. As this higher “Custo-Brasil” implies the need 
of higher protection to keep domestic firms afloat, we have a vicious circle. In other 
words, the business environment in Brazil substantially damages competitiveness of 
the manufacturing sector and give political excuses for a higher protectionist 
environment. Conversely, the higher protectionist environment reduces the incentives 
for the dominant domestic manufactures to call for a better business environment. The 
result is that the high protection levels against imports help to shape a worse business 
environment equilibrium. 
 
The research also highlighted the importance of high interest rates as a major 
deterrent of industrial competitiveness in Brazil, both by direct (higher costs of funds) 
and indirect (a more appreciated domestic currency) channels. The evidence gathered 
in this research also allows us to infer – although we did not quantitatively compare 
these – that the strong recent structural reduction in interest rates faced by the 
Brazilian economy has the potential to deliver positive competitiveness results that are 
more important than the industrial or trade policies seen up to now. Thus, the fiscal 
and macroeconomic changes that allowed substantially lower interest rates in Brazil 
seems to have the potential to improve industrial competitiveness to levels not seen 
before. However, although important, the reduction in interest rates is not enough to 
make the Brazilian economy ready to enter the centre stage of global competition and 
innovation. It is also necessary to be completely immersed into Industry 4.0 
technologies. For this, the reduction of other aspects of “custo-Brazil” are increasingly 
important. Moreover, as said before, the urgency to move to more technology-
intensive sectors and processes is growing, as the competitiveness advantages from 
cheaper labour are losing importance. This last aspect is also added by the well-
documented fact that value added is increasingly coming from activities intense in 
ideas, innovation and creativeness, while the manufacturing process itself is losing 
space in value-adding. 
 
The recent EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement, aimed to reduce trade tariffs on a phased 
timetable, makes it all the more urgent to address the issues discussed in this thesis. 
353 
 
The agreement, concluded on June 28th, 2019, covers tariffs on goods and services, 
technical and sanitary barriers and measures, intellectual property, government 
procurement and other issues.  The EU exports are concentrated in machinery, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, cars and car parts. Moreover, these sectors are heavily 
protected by tariffs, what suggest that a reduction in those tariffs could be very 
worrying for the Brazilian firms in these sectors. As seen in this thesis, cars, for 
example, are protected by 35% tariff on imports.   
 
However, we can argue that the structural reduction of interest rates in Brazil (and the 
consequent currency depreciation) has the potential to make the country much better 
prepared to compete with European manufacturers based on current manufacturing 
practices. Nonetheless, to compete in the smart-factory world of industry 4.0 
technologies the threshold is higher, and competitiveness will likely be given by first-
mover advantages from tapping into the new reality and opportunities, within existing 
sectors, and to new ones.  
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Date
Annual inflation (IPCA) - 
al l items
Annual inflation 
(IPCA) - new cars
Annual inflation 
(IPCA) - autoparts
December 1980 99,25
December 1981 95,62
December 1982 104,79
December 1983 164,01
December 1984 215,26
December 1985 242,23
December 1986 79,66
December 1987 363,41
December 1988 980,21
December 1989 1972,91
December 1990 1620,97 1406,34 1217,86
December 1991 472,7 513,38 520,52
December 1992 1119,1 995,32 972,32
December 1993 2477,15 2293,43 2566,84
December 1994 916,46 774,98 741,48
December 1995 22,41 7,45 22,96
December 1996 9,56 8,6 8,87
December 1997 5,22 3,79 4,82
December 1998 1,65 -6,01 -1,22
December 1999 8,94 22,79 16,07
December 2000 5,97 3,94 4,09
December 2001 7,67 2,42 3,5
December 2002 12,53 0,46 7,41
December 2003 9,3 1,02 7,61
December 2004 7,6 13,65 19,5
December 2005 5,69 3,22 3,97
December 2006 3,14 0,93 1,67
December 2007 4,46 1,74 4,53
December 2008 5,9 -2,25 8,52
December 2009 4,31 -3,62 2,25
December 2010 5,91 -1,03 3,66
December 2011 6,5 -2,88 3,13
December 2012 5,84 -5,71 3,67
December 2013 5,91 3,52 4,09
December 2014 6,41 4,62 3,3
December 2015 10,67 4,84 5,88
December 2016 6,29 0,48 2,93
December 2017 2,95 -0,84 0,83
December 2018 3,75 0,95 0,48
Source: Sidra/IBGE - Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo (IPCA)
IPCA Historical series - accumulated annual changes (%). 
Note for calculation of real car price variation: 
(1+real change)=((1+nominal change)/(1+inflation))) 
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Year
Total  
production of 
cars and l ight 
commercials, in 
units (A)
Registration of imported 
new cars and l ight 
commercials, in units 
(B)
Exports of cars 
and l ight 
commercials, in 
units ( C)
Apparent 
consumption 
(D = A+B-C) 
Import 
penetration 
coefficient (E 
= B/D)
1975 818.816 20.236 798.580 0,00%
1976 863.710 14.296 849.414 0,00%
1977 780.928 18.926 762.002 0,00%
1978 941.496 36.925 904.571 0,00%
1979 1.003.578 34.166 969.412 0,00%
1980 1.036.537 63.871 972.666 0,00%
1981 687.510 113.020 574.490 0,00%
1982 800.764 105.474 695.290 0,00%
1983 853.096 100.687 752.409 0,00%
1984 807.604 107.370 700.234 0,00%
1985 892.006 116.596 775.410 0,00%
1986 957.720 86.294 871.426 0,00%
1987 829.578 230.488 599.090 0,00%
1988 976.597 203.035 773.562 0,00%
1989 933.369 181.484 751.885 0,00%
1990 844.563 115 108.960 735.718 0,02%
1991 884.166 19.837 85.586 818.417 2,42%
1992 1.015.879 23.691 158.074 881.496 2,69%
1993 1.324.228 69.078 97.517 1.295.789 5,33%
1994 1.499.817 184.358 99.553 1.584.622 11,63%
1995 1.536.866 364.748 81.671 1.819.943 20,04%
1996 1.738.273 219.515 103.110 1.854.678 11,84%
1997 1.984.403 299.818 191.327 2.092.894 14,33%
1998 1.497.409 343.833 224.201 1.617.041 21,26%
1999 1.281.463 174.974 195.682 1.260.755 13,88%
2000 1.590.716 166.348 272.529 1.484.535 11,21%
2001 1.714.893 175.139 236.380 1.653.652 10,59%
2002 1.698.848 113.134 255.058 1.556.924 7,27%
2003 1.720.800 72.199 374.450 1.418.549 5,09%
2004 2.180.206 59.634 533.244 1.706.596 3,49%
2005 2.376.296 85.214 677.624 1.783.886 4,78%
2006 2.470.613 139.185 588.517 2.021.281 6,89%
2007 2.803.051 273.673 585.645 2.491.079 10,99%
2008 3.002.091 371.077 524.034 2.849.134 13,02%
2009 3.022.183 485.679 351.644 3.156.218 15,39%
2010 3.404.663 657.616 472.370 3.589.909 18,32%
2011 3.152.355 853.962 518.572 3.487.745 24,48%
2012 3.248.601 783.674 411.655 3.620.620 21,64%
2013 3.494.014 703.473 531.627 3.665.860 19,19%
2014 2.987.817 614.941 309.874 3.292.884 18,67%
2015 2.349.390 412.899 389.024 2.373.265 17,40%
2016 2.096.528 271.608 485.255 1.882.881 14,43%
2017 2.633.699 242.308 728.739 2.147.268 11,28%
2018 2.748.358 308.566 595.432 2.461.492 12,54%
Primary data sources: Anuario Anfavea and Abeifa.
Calculations of import penetration coefficients by the author
Note the market was oppened to imports in 1990.
Import Penetration
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APPENDIX II – INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF TOYOTA COROLLA PRICES, 
USING EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTMENTS, AND TESTING SCALE, 
SPECIALIZATION, TRADE BARRIERS AND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
MEASURES AS POTENTIAL EXPLANATORY VARIABLES. 
 
Models, prices and taxes per country 
 
As a general rule, we chose sedan E-170 models, but for the markets these are not 
produced we chose the most similar, as the hatchback E-180 (usually around 10% 
more expensive, in markets were both options are available). The engine sizes and 
trims were also chosen to be the most similar possible. In this sense we chose the 
cheapest model with automatic gearbox, petrol, and engine size between 1.6 and 1.8.  
The inclusion of sales taxes; and delivery, processing and handling fees is explained 
in the notes for each case. No optional accessory is included. 
 
JAPAN 
Type: hatchback 
Model chosen: Corolla Sport 2019, GX, 1.2 litters turbo, petrol, CVT, 2 wd (E180). 
Price (including sale tax): 2,138,400 
Accessories: 521,120 
Price with accessories: 2,659,500 
Source: https://www.tokyo-corolla.com/lineup/corollasport#u20180605132101 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Takaoka Plant - RAV4, Harrier, Auris, Prius, Auris (Corolla hatchback) - 397 thousand 
units 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/manufacturing/ 
 
Notes: 1) Models in Japan have smaller engines. The chosen model is then 
representative of the cheapest automatic option; 2) the previous E180 hatchback 
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(called in Japan “Auris”); 3) Corolla Axio is a smaller version (wheelbase: 2,600mm), 
derived from previous generations of Corolla, and based on the platform E-160, built 
to attend policy specifications for the Japanese market. We consider it a different 
vehicle; therefore, it will not be used as our representative model for Japan.  The total 
production of the plant where the Corolla Axio model is produced (TOYOTA MOTOR 
EAST JAPAN, INC.) was 493 thousand units produced in r 2017, together with Aqua, 
Sienta, C-HR, Porte, Spade, JPN TAXI, Comfort and Isis) 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/manufacturing/ 
 
TAIWAN 
Type: Sedan 
Model chosen: 2019 Toyota Corolla Altis 1.8 litters, CVT (E170).  
Price: 656,000 
Source: https://www.toyota.com.tw/showroom/ALTIS#/spec 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Kuozui Motors, Ltd - Camry, Corolla, Vios, Yaris – 118 thousand units. 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/asia.html 
 
Notes: 1) Taiwan produces the sedan version, there called “Corolla Altis” (a name also 
used in ASEAN countries); 2) The hatchback version of the new platform E210 will be 
called Corolla “Auris” in Taiwan.  
 
CHINA 
Type: Sedan 
Model chosen: 2019 Toyota Levin (Corolla) 1.8 litters, 185T CVT (E170). 
MRSP price: 119,800.00  Yuans (11.78 MILLION YUANS) 
 
Notes on taxes: 
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The VAT of 17% and the consumption tax of 5% are already included on the MRSP 
price. The vehicle purchasing tax (VPT) is calculated based on the purchase price 
excluding VAT. The consumption tax (CT) is also calculated based on the purchase 
price excluding VAT. 
 
Price:  
Sources: https://www.gac-toyota.com.cn/vehicles/newlevin 
https://www.gac-
toyota.com.cn/minisite/Campaigns/2018/newLevinTable?module=gsjycvt 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Tianjin FAW Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. (TFTM) - Vios, Corolla, Crown, Reiz – 517 
thousand units. 
GAC Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. (GTMC) - Camry, Yaris, Highlander, Camry Hybrid, Levin 
– 439 thousand units. 
Sources: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/asia.html 
http://www.gac-toyota.com/ 
http://www.tjfaw.com/ 
http://www.tftm.com.cn/english/gsjj/index.htm 
 
Notes: Chinese production of Toyotas is made by two different joint-ventures: Tianjin 
FAW Toyota Motor (where the discussed model is called “Corolla”) and GAC Toyota 
Motor (where the discussed model is called “Levin”).   
 
VIETNAM 
Type: Sedan   
Model chosen: 2019 Corolla Altis 1.8 litters, E, CVT (E170) 
Prices:733,000,000 
 
Source: http://www.toyota.com.vn/corolla-altis-1-8e-cvt?spy=sec_dt_01 
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Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Toyota Motor Vietnam Co., Ltd. (TMV) - Camry, Corolla, Vios, Innova, Fortuner – 41 
thousand units 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/asia.html 
 
Note: Toyota Motor Vietnam Co., Ltd  (TMV) is a Joint Venture between Toyota, KUO 
Singapore, and the Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corporation. Source: 
http://www.toyotavn.com.vn/en/toyota-vietnam/about-us 
 
THAILAND 
Type: Sedan 
Model chosen: 2019 Toyota Corolla Altis, 1.6 litters, G, CVT (E170). 
Prices: 869,000.00 
Source: https://www.toyota.co.th/en/model/altis/specification 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Toyota Motor Thailand Co., Ltd. (TMT) - Corolla, Camry, Camry Hybrid, Vios, Yaris, 
Hilux, Fortuner -524 thousand units 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/asia.html 
 
PAKISTAN 
Type: Sedan 
Model chosen: 2018 Corolla Altis 1.6, automatic (E170).  
Price: 2,574,000 
Source: http://www.toyota-indus.com/altis/ 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
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Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Indus Motor Company Ltd. (IMC) - Corolla, Hilux – 61 thousand units 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/asia.html 
 
Note: Apart from Japan, in all other Asian producers the cheapest automatic model is 
either 1,6 or 1,8 litres. Therefore, we chose the cheapest model in Pakistan with this 
engine size (Pakistan is the only Asian producer that still has also a 1,3-cylinder model, 
costing 2,119,000 – the cheapest Xli automatic) 
 
INDIA 
Type: Sedan 
Model chosen: 2019 Corolla Altis, 1.8, G, CVT (E170). 
Prices:1,788,000 
Source: https://www.toyotabharat.com/pricelist/ 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Toyota Kirloskar Motor Private Ltd. - Corolla, Innova, Fortuner, Etios – 154 thousand 
units 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/asia.html 
  
TURKEY 
Type: Sedan (Corolla) and hatchback (Auris) 
Model chosen: 2018 Corolla Sedan Touch Multidrive S 1.6 (E170) 
Price: Average of the recommended price (116,850) and the campaign price (102,800) 
= 110,000 
Sources: http://www.toyotatoyan.com.tr/fiyat-listesi 
http://turkiye.toyota.com.tr/middle/fiyatl_aksesuar.html#YeniAuris 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
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Toyota Motor Manufacturing Turkey - Verso, Corolla, C-HR – 280 thousand units 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/europe.ht
ml 
 
Notes: 1) for the European market there are both the Corolla sedan and the Corolla 
hatchback (in some markets still under the name “Auris”); 2)  The hatchback 
(previously based on the E180 platform), is, from 2019, based on the new E210, as 
well the new E210 sedan; 3) We chose the sedan version, as comparator, but for 
illustrative purposes the cheapest automatic hatchback (Auris Active Multidrive S 1.6) 
costs an average of 122,500 (average of the recommended price (124,750) and the 
campaign price (120,250)).    
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Type: Sedan (Corolla) and hatchback (Auris) 
Model chosen: 2019, Toyota Corolla 1.6 Prestige CVT (E170). 
Price: 330,000 
Source: http://www.toyota.co.za/mobi/list-ranges 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Toyota South Africa Motors - Corolla, Hilux, Fortuner, Dyna – 129 thousand units 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/africa.htm
l 
 
Notes:  South Africa sells the old generation Corolla as Corolla Quest, for lower prices 
(1.6 Corolla Quest AT from 235,000), and the hatchback Auris XR CVT from 378,200. 
 
UK 
Type: Hatchback 
Model chosen: Toyota Auris, Icon, 1.2, Petrol Turbo (115 hp) Automatic (E180) 
Prices: 21,520.00 
389 
 
Source: https://www.toyota.co.uk/new-cars/auris/index/specifications 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing (Burnaston, Derby, UK) - Avensis, Auris, Auris Hybrid – 
145 thousand units 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/europe.ht
ml 
 
Notes: 1) up to now, the UK produced only the hatchback version, called “Auris” 
(E180). All production will be replaced by the new E210, from 2019, under the name 
“Corolla”; 2) The engine options are either 1.2 turbo petrol or 1.8 hybrid. The chosen 
model was the cheapest automatic 1.2 turbo petrol, before the arrival of the new 
model, in 2019.  
 
USA 
Type: Sedan and hatchback 
Model chosen: 2019 XLE 1.8L 4-Cylinder, CVT, Sedan (E170) 
Price: 22,135 
Source: 
https://www.toyota.com/corolla/2019/features/mileage_estimates/1856/1863/1866 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Mississippi - Corolla – 164 thousand units 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/north_am
erica.html 
 
Note: The price includes the charged delivery, processing and handling fee of 920 US 
dollars. 
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CANADA 
Type: Sedan and hatchback 
Model chosen: 2019 Toyota COROLLA CE CVT 1.8 Sedan (E170) 
Prices and taxes: 
MRSP price: 20,375 Canadian dollars 
Freight, delivery, and other charges: 1,776 
Subtotal: 22,151 
Sales tax (HST of 13%, based on Ontario province): 2,879 
Total retail price including sales taxes, freight and charges: 25,031159 Canadian 
dollars. 
Invoice price: not available. 
 
Notes on taxes: Some Canadian provinces moved from taxation based on the goods 
and services tax (GST) and provincial sales tax (PST) to the single harmonized sales 
tax (HST). In the case of Ontario this is charged at 13% of the retail price, in line with 
the Canadian average. Federal excise taxes on fuel-inefficient cars, ranging from 
1,000 to 4,000 Canadian dollars do not apply to the Corolla. Excise tax of 100 
Canadian dollars per air conditioning is included in the calculations.  
 
Sources: https://www.toyota.ca/toyota/en/build-price/corolla 
https://www.toyota.ca/toyota/en/build-price-pricing-summary 
PWC (2015). 2015 Global Automotive Tax Guide. Available at 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/automotive/pdf/pwc-global-automotive-tax-guide-
2015.pdf 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017: 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing Canada - Corolla, RX350, RAV4 – 572 thousand units 
 
159 Toyota offered a price rebate of 500 Canadian dollars for the 2019 model, but we opted to do not 
include this in the calculation. 
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https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/north_am
erica.html 
 
BRAZIL 
Type: Sedan 
Model chosen: 2019 Corolla GLi CVT 1.8, Sedan (E170) 
Price: 90,990 
Source: https://www.toyota.com.br/modelos/corolla/ 
 
Total production of plants where the model is produced (includes other models as 
well): 
Plant – main models – thousand units produced in 2017 
Toyota do Brasil Ltda - Corolla, Etios – 198 thousand units 
Source: 
https://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/en/corporate/companyinformation/worldwide/latin_ame
rica.html 
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APPENDIX III – Regulations consulted for Table 7 
 
 
 
 
 
Decrees and Resolutions
Date 
published
Portaria MEFP 259/1990 04-May-90
Portaria MEFP 58/1991 06/feb/1991
Portaria MEFP 131/1992 19-feb-92
PORTARIA MF Nº 492/1994
15/09/1994
Decreto 1.343/1994 26-dez-94
Decreto 1.391/1995 13-fev-95
13-fev-95 1-jan-96 1-jan-97 1-jan-98    1/1/9999 1-jan-00 1-jan-01
  32%   30%   28%   26%   24%  22%   20%
Decreto 1.427/1995 30-mar-95
Decreto 1.471/1995 28-abr-95
1-mai-95 1-jan-96 1-abr-96 1-jan-97 1-jan-98 1-jan-99 1-jan-00 1-jan-01
70% 62% 30% 28% 26% 24% 22% 20%
Decreto 1.763/1995 27-dez-95
Decreto 1.767/1995 29-dez-95
1-jan-96 1-abr-96 1-jan-97 1-jan-98 1-jan-99
70% 70% 63% 49% 35%
Decreto 1.848/1996 01-abr-96
1-abr-96 1-jan-97 1-jan-98 1-jan-99
70% 63% 49% 35%
Decreto 1.987/1996 21-ago-96
Decreto 2.307/1997 21-ago-97
Decreto 2.376/1997 13-nov-97
1-jan-97 1-jan-98 1-jan-99
63% 49% 35%
Decreto 2.624/1998 15-jun-98
1-jan-98 1-jan-99
49% 35%
Decreto 2.770/1998 04-set-98
Decreto 3.317/1999 31-dez-99
Decreto 3.704/2000 28-dez-00
Resolução CAMEX 07/2001 26-mar-01
Resolução CAMEX 42/2001 29-dez-01
Sources: Legislation database at the Brazilian Revenue Scretariat (http://normas.receita.fazenda.gov.br/sijut2consulta/consulta.action)
Legislation database at the Brazil ian Presidency (http://www4.planalto.gov.br/legislacao/)
Establishes 35% as the exception tariff for vehicles during the year 2000
Establishes 35% as the exception tariff for vehicles
Establishes 35% as the exception tariff for vehicles
Establishes 35% as the TEC tariff for vehicles
Renewed cronogram of convergence with tariff exceptions:
Tariffs reduced to 35% for a quota of 50 thousand vehicles imported by newcomers (from South 
Corea, Japan, and Europe), up to 1 year
Tariffs reduced in 50% (equivalent to 31,5%)for a quota of 50 thousand vehicles imported by 
newcomers (from South Corea, Japan, and Europe), up to 1 year
Add an extra 3% (TEC goes to 23%) and renews the cronogram of convergence with tariff exceptions: 
Renews the cronogram of convergence with tariff exceptions:
Tariffs reduced in 50% (equivalent to 24,5%)for a quota of 50 thousand vehicles imported by 
newcomers (from South Corea, Japan, and Europe), up to 1 year
Reafirms a TEC of 20%, with a renewed cronogram of convergence with tariff exceptions:
Abstract and tariffs
Establishes a tariff of 85% for cars and light commercials
Establishes a cronogram for tariffs: from 15/february/1991 to 31/december/1994, and after 1994
Anticipates the cronogram for the trade liberaliation establieshed in the Portaria 58 (31/jan/91): to: 
01/october/1992 what was previously set to 1993; and to 01/july/1993 what was previously set to 
1994 and after.
Modifies the ad valorem tariffs fro cars and light commercials to 20%
Establish the Commom External Tariff (TEC) in Mercosur at 20% for vehicles.
Establish tariff exceptions for vehicles, for the following timetable:
Increases the tariffs, as exception, to 70% for up to 1 year. 
Establishes the following tariff cronogram:
Establishes a 70% tariff for vehicles, after 01/01/1996
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APPENDIX IV – COST STRUCTURE IN THE BRAZILIAN MARKET 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL 
MANUFACTURING
TRACTORS FOR 
AGRICULTURE
VEHICLES, 
CHASSIS AND 
TRAILLERS
CARS, SUVs AND 
LIGHT 
COMMERCIALS
TRUCKS AND 
BUSES
CABINS AND 
CHASSIS AUTOPARTS
REVENUE
GROSS REVENUE
SALES AND SERVICES 3,119,834,233.00 4,748,545.00 280,077,161.00 149,928,958.00 27,677,115.00 10,158,886.00 92,114,219.00
DEDUCTIONS
TAXES ON REVENUE AND RETURNED ITEMS (1) ( E) 587,293,171.00 636,921.00 60,868,834.00 35,062,040.00 3,792,954.00 1,820,776.00 20,172,149.00
OTHER REVENUES
FINANCIAL, OTHER OPERATIONAL AND NON-OPERATIONAL INCOMES 376,096,551.00 454,229.00 28,249,457.00 16,578,858.00 2,334,406.00 1,818,916.00 7,514,483.00
TOTAL NET REVENUE 2,908,637,610.00 4,565,853.00 247,457,779.00 131,445,776.00 26,218,566.00 10,157,026.00 79,456,549.00
COSTS
TOTAL LABOUR EXPENSES 380,058,056.00 591,851.00 37,088,675.00 13,846,522.00 3,711,215.00 2,436,958.00 17,007,848.00
WAGES 244,330,588.00 393,211.00 24,313,417.00 8,957,701.00 2,267,931.00 1,711,652.00 11,309,888.00
TAXES ON WAGES, PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS, BENEFITS…
INPUTS
PURCHASES OF RAW MATERIALS AND INPUTS (N) 1,135,273,711.00 2,760,158.00 122,892,072.00 68,845,458.00 12,656,774.00 4,616,902.00 36,738,668.00
PURCHASES OF GOODS FOR RESELLING (O) 197,555,257.00 356,460.00 17,560,132.00 14,125,524.00 1,573,317.00 87,606.00 1,756,483.00
DIRECT PRODUCTION COSTS
FUEL FOR MACHINES (I) 24,699,327.00 7,444.00 618,216.00 168,158.00 88,308.00 42,886.00 317,876.00
ELETRICITY (J) 41,400,612.00 19,029.00 2,233,254.00 497,057.00 107,704.00 94,611.00 1,531,775.00
PARTS, ACESSORIES AND SMALL TOOLS (K) 25,464,579.00 14,496.00 2,301,887.00 137,093.00 917,007.00 134,112.00 1,110,297.00
INDUSTRIAL SERVICES (L) 59,897,679.00 32,251.00 1,904,898.00 543,585.00 308,391.00 58,875.00 991,356.00
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF MACHINES (M) 22,862,807.00 14,222.00 1,561,933.00 362,188.00 204,581.00 62,723.00 931,443.00
OTHER COSTS AND EXPENSES
RENTS 74,067,929.00 19,353.00 1,168,688.00 251,573.00 110,916.00 105,054.00 698,909.00
LEASING 2,013,566.00 8,273.00 75,775.00 20,106.00 12,391.00 3,600.00 38,969.00
DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION 122,167,803.00 79,072.00 9,761,276.00 5,929,779.00 589,932.00 268,057.00 2,970,177.00
ADVSERTISING 27,261,921.00 9,990.00 4,787,782.00 4,608,332.00 74,904.00 9,344.00 95,050.00
FREIGHT 75,232,746.00 150,733.00 5,021,562.00 3,340,817.00 505,531.00 106,676.00 1,068,195.00
TAXES 16,760,684.00 9,788.00 1,635,501.00 769,676.00 277,873.00 51,302.00 532,212.00
INSURANCE 4,045,710.00 5,125.00 253,089.00 93,027.00 44,710.00 10,795.00 104,027.00
PASSIVE MONETARY VARIATIONS 112,305,278.00 107,854.00 10,842,258.00 6,110,526.00 1,201,345.00 516,176.00 3,014,181.00
FINANCIAL EXPENSES 180,675,603.00 195,976.00 13,142,766.00 7,966,234.00 716,183.00 784,035.00 3,669,349.00
NEGATIVE RESULTS FROM PARTICIPATION IN OTHER FIRMS 34,111,876.00 99,096.00 1,068,165.00 1,570.00 230,936.00 174,284.00 661,374.00
SERVICES FROM THIRD PARTIES 62,403,479.00 82,261.00 4,724,993.00 2,038,847.00 490,464.00 169,724.00 2,022,085.00
SALES EXPENSES 61,556,363.00 130,616.00 8,054,681.00 5,345,023.00 1,479,583.00 220,484.00 1,003,623.00
WATER AND SEWAGE 2,048,221.00 2,707.00 162,066.00 67,348.00 12,386.00 9,485.00 72,313.00
TRAVEL 9,174,524.00 21,099.00 765,361.00 249,148.00 98,267.00 33,718.00 383,628.00
OTHER OPERATIONAL COSTS AND EXPENSES 101,768,830.00 68,959.00 10,003,866.00 4,076,517.00 1,752,731.00 383,050.00 3,779,432.00
NON-OPERATIONAL COSTS AND EXPENSES 75,246,703.00 4,358.00 3,517,399.00 989,851.00 579,708.00 261,599.00 1,686,169.00
ROYALTIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 7,021,860.00 898.00 1,787,035.00 1,143,314.00 252,700.00 66,175.00 324,800.00
TOTAL COSTS AND EXPENSES 2,855,075,124.00 4,792,069.00 262,933,330.00 141,527,273.00 27,997,857.00 10,708,231.00 82,510,239.00
PROFIT BEFORE TAXES
PROFIT BEFORE TAXES 53,562,486.00 -226,216.00 -15,475,551.00 -10,081,497.00 -1,779,291.00 -551,205.00 -3,053,690.00
VALUE ADDED
VALUE ADDED
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ENGINE PARTS
TRANSMISSIONS 
AND GEARBOX 
PARTS
BRAK SYSTEM 
PARTS
DRIVING WHEEL 
AND BUMPER 
SYSTEMS PARTS
ELECTRIC AND 
ELCTRONIC 
MATERIAL PARTS, 
EXCEPT 
BATTERIES
OTHER 
AUTOPARTS AIRCRAFTS
AIRCRAFTS 
TURBINES AND 
PARTS MOTORCYCLES
REVENUE
GROSS REVENUE
SALES AND SERVICES 15,029,780.00 8,618,458.00 5,759,935.00 9,533,134.00 17,246,348.00 35,926,564.00 (x) 1,181,424.00 11,586,554.00
DEDUCTIONS
TAXES ON REVENUE AND RETURNED ITEMS (1) ( E) 3,005,366.00 1,919,899.00 1,347,894.00 2,238,144.00 3,750,544.00 7,910,302.00 (x) 75,081.00 1,521,373.00
OTHER REVENUES
FINANCIAL, OTHER OPERATIONAL AND NON-OPERATIONAL INCOMES 1,579,417.00 649,273.00 416,265.00 453,901.00 1,807,076.00 2,608,551.00 157,582.00 1,165,509.00
TOTAL NET REVENUE 13,603,830.00 7,347,831.00 4,828,306.00 7,748,889.00 15,302,880.00 30,624,813.00 (x) 1,263,925.00 11,230,690.00
COSTS
TOTAL LABOUR EXPENSES 3,280,749.00 1,702,243.00 939,371.00 1,441,304.00 3,274,717.00 6,369,464.00 (x) 321,198.00 1,754,133.00
WAGES 2,215,886.00 1,188,114.00 588,933.00 926,465.00 2,198,640.00 4,191,850.00 (x) 237,773.00 1,001,967.00
TAXES ON WAGES, PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS, BENEFITS…
INPUTS
PURCHASES OF RAW MATERIALS AND INPUTS (N) 5,157,501.00 3,255,510.00 2,813,194.00 4,034,847.00 6,215,168.00 15,262,448.00 (x) 412,536.00 5,484,569.00
PURCHASES OF GOODS FOR RESELLING (O) 223,313.00 59,872.00 25,582.00 331,881.00 484,431.00 631,404.00 (x) 401.00 353,640.00
DIRECT PRODUCTION COSTS
FUEL FOR MACHINES (I) 102,796.00 38,970.00 19,705.00 47,008.00 14,927.00 94,470.00 (x) 1,027.00 17,546.00
ELETRICITY (J) 476,771.00 203,081.00 117,814.00 100,956.00 152,730.00 480,423.00 (x) 14,323.00 85,747.00
PARTS, ACESSORIES AND SMALL TOOLS (K) 344,863.00 160,685.00 49,823.00 66,985.00 125,356.00 362,585.00 (x) 32,459.00 28,235.00
INDUSTRIAL SERVICES (L) 155,914.00 144,357.00 37,885.00 95,194.00 163,684.00 394,322.00 (x) 56,174.00 57,908.00
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF MACHINES (M) 171,239.00 123,122.00 35,299.00 69,741.00 146,718.00 385,324.00 (x) 44,623.00 98,526.00
OTHER COSTS AND EXPENSES
RENTS 92,591.00 62,764.00 23,455.00 62,492.00 102,983.00 354,624.00 (x) 13,829.00 54,640.00
LEASING 3,166.00 3,792.00 8,382.00 3,178.00 9,380.00 11,071.00 (x) 1.00 1,463.00
DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION 642,656.00 265,140.00 152,537.00 217,362.00 481,604.00 1,210,878.00 (x) 49,002.00 468,476.00
ADVSERTISING 24,259.00 8,552.00 6,466.00 13,042.00 26,144.00 16,587.00 (x) 469.00 93,175.00
FREIGHT 225,651.00 71,849.00 99,106.00 130,734.00 175,764.00 365,091.00 (x) 11,956.00 298,217.00
TAXES 58,239.00 40,144.00 38,510.00 23,426.00 245,386.00 126,507.00 (x) 8,551.00 80,841.00
INSURANCE 21,969.00 12,092.00 6,480.00 13,421.00 16,160.00 33,905.00 (x) 1,409.00 24,489.00
PASSIVE MONETARY VARIATIONS 562,962.00 300,389.00 192,154.00 112,726.00 1,108,199.00 737,751.00 (x) 77,923.00 315,131.00
FINANCIAL EXPENSES 822,894.00 226,122.00 154,640.00 395,937.00 518,384.00 1,551,372.00 (x) 59,982.00 158,785.00
NEGATIVE RESULTS FROM PARTICIPATION IN OTHER FIRMS 228,223.00 229,901.00 1,376.00 15,888.00 93,395.00 92,591.00 (x) 37.00 30,246.00
SERVICES FROM THIRD PARTIES 296,946.00 265,179.00 101,302.00 238,402.00 344,340.00 775,916.00 (x) 109,845.00 176,058.00
SALES EXPENSES 154,500.00 43,564.00 46,265.00 41,033.00 558,515.00 159,746.00 (x) 157.00 322,324.00
WATER AND SEWAGE 16,024.00 7,059.00 4,860.00 8,064.00 9,555.00 26,751.00 (x) 1,544.00 1,961.00
TRAVEL 49,356.00 30,987.00 17,049.00 28,071.00 77,560.00 180,605.00 (x) 5,146.00 28,422.00
OTHER OPERATIONAL COSTS AND EXPENSES 546,362.00 249,309.00 169,026.00 422,789.00 1,061,515.00 1,330,431.00 (x) 37,262.00 254,239.00
NON-OPERATIONAL COSTS AND EXPENSES 546,993.00 101,837.00 29,635.00 11,964.00 534,321.00 461,419.00 (x) 11,700.00 371,833.00
ROYALTIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 42,614.00 19,673.00 46,479.00 11,525.00 59,487.00 145,022.00 (x) 0.00 79,749.00
TOTAL COSTS AND EXPENSES 14,248,551.00 7,626,193.00 5,136,395.00 7,937,970.00 16,000,423.00 31,560,707.00 1,271,554.00 10,640,353.00
PROFIT BEFORE TAXES
PROFIT BEFORE TAXES -644,721.00 -278,362.00 -308,089.00 -189,081.00 -697,543.00 -935,894.00 (X) -7,629.00 590,337.00
VALUE ADDED
VALUE ADDED
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APPENDIX V – TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
 
 
 
 
Year Y K L
IPCA Index 
01/01/1996 =100
Y at constant 
prices
K at 
constant 
prices
1996 6.682.387 115.950 72.910 109,56 23.405.297,28 406.118,98
1997 7.436.077 118.704 77.070 115,28 24.753.015,79 395.138,73
1998 6.895.016 98.411 55.257 117,18 22.579.386,41 322.270,46
1999 5.160.424 115.231 56.706 127,66 15.512.252,78 346.384,79
2000 7.873.988 127.036 53.982 135,28 22.335.789,14 360.357,33
2001 7.840.034 143.954 51.721 145,65 20.655.218,12 379.258,72
2002 10.061.752 207.112 51.242 163,90 23.556.845,26 484.896,20
2003 11.804.667 268.934 50.724 179,15 25.285.823,32 576.061,79
2004 15.183.695 281.836 55.135 192,76 30.226.548,47 561.057,73
2005 16.386.651 299.998 57.617 203,73 30.865.079,05 565.061,28
2006 19.062.236 316.820 57.099 210,13 34.811.593,56 578.578,98
2007 23.334.130 365.787 65.054 219,50 40.793.564,37 639.481,97
2008 30.428.750 451.189 73.118 232,45 50.233.000,87 744.840,90
2009 30.500.956 471.292 71.321 242,47 48.271.588,10 745.878,70
2010 34.447.856 514.647 78.328 256,80 51.475.830,74 769.042,98
2011 35.589.195 593.117 79.603 273,49 49.935.536,95 832.208,09
2012 36.743.163 556.398 83.144 289,46 48.710.015,48 737.610,84
2013 38.251.858 546.989 83.023 306,57 47.880.347,65 684.673,24
2014 35.407.632 501.675 84.944 326,22 41.650.402,23 590.126,04
2015 27.558.204 609.507 77.530 361,03 29.291.615,03 647.844,99
2016 25.074.617 664.133 71.509 383,74 25.074.617,00 664.133,00
2017 28.988.500 585.205 72.094 383,74 28.988.500,00 585.205,00
Source: PIA/IBGE and author`s calculations
Data for the Brazilian automotive sector
ΔY ΔK ΔL αΔK (1-α)ΔL ΔA
ΔA 
moving 
average
ΔA index 
for the 
automoti
ve sector
Labour 
Productivity
Capital 
Intensity
 Change in units 
produced (% 
from previous 
year)
Total scale 
(production
, in units)
100 321,02 5,57 1.738.273
5,76% -2,70% 5,71% -1,62% 2,28% 5,10% 105,10 321,18 5,13 14,16% 1.984.403
-8,78% -18,44% -28,30% -11,06% -11,32% 13,60% 9,35% 119,40 408,62 5,83 -24,54% 1.497.409
-31,30% 7,48% 2,62% 4,49% 1,05% -36,84% -11,62% 75,41 273,56 6,11 -14,42% 1.281.463
43,99% 4,03% -4,80% 2,42% -1,92% 43,49% 3,33% 108,21 413,76 6,68 24,13% 1.590.716
-7,52% 5,25% -4,19% 3,15% -1,68% -9,00% 17,25% 98,48 399,36 7,33 7,81% 1.714.893
14,05% 27,85% -0,93% 16,71% -0,37% -2,29% -5,64% 96,22 459,72 9,46 -0,94% 1.698.848
7,34% 18,80% -1,01% 11,28% -0,40% -3,54% -2,92% 92,81 498,50 11,36 1,29% 1.720.800
19,54% -2,60% 8,70% -1,56% 3,48% 17,62% 7,04% 109,17 548,23 10,18 26,70% 2.180.206
2,11% 0,71% 4,50% 0,43% 1,80% -0,12% 8,75% 109,04 535,69 9,81 8,99% 2.376.296
12,79% 2,39% -0,90% 1,44% -0,36% 11,71% 5,80% 121,81 609,67 10,13 3,97% 2.470.613
17,18% 10,53% 13,93% 6,32% 5,57% 5,30% 8,50% 128,26 627,07 9,83 13,46% 2.803.051
23,14% 16,48% 12,40% 9,89% 4,96% 8,30% 6,80% 138,91 687,01 10,19 7,10% 3.002.091
-3,90% 0,14% -2,46% 0,08% -0,98% -3,01% 2,65% 134,73 676,82 10,46 0,67% 3.022.183
6,64% 3,11% 9,82% 1,86% 3,93% 0,84% -1,08% 135,87 657,18 9,82 12,66% 3.404.663
-2,99% 8,21% 1,63% 4,93% 0,65% -8,57% -3,86% 124,22 627,31 10,45 -7,41% 3.152.355
-2,45% -11,37% 4,45% -6,82% 1,78% 2,59% -2,99% 127,44 585,85 8,87 3,05% 3.248.601
-1,70% -7,18% -0,15% -4,31% -0,06% 2,66% 2,62% 130,83 576,71 8,25 7,55% 3.494.014
-13,01% -13,81% 2,31% -8,29% 0,93% -5,65% -1,50% 123,43 490,33 6,95 -14,49% 2.987.817
-29,67% 9,78% -8,73% 5,87% -3,49% -32,05% -18,85% 83,87 377,81 8,36 -21,37% 2.349.390
-14,40% 2,51% -7,77% 1,51% -3,11% -12,80% -22,42% 73,14 350,65 9,29 -10,76% 2.096.528
15,61% -11,88% 0,82% -7,13% 0,33% 22,41% 4,81% 89,53 402,09 8,12 25,62% 2.633.699
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Year Y K L
IPCA Index 
01/01/1996 =100
Y at constant 
prices
K at constant 
prices
1996 156.966.503 7691958 3717583 109,56 549.780.739,37 26.941.355,48
1997 169.148.743 8308333 3659383 115,28 563.057.847,07 27.656.558,42
1998 169.384.564 8644425 3573259 117,18 554.690.449,34 28.308.246,48
1999 203.905.908 10009779 3680099 127,66 612.941.879,93 30.089.431,04
2000 247.457.251 12656572 4004852 135,28 701.950.902,02 35.902.330,99
2001 282.129.928 14777811 4102382 145,65 743.294.633,71 38.933.365,53
2002 324.556.941 18188147 4189517 163,90 759.861.467,27 42.582.580,50
2003 395.291.392 24287372 4507264 179,15 846.721.749,74 52.024.017,05
2004 463.813.873 27516414 4886680 192,76 923.325.482,72 54.777.590,15
2005 486.396.854 30252139 4861375 203,73 916.152.870,28 56.981.421,14
2006 529.683.718 35452012 5141027 210,13 967.312.245,23 64.742.721,29
2007 570.330.904 36456542 5427973 219,50 997.072.976,19 63.734.636,47
2008 679.707.725 45360149 5666912 232,45 1.122.088.772,70 74.882.353,18
2009 635.745.620 40446507 5715537 242,47 1.006.147.174,63 64.011.669,86
2010 758.504.962 48934229 6110687 256,80 1.133.442.761,78 73.122.985,93
2011 834.699.115 53762567 6259891 273,49 1.171.174.242,53 75.434.767,51
2012 883.816.649 58119277 6261996 289,46 1.171.666.213,34 77.048.099,61
2013 969.660.368 59579670 6406944 306,57 1.213.736.481,10 74.576.647,04
2014 1.000.085.015 63638601 6268879 326,22 1.176.411.434,12 74.858.813,75
2015 1.008.862.833 77909550 5681774 361,03 1.072.320.305,20 82.810.060,70
2016 1.019.713.934 69936533 5356413 383,74 1.019.713.934,00 69.936.533,00
2017 1.073.515.793 69262095 5359281 383,74 1.073.515.793,00 69.262.095,00
Source: PIA/IBGE and author`s calculations
Data for the Brazilian manufacturing sector
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ΔY ΔK ΔL αΔK (1-α)ΔL ΔA
ΔA 
moving 
average
ΔA index 
for the 
overall 
manufact
uring
Labour 
Productivity
Capital 
Intensity
100 147,89 7,25
2,41% 2,65% -1,57% 1,59% -0,63% 1,45% 101,45 153,87 7,56
-1,49% 2,36% -2,35% 1,41% -0,94% -1,96% -0,26% 99,46 155,23 7,92
10,50% 6,29% 2,99% 3,78% 1,20% 5,53% 1,79% 104,96 166,56 8,18
14,52% 19,32% 8,82% 11,59% 3,53% -0,60% 2,47% 104,33 175,28 8,96
5,89% 8,44% 2,44% 5,07% 0,97% -0,15% -0,37% 104,18 181,19 9,49
2,23% 9,37% 2,12% 5,62% 0,85% -4,24% -2,20% 99,75 181,37 10,16
11,43% 22,17% 7,58% 13,30% 3,03% -4,91% -4,58% 94,86 187,86 11,54
9,05% 5,29% 8,42% 3,18% 3,37% 2,50% -1,20% 97,24 188,95 11,21
-0,78% 4,02% -0,52% 2,41% -0,21% -2,98% -0,24% 94,34 188,46 11,72
5,58% 13,62% 5,75% 8,17% 2,30% -4,89% -3,94% 89,72 188,16 12,59
3,08% -1,56% 5,58% -0,93% 2,23% 1,78% -1,56% 91,32 183,69 11,74
12,54% 17,49% 4,40% 10,49% 1,76% 0,28% 1,03% 91,58 198,01 13,21
-10,33% -14,52% 0,86% -8,71% 0,34% -1,97% -0,84% 89,78 176,04 11,20
12,65% 14,23% 6,91% 8,54% 2,77% 1,35% -0,31% 90,99 185,49 11,97
3,33% 3,16% 2,44% 1,90% 0,98% 0,46% 0,90% 91,40 187,09 12,05
0,04% 2,14% 0,03% 1,28% 0,01% -1,25% -0,40% 90,25 187,11 12,30
3,59% -3,21% 2,31% -1,92% 0,93% 4,59% 1,67% 94,39 189,44 11,64
-3,08% 0,38% -2,15% 0,23% -0,86% -2,44% 1,07% 92,09 187,66 11,94
-8,85% 10,62% -9,37% 6,37% -3,75% -11,48% -6,96% 81,52 188,73 14,57
-4,91% -15,55% -5,73% -9,33% -2,29% 6,71% -2,38% 87,00 190,37 13,06
5,28% -0,96% 0,05% -0,58% 0,02% 5,83% 6,27% 92,07 200,31 12,92
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APPENDIX VI – DATA FOR MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION 
Dependent variable: markups for automakers 
 
Dependent variable: markups for autopart producers 
 
Time CARMARKUP DUMMYINOVAR REERTARIFFS HHI YTOTAL
1996 0,075839724 0 1,643623957 2928,084 1738273
1997 0,157104635 0 1,53583379 2784,403 1984403
1998 -0,033085194 0 1,443307263 2675,312 1497409
1999 -0,131573577 0 1,965271511 2587,562 1281463
2000 -0,001747111 0 1,822242481 2520,338 1590716
2001 -0,055952672 0 2,182079605 2501,432 1714893
2002 -0,158933647 0 2,289051089 2380,947 1698848
2003 -0,087463372 0 2,422166539 2143,072 1720800
2004 0,076420954 0 2,306739666 2115,781 2180206
2005 0,006392612 0 1,888969403 2057,456 2376296
2006 0,08104643 0 1,692844022 2076,981 2470613
2007 0,117408286 0 1,57498254 2041,645 2803051
2008 0,204969625 0 1,507559425 1941,828 3002091
2009 0,091557043 0 1,520823398 1961,945 3022183
2010 0,084919033 0 1,34 1995,958 3404663
2011 0,006834627 0 1,294703757 1869,982 3152355
2012 0,054219065 1 1,760453396 1857,104 3248601
2013 -0,066973054 1 1,865629521 1550,94 3494014
2014 -0,004333079 1 1,883270373 1506,906 2987817
2015 -0,175966256 1 2,234182705 1295,943 2349390
2016 -0,119644228 1 2,094748837 1198,653 2096528
2017 -0,066757375 1 1,910503679 1247,143 2633699
2018 0 1,695143531 1226,857 2748358
Time AUTIOARTMARKUP DUMMYINOVAR REERTARIFFS HHI YTOTAL
1996 0,124416022 0 1,643623957 2928,084 1738273
1997 0,143536602 0 1,53583379 2784,403 1984403
1998 0,124005483 0 1,443307263 2675,312 1497409
1999 0,073631547 0 1,965271511 2587,562 1281463
2000 0,110043911 0 1,822242481 2520,338 1590716
2001 0,112999675 0 2,182079605 2501,432 1714893
2002 0,029539808 0 2,289051089 2380,947 1698848
2003 0,107328942 0 2,422166539 2143,072 1720800
2004 0,205697652 0 2,306739666 2115,781 2180206
2005 0,181370248 0 1,888969403 2057,456 2376296
2006 0,188731614 0 1,692844022 2076,981 2470613
2007 0,222066049 0 1,57498254 2041,645 2803051
2008 0,229550696 0 1,507559425 1941,828 3002091
2009 0,294384306 0 1,520823398 1961,945 3022183
2010 0,28492701 0 1,34 1995,958 3404663
2011 0,267543349 0 1,294703757 1869,982 3152355
2012 0,224706483 1 1,760453396 1857,104 3248601
2013 0,228150238 1 1,865629521 1550,94 3494014
2014 0,167193459 1 1,883270373 1506,906 2987817
2015 0,026448334 1 2,234182705 1295,943 2349390
2016 0,064699607 1 2,094748837 1198,653 2096528
2017 0,153785856 1 1,910503679 1247,143 2633699
2018 0 1,695143531 1226,857 2748358
